TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Bryn]

A closer-up view of Bolton's Hill, looking north towards the Anzac positions (see previous post for wider view).

[Bryn]

Looking the other way.

Gaba Tepe from Harris Ridge, parallel with Wilson's Lookout.

[Bryn]

From the Red Cross investigation into the disappearance of L/Cpl Pearce, 7th Battalion AIF:

[michaeldr]

From my post #257 above

quote from Bill's post #151

"Of the 11 (sic) 25mm multi barrelled guns, we positively identified the positioning of eight: two were at Kabatepe; two at Zigindere (at the mouth of Gully Ravine) with one of these guns being captured at X Beach; two guns at Ece Liman, the small port area on the Gulf of Saros; and two at Kumtepe, in the hills above where the present day Kum Hotel is located about 3.5 km to the south of Kabatepe."

Bill and co. have identified the positions of eight of the 25mm Nordenfeldt guns from a total of thirteen (not 11) which are shown on the 5th Army's Organization Chart [see my post #100] as being at the disposal of the 9th Division.

Where were the other five 25mm Nordenfeldt guns?

Lt. Charles Conybeare RMLI, No.3 Coy. Plymouth Bn., writing in the Globe & Laurel, April/May 1919 *, describes the action at 'Y' Beach on the evening of the 25th April 1915, and he mentions that at that time the right flank being subjected to "rifle fire which was terrific and a Nordenfeldt"

This may be an addition to the eight (out of 13) so far identified by Bill & Co. (see post #151)

on the other hand, as it was the evening of the 25th, it may equally well be a gun which was moved up from elsewhere

My reason for this latter caution is that I now believe that these weapons were much more mobile than I had originally thought. Writing in chapter 8 of 'Seapower Ashore' [Chatham Publishing, 2001] Richard Brooks describes the action at Tientsin in 1900 during the Boxer rebellion and he includes a photograph from his own collection, which shows the 'Nordenfeldt machine gun' of HMS Orlando which has been mounted on large wheels (diameter coming above the elbow of a standing man) and with shafts for pulling it along; the whole looks something akin to a stripped down hawker's handcart. This 'Nordenfeldt machine gun' has a crew of 5 bluejackets.

It is quite possible that a similar conveyance was used by the Turks to provide mobility for these guns, while their more modern (Maxims) weapons where held in reserve to appear later on the evening of the 25th April 1915.

................................................................................

regarding the question of time-scale and the use of the words "The Landings";

The British appear to think that the term 'The Landings' covers the period 25th to 27th April 1915, with the First Battle of Krithia being on the 28th

Similarly at Anzac, the end of The Landings appears to be the 28/9th April with the arrival of the RND for the stage which later became known as the Defence of Anzac.

However, for the purposes of this discussion and unless persuaded otherwise, I am quite happy to go along with our Turkish friends and look at the machine gun situation during the daylight hours of the 25th April 1915.

regards

Michael

* as quoted in 'From Trench and Turret - Royal Marines' letters and diaries 1914-1918' by S. M. Holloway, pub. Constable 2006

[green_acorn]

Michael and others,

You are right about a wheeled version of the Nordenfeldt, here is an image of a Gardner MG, Maxim MG and Nordenfeldt MG mounted on gun carriages. However, given the cartridge size and weight, even one Nordenfeldt would have required an ammunition train larger than that for a Maxim and from the Turkish Army Handbook there is no evidence of such a unit.

cheers,

Chris H

[michaeldr]

quote: However, given the cartridge size and weight, even one Nordenfeldt would have required an ammunition train larger than that for a Maxim and from the Turkish Army Handbook there is no evidence of such a unit.

However, the organization chart in the TGS's Brief History shows that there were 13 (thirteen) of them with the 9th Division on Gallipoli just a week before the landings

and Bill and our Pals there have found the deployment details for 8 of them for the 25th April 1915. They were there all right, Chris, and judging by the numbers of allied soldiers who heard/saw machine gun fire, they were not short of ammo either!

One was even captured for heaven's sake,

which alas, puts the Intelligence Section, Cairo, on the spot

with best regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Michael,

You are indeed correct, I was incorrectly applying my own logic without the evidence. I tend towards the view that the five "missing" Nordenfeldt MG's in the 9 Division Area were deployed as "fixed" weapons at other permanent/fixed defence positions on the Peninsula.

