TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[PMHart]

Hi again Michael,

Quoted in Bush, p124, is Wedgwood, "If the River Clyde had not been on that beach with our 11 Maxims on board not one of the 400 still living on the shore could have survived."

I don't for a moment think this is a final answer as to how many Maxims were aboard the River Clyde but he was in command of them! Perhaps they built 8 positions (I've seen that figure before!) but had 11 guns (the most common figure quoted)?

Pete

[michaeldr]

Pete,

Thanks for giving that ref re Wedgwood's maxims

The 37mm guns by all accounts did have a quite distinctive fire sound contributing to their unofficial name of Pom Poms

But it is my guess that the 25mm Nordenfeldt guns with their multiple barrels would have produced a sound which was very hard to distinguish from that of a true machine gun

[Thirteen of these latter guns are shown in the 9th Div.'s section of the Fifth Army's Organization chart; see post #100, also Bill's post #151]

best regards

Michael

[CSMMo]

I guess we all have to read the various sources and make our own judgement. From what I've read, primarily of the action at 'W' Beach, many say machine guns were there. I believe that the issues uppermost on the minds of those who were landing was not "I wonder what those weapons are?". When one is faced with the imminent end of one's life, a lot of things happen to his perceptions. To new troops under fire, the volume of fire that the Turkish rifles created would be cacophonous, confusing, frightening and the source of resources heretofore not used in each man's life (in all probablility) of surviving to get to shore and gain cover and then to silence those weapons. Training kicks in, but so does the will to live. That so many were able to eventually silence the rifles on the bluff at 'W' Beach is an amazing feat of arms. I have not heard that the Briitsh, French or ANZAC's had the type of training I and my contemporaries received where we could listen to the various types of foreign weapons firing over our heads to distinguish one from the other. That we have so many accounts and that they provide as much accuracy as they do is a gift to enhance our understanding of that eventful day. Remember that the machine gun was a new-ish weapon of which they had heard a good deal. It and artillery (and numbers) stopped the Allies from being home by Christmas 1914, so their power was well known and, probably, dreaded. They were looking for them, but they were still new.

I choose to believe the Turks and believe that the machine guns accounts were reflections of the volume of rifle fire that they encountered and the intensity of that experience. That alone creates awe when contemplating the reality of that landing.

That said, this has been an educational, interesting thread for which I am grateful to the participating members.

Thanks!

Mike Morrison

[Peter Doyle]

If someone can point to solid evidence of machine guns that were in action during the early morning of 25 April (as opposed to arriving later in the day which the Turks admit) then I for one would be delighted as a vindication of the judgement of men like Geddes whom I greatly admire. But so far they haven't and the machine guns seem to have melted away - despite the capture at the point of the bayonet of their supposed positions at both Anzac and Helles. The Turks could not possibly have got them away - so where are they?

I don't believe that anyone has that in mind. One point I would however make is that the Turks had nothing to cover up on their performance on 25 April. It was after all a day of utter failure (if enormous demonstrable courage) for both the British and Anzacs. The Turks don't lie about machine guns at other times so why for just a few hours on landing? I certainly don't think there were any machine guns at W Beach but a lot of British accounts refer to them, it almost seems to have been a verbal tic, a method of describing a storm of fire!

Well, maybe; the difficulty at this point is, perhaps, the relative scarcity (or availability) of Ottoman accounts to balance the emphasis given at the time (in Geddes's own account, for example) to the location of machine guns. At the time of his writing, the failure was not so complete; and to play devil's advocate, would it not magnify the Ottoman's achievements if they were not using machine guns, but bolt-action rifles in the hands of men defending their homeland. Tracking down the missing guns might well be the only way, but negative evidence is always a difficult way to prove a point. Interesting debate, though, eh chaps...?

Peter

PS Just how many Peters/Petes can be squeezed into one thread, mind you there are a fair amount of Bills...

[Krithia]

Hi again Michael,

Quoted in Bush, p124, is Wedgwood, "If the River Clyde had not been on that beach with our 11 Maxims on board not one of the 400 still living on the shore could have survived."

