TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Chris Henschke]

And the closest I can find for the other symbol are these.

[Ozzie]

Chris, The Professor should nearly be finished with his commitments, so hopefully an answer soon.

Cheers

Kim

[green_acorn]

Chris,

The only problem with the last map you posted from the Turkish OH is that it has been made recently, since Turkey joined NATO and though it shows general dispositions and boundaries it doesn't identify the defensive positions.

I have found what I was looking for the reinforcement of the area.

First this is the symbols description from Esat Pasha's map of 4.8.1915

Chris H

OOOps, here they are:

First this is the symbols description from Esat Pasha's map of 4.8.1915

Chris H

[Crunchy]

Chris H

Correct. Nonetheless, they match the 1935 map positions for the initial positions but in more detail. The Turkish OH version actually shows the section posts in the same positions as other earlier maps, except for one just north of Ari Burnu. The symbols are different but each has a description of the weaponry beside each symbol as I have indicated in the post. I'm hoping a Turkish Pal can translate them for us. Have you seen the Ottoman weapon symbols I posted on the thread your initiated regarding Turkish symbols?

Cheers

Chris

[green_acorn]

Chris,

Sorry, no I haven't got that far yet having just got home from the weekly Rissole meat tray trip.

Here is the map from the first history of the 27th Regt move between 0530 and 0830.

[green_acorn]

Here is the situation map at 1100hrs showing the deployment of 27 Regt and Mustafa Kemal's 57th Regt. Interestingly this map shows the MG's for the first time.

cheers,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

Chris H,

They seem to be the same maps as I posted earlier and are much clearer than mine. Both maps have the machine gun symbols in exactly the same locations as the maps as I posted earlier. No other machine guns are evident on any of the maps, either at Anzac Cove or the Fisherman's Hut.

The Turkish OH map says there were two nordenfelts and two mantelli's at Kapa Tepe and I wonder if the Kapa Tepe symbols on the 0830 map are actually referring to them as a battery.

Thanks for the maps Chris, they are much clearer than the images I was able to post.

Cheers

Chris

[green_acorn]

Chris,

From the information Chris Henscke gave me on German symbols and the symbols annotated on these maps it would appear the MG's are referred to as the MG Coy's and that the guns at Kapa Tepe, just of image on my second photo are of a battery or company. The red dashed line heading N enfilading Anzac Cove being the line of fire from the Kapa Tepe position. Very well positioned, long grazing fire.

The deployment of 27 Regts MG Coy vicinity Top Bayir, in two positions, by 11am enfilading any further ANZAC push NE towards 57 Regt certainly seems to have helped Mustafa Kemal.

Does the AWM allow the use of digital camera's in the Reading Room now? I have a little portable copy stand and my Canon camera allows reote use from my notebook, so I basically havea high resolution photocopier. I am hoping to get down to canberra next week or the week after to collect more material and being able to image it straight away saves a lot of time and should keep me quiet for a while.

cheers,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

Does the AWM allow the use of digital camera's in the Reading Room now?

Chris,

Yes they do as long as you don't use a flash. I have sent you a PM re your visit.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

I note that, in the 'Handbook of the Turkish Army', referred to in previous posts, is this comment: "Prisoners taken in Gallipoli report that in some divisions there are twice this [normal] complement of machine guns." (p28). [my edit].

[PeterH]

If I'm correct accounts offshore Anzac also mention the distinct sound of MG fire being heard.However other accounts mention a "roar",what they said was a combination of artillery,rifle fire and "machine guns".

It must be remembered that enough carnage could be generated without machine guns being on hand as well.The experience of the Boer War,especially the Black Week of 1899 had shown that a "zone of death" was achievable with even modern,bolt action rifles solely in use.The German experience on the Western Front in 1914,mainly in action against the French,with something like 800,000 casualties in four months,had demonstrated that even with sparse French MG resources,enough men were being put down,when in exposed positions,by artillery and rifle fire in unison.Likewise if I'm correct the Turkish attack at Anzac on the 18th/19th May,that resulted in an estimated 10,000 Turkish dead and wounded,was mainly repulsed due to the defender's rifles.Something like 948,000 rounds were fired by the Anzacs in repulsing that attack.