I believe the Nordenfeldt MG's weren't high value, given the likely age (20 plus years?) of the guns and the weight and volume of the ammunition and therefore the necessary logistics train. Nordenfeldt's also don't seem to have been deployed as mobile weapons in other armies since the advent of the Maxim, I would imagine the Turkish Army and its German advisor's ascribed to the same sort of employment theory, noting of course they aren't identified as a "unit" weapon in either the Cairo Intelligence Handbook or in any Turkish documents. But in an Army that was underfunded and recovering from the Balkan War, the Nordenfeldt's were still valuable for the defence of fixed land gun battery sites where their high rate of fire allowed the redeployment of defending infantry for manoeuvre.

At this point in the war, the Maxim's were still a high value weapon, brigaded in the MG Coy and not integrated into the Bns or Coys which leads me to the view of Jeff and Chris that they held them back and were not seen on the battlefield until about 0830.

I believe that the German advisor's also countered the desire of some Turkish officers for the forward defence of the shores of the Peninsula at all suspected landing sites in favour of defence-in-depth with strong manoeuvre forces. No doubt if the German view had not prevailed Maxim's and other MG's would have been deployed along with all available infantry covering the beaches. But the Maxim's would probably still only be deployed in pairs as they needed their Range Finder Corporal, Detachment Officer and other elements of the MG Coy. Plus as the MG's were in a separate unit, most likely responsible for their own local defence, to employ the MG's individually is not sensible, they needed to be able to coordinate their fire to cover stoppages and redeployment. Finally cleaning was a big issue with the MG's of the time, they had to be cleaned frequently the ammunition was not high quality (not that any other nations ammunition was much better), causing a lot of fouling.

Whereas tying the older and less valuable Nordenfeldt's to Battery positions also meant they had the benefit of the Battery Range Finders or were used against targets they had good range tables for, therefore having two or three at Gaba Tepe would make quite sound sense.

And I would have to agree about the comments about Crunchy's and More Marjorum's post's, the sound description of the practicalities of small arms fire and the nature of MG fire against the rate of movement of lifeboats, makes the thought of a Turkish Platoon firing at two boats suicidal.

cheers,

Chris H

PS: Crunchy's post reminds me of a MG Platoon shoot over about five to seven days, I supported as a Regt Sig many moons ago (1978). Our Bn had been allocated Vickers for training and overhead fire during Live Fire Practices. A Platoon of three sections/six guns, firing as sections and a platoon over open sights out to 1600 odd metres, was impressive. Mind you the tripods having smooth brass faces on their legs where they joined were dangerous, the guns would slowly slide down, a soldier from another Bn was shot in the back because of that, he survived because of his pack and the poor quality of Indian ammunition the Army had purchased (all tracer had to be stripped from the belts as it would head anywhere but the target). To clean the Vickers during a shoot (and in combat), the belt was removed and the tripod was unlocked to allow the barrel to drop forward, the trigger plate and lock (operating group) was then removed and the water from the cooling jacket, which could be boiling, poured over the lock and down the breech to flush out the carbon - very effective, but not something you would want to be doing without mutual support.

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Chris H,

The more one looks for information on the landing, the more convinced I am to there having been no Turkish machine guns firing on the different Battalions as they landed.

Two new pieces of information have only just come to my attention in the last week or so.

Last Saturday I was looking through Ross McMullin's book, POMPEY ELLIOTT, with the intention of purchase, now on my 'must have list', and was drawn to a very interesting photograph from within it.

This shows one of the 7th Battalions life boats approaching Anzac Cove, morning of the 25th, taken from one of the other boats along side. The interesting thing about this shot, is it shows at least two men drooping over the boats side, with the caption stating they were some of the dead in the boat, but all other men are sitting quite upright, still rowing, with no apparent sense of alarm or panic.

What it does clearly indicate, is that they are not under intense machine gun and rifle fire as they approach Anzac beach. The casualties would indicate that they have been hit by either, shrapnel, or rifle fire, or both, further out as the boats are still approaching their landing points.

This seems to be born out by many of the accounts of the landing.

The second is even more interesting, as it contradicts the account given in the War Diary, and this comes from John Hamilton's latest book, GALLIPOLI SNIPER. It is the account of the 11th Battalions landing by Pte Keith Wadsworth No.1199, 1st Reinforcements, from the time they clamber down into the pinnace to be towed towards the shore, until he was wounded later in the day.

He describes vividly the approach to Anzac Cove, the green flare being fired by the Turks, then silence. The first shot fired by a Turkish sentry, then increasing rifle fire being directed at the boats.

But no machine gun fire, at the boats, or as they land on the beach.

Here again we have one of the differing versions with regard machine guns firing, or no machine guns. I would take such an account as this, and the photograph, to fall into line with the Turkish version of events for the landing from 4.30 am until later in the morning.