I don't for a moment think this is a final answer as to how many Maxims were aboard the River Clyde but he was in command of them! Perhaps they built 8 positions (I've seen that figure before!) but had 11 guns (the most common figure quoted)?

Pete

Hi Pete/Michael,

I saw my name mentioned so will jump in quickly and add a little more on the River Clyde maxim discussion.

I am pretty sure there were eight casements as referenced by Wedgwood and Illingworth, of course this doesn't mean there were eight Maxims in these. How many was a question I have spent sometime trying to find an answer too. Recently I have come across some information on Sub Lt A. Coke, one of the other RNAS officers who was aboard the RC. Coke wrote on 19th April 1915 ...Wedgwood, Illingworth, Parker and myself, 40 men, were taking 10 maxims and putting them all round the focsle of the ship and we are to cover the landing of the first troops to land. This contradicts Wedgwood who records eleven, however Coke goes as far as drawing a plan of the ship which clearly shows 10 Maxims positioned; 3 on the focsle under the command of Coke, 3 on the port side under th ecommand of Parker, 1 on the Bridge with Wedgwood and 3 towards the stern under Illingworth.

I published at the time (in the RND journal and the Gallipolian) a few photos that were taken by Illingworth (I think the IWM have copies of some of these) aboard the River Clyde that shows the armoured gun shelters. I will have a look through the others to see if there is any more that support the maxim numbers.

regards, Steve

[Bryn]

I don't see that anyone is implying the Turks are or were 'lying' about the presence or otherwise of machine guns. But there seems to be a strong tendency for many to write off all other accounts as inaccurate in order to conform to the Turkish version, yet not consider that just such inaccuracy is possible on the Turkish side as well. British, Anzacs and French report MGs at the Landing. I personally don't accept that all those can be inaccurate while Turkish sources alone are infallible. If we're going to claim that the sources might be inaccurate, that goes both ways.

Even if the Anzacs (for example) did not know the sound of a machine gun at the time of the Landing (which is speculation), the writers of the accounts later would certainly by then have been able to pick the sound, remember the first morning, and still referred to their presence in the initial landings.

[Bryn]

In the later editions of Volume 1 of the Official History, Bean has made alterations to aspects of the narrative based on new facts. One such alteration is that the rumour that Turkish or German officers were yelling orders in English, designed to confuse the Anzacs, was in fact caused by the Anzacs themselves. I've referred to this in another thread. So Bean was not afraid to alter the narrative if new information came to light, and the fact that he makes very little of the machine guns on the northern flank anyway leads me to believe that it would not be so important to him to have that belief perpetuated if he suspected it were false.

But nowhere, in any edition, is there a doubt raised that there were MGs at or near Fisherman's Hut. That implies that nobody who was there and who had read the Official History, had questioned or disputed this. One of those likely to have read the account is Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Rafferty, DSO, MiD, also a Boer War veteran. He commanded 10th Battalion at one point, and was one of the last commanding officers of 11th Battalion. He was one of the 12th Battalion officers sent to the flank to silence the machine gun on that first morning.

As an acknowledged contributor to the 12th Battalion's history, he might have been expected to have had something to say about the inclusion of the account of the MG in the history had he thought there had been no MG there. And yet there it is:

'This portion of the beach was under direct machine-gun fire, apparently coming from the lower slopes of Walker's Ridge, or perhaps further north from the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut. ... As they neared the foot of the cliff the machine-gun still worried them considerably, and the Colonel ordered Rafferty to take his platoon and endeavour to silence it.' (p43).

The 11th Battalion history - the battalion Rafferty eventually commanded - also mentions the MG, and again Rafferty has apparently not disputed it was there. Also one of the sources quoted in the preface to the history is "the diary of Captain Charlie Gostelow." Captain Gostelow, MC, was also one of the three officers (with their men) sent to silence the MG on the northern flank. The other was Lieutenant Strickland, also a Boer War veteran who was the only private promoted to commissioned rank from the 3rd (WA Mounted Infantry) and severely wounded 14 Feb 1901.

So the colonel who sent the officers - Clarke - was a Boer War veteran and officer of 35 years' service, whose 12th Bn machine-gunners 'attained a high degree of efficiency' in Egypt (I assume he saw and heard them firing at least once), and of the three officers sent to silence the MG two were Boer War veterans and the others' diary was used in compiling the battalion's unit history.