I think German estimates in 1914 was that one MG had the equivalent fire power of 80 riflemen.This was magnified by its concentrated effect though.The inverse would also mean that 80 men could lay down the fire power of one Maxim.Also according to Tim Travers,"..in 1907, trials at the Musketry School at Hythe revealed that at 600 yards two Maxim machine guns could annihilate a battalion advancing in open order in one minute if the troops did not go to ground".While V Beach did experience something like this magnitude of slaughter,I think events at Anzac (also due to the attackers being in a less exposed,flat position) show that nothing like this degree of resistance was encountered.

Anyway still a good debate here.

[Crunchy]

Peter,

Thank you for your very useful contribution. The effect and noise of concentrated, modern, bolt action rifle fire is often underestimated. I have been advised by one of our prominent military historians that in training the Anzacs fired on average about 75 rounds per man before they went to Gallipoli thus they would not have heard concentrated rifle fire and it is quite possible that they mistook rapid rifle fire for machine guns. Also machine guns were a specialist weapon employed in a specialist platoon and it possible that many of them may never have heard a machine gun firing during their training.

It is an interesting riddle.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

While rifle fire was certainly very concentrated and accounted for great numbers of the attacking Turks on 19th May, accounts don't leave out the machine guns:

Bean mentions the 'annihilating fire of rifles and machine guns' on the attacking Turks, and a New Zealand account states; "The newly arrived 2nd Turkish Division was engaged: their losses must have amounted to 9000 killed and wounded as all attacks were beaten off with heavy slaughter; our artillery and machine guns, wonderfully handled, ploughed bloody furrows into the massed Turkish infantry."

Most Anzac officers had prior military service, including many who served in the Boer War and some in other conflicts as well, and it's impossible to know that they had never heard either concentrated rifle fire or machine gun fire.

[PMHart]

Hi,

I would also be interested in which Boer War battles/skirmishes featured Boer machine gun fire? Did they have many/any machine guns? Were they firing in conjunction with incoming and outgoing heavy rifle fire? Were Australian officers present during these engagments? I genuinely don't know - like most Great War obsessed people I know very little about the Boer War.

I am now pretty certain that the fixed Nordenfeldts explain much of the automatic fire and I suspect that most of the machine gun reports emanating from survivors from V Beach refer to the sound of the 11 or so Maxims firing from aboard the River Cylde. They mustn't have been able to hear themselves think! At Anzac the machine guns arrive - as the Turks cheerfully admit later in the day and I think the multiple reports are largely explained by the effects of echoing throught the tangled gullies. Other confusion may be caused by difficulties in remembering when exactly an incident occurred in a long, frightening and dreadfully confusing day.

Personal experience reports have always been at the heart of my work as an oral historian, but I rarely believe them when they are in conflict with the facts or indeed simple probablility. There is a definite tendency to 'hear' machine guns when under heavy fire, this is then coupled by a natural desire to exagerate difficulties to excuse hold ups or a failure to achieve objectives. In some cases it is just plain and simple lying - to sell books, or appear the hero. For me the men of 25 April 1915 are heros enough without any embellishments...

I have been very impressed with this thread and particularly appreciated the measured contribultions of Chris, young Bill Sellars and many others. Like Chris, I had always believed that the machine guns were there at both Anzac and V Beach (I never believed W Beach had them) but the weight of evidence has gradually persuaded me otherwise over the last ten years. The Turks have not falsified their order of battle! In the end if the guns weren't there, then they weren't there! All in all it shows that the power of concentrated bolt action rifle fire in the hands of determined troops should not be underestimated on troops packed in boats or emerginhg from the Clyde.

Finally if there were so many Turkish machine guns at Anzac and Helles where are they? The captured Nordenfelt is proudly displayed as you would expect but where is the gun reputedly overrun on Plugges? Where are the Helles machine guns?

Keep up the good work,

Pete

PS As for my relevant military experience to allow me to comment on all this - all I can say is that I once saw a war film on TV but it scared me a bit - the noise, the blood, the dreadful acting - so I try to only watch light comedies these days.

[Crunchy]

Pete,

My apologies for deleting the post you refer to for the reasons I mentioned in my PM.