Wadsworth account can be found at pages 132 to 137, of Gallipoli Sniper, as I have given an undertaking not to quote directly from the book in breach of copyright.

Bryn,

Thank you very much for putting up your magnificent photographs, they certainly give a dynamic visual and true perspective of what the maps indicate. I am very impressed by your apparent methodical and detailed approach to photographing the Anzac sector, with an eye to capturing the areas of these various actions. Well done.

All I need to now ascertain, is, just what do those symbols actually represent, and if possible, just where were the two Nordenfeldts positioned, for no doubt, they were indeed there.

Jeff

[michaeldr]

Jeff,

re your post #293 and the map symbol which you show there:

It is not very clear on my machine, but it looks very similar to four shown on the att. Turkish artillery map for the Helles front

Do you think that this symbol could have been used to indicate one of the Ottoman artillery's forward observation posts?

regards

Michael

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Jeff

Interesting evidence but inconclusive. Let me give you another piece of evidence from an eye witness account that located the Nordenfeldt and in this pic, was used by the attacking Australians to fire at the Turks.

The fact that this is from a Wills Cigarette Card is neither here nor there - it is an account that obviously resonated and thus came from an eye witness. It has similar veracity as any other evidence presented to date.

Bryn and Jeff

Eye witness conflation is a common problem. So Bryn, you know full well that the Red Cross Cards are next to worthless in detailing evidence of injuries. For the benefit of members, let me give a modest example of conflation which Jeff you will readily appreciate because it is in your area of expertise and for Bryn because it is an eye witness report.

The morning of the 21st. of March saw a reconnaissance party of about 150 all ranks leave the Brigade and proceed on a road to Wadi Mucksheib a small Turkish post away out on the Desert about 30 miles east. The march was very arduous but ended most successfully, about 40 prisoners being brought in and the water reservoirs there were destroyed. Capt. A.E. Wearne, a newly joined Officer, was in charge of the 8th Regiment personnel, consisting of about 6 Officers and 72 Other Ranks, and he was subsequently awarded the Military Cross, and Sgt. P.J. Maginness the D.C.M. Cpl. Monaghan was our only casualty, he being killed.

8th LHR History by Capt TS Austin, AWM224 MSS35

Basically this is a conflation of two accounts, the reconnaissance to Wadi Mucksheib and the raid on Bir el Jifjafa three weeks later. The result is that anything written by Austin needs to be double checked before being used as evidence regardless of how much I like him as a source or that he agrees with my point of view.

What is evident is that even eye witnesses to an event can report on another event in the belief that it is the event they are actually reporting on - vis a vis, conflating accounts to give one account of actually two disparate accounts.

So we get back to accreditation of sources, and this is more specifically directed at Jeff - apart from a source agreeing with your point of view, what have you actually done to establish its reliability?

What I mean is:

Is this person a reliable reporter?

What is the track record of reliability?

Is there any passage in that person's words which you would find unreliable?

What is your basis for distinguishing between credible and unreliable data from that informant?

When there is no ability to cross reference information, what is the basis of acceptance from the informant?

It is not good enough to cherry pick a passage because it suits a belief and then to ignore a gaff by the same informant because it has nothing to do with the subject at hand. I have witnessed cherry picking aplenty but no one actually giving an analysis of the source - except that it agrees with a belief.

Cheers

Bill

[green_acorn]

Jeff

Interesting evidence but inconclusive. Let me give you another piece of evidence from an eye witness account that located the Nordenfeldt and in this pic, was used by the attacking Australians to fire at the Turks.

The fact that this is from a Wills Cigarette Card is neither here nor there - it is an account that obviously resonated and thus came from an eye witness. It has similar veracity as any other evidence presented to date.

Bill

Bill,

That Wills cigarette card is hardly evidence, it is an artists rendition of propaganda value, created for the propaganda value and to encourage sales through collectors. It was possibly created from third or fourth hand hearsay, but most likely from a heavily censored news report, of an event that may or may not have happened, by an artist in London. Besides which it is not a Nordenfeldt multi-barrelled MG, an oversize artists interpretation of Maxim maybe.

If it is "evidence" who was the eyewitness, who was the artist, how, where and when did he paint it without interrupting the chain-of-evidence/memory and what was the purpose of the painting besides advertising and encouraging collectors. It is like a drawing from the London Illustrated News created to enhance the theme and message of an accompanying story, but hardly evidence.

cheers,

Chris H

[Auimfo]

What I mean is:

Is this person a reliable reporter?

What is the track record of reliability?

Is there any passage in that person's words which you would find unreliable?

What is your basis for distinguishing between credible and unreliable data from that informant?

