TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bryn

Just adding the best possible data from the Turkish General Staff map of the same day.

In between these two maps is the reality.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

Thanks Bill. The first map does not extend as far as Fisherman's Hut, so it's impossible to tell from that whether there were any guns there. I also wonder what is meant here by 'guns'. Are they all artillery pieces? Nordenfeldts? Machine guns? I assume they're supposed to be artillery, as there were two at the Cup, on Lone Pine (where the '7 Gun battery' is marked), and this map also seems to be marking the Olive Grove guns, inland from the Gaba Tepe headland. The Turkish map also seems to be indicating the Olive Grove guns but makes no indication of any on the 400 Plateau.

The Turkish map indicates defences at Balikci damlari (Fisherman's Hut).

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Thank you for the maps. I think you have summed it up pretty well. The only comment I would make is that air reconnaissance, relatively speaking, was in its infancy at the time. I haven' t seen any air photos taken prior to the landings although it was used later in the campaign. If air photos weren't being used then this information would seem to be a compilation of several flights flown over the area with the pilot, or the observer if he had one, marking what they could see as they flew over the ground using large scale maps, so it was not easy to discriminate locations with precision. Thus the accuracy of what they plotted may have been out in regards to location, but they seem to have done a pretty good job under the circumstances. I agree they seem to have greatly over estimated the number of guns. I did read somewhere, but unfortunately I can't remember the source, that the Ottoman's moved some of their batteries around in the period prior to the landings and that they placed some of them within olive groves in an attempt to hide them rather than in the gun positions they later took up. These two points might account for the over estimation.

Bryn.

I would think the guns they are referring to would be artillery pieces as I doubt that a machine gun (maxim type) would be all that easy to pick up in a flight over a position, where an artillery piece would be much more evident. The Turkish map does show the battery on the 400 Plateau. It is marked to the right of the word Ku Ariburnu and just below the letter K in the word Kemalyeri, although the symbol is in Legge Valley. The ridge to the left of the symbol is Second Ridge and that to the right is Third Ridge.

Cheers

Chris

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bryn

Mate, when I said there was nothing at Fisherman's Hut, that is what the map indicated. I have posted the section of the map with Fisherman's Hut and circled the four small trenches. But there was no more spotted.

Now I'm not much of a practical man when it comes to the placement of weapons, but I would have said that this was a lightly held position. Chris would be able to give some idea as to the practicality for placing machine gun(s) in the marked trenches.

Chris

While some reconnaissance reports for Gallipoli do exist and I believe they did use the camera - there is a good composite aerial pic of the trenches taken in September - but looking at the recon reports available, they did not take any pix. So we are in a bit of a quandary on this matter. The result will be best guess and no more.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

So the Turkish map is from later in the campaign, or from after it - it's not one drawn up before 25th April.

[michaeldr]

In respect of the 25th April 1915 landings, the British aerial photography was at best limited

The first allied flight over the peninsula was on 28th March 1915

after that planes were over there "at every opportunity"

the flyers plotted enemy positions and

"…procured some crude but useful photographs of the landing beaches and the ground in the immediate neighbourhood and they wrote descriptions of the beaches as they appeared from the air; they corrected the inaccurate maps; and they dropped bombs on batteries and camps............

Most of the early photography, which was of an experimental kind, was done by one officer, Flight Lieutenant C. H. Butler, who began on the 4th April with a small folding Goertz-Anschutz camera. A better camera was later borrowed from the French squadron, which under Captain Cesari had come out in May..................

It was not until the end of August that a regular photographic section was organized;...."

[from 'The War in the Air' Vol. II, by H. A. Jones]

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Chris H,

re your post #121

I have sent you a PM on this

best regards

Michael

[Crunchy]

Bill,

The trenches appear to be in the area of No 1 Outpost. The trench closest to the sea is a perfectly suitable position for a machine gun, the further inland they go the less effective the fields of fire appear to be in terms of range due to the spur to the south of those positions.

Expanding on Chris Henderson's comments above on the employment of machine guns, and I must add we are talking about the use of machine guns in the defence, the terrain plays a pivotal part in their siting to make the most effective use of them.