The three 7th Battalion officers who were in the boats as they approached Fisherman's Hut - Captain Jackson and Lieutenants Scanlan and Layh - have apparently not intervened in the writing of the account by the 7th Battalion's historian. Nor is there any evidence of anything written by them at any time to indicate doubt at the presence of MGs during their approach.

[PMHart]

Hi Bryn,

I do not, and have never said, that I believe Turkish personal experience accounts, but not British/Anzac accounts. What I, Chris and others see is a clear difference in the nature of the Turkish reports. Their evidence is based on army lists, official sources and the reports of officers that delineate the units and weapons under their command. These are things that they knew, hard facts that can still be checked - if they are false then they and their descendants are lying! It indicates a considerable officially backed conspiracy to falsify orders of battle and the order of events that reaches both backwards and forwards in time! This type of evidence equates to the fact that we know that we had Maxims in the picket boats at Anzac or aboard the River Clyde - because they were under our command and control.

The British and Anzac evidence of Turkish machine guns early in the day is based on the snapshot opinion of people under fire, under severe stress, with no real idea of what was going on. Many also faced a compelling temptation to exaggerate the scale of the opposition to excuse their disastrous collective failure on 25 April. In these circumstances most of them are entitled to make mistakes and very few of them could be considered to have been lying - they were just responding to a dreadful situation. They could not necessarily know exactly what firepower the Turks were deploying against them unless for instance they over-ran the machine guns. But if they did then where are they? Hence my interest in that point. They would be concrete trophies on a day of miserable failure.

When under pressure Turkish accounts of course display the same kind of confusions, contortions and wishful thinking. They too cannot be trusted as to timings, the exact course of events, or (crucially in considering our point) the motives, strength and movements of their enemies.

Having said all this I repeat: If we could prove the existence of a couple of machine guns at V Beach I would be far happier. But even if they were not there, then I believe that the combination of concentrated rifle fire and Nordenfelts made it a murderous undertaking that still stirs the imagination. I personally do not need to 'make things worse' to exaggerate the challenge faced.

Cheers,

Pete

[Bryn]

I already posted a reference to a Turkish article stating there were machine-guns at V Beach from the British Official History Volume 1. The fact that nobody has been able to get their hands on it in the few days since does not prove it doesn't exist. If it did not exist, the British official historian must have been lying (or to put it another way, 'exaggerating the difficulties'), but if that were true, he would hardly have risked being found out by giving an exact reference to it.

As to your question, 'where are they?' : it was never claimed that a machine gun was captured on the northern flank. Only that one was there.

[green_acorn]

I have been reading the War Diaries of 1, 2 & 3 Bde, 1st Aust Div, the A&NZ Army Corps and HQ MEF, what has been noticeable is the lack of reporting of machine guns. MAJ Blamey as the GSOII 1 Div records the first Turkish rifle fire at 0432hrs, he and MAJ Villers-Stuart the Corps GSOII (Int) landed shortly after 3 Bde and Blamey's diary is quite detailed, he makes mention of shrapnel and snipers (including those at Fishermas Hut).

The special instructions for 3 Bde also quite specifically state rifles were to be unloaded and that magazines were not to be charged until reaching shore. In the case of the Maxim guns on the steam boats the Royal Navy officers were ordered not to fire unless it was the only way of affecting the landing.

In the case of the Handbook of the Turkish Army 2 Bde received their copy of the 3rd edition on 20 April.

The disposition of gun batteries and trenches identified by aerial reconnaisance (the kite balloon towed behind HMS Queen) would be interesting to map against Turkish orders.

cheers,

Chris H

[Bryn]

Chris,

Blamey did not land at Anzac until about 7:20 am on 25th April and, as he didn't land on the northern flank, but in the cove itself, he would not have come under the fire of any machine gun near Fisherman's Hut, if such existed. On the other hand, the 11th Battalion, part of which landed at about 4:30 am, and north of the cove, does mention landing under machine-gun fire in their war diary. Meanwhile there were Turkish snipers in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut until at least 28th April, as on that day two men from the Canterbury Battalion were killed by them while attempting to reach the bodies of the 7th Battalion killed during the Landing opposite Fisherman's Hut.