When there is no ability to cross reference information, what is the basis of acceptance from the informant?

It is not good enough to cherry pick a passage because it suits a belief and then to ignore a gaff by the same informant because it has nothing to do with the subject at hand. I have witnessed cherry picking aplenty but no one actually giving an analysis of the source - except that it agrees with a belief.

Cheers

Bill

I recently read a short biography on a distant relative of mine that failed in exactly these ways.......how odd.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Jeff Pickerd]

Michael,

Thanks for looking for similar symbols on the maps of the TGS history, but none of these seem to be exactly the same as the ones on the two maps I put up.

It is intriguing as to why no identification of these symbols can be found amongst the different legends for units, formations, guns and MG's of the Turkish records. These symbols are on those two maps for a reason, information as to their nature must be in the Turkish records that relate to these maps, otherwise they would not have been drawn there, but nothing seems to be coming to light.

Your observation, as to that of Crunchy's, as to them possibly indicating forward artillery observation posts, could be valid, but until such time as we can have these symbols positively identified, it's anyone's guess as to their meaning.

I can find nothing to indicate the positions of the two Nordenfeldts at Gaba Tepe from any of the period maps, or maps for the later stages of the campaign.

Of the symbols that come close to those of the Nordenfeldts on the Ari Burnu area maps, all would appear to be artillery pieces. There is no indication of anything similar around the Gaba Tepe area.

Bill,

I would think your "Wills" cigarette card depicts an Australian Nordenfeldt gun in action during the Boer War, much in the way of archival documentation and images to support that.

A very long stretch of the imagination to claim it as depicting the gun in action at Gallipoli.

Still trying to see what the history of the 8th LH Regt, with the account of the Wadi Mucksheib/Bir el Jifjafa ventures, has to do with my post of Pte Keith Wadsworth's account of the 11th Battalion's landing at Anzac Cove, 25th April. It's hardly like Wadsworth mixing the 25th April and 19th May into one episode. I'm more than comfortable to the credibility of the evidence.

Jeff

[Bryn]

Jeff, the Wills card is from a series of 50 released in 1915, related to incidents in 1915, all of which are captioned as such on the back. It does not depict a gun in action during the Boer War.

As Pte Wadsworth landed in Anzac Cove, he was not amongst those who landed further north, which is where the many reports of the machine gun come from. Witnesses there do report machine gun fire.

[Auimfo]

Bryn is correct about the cigarette card however it's still only a 'third-hand' source rather than an eyewitness account. Jeff was quoting Wadsworth, who we know, was recounting his actual experiences. Bill has produced a card that he 'assumes' must've come from an eyewitness via the producers of Wills cigarettes. Certainly it's an interesting card and bears consideration but it needs to be assessed on it's own merits and I don't think it can be classed as anything even approaching an eyewitness account. Indeed, the card does not even make the claim that it was depicting a scene from the day of the initial landing.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Bryn,

If the 'Wills' cigarette cards depict the events of 1915 it makes that particular card absolutely factually wrong. It is obviously the artists interpretation of the fighting on Gallipoli being influenced by images of the Bore War, for we all know that the Australian forces landed with no such gun as depicted.

I fail to see what relevance this card has to the Turkish machine gun question, other than reinforcing the belief that they were there when the evidence suggests otherwise. It is flight of fancy.

Yes Pte Wadsworth landed at Anzac Cove, he clearly states that. But the point of putting the reference to his account, is to show that here was a man of the 11th Battalion who recorded a different experience to that recorded in the 11th Battalions War Diary. He mentions no machine gun fire, the War Dairy does.

If there are conflicting accounts from men who landed, and the Turkish accounts strongly suggest that they had no machine guns on the morning of the 25th, I would tend to support the accounts that coincide with those of the Turks. The total lack of any evidence of Turkish machine gun positions being located as the first and subsequent lines of defensive positions are over run would further support the Turkish view point. If there were machine guns, just where were they, and where did they go?

If one studies many of the second hand reports stemming from Egypt, as related by men relating what they have been told of the fighting by the wounded who are flooding into the hospitals there, the story of facing heavy machine gun fire at the landing becomes entrenched. It takes on the suggestion that it was a fact. The brutality and Barbarism of the Turk at this time is also a fact, according to the stories related.

I would suggest that the reports of machine gun fire brought down on the landing forces, once made, gained strength, became established and had to be maintained as a popular belief. The men at the time had no evidence to support, or refute, the suggestion, one way or the other, it just became an excepted fact.

Jeff

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Firstly, the silly stuff.

For the humour bereft, let me agree with you that I am stating that this card is some sort of authentic claim.