By effective I am referring to the beaten zone (area where the rounds hit the ground) and trajectory of the rounds on their way to the beaten zone. The beaten zone is an elongated ellipse where the length of the ellipse is in line with the direction the gun is firing - it is long and narrow. Machine guns are most effective when two conditions are best met: firstly firing in enfilade (from the flank) with the rounds and the beaten zone running along the line of assaulting troops (ie parallel to the line of troops) and perpendicular to the direction of assault; secondly grazing fire, which means the bullets are traveling close to and parallel to the ground about waist height or lower without any dead ground (defilade or the area where the weapon cannot fire into) between the gun and the target. The least effective use is frontal fire where the beaten zone is perpendicular to the line of troops assaulting and parallel to the direction of assault and from a position of plunging fire. Plunging fire occurs when a machine gun is placed on a high hill and is firing down from that hill. In this position the bullets are coming down at an angle and the beaten zone is shortened. Also there is likely to be dead ground in the area closest to the gun and the assault is in defilade, thus the killing area is greatly reduced.

The terrain rarely allows the ideal conditions to be met but as Chris Henderson has pointed out, the siting of machine guns is carefully undertaken, initially by the company commander and then by the battalion commander, to make sure their fire will be as effective as possible. The primary arc of the gun will always be to cover the most likely approach in enfilade, and at some range to make best use of the beaten zone and grazing fire. Thus in a well sited position the machine guns of one platoon will cover the likely approaches to the adjoining platoons and the likely approaches to that platoon will be covered by the guns in the adjoining platoon. Tying in the fire of machine guns like this is called interlocking fire and the photos Peter Doyle provided above show perfect examples of it. The riflemen will provide close protection for the gun. You will also have situations where some of the guns of one battalion fire across a likely approach to an adjoining battalion. Here we are talking about modern units with three machine guns per platoon, nine in a company and thirty six in a battalion without an additional machine gun platoon. (We have four rifle companies per battalion as opposed to three in a US battalion.) With the Ottomans, machine guns were a very scarce and valuable asset with four guns to a three battalion regiment. They would be controlled by the regimental commander and carefully allocated. They wouldn't have had enough to cover all of the likely landing beaches, let alone employ interlocking fire across all of them.

In the example of No 1 Outpost above, a machine gun in the trench nearest the sea provides good enfilade fire down along North Beach towards Ari Burnu or across the front of a position at the Fisherman's Hut, although there is likely to be some dead ground immediately in front of the gun depending on the actual terrain. Rafferty and Strickland were able to get into dead ground about 130 metres from No 1 Outpost on the day. If the terrain allowed, the same gun might be able to cover both arcs, ie across the front of the position at the Fisherman's Hut and down along North Beach. The gunners would be told which was the primary arc (priority area) and which was the secondary arc (fire on this arc if no enemy are attacking in the primary arc).

Even someone with basic training in the employment of machine guns wouldn't put one on Plugge's Plateau; too high a position in comparison to the ground immediately around it with very steep slopes, resulting in too much dead ground in front of the gun and plunging fire. A more effective location would be Ari Burnu because it is significantly lower and the plunging fire effect and amount of dead ground in front of the gun is accordingly reduced, but there would be dead ground some way out from the gun due to the height and slope of the position. Its best use would be firing across the approaches to and along North Beach beyond the dead ground and provide interlocking fire with a gun at No 1 Outpost.

I hope this explanation is useful and understandable.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

I agree that the trenches marked on Bill's most-recently-posted map are in fact on what became known as No. 1 Outpost. Fisherman's Hut knoll is the next to the north, and seems to be obscured under markings made on the map.

[Crunchy]

Flight Lieutenant C. H. Butler, who began on the 4th April with a small folding Goertz-Anschutz camera.

Michael,

Do you know if this camera was fitted to the aircraft so it could take true vertical or oblique shots or was it hand held?

Regards

Chris

[green_acorn]

The TGS map is a modern interpretation, it uses military symbology that the Turks would not have adopted until after joining NATO. Tolga Ornek and Feza Toker's book Gallipoli: The Front Line Experience has reproduced Esat Pasher's map displaying tOttoman positions in the North, it is dated "4.8.1915" I am assuming that is 4 August 1915,

cheers,

Chris Henderson

[Pete1052]

...your world goes silent and you feel everything around you is in slow motion for perhaps twenty seconds at a time, like one of those dreams in which you are trying to run forward and your have lead weights on your feet. I have been told the reason for this is that the brain is processing information at such a rate that everything appears to slow down.

A Vietnam veteran of U.S. Army armor said combat has the same odd slow-motion quality that a car accident or near-car accident can have. It happened to me once years ago in a situation in the States that almost turned violent--a mere 20 seconds seemed like 3 minutes.

[Ozzie]

We are fortunate on this forum, that those who have served, share with us, their professional knowledge.

One who has not been under fire, can only surmise.

