TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Ozzie]

Chris, I think you have just taken this thread to a new level.

We have Anzac sources that say.....,Turkish sources that say....., but when you put forward such a compelling diagnosis of military science, ( if I may describe it thus), then it does give one something to think about.

Best regards

Kim

[michaeldr]

quote from Chris: Can anyone clarify if this is actually a nordenfelt please? It certainly looks like one.

Agreed Chris, it certainly looks similar to the example (4 barrel version) shown here with the firing lever on the right hand side

see http://web.ukonline.co.uk/stephen.johnson/arms/nord1.jpg

regards

Michael

[Crunchy]

These two You Tube clips give an impression of the concentrated cone of fire from a maxim gun I was referring to in post #274 above.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knH2Hqt3J9U...feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIpQ3JvcbV8...feature=related

[Eceabat]

Hi Chris,

unfortunately, Turkey has blocked access to Youtube again so I can't comment on the images shown. (Noooo, Turkey doesn't have censorship)

Michael, given the shortage of machine guns and other heavy weapons in the Ottoman army following the Balkan wars, the machine gun companies of some regiments were equipped with Hotchkiss machine guns, though Sahin and I are still trying to work out of what sort. It should be noted that Ottoman cavalry brigades each were supposed to have a machine gun squadron, these being equipped with Hotchkiss guns. In at least one case, a cavalry brigade was stripped of its machine gun component, this unit being transformed into a machine gun company for an infantry regiment, the 20th.

Cheers

Bill

PS Michael, friends and family fine, country in turmoil.

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Glad to hear all of you are well. Keep safe Mate.

Michael,

I think this may be the model of the Hotchkiss the Turks were using. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss_M1914_machine_gun although it would have been an earlier model of the same design. if not, then possibly it was the Hotchkiss Light Machine gun which was introduced into the French Army in 1909 here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss_M19...cie_machine_gun which appears to have been used for cavalry units in the British Army. This second gun may be the one Bill is referring to being re-issued from the cavalry to the 20th Regiment.

regards

Chris

[Jeff Pickerd]

May I thank to you all for your kind words, but it was more a sense, of trying to make sense, of all the varying reports of there being machine guns, and no mention of machine guns, on the morning of the 25th that prompted my post.

Chris, I would join Kim in acknowledging your concise analogy following from my post, some exceptional hypothesis to the rate of fire scenario and far better thought through than my febble attempt. Many thanks also for those fascinating links to the Nordenfeldt footage, it does indeed demonstrate its comparison to that of Maxim machine gun fire.

Michael, you are correct with regard to the listing of the 13 Nordenfeldt guns and quite right to pull me up on my throw away line, the Devil got hold of me, but if someone as knowledgeable about the Canakkale campaign as Sahin cannot locate the positions for the missing guns, I doubt if anyone can, even with Bill's help.

Journo Bill, Eceabat, thanks for your run down on the average rate of Turkish fire of 12 rounds per minute, I had tried to equate the speed in which the 5 round clip could have been loaded, but figured it could have been comparable to the .303, even with its 10 round magazine. I also used the rate of the two ammunition pouches of the Turkish soldier holding 90 rounds (3x5x3=45x2), and this from memory of the pouch my Grandfather brought home with 11 clips encased (now sadly stolen).

I had hoped my speculation to the two 25 mm Nordenfeldt guns being positioned either side of Gaba Tepe would have prompted the experienced military personnel, strategic analyst's, weapons experts and campaign experts, amongst you all, to examine this assumption and the true meaning of those two unidentified symbols. I'm no strategic or military expert myself, but such positioning looks quite plausible.

I still feel that we have all become a little bogged down on the question of whether there were machine guns at Anzac on the morning of the landing, regardless of what statements were made to there being machine gun fire brought to bear on the landing parties, there are now nearly as many that make no mention of any machine gun fire, referring to heavy rifle fire and shrapnel only. I suppose my even suggesting such further exacerbates the bogging down.