I'm not sure how the fact that the Australians landed with unloaded rifles bears on the presence or otherwise of Turkish machine guns. Except that it would perhaps make it easier to distinguish incoming fire when none was being returned.

[Crunchy]

Why is the presence or absence of a relatively small number of Turkish machine guns firing onto the landing beaches such an important issue? Does the answer somehow explain the eventual outcome of the campaign?

Pete1052,

You may well ask. To set the thread in context, in Australian and New Zealand history the Landing at Anzac is an iconic event and seared into our national psyche. It was, for both our countries, the first battle on the international stage and we are probably the only two countries that have a national holiday in honour of a battle. For me it is the curiosity of trying to find out what actually happened at Anzac on the 25th April 1915. Having been brought up on the popular view of the Landing, as the years passed it became apparent that view was incorrect. The more I read, from both secondary and primary sources, the more I became aware of contradictions and inconsistencies in accounts and that, in the popular view, the Landing had its fair share of myths.

My training impressed on me the need to verify and cross check sources, to consider all of the information available and draw deductions and probabilities from conflicting information rather than assuming a particular source was the correct one. Thus the more information we can assemble the better we will be able to assess the probabilities of what actually occurred and draw our own conclusions. I am grateful for all of the information that has been offered on this thread and I doubt it would have been forthcoming but for the debate that has ensued.

As to your second question. At Anzac machine guns made no difference at all, as the troops quickly scaled and captured the heights above the beach and the few Turkish defenders quickly retired inland. The only area where heavy casualties were sustained in an initial landing was at the Fisherman's Hut, where about four boats came ashore some 1100 yards north of Anzac Cove, but again the few Turks defending the knolls retired inland after about 15 - 20 minutes. Thus, overall, the Turkish defence of the beaches in the Kapa Tepe zone was minimal and any machine guns there had little impact on the landing.

Why the number of posts over such a minor issue? Largely, I think, because of the contradictory information available.

Cheers

Chris

[green_acorn]

Bryn,

I hadn't got that far last night in reading the Diaries online.

I would find it disconcerting that at such an early point of the operation, 11 AIB being under fire from a machine gun wasn't recorded/reported at a higher level as I would have expected. I say this from the point of view that it would have been logical that machine guns be reported and targetted immediately by naval gunfire support, as we know, not to do so turned operations elsewhere.

I added the comments from the Special Instructions out of interest. Despite the intent for a silent assault, going ashore with unloaded rifles and empty magazines (uncharged) certainly is unusual, normally caused by concern about the discipline of "raw" troops (That being a subjective comment).

The comment about the Maxims on the steamboats was intended to balance the possibility that some soldiers were reporting the friendly fire, as you identify, the RN instructions and the unloaded rifles would certainly make it easier to distinguish hostile fire.

cheers,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

going ashore with unloaded rifles and empty magazines (uncharged) certainly is unusual, normally caused by concern about the discipline of "raw" troops (That being a subjective comment).

Chris H,

It certainly is unusual. The reasons for this could have been as you say a concern about raw troops and to prevent an accidental discharge and consequently the troops firing prematurely or firing indiscriminately in the darkness. Once the troops landed, however, the loading of magazines was not a lengthy procedure with the ammunition already in chargers and they were able to load five rounds at a time. Regarding the indiscriminate fire Bean Vol 1 p261 writes "The fatal Australian fire from below, which Graham Butler stopped, had been responsible for the loss of at least one brave man. On the very edge of the plateau Sergeant Fowles was greviously wounded by one of the bullets. 'I told them" he said as he lay there dying in the Turkish trench- "I told them again and again not to open their magazines".

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

So the colonel who sent the officers - Clarke - was a Boer War veteran and officer of 35 years' service, whose 12th Bn machine-gunners 'attained a high degree of efficiency' in Egypt (I assume he saw and heard them firing at least once), and of the three officers sent to silence the MG two were Boer War veterans and the others' diary was used in compiling the battalion's unit history.