Those that have been through, and survived one or many firefights, can share their experience.

And so they do.

We learn from their experiences.

At what cost to them, we shall never know.

Thank you for sharing.

Regards

Kim

[michaeldr]

Chris,

re your post #135 above

I do not have a clear answer to your question

But my guess is that it was a hand-held operation performed over the side of the aircraft

Were talking about March-April 1915 in the Aegean

As I understand it developments were being made on the WF, but even so

the 'A' camera was first used there only on the 2nd March 1915 and

it too was not fixed to the plane in the earliest stages

All the indications are that, at this time and in this theatre, we are not talking about anything very sophisticated.

regards

Michael

[Crunchy]

Kim,

Thank you for your kind words. PM sent.

Michael,

Thank you for the clarification. You have to admire them don't you? Given the conditions they worked under they came up with a pretty good understanding of the Ottoman defences.

Regards

Chris

[michaeldr]

quote: Does anybody know of any Turkish record of the Nordenfeldt gun that was emplaced on Gaba Tepe? I see it's not noted on the diagram from the TGS's Brief History that Michael's posted.

Bryn,

I may have given the impression that all of the thirteen Nordenfelt 25mm (shown with the 9th Division's artillery on that chart) were at Helles

If that was so then I apologise. Some were at Helles where one was captured, but not all were there.

The TGS'c Brief History indicates that the area of responsibility for

"the defence of the 35km shoreline extending from Azmak Creek, in the north of Ariburnu, to Seddulbahr was left to the power of the 9th Division"

They continue "...a battalion affiliated to the 29th (sic) Regiment was positioned in the northern sector of the division's area of responsibility. Some units of the 29th (sic) Regiment were scattered along the 12km shoreline between Azmak and Camtepe. The main force was kept intact in the western sector at Eceabat.

The commander of the battalion considering the importance of the Kabatepe shoreline, as it provided an appropriate landing ground had rightly positioned he reserve forces one-and-a-half km to the east of Kabatepe."

Note - these refs to 29th - shouldn't they read 27th?

Going back to the Naval History's quote from the German, Major Prigge; this time I will give the footnote in full

"The Turks state that it was the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment, and that it had attached to it three batteries - one field artillery, one mountain and one of 6" short guns - besides some Nordenfeldts."

Thus, the Turks awaiting the landing of the first Anzacs at dawn on the 25th April certainly had some of those thirteen Nodenfelts shown on the chart;

but how many is 'some'?

regards

Michael

[Peter Doyle]

With regard to photo reconn, this certainly was carried out prior to the landings, and during them too and I have seen examples that, in reasonable detail, show the landings in action, with the River Clyde engaged. My understanding is that these were hand held cameras. Maps were also annotated from the intelligence gained, likely to be done in the air, and simple summary maps were drawn up of defences. These mark on potential strong points, but nothing in the way of greater detail, as you might expect...

Peter

[Crunchy]

Bryn,

Turkish 9th Div Order dated 7th April. This details the defensive arrangements to be taken up by units in the 9th Division area according to Liman von Suanders new defence arrangements for the Peninisula. Nordenfelts are at Kapa Tepe. Paragraph 5 details the Kapa Tepe sector and is quoted in full below.

5. The section commencing from Aghil Dere (inclusive) as far as the left of the four 18-centimetre gun position (Pellaimont luk) in the neighbourhood of Kapa Tetpe (inclusive) will be covered and defended by the battalion which will be sent from the 27th Regiment , and this section will be named the Kaba Tepe section.

The Field battery will again be sent to a concealed position E of Ari (?) Point, and this battery will be under command of the Officer commanding this district. The Mantelli (?) and Nordenfelts (guns) which are at Kapa Tepe, and the 15 -centimetre heavy battery (consisting of four guns) are under the Officer commanding this district. For the protection of the guns against a sudden attack a special force must be detailed..

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Thanks Chris, Michael.

A party of mainly 11th Battalion, along with engineers, encountered a Nordefeldt gun on 4th May. Four boats containing approximately 120 men in total, and a shore party of about 13 (these came along the beach), assaulted the Turkish positions on Gaba Tepe:

'There was no sign of life on the land. No shot was fired. But it seemed impossible that the Turks could be surprised. ...Looking to the beach on their left Leane saw the forms of Rumball and his party of the 10th engaged in cutting the northward wire. Thirty yards from shore the boats grounded. As the men scrambled out, a heavy fire was opened on them. In their trenches high up the green slope the Turks had three machine-guns and an automatic gun firing a 1-in shell. Lieutenant Rockliff was hit, and another officer of Leane's party, Lieutenant H.B. Thompson - one of a number whose promotion from sergeant had been authorised the night before, though he had not actually heard of that fact - was killed.' (Bean Vol. 1 p559).