I am firmly convinced that the evidence, both Turkish and Anzac, predicate the non existence of any machine guns along the Anzac front until later in the morning, as per Lt Col Sefic Aker's account. There is just no actual evidence to these guns having existed other than the notion of some men to have been subjected to what they mistakenly perceived to be machine gun fire.

Jeff

[Droocoo]

Probably maxims.

[59165]

yes

[Crunchy]

Jeff,

What do the symbols of the weapons positioned either side of Gaba Tepe look like?

We are seeking information on what these symbols refer to.

Regards

Chris

[grantmal]

Thanks to all contributors to this very interesting and informative thread.

Without reading back through every post, I thought there was some agreement that one or more machine guns were sited at Gaba Tepe, but their existence at Fishermans Hut was still in dispute through lack of confirming Turkish documents.

I know there is a demand for 'evidence' and this hardly confirms anything, but Major General Bridges, 1st Australian Division commander, definitely pitched his tent in the 'machine guns at the Landing' camp, as his report on May 7th confirms:

"While in the tows and during the landing the troops were under machine gun and musketry fire and enfilade shrapnel fire from Gaba Tepe. An accurate statement of the losses incurred during disembarkation cannot be obtained; it is feared there were many casualties."

Good on you,

Grant

[Bryn]

As far as I'm concerned, Grant, the evidence for the existence of a machine-gun in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut is the number of witnesses to its fire. It's apparently easy for some to write all these off in order to conform to what Turkish documents are available, but I'm still not convinced by any of the counter-arguments to the many witnesses' ability to identify machine-gun fire. In fact, I'm yet to even read a counter-argument to most of these witnesses' observations that is not based on others' experiences.

[Crunchy]

Grant,

I think Bridges would have relied on the reports of others, as he came ashore about 7:30am by which time the Turks had withdrawn and the 3rd Brigade was well and truly secure on Second Ridge. He would have been well off shore when the initial landings were made. Perhaps there is also the element of trying to justify why the 1st Division failed to achieve its objectives. This would not be the first time a commander's report was not entirely accurate or tried to put the best face on failure. I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately, but the machine gun approach, as reported by others, would certainly add an element of difficulty to the task and a reason why more was not achieved.

It seems that Bridges was quite disappointed at the results achieved. His own performance at the landing was uninspiring and he showed a distinct lack of initiative and leadership that day, which reflects his inexperience in formation level command. He was a regular soldier, a very good gunner and he had considerable staff experience in the defence policy area during the formation of the Australian Military Forces post Federation. He was attached for Special Service to the RA of the British Cavalry Division during the South African War but it appears he never commanded a field unit or formation at any level prior to taking over the 1st Division in 1914.

An interesting aside; in the weeks prior to Bridges' mortal wounding, according to Casey's diary, he became quite reckless in exposing himself to enemy fire. Reading a Reveille article, a digger who witnessed his wounding stated that as Bridges arrived at the sandbag wall stretching across the path in Monash Valley he warned Bridges to run across the gap, as a Turkish sniper had shot a few men at that spot. According to the account Bridges walked out and hesitated in the open at which time he was shot.

regards

Chris

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Giving appropriate weight to evidence is always a problem when examining the records as a consequence of historical events. I tend to give much weight to the immediate, on the spot information. Sometimes it is ill informed but most of the time it expresses the mood of the moment. So signals to me are the most valuable primary source information. A search of signals at the AWM reveals that only a bare few are available for 25 April 1915 and none relate to this subject. The other items I give weight to are the immediate reports generated on the day or close to the date being examined. These may be War Diary entries, personal diary entries, Routine Orders, Special Orders, and other reports. While generated after the event, they are still unvarnished and do not contain the glosses that later histories contain. Official Histories are wonderful markers but as I have discovered, they are remarkably unreliable documents. Worse still are the books produced by commanders many years after the events in which they took part.

Let me give an example - something totally removed from this subject but with quantifiable consequences. Then I will bring this back to the current discussion.