Bryn,

I think we are at cross purposes here. I don’t think anyone believes LTCOL Clarke had never heard a machine gun firing during his career. As CO 12th Battalion he would certainly have observed them firing during the training in Egypt. This has been acknowledged previously at post #94 "Given his experience he would have known the difference between a machine gun and a rifle firing in a light action …” which was reiterated at post #184.

Thus we are in agreement that Clarke would have heard a machine gun firing prior to the landing at Anzac.

That is not the issue I, and others, have raised. The point under discussion is: Clarke believed he heard a machine gun firing from the area of the Fisherman’s Hut and no one doubts he believed he did hear one. However, with other weapons firing around him and given that source of the firing from the left flank was some 900 yards away is it possible that he may have mistaken rapid rifle fire for a machine gun?

Acknowledging he was an experienced militia officer and that he would certainly have heard a machine gun firing prior to the landing Clarke may well have been correct in saying it was a machine gun, but in the heat of battle, is it possible he could have been mistaken and assumed that rapid rifle fire some 900 yards away was machine gun fire?

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

The 11th Battalion history Also one of the sources quoted in the preface to the history is "the diary of Captain Charlie Gostelow." Captain Gostelow, MC, was also one of the three officers (with their men) sent to silence the MG on the northern flank. T

and of the three officers sent to silence the MG two were Boer War veterans and the others' diary was used in compiling the battalion's unit history.

Bryn,

That's true. But did Gostelow's diary actually say anything about this incident? There is no indication in the history that it did.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

The only problem here is, can all of the people have been wrong, all of the time?

Michael,

Bryn and yourself make the very valid point “The only problem here is, can all of the people have been wrong, all of the time?” One would naturally assume that in circumstances where several people report a particular thing that not all of them could be wrong. But is this always a valid assumption to make? In certain circumstances, if a number of them were wrong, is it possible that all of them could be wrong?

Let me expand. In a situation where people report seeing some thing, such as a vehicle accident, a number of the witnesses may be incorrect in some details and correct in others. It is common knowledge that witnesses to vehicle accidents give contrary descriptions of what occurred. In the discussion of this thread we are talking of people hearing something amongst a multitude of firing. Thus, if several were mistaken in hearing what they heard, is it not possible that all of them could have been similarly mistaken? There is quite a difference between seeing something and hearing something and this is the point people are making.

Those who have been under hostile fire can readily admit that no matter how many weapons they have heard firing on a rifle range, the atmosphere is quite different in action when several weapons are firing at once and it is not easy to clearly differentiate separate weapons when a number of them are firing at once. In my experience, the rifle range and blank rounds on exercises do not come close to replicating an actual firefight. There are, of course, instances when a machine gun can be distinguished but generally this is when they are firing on their own or when the other firing is relatively light. As the level of firing increases the blurring of weapon noise increase and it doesn’t need a “wall of noise” for the blurring of weapon sounds to occur. It is a jumble of noise. Further, it is easier to distinguish weapons when the source of the firing is relatively close than when it is many hundred yards away.

Thus, in the “heat of battle’ and facing “heavy” fire, as reported in some of the battalion diaries, is it not possible for everyone to be mistaken in what they heard ?

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

maybe the Turkish record is inaccurate. Let's face it. If there were MGs at Fisherman's Hut and V Beach, and the records say there weren't, then the inescapable conclusion is that the records are wrong.

Bryn,

That is true, but it can equally be said that if there weren't MG there then the inescapable conclusion is that the records are accurate.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

I have been reading the War Diaries of 1, 2 & 3 Bde, 1st Aust Div,

Chris H

I have been reading the same diaries. What was also evident was the reference to the large number of casualties caused by shrapnel fire as the following boats passed from ship to shore.

I then read the battalion war diaries in order of the landing of the three brigades.

9th Battlion: “The landing was effected under rifle fire and the troops pressed forward the enemy gave way and the advance continued."