'We dashed over the sides and waded towards the beach. It was not until the boats grounded that the Turks appeared. Immediately a withering fire broke out from machine guns, rifles, and two small automatic guns firing 1lb shells. Lieut. Rockliff was shot with several others before they could clear the boats. Lieut. Thompson fell shot, fatally wounded.' (Leane, 'Gaba Tepe Raid: Gen. Leane's Review.' Reveille Vol.5 No.9 1 Jun 1932 p2).

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Chris

Thanks for taking the time to produce an excellent description of MG emplacement at the later known position as No 1 Outpost.

Michael, Peter and Bryn

Thanks for all the additional commentary. I keep learning a great deal from you fellows.

Cheers

Bill

[michaeldr]

Like Chris, I have been puzzled for some time by the Turkish gun referred to as 'Mantelli'

If anyone has any firm information on this gun, or was it a class of guns, then please assist by providing leads

Regarding the aerial photography, Peter Chasseaud and a certain Mr. Peter Doyle in their book 'Grasping Gallipoli' pub. by Spellmount, 2005 [iSBN 1-86227-283-2] speak quite highly of the achievements of Butler whose "near-vertical photographs enabled Turkish trenches, batteries and other tactical features to be plotted with some precision"

However they also mention that Samson (CO of the RNAS in the MEF at that time) was critical of the command policy, "believing that had they been permitted to concentrate solely on close reconnaissance of the landing beaches, they would have produced much more complete results."

It is also confirmed that at this stage we are talking about only one camera, only one photographer and shortages of plates, film, paper and chemicals.

regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Michael,

The other issue with aerial photogrpahy at that time, besides the lack of fixed camera's was the inability to properly exploit the images. We are talking before the days of good altimeters linked to the camera for scaling and limited understanding of photo interpretation. Though I didn't manage to win it I managed to copy the details of a document that was previously in the Headlam Papers discussing aerial photo interpretation at Gallipoli. I will type it up properly and add the text here sortly.

cheers,

Chris H

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Michael

G'day mate

While not aiming to steal Chris's thunder, I might have a go at answering part of your question. I believe the Turkish term “Mantelli” is derived from the German term “Mantelkanone”. These were the old mid 19th century muzzle loading, shell guns produced by Dahlgren or Krupp. The chamber is covered with a steel mantle to provide the breech with extra reinforcement and strength. Because of their age, the Mantelli guns had a very slow rate of fire. Under normal circumstances they could fire a maximum of 3 rounds per minute and if the men really pushed it, 4 rounds but this was very unusual.

At Anzac, the story of the Turkish use of the Mantelli gun is described in the book by Lt. Col. Şefik Bey "Çanakkale-Arıburnu Şavaşları ve 27 nci Alay" (The Çanakkale and Arıburmu Battles and 27th Regiment)

The 27th Regiment worked hard at Arıburnu before the landing. They built new roads and they fortified the trenches. They even built a gun emplacement for a Mantelli gun by the shore of Kabatepe to fire upon landing enemy although hidden from any naval bombardment.

The Mantelli fired 114 shrapnel and 37 HE shells into the landing enemy and caused heavy casualties. A ship moved between Kabatepe and Arıburne putting an end to gun.

The Turkish artillery were blessed with these older style guns which were often captured during the Sinai and Palestine campaigns. A battery of 4 Krupps Mantelli mountain guns were captured at Magdhaba.

I hope this helps a little. I am sure Chris will have a great deal more to add.

Cheers

Bill

[Crunchy]

G'Day Bill,

You are not stealing any thunder at all. I know very little about them. Many thanks for the information, it is very useful. Every bit adds to the picture and I am very appreciative for the description. Do we know what calibre they were?

Cheers

Chris

[Jeff Pickerd]

Chris,

Have a look at Plate 3, TGS, "Canakkale Fortified Area Artillery (February 18, 1915)". Mantelli guns described: "adet 87/24 luk mantelli top." The only Turkish word I know is "Top" meaning "Gun". If the guns denoted as 75 are the French 75 mm, then 87/24 is the calibre.

I think Bill has cracked the riddle as to what type of gun they were.

25 mm Nordenfeldt also listed.

The only trouble with this map is it applies to the Dardanelles Straits defences, not the Ari Burnu area.

Jeff