The engagement at El Buqqar Ridge on 27 October 1917 was a small engagement but it did produce a posthumous VC for Major Lafone of the 1/1st County of London Yeomanry. We have four published accounts of the event in addition to a report by the 9th LHR. I will only deal with the published accounts - 3 British and one Turk. One British account was produced during the war and the other accounts were produced post war when all the relevant material was available to establish casualties. The accounts were:

Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir, Yildirim

S. F. Hatton, The Yarn of a Yeoman

Cyril Falls in the Official British War History, Egypt & Palestine 1917-18

W.T. Massey, How Jerusalem was Won

You can read the four accounts at:

http://alh-research.tripod.com/Light_Horse...opic_id=1106205

Reading these four different accounts would lead a person to believe that four different battles were being discussed. Let us look at the only quantifiable information, casualty count. Here are the four different versions of the same event:

Falls: Turks - at least 15 dead; Allied 79 KIA and WIA

Hatton: Turks - 208 KIA; Allied ?

Massey: Turks ?; Allied 24 KIA 53 WIA 10 MIA = 87 casualties

Hüsnü: Turks 10 KIA 40 WIA; Allied 200+ KIA

Hüsnü describes the Allied dead as being in excess of 200 while Hatton makes a similar description about the Turkish dead.

If we accept Hüsnü for the quantum of Turkish casualties and Falls for the Allied casualties.

the thing is that Hüsnü describes the action as a "reconnaissance in force", sort of a post battle failure justification - "Oh well, we never meant to hold it anyway." Similar to putting the term "raid" upon the two Moab invasions. Hüsnü is usually reliable as he was a witness to all the events. However, he is a Kemalist and so employed this gloss to his work.

The point here is that the further we are away from the event, the more varnished the stories are with the gloss that is in vogue at the time. The voice on the day disappears to the voice of ideology and its concomitant style.

So now we come to the chief witness upon whom utmost reliance is placed by some in making their conclusions. That is, the notes made by Sefik Aker, in his book Canakkale - Ariburnu - Savaslari ve 27 Alay. Before even quoting from thsi source we need to bear in mind that Aker is writing 20 years after the events. The gloss employed is that of a Kemalist, keen to show the public that his stout defence was inspired by Ataturk. The natural corollary is to downplay the ability to defend. This is the classical "under dog" ploy. It makes for a heroic story where Kemal is able to play his part as the victor despite having nothing except a couple bayonets to win the day.

What does Aker say about Fisherman's Hut? If we go to Paragraph 34, we find this outline:

Essentially it says that No 1 Platoon under the command of 2/Lt Hayrettin established his defensive postion in the trenches around Fisherman's Hut. So we know that the area was covered by a platoon.

We go to Paragraph 35 for information about the significance of this disposition.

Here Aker is saying that there are three platoons to a company which at strength, contained 250 men. By deduction, we get the figure of about 80-85 men in No. 1 Platoon. In addition he says there was one Machine Gun Company per Regiment with 4 Machine Guns and none in the battalions. By deduction, Aker is saying that there were no machine guns at Fisherman's Hut.

QED.

Well apparently.

But he never says there were no machine guns. He leaves it up for us to deduce this information by referring to another factoid about an Infantry Platoon.

However, like Hüsnü who went before him, there was another agenda being served here. I am not sure we can treat Aker as a reliable and on the spot witness. His account is tainted by time and politics. Hüsnü gave us 200 dead Allies and a Reconnaissance in Force. Aker has his little gems as well. It would be better to view the actual Turkish War Diaries of the Battalions who took part in the action to view the immediate and on the spot commentary. I hold the work of the dead major from 1/33 IR in far higher regard in terms of evidence as he wrote at a time when the battle was still ongoing. He knew nothing of Ataturk.

It is the same as the immediate witnesses giving their accounts. They may or may not be correct but their accounts are far less likely to be corrupted by time and an agenda. They may well be, as Chris says, parts of a gloss to excuse lack of progress on the day.

But let us take a look at this idea. My original question to Jeff was framed to tease out the notion of acceptable evidence. Second guessing evidence by suggesting the witness statements may be an effort to explain failure requires more than this as a dismissal. They need analysis regarding the person making the utterance. Was the person prone to making exaggerated claims? I have seen no analysis of this sort at all. There must be a basis for dismissing testimony that is related to the individual and not the overall impact of that comment. That is the sophism of going from the general to the individual and so has little basis in logic. If we are dealing with the individual, we must look at that individual as an individual, with all the flaws and strengths that make an individual.