In fairness to Pete and to put his post in context I was asking for a list of the Australian officers who served in the South African War together with their actual battlefield experience in that conflict. Which of them then mentioned machine guns at the landing? If we are to use them and their accounts as proof that machine guns were at the landing then it is appropriate that we relate who they were and what their previous battlefield experience was. The Australian experience in South Africa was largely after the large engagements were fought. Certainly some fought at places like Eland's River and Diamond Hill but can we be sure that the experienced officers Bryn refers to were in these engagements or was it in the patrol work largely chasing parties of Boers after the surrender at Paardeburg. Also what were the other conflicts they fought in and who actually fought in them?

The pre- war Militia training of many of the officers would have consisted, at best, of one evening a week, a weekend camp per month (but not all units did this) and an annual two week camp so their experience would have been limited and it wouldn't have prepared them for anything like the impact of battle. Nor was the training in Egypt prior to the landing all that extensive.

I think I have mentioned often enough in this thread that it not an issue as to whether they had ever heard rifle fire or machine gun fire, but in what context?

Regards

Chris

PS. I prefer the lighter comedies too Pete.

[PeterH]

Turkish accounts also speak of receiving MG fire from offshore boats at ANZAC as well.

One account here from Captain Faik:

"..I saw a machine-gun firing from a boat in front of Ariburnu.Some of these shots passed over us.At once I ordered the platoon to move back..."

And Lieutenant Asim at Gaba Tepe:

"..only when the craft were quite close to Ari Burnu did our troops then open fire on them.There was reciproral fire with machine-guns from the landing craft as we opened up with the Mantelli gun.."

[green_acorn]

I note that, in the 'Handbook of the Turkish Army', referred to in previous posts, is this comment: "Prisoners taken in Gallipoli report that in some divisions there are twice this [normal] complement of machine guns." (p28). [my edit].

Bryn,

One day I will get to the TNA and find that book in its original form with all of its amendments, and for me the just as important later editions so important to General Allenby and the Desert Mounted Column. As I suggested in a previous post I believe that the footnotes were added by Mr Graves, unfortunately this footnote has not been dated and referenced, a very common fault in "intelligence product". There is a very good article on the problem of not attributing information at "A Modest Proposal for a Revolution in Intelligence Doctrine: An Intelligence Role for the Footnote" by John Alexander at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-...telligence.html

Noting that Graves has indicated the information has come from prisoners, when were they captured? April, August or November? Where were they captured? Helles, Anzac Cove? which regiments are they from? All the imponderables we won't know without the original Intelligence Officers reports at HQ MEF and the files Mr Graves worked with at HQ EEF, Cairo.

Kindest regards,

Chris Henderson

[Bryn]

Peter,

The landing boats (i think it was actually the steam pinnaces that towed the boats) at Anzac had machine guns mounted in the bow. I've read a few Australian accounts of their being used during the Landing.

[Pete1052]

Why is the presence or absence of a relatively small number of Turkish machine guns firing onto the landing beaches such an important issue? Does the answer somehow explain the eventual outcome of the campaign? Two weeks ago I went back to the beginning of the thread to try to find out for myself but no answer was apparent in the first dozen or so messages.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Pete1052

G'day mate

Interesting philosophical question. What is relevant information to write history? No one knows the answer as it is tailored to the individual. If a person writes a generalised history then this information is not important. If a person is writing an individual's biography, than this information is vitally important in placing the person and his behaviour. So take your pick. At the end of the day, relevance is a matter for the individual to make a judgement. For Bryn and Chris, this is important to them while apparently this does not appear germane to your interests. That is the beauty of history - something there for everyone.

Cheers

Bill

[Pete1052]

Bill, I thought there might be an unspoken reason for why the thread has grown to more than 200 posts. The only book I've read on Gallipoli was Alan Moorehead's and it's been more than 25 years since I read it. If I recall correctly he attributed the overall result of the campaign to the failure to seize the high ground immediately following the landings. I thought that perhaps the amount (or perceived amount) of forward-deployed Turkish firepower at the time of the landings might be an explanation for why this thread has generated so much interest.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Pete1052

G'day mate

I understood what you were after. However, my comment was more to the point that the original objective, if there was one, has been superseded. I have learned a great deal about this phase of the campaign, something of which I have very little knowledge and this discussion allows people to add to the mix or revelations. While I will never use this specific information in the near future, it adds to my overall knowledge base. The references given assist in directing further research which leads to further understanding. So for me, it is the range of sources quoted that makes all the difference. I am grateful to the contributors who have made this available.