And for everyone else.

The real issue is the nature of evidence. For Jeff, this was a good natured piece of fun that highlighted a real issue. When is a piece of evidence considered to be reliable. The cigarette card is as reliable as any other evidence until subjected to rigorous scrutiny. If we are going to accept a piece of evidence, it has to be based on something more concrete and examinable than a feeling, and more precisely, it agrees with your particular belief. The methodology employed in dismissing the evidence presented by the cigarette card should be the same in accepting another piece of evidence or else you will find your evidence dismissed with similar alacrity as the cigarette card. Until you get your head around this Jeff, you are left with another Wills cigarette card's worth of evidence.

Cheers

Bill

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Tim,

You posted as I was replying. The cards caption is interesting, in so much as it seems that such an incident never occurred. If it had, the question of mobility for the Turkish Nordenfeldt guns would have been explained, despite the gun depicted being the wrong type. It would seem that if these guns were to be sent over to Australia, we are still waiting for them to arrive.

If my assumption to the card representing an Australian Nordenfeldt gun team was wrong, and its relevance to the Turkish machine guns, also wrong, my assertion that it was a 'flight of fancy' is even further reinforced.

It was propaganda such as this that would have made the presence of Turkish machine guns at the landing to be upheld as a common belief.

Jeff

[Jeff Pickerd]

Bill,

I'm not just sure what you are implying. When you have sighted and read Pte Keith Wadsworth's account of his experience on the morning of the 25th April 1915, I will be prepared to argue the case of the accuracy of his account, but the point still remains, his account is as good as any other account that states an alternative view.

They all have to examined.

You are right, the card was a piece of humour, but it also highlights the building of a myth.

Jeff

[Auimfo]

.....When is a piece of evidence considered to be reliable. The cigarette card is as reliable as any other evidence until subjected to rigorous scrutiny. If we are going to accept a piece of evidence, it has to be based on something more concrete and examinable than a feeling, and more precisely, it agrees with your particular belief............

Bill,

I think Jeff has explained his stance quite clearly. He does not accept Wadsworth's evidence just on a feeling but considers it with respect to the evidence supported by the Turkish accounts. If you read his posts he concedes that Wadsworth's account was in opposition to the war diary and only used it to show there was differing opinions even among the soldiers themselves. He simply thinks the weight of circumstantial evidence would support the theory that there were no Turkish machine guns at the landing. He never claimed it to be the 'smoking gun'.

I'd suggest before passing judgement on others methodology you re-check to see that everything you've written complies with those same rules (see my post No.312)

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Bryn]

I find it illuminating that Pte. Wadsworth's statement is apparently reliable - so reliable in fact that the battalion's war diary entry is relegated to mere hearsay - in that it does not mention machine guns, while so many others, in addition to the battalion war diary, are also regarded as unreliable, or ignored, because they do mention the presence of machine guns. Maybe it's just me, but where a single soldier's account difers from the war diary, I'd take the war diary as more reliable when it's backed by evidence gathered and considered at the time. The 11th Battalion landed scattered over a wide area. The individual soldier would have seen what he saw in his own locality. The war diary would presumably have been compiled on the basis of many reports covering the entire landing area.

Besides, if people are to argue that those reporting the presence of machine guns may be wrong due to inexperience, then that works both ways. Soldiers encountering them may not have known they had encountered them.

[Auimfo]

Bryn,

I'm certainly not one to take sides in this debate as there are many others far more qualified on the use of machine guns at the landing than I am. From what I have seen, there are two schools of thought based either on a few private Australian accounts coupled with Turkish records or the majority of Australian accounts coupled with the war diaries. Personally I find neither conclusive and probably there will never be a finite answer to the question.

However, what I have noticed in recent posts is the attempt to influence a debate by incorrectly discrediting the 'opposition' evidence rather than locating and producing concrete evidence in support of one's own ideas. In other words, "throw enough mud and it will begin to stick". (I'm not referring to your posts).

IMHO, this debate should be left to the likes of yourself, Jeff, Crunchy, etc who have knowledge about what they say and the remainder of us should read with interest rather than criticise someone's methodology over something we have limited knowledge of.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[green_acorn]

Jeff,

re your post #293 and the map symbol which you show there:

It is not very clear on my machine, but it looks very similar to four shown on the att. Turkish artillery map for the Helles front

Do you think that this symbol could have been used to indicate one of the Ottoman artillery's forward observation posts?

regards

Michael

Michael,

The Turkish General Staff symbols are interesting, they aren't quite the NATO standard, but .............

In the case of the five circular symbols