Let me illustrate the logic implicit in the above conclusions. Average debt per Australian is $23,800, therefore SWIMBO and I have a combined debt holding of $47,600. Reality is that I have nil debt. The result of going from the general to the individual creates a skewed outcome and an incorrect perception of the subject of examination. So too with the accounts of machine gun fire at Fisherman's Hut.

So back to our story, I would not be so keen to dismiss the eye witness accounts in favour of a third party account written 20 years later. Chris and Jeff may be 100% correct for all the wrong reasons. It is not because of the logic since that has yet to be established. So it is a guess. A calculated guess, but a guess none the less.

A guess I cannot accept without good reason.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

Chris, when you write, "I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately... ", surely you must mean, "IF Bridges did it at all, I am not saying he would have done it deliberately."

Otherwise the implication is that Bridges was lying, or at best going along with something he knew to be false, when this is not proven at all; it's only one possibility, based solely on the premise that others have been known to do it.

[Crunchy]

Hi Bill,

Thank you for a well reasoned opinion for the opposing view.

I agree with your point about the reliability of histories written after the event, particularly unit histories. I would think that the comments you make about Aker can also be made against Anzac accounts. I am more skeptical of first hand accounts than Bryn and yourself. This is based on personal observations where first hand accounts proved to be incorrect when all of the evidence was actually evaluated after the event. Mainly people assumed things were there when they weren't, others were mistaken in even what they thought they saw and others just repeated what they heard others say. On occasion, certain things were deliberately altered or left out so as to show things in a better perspective; too often this happens in some military reports. I treat all first hand accounts and after action reports with care - they are not always correct and can contain errors, either mistakenly or intentional; that is why they have to be evaluated against other sources and probabilities.

This tendency was countered by SLA Marshall's technique of questioning veterans as a group soon after battles in World War Two and Korea. He would sit the whole section down and go through the action with them, some made statements that turned out to be incorrect and it was only by questioning them in a group and going over the ground, where possible, did a truer picture emerge of what occurred. I say truer, because I don't believe we can ever be categorically sure of what actually happened. I experienced a similar approach in our after action debriefs in Vietnam.

The statements made by Anzacs are also a mixture of fact and opinion based on what each person thought they saw and heard, each independently made without the benefit of a group debrief. It is not a matter of dismissing them or trying to find reasons to dismiss them but an honest attempt to evaluate the validity of them, and those of the Turks, against all other factors. Accounts on both sides contain errors and that is natural. If we were to dismiss the whole of an account as erroneous because it contains one or two errors then we would be accepting very few, if any, first hand accounts.

The issue here is two completely opposite views from either side of the firing line. What I am trying to do is identify a possible element that could be mistaken on either side. The common element I think could be mistaken is what people thought they heard.

As you have rightly pointed out, none of the Turkish accounts actually say there were no machine guns at the Fisherman's Hut, This is a valid point and we cannot use them as proof there were no machine guns located there. When we consult the available maps, however, they have clearly marked their weapons and troop positions. Many of these have been confirmed by other accounts and by Allied aerial reconnaissance reports and maps prior to landing. We are prepared to accept those locations as correctly marked because they were confirmed by own sources, but can we readily dismiss no markings of weapon in a location as an error on their part? The Anzac accounts speak of maxims firing from Third Ridge later in the morning and the Turks readily show these guns marked on their maps in the same area and where they moved to later in the day. However, they don't have maxims marked at the Fisherman's Hut. Do we simply assume their map must be wrong because it doesn't accord with what some of our people said they heard? It is a rather tall ask for us Australians to suggest the Turks falsified their accounts or their records are wrong simply on the basis that our accounts must be correct.

The one thing we seemed to have overlooked is that over the years it is elements of the traditional Australian view of the landing that has been found wanting when we look closely at our own sources, let alone the Turkish sources. I might add that the comment you made about Aker's account could just as readily be said of some Anzac accounts.