10th Battalion: Written by CO LTCOL Weir. “ … a rifle fired from the hill in front of us above the beach, right in front of where we were heading for, almost immediately heavy rifle and machine gun fire was opened upon us, we had to row another 15 yards or so before we reached water shallow enough for us to get out of the boats, this as at about 4:15 am … the men sprang to their feet & with a cheer charged up the hill held by the Turks & drove them off it, following up their success on the quickly retreating foe. Shortly after this the two Companies A & B off the Torpedo Destroyers reached the Beach, they were subjected to heavy shrapnel and machine gun fire, these Companies pushed on quickly & soon joined us in a general advance” An observation: this ”heavy” machine gun fire must have been ineffective, perhaps the most ineffective of the war given the ease with which the position was captured.

11th Battalion: “Landed under heavy Musketry and Machine Gun Fire and stormed the cliffs about 300 ft high. Pushed back the Turks and occupied the position”

12th Battalion: “While loading from the destroyers to the boats we were heavily shelled from KAPA TEPE and on landing met heavy machine and rifle fire from the direction of the Fisherman’s Hut.”

5th Battalion: entries for April not available.

6th Battalion: entires for April not available

7th Battalion: Written by CO LTCOL Elliot. After writing of the changes that had to be made because the tows had not arrived and the troops had to be distributed in the ships boats he writes: “Left HMT Galeka by the 5th boat & landed under shrapnel fire.” There is, however, a memo pasted in the diary by Major Jackson who landed at the Fisherman’ Hut. He writes: “ About 5am, about 120 men of B Coy 7th Bn which was already drawn up on the TS Galeka were embarked in four boats and proceeded to row ashore. … and we accordingly made for the vicinity of the Fisherman’s Hut (square 237L) … when about 200 yards from the shore the enemy, who were entrenched on a Knoll behind the Fisherman’s Hut and knoll about 500 yards SOUTH EAST opened fire on the boats with machine guns and rifles. We landed and took up position behind sand heaps at edge of beach the fire being too heavy to advance over the flat leading to the huts. We poured in rapid rifle fire and in about quarter of an hour threatened to assault, when the enemy immediately retired. We occupied their trenches in rear of the Fisherman’s Hut with the remains of the platoons, numbering about 40 men and held the position to allow the Field Ambulance; who had sent up bearers, to remove the wounded, which was done as far as possible. Assistance was also received from a trawler which towed away two boats loaded with wounded. … ”

8th Battalion: Very difficult to read but no mention of fire until later in the day when mentions artillery fire causing heavy casualties.

1st Battalion: “Landed without loss.”

2nd Battalion: No entry for 25th April

3rd Battalion: The Bn commended dis-embarkation and the Bn was ashore by 8:30am.”

4th Battalion: First tows left LAKE MICHIGAN 6:45am containing Beach Party, 1st Infantry Brigade HeadQrs, Battalion HeadQrs and Brigade signal section. – 1.5pm Landing of 4th battalion completed.”

What are we to make of this? Of the three leading battalions one reports rifle fire and two report landing under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. Yet all report that the Turkish positions were captured quickly. The fourth battalion in 3 Brigade reports heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the direction of the Fisherman’s Hut. In another post we, including Bryn, have demonstrated from photographs taken that morning there is no real evidence of heavy casualties being sustained on the beaches. Thus this “heavy” machine gun fire was not all that effective.

From the Turkish perspective, we know the CO 27th Regiment had his machine gun company with him and on page 20 of Gallipoli 1915: Day One Plus LTCOL Sefik Aker is recorded as writing in his account “As soon as the promised artillery battery appears, it will go into action to compliment the Regiment’s four machine guns which will be firing from Hill 165, under my direct command, to support both probes” Thus all four machine guns of the company were on Third Ridge.

We have evidence that the Anzacs heard machine guns but none that they actually saw or captured a maxim gun, which is a heavy weapon that cannot be quickly carried away, and yet in all accounts the Turks withdrew rapidly, apparently taking their maxims with them.

Therefore, as has been asked before in this thread, if there were MG at the Fisherman's Hut what organization provided these machine guns? No-one has provided an answer to date.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

he would not have come under the fire of any machine gun near Fisherman's Hut, if such existed. [Crunchy's emphasis]

Bryn,

Just clarifying your position. Are you suggesting above that a machine gun may not have been at the Fisherman's Hut?

If so, then we are arguing the same point. Not that there was or wasn't a machine gun there, but that we are not sure given the contradictory evidence available.