Cheers

Bill

[michaeldr]

Pete,

with regard to your "I am now pretty certain that the fixed Nordenfeldts explain much of the automatic fire and I suspect that most of the machine gun reports emanating from survivors from V Beach refer to the sound of the 11 or so Maxims firing from aboard the River Cylde."

Do I understand you to say that the sound of the fire of the Nordenfeldts could not account for the reports of machine gune fire? And secondly, do you have a reference giving this number of maxims on the River Clyde, as my impression is that it was probably not more than eight? This is based on Steve Chambers' article in 'RND' [issue No.4 March 1998] where he describes eight casemates having being built on the River Clyde to house them, and 12 motor cycles being taken on board so that after the landing they could carry the maxims and their ammunition; one motor cycle does not sound like anywhere near enough to transport the ammo for 11 maxims.

I agree with your point about treating reports with a certain scepticism; one soldier or one officer sees very little of any particular battle, only what is in his immediate vicinity and even then distractions can lead to an uncertain recollection of the events at a later date. The only problem here is, can all of the people have been wrong, all of the time? Likewise I think that your quote: a natural desire to exaggerate difficulties to excuse hold ups or a failure to achieve objectives applies equally to the Ottoman accounts. I have mentioned earlier (post #39) the peculiar feature of the Turkish GS's Brief History whereby they refer to their own machine guns when making direct quotes from orders or reports, but seem never to mention them in the narrative itself.

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Pete,

Further to my post above

I have now found a ref to the 11 maxims on the River Clyde [The War in the Air, Vol. II, p.37]

Still not sure how to reconcile this with the number of casemates and their planned use together with the 12 motor cycles, but eleven are certainly mentioned.

regards

Michael

[PMHart]

Hi Michael,

Sorry chum, but I haven't had the time to check the number of Maxims on board the Clyde but as I remember it the number seems to vary fairly cheerfully from 8 to 12 depending on source! One reference even refers to 18 motorcycles I think! My memory is dreadful! In a sense though the number doesn't matter to the point I was trying to make which is that they would provide a roar of sound covering and confusing the issue as to whether there were Turkish Maxims firing at the same time. As to the varying sound signatures I simply don't know. I thought that Nordenfelts had a distinctive pom-pom sound as per their nickname, but I really don't know how distinctive it was or whether it could be distinguished in amdst the noise of rifle fire. Their fire would however explain some of the more destructive aspects to the fire pouring down into the boats. As you know all sources refer to the splendid fire control of the Turks: they only fired when something was happening, which of course is also when the covering fire of the Briitsh Maxims would swell up.

I must make it clear that I regard this whole question as a work in progress. I do not have a hard and fast position and I know that is also the position expressed in the well-considered posts of Chris (Crunchy). If someone can point to solid evidence of machine guns that were in action during the early morning of 25 April (as opposed to arriving later in the day which the Turks admit) then I for one would be delighted as a vindication of the judgement of men like Geddes whom I greatly admire. But so far they haven't and the machine guns seem to have melted away - despite the capture at the point of the bayonet of their supposed positions at both Anzac and Helles. The Turks could not possibly have got them away - so where are they?

We are far enough away to properly consider such issues without feeling that a slur is being cast upon the men involved. I don't believe that anyone has that in mind. One point I would however make is that the Turks had nothing to cover up on their performance on 25 April. It was after all a day of utter failure (if enormous demonstrable courage) for both the British and Anzacs. The Turks don't lie about machine guns at other times so why for just a few hours on landing? I certainly don't think there were any machine guns at W Beach but a lot of British accounts refer to them, it almost seems to have been a verbal tic, a method of describing a storm of fire! Which of course there was from about 100 Trukish rifles indulging in rapid fire onto a fairly concentrated pinned down target. Oooo'er! I wouldn't fancy it in a month of Sundays that's for sure....

Cheers,

Pete

P.S. When some of the less experienced troops landed at Suvla there are frequent references in accounts (oral and documents) to officers and men not recognising the sound of rifle fire or the sound of bullets passing close by. The troops at Helles may have been regualrs but they were not by any means battle hardened and the British Army did not have 'battle innoculation' in those days.