I doubt that any of us will be able to provide conclusive evidence one way or the other on this issue so it is likely to remain a matter of conjecture. As a matter of curiosity, it would be nice to know one way or the other but I doubt that we ever will. Then again history is always a matter of opinion.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Re post #289 For the record - I am surely NOT saying that at all nor am I suggesting Bridges was lying.

What I actually said was I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately, but the machine gun approach, as reported by others,

[Bryn]

IF Bridges' report was inaccurate, it's implied this would be because it was based on 'the machine gun approach', as reported by others.

This in turn assumes all the reports of machine guns at the Landing are inaccurate, which has not, at least as far as I'm concerned, been proved.

Unless we accept that all these reports are inaccurate - which I don't - this provides no basis for believing Bridges' report would be inaccurate.

[Jeff Pickerd]

Chris,

Here is the symbol I am referring to. I can find no reference to it in any of the Turkish map legends.

I will post the relevant sections of the two Turkish maps that I have referred to after this.

Jeff

[Jeff Pickerd]

This is a section of the map, ‘The movements of Mehamet Sekik and his 27th Regiment between 05:30 and 08:30 a.m.’ (Companion to the Feature Length Documentary, GALLIPOLI, Tolga Ornek and Feza Toker, page 26).

These two symbols are either side of Gaba Tepe. The one in the North appears to be just South of Harris Ridge, and the one to the South of Gaba Tepe on the hill above Azmak dere.

Jeff

[Jeff Pickerd]

The map from, GALLIPOLI 1915, Through Turkish Eyes, Prof Haluk Oral, page 46, map No. 116, 1940, historical section of the Askeri Mecmua.

Here the symbol appears, but only North of Gaba Tepe at the same place as in the previous map, same symbol, different map.

Jeff

[Ozzie]

On re-reading this entire thread, one has to wonder at the many succinct and detailed analysis put forward from members within their own fields of expertise.

The thread has travelled from Helles to Anzac and has bought forward much information.

I find that the following seems to cause some conflict of opinion between posters.

What time is meant by the Landing?

4.30am on the 25th?

All day of the 25th?

This would seem to have some bearing on the question of Machine Guns, in regards to Anzac, as it was lightly held by the Turks at 4.30am, but reinforced later on.

Another question: Some sources say that the Turks had very few Machine Guns, others say that there were plenty enough to worry the invading forces.

On studying the sources and maps put forward by members, one has sift to through which sources where recorded at the time, that time being the 25th April, and what were sources from a later date, in which the authors of the documents had time to reconstruct, with hindsight, the movements of the day.

First hand accounts are great, but whose first hand accounts? There seems to be a wide difference, even amongst those of the same army.

A very thought provoking thread, which seems to highlight the differences between eye witness accounts.

And the discrepencies between Official Records.

Cheers

Kim

[Jeff Pickerd]

The fact that I could find no reference to just what this symbol represents and from all the maps, both Turkish and British, and that they give no indication to the position of the 25 mm Nordenfeldt guns purported to be at Gaba Tepe, aroused my suspicion that these two symbols might well be the Nordenfeldts.

Both michaeldr at Post 141, and Crunchy at Post 143, establish the fact that there were two Nordenfedlt guns attached to the 27th Regiment and positioned at Gaba Tepe, but were they actually positioned on Gaba Tepe itself?

It was the post by Bryn, at Post 144, that further gave weight to that suspicion, quote: -

"A party of mainly 11th Battalion, along with engineers, encountered a Nordefeldt gun on 4th May. Four boats containing approximately 120 men in total, and a shore party of about 13 (these came along the beach), assaulted the Turkish positions on Gaba Tepe:

'There was no sign of life on the land. No shot was fired. But it seemed impossible that the Turks could be surprised. ...Looking to the beach on their left Leane saw the forms of Rumball and his party of the 10th engaged in cutting the northward wire. Thirty yards from shore the boats grounded. As the men scrambled out, a heavy fire was opened on them. In their trenches high up the green slope the Turks had three machine-guns and an automatic gun firing a 1-in shell. Lieutenant Rockliff was hit, and another officer of Leane's party, Lieutenant H.B. Thompson - one of a number whose promotion from sergeant had been authorised the night before, though he had not actually heard of that fact - was killed.' (Bean Vol. 1 p559).