Cheers

Chris

[grantmal]

Some points from the 3rd Field Ambulance perspective:

Prior to the 7th Battalion troops landing in front of Fishermans Hut, the 3rd Field Ambulance's C Section was in one of the most northerly boats to land on North Beach. Capt McWhae, from his hospital bed in Alexandria (wounded on April 27th) wrote: "... soon the destroyer was under a heavy fire -- rifle bullets chiefly -- after first tow left destroyer, we waited our turn taking what cover we could on deck... The row boats returned to destroyer and we entered them under a heavy fire. Then we rowed to shore under a frightful fire. Machine gun, a few hundred yards north near Fishermans hut." In the AWM's "Notes from Colonel McWhae", which I presume were made for Butler's Medical History, is the following: "At first the beach was absolutely swept by machine gun and rifle fire so that there was no possibility of going near the boats or to help the wounded lying on the beach." Arthur Adams, C Section, wrote in his diary: "Two machine guns from projecting cliffs on either flank cut up our men awfully." Syd Penhaligon, C Section, wrote in his diary: "Some boats had very few casualties, while others suffered very heavily. In one place two boat loads tried to land at one point and machine gun opened fire on them.... it was an awful sight, men were hanging over the sides of the boats and lying about in all sorts of positions."

Lt Col Buchanan, at the Landing a Captain in the 3rd Field Ambulance, wrote in June 1918 (to Butler): "... we proceeded to embark in rowing boats. Before doing so, fire was opened with machine gun and shrapnel from the shore and five AMC men were hit on the destroyer, none seriously. The boats were drawn in convoys of three by launches until within 50 yards of the beach when we were expected to row. By this time direct machine gun fire had been directed on the boats and a number of casualties occurred." In his personal diary, as quoted in the Austin's 'The Body Snatchers', Buchanan wrote: "I don't know what it was, shrapnel, maxim or rifle -- I was frightened to look, but I was never so frightened in my life as when I had to stand up in the bow..." Capt Fry, in charge of B Section, wrote in his diary "struggled to land with storm of shots, shrapnel and rifle, all about." In his official report on the Landing for the ADMS Fry wrote: The disembarkation into the tows was made under rifle fire.... Landing was effected under heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, and several casualties occurred."

Other 3rd Field Ambulance diarists mention the heavy fire without specifying/speculating on the weapons involved.

One C Section stretcher bearer and a sailor rowing were hit, and bullets were "plugging their way through the sides of the boat" on the way to the beach. As the boat reached the beach and men began to disembark a further 13 stretcher bearers were killed or wounded in the boat and on the beach. Visibility was still very low -- from the 7th Battalion's boats, coming ashore some 15 to 20 minutes later, the Red Cross flag raised by McWhae could only be seen "as they neared the land..." As I posted earlier in this thread, I have always wondered how such a sudden and accurate fire could be brought on to C Section's boat from Fishermans Hut, in low light, by individual rifles. I also mentioned in a separate thread how Otto Kirkby, among the C Section wounded, maintained it was a machine gun that wounded him. I was asked how Kirkby could have been sure the bullet that hit him came from a machine gun, but I think the point was that it was assumed that only a machine gun firing in the semidarkness at such a distance could have caused so many casualties in a small area in a short space of time.

It's impossible to say whether the fire brought to bear on C Section came exclusively from Fishermans Hut, as accounts mention some fire coming from other areas, but most of C Section's writers emphasise the fire coming from the Fishermans Hut area. If Fishermans Hut was being defended by a platoon of 90 riflemen, a majority of them must have fired on C Section's boat at the same time to score so many hits over such a distance in poor light (I note that during the Turkish attack of May 19th nearly one million rounds were fired from the Anzac lines -- the Turks suffered around 10,000 casualties). There were at least two other boats with 12th Battalion infantry aboard landing close to C Section's boat, so there were other targets available in the immediate vicinity.

On a trip to the Peninsula in late April 2005 I stood on the beach below Fishermans Hut at 5 a.m.; a small white rowboat was pulled up on the beach down near where the 3rd Field Ambulance came ashore, and it was almost 'glowing' in the pre-dawn light. It did make a fantastic target!