'We dashed over the sides and waded towards the beach. It was not until the boats grounded that the Turks appeared. Immediately a withering fire broke out from machine guns, rifles, and two small automatic guns firing 1lb shells. Lieut. Rockliff was shot with several others before they could clear the boats. Lieut. Thompson fell shot, fatally wounded.' (Leane, 'Gaba Tepe Raid: Gen. Leane's Review.' Reveille Vol.5 No.9 1 Jun 1932 p2)."

If one examines Map No. 23 from the "Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, by C.E.W. Bean, Vol 1, Chapter XXIV, ANZAC BEACH, 4th May 1915, here the position of Captain Raymond Lean's raiding party is shown. From the description of the Turkish fire, from the 'grassy slopes' this does no sound like the fire is coming from on top of Gaba Tepe, but more in line with what Map 23 outlines.

The map put up by Bill Woerlee at Post 125 shows 'one gun' at square 224, q, dot point 1, but what sort of gun?

From the AWM, "Mapping Gallipoli", Colonel Henry Maclaurin's map is digitised. On this map, at square 224, r, dot point 3, there is a black dot, but what does this represent?

At the same site, Captain Lean's map is also digitised, at square 224, w, dot point 1, there is a symbol for a gun, but again, what sort of gun?

Are all these references indicating that the unknown symbol could well be one of the Nordenfeldts?

There is more to done on this scenario, distances to be established, hight contours to be worked out, and the most probable location for the synbols to be established from the varying maps, and hopefully more information coming out of Turkey as to just what these symbols represent.

Jeff

[Jeff Pickerd]

A very good point Kim, and one I have contemplated.

Just what is "the landing" when referred to in many of the accounts?

Is it, leaving to tows and landing on the beach? Moving from landing at the beach and heading off up onto the heights above Anzac Cove?

Or is it encompassing events of the whole day of 25th April?

This is what makes this whole question so intriguing.

Jeff

[Crunchy]

Hi Jeff,

I am not sure what the symbols represent.

On the larger map you emailed to me, and indeed the one posted above, he shows the more conventional style of symbols for main weapons for the artillery pieces in the locations we know there were guns. He has no trenches marked - only main weapons and troop unit symbols. If you look at Michael's post #100 on page 4, the orbat chart for the 9th Division he has posted shows symbols for both the 25mm and 37mm Nordenbfelts which reflect the conventional style of symbols for weapon systems.

They don't look like a weapon symbol to me, but more like a troop position symbol. The other troop symbols, which are similar but larger, are in the same positions as other Turkish maps and sources place the platoons within the company boundaries. I then thought the symbols you are referring to might be detached sections but I am not sure of that either. I also notice on the map you emailed me the same symbol is marked at Cenup AriBurnu (Queensland Point) and we know a nordenfelt was not captured there and it is highly unlikely they could have got one away in the rapid withdrawal. Nor are they maxim guns as he shows the maxim gun weapon symbol at Scrubby Knoll exactly where where Aker said he first brought his machine company into action, and as marked on Aker's original map. I think the triangular flag represents the HQ of the 2nd Battalion and the reserve company is in the same area, which reflects where they expected a landing in the area, on the beaches immediately north and south of Kapa Tepe. The letters Bl, I think stands for company. Sorry I can't be more helpful.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Jeff,

You wrote:

"The map put up by Bill Woerlee at Post 125 shows 'one gun' at square 224, q, dot point 1, but what sort of gun?"

I can't answer that but it seems to me the position is what later became Bolton's Hill. It would have been an ideal place to cover the beach and in fact now there is a concrete pillbox there, built some time before the Second World War.

Bolton's Ridge and Hill (concrete pillbox visible directly below 's' in word 'Bolton's'), 'Z' Beach. Taken from 'Turk Hill', a small knoll near Gaba Tepe.