Grant

[Pete1052]

Why the number of posts over such a minor issue? Largely, I think, because of the contradictory information available.

Thanks, Chris. I was started to wonder whether this was a Longstreet at Gettysburg type of issue.

[Bryn]

Chris,

I've read so much contradictory evidence in different accounts (sometimes in the same account), on many different issues, that I always have room for doubt. At the same time I feel in this case that the evidence for the presence of a machine gun is stronger. In other words I believe that an MG was located in the direction of Fisherman's Hut, because I think enough evidence supports this, and I still haven't seen anything more convincing than people who were there saying a machine gun was there. At the same time, as I say, there is always room for doubt; for me, a very small doubt.

The fact that nobody else seemd to have read the relevant section of the British Official History, as evidenced by the fact that nobody was aware of the reference there to the Turkish account of MGs at V Beach, worries me in a supposedly evenhanded discussion. A Turkish source denies the presence of MGs at any place along the entire coast (which the Turks and Germans knew full well was about to be invaded), and there seems to be an immediate assumption, on the part of some people, that it must be true, and that becomes the bedrock against which all evidence is judged. Because it must be true, all those allied accounts (and at least one Turkish), must be wrong. And so the reasons start to appear why they must be incorrect, or, in the case of the French account and the contradictory Turkish account, not discussed at all. I realise this does not apply to everyone. You and others have not taken an intractable position one way or the other, but even so, the whole discussion seems to me to be in favour of the Turkish account with a brushing-aside of evidence that does not support it.

[Eceabat]

Hi all,

just visiting from the crisis that is Turkey.

While this will not go anywhere towards answering the question one way or the other over whether there were Turkish machine guns above the landing beaches at Ariburnu on 25 April, I hope this will clarify where the machine guns of the Ottoman 27th Regiment were.

Below is the translation of notes and orders issued by Sefik Aker, commander of the 27th for his first probing attacks against Lone Pine and Johnstone’s Jolly by the 1st Battalion and the area south of the Pine by the 3rd. These orders, issued at around 8:00am, include direct reference to the regiment’s machine gun company, which came up with the two battalions from reserve from Maidos (Eceabat)

Aker personally positioned the four machine guns on Hill 165, which was part of Third Ridge just to the south of Scrubby Knoll. In his orders for the attack, quoted below, he refers to the company, along with a battery of artillery that was supposed to come up in support from Maidos but was delayed.

“As soon as the promised artillery battery appears, it will go into action to complement the Regiment’s four machine guns which will be firing from Hill 165, under my direct command, to support both probes."

So, as of 8:00 am, we know exactly where the 27th Regiment’s four machine guns were, directly under the command of the regimental commander at the point where he had established his forward headquarters.

If there were any machine guns positioned at Fisherman's Hut or elsewhere in the Ariburnu sector on 25 April, they did not belong to the regiment tasked with defending the region.

Just thought I'd throw that one into the mix.

Cheers

Bill

[michaeldr]

Chris' post No.242, quote: Bryn and yourself make the very valid point “The only problem here is, can all of the people have been wrong, all of the time?” One would naturally assume that in circumstances where several people report a particular thing that not all of them could be wrong. But is this always a valid assumption to make? In certain circumstances, if a number of them were wrong, is it possible that all of them could be wrong?

Chris,

Everything is possible, including the remote possibility that all of the allied soldiers who heard machine guns were mistaken. However I put this in a very low order of likelihood.

If one accepts the Turkish statement that their machine guns did not arrive until late in the day on the 25th April 1915, then one possible explanation is that what was being heard was the fire from the thirteen Nordenfeldt 25mm guns

I am prepared to accept that, within the strict meaning of the words, they are not machine guns

But I think that this is a case of semantics

For my money, their rate of fire puts them in a class together with machine guns

They were encountered at Helles where one was captured

and according to Prigge they were also at Gaba Tepe

The fact that the Turks do not list these weapons with their infantry, but instead, list them with their artillery, makes no difference to my looking upon them as machine-gun-equivalents.

I am trying to be sure to read all the posts here, but so far I have not seen anything to dissuade me from the above

Regards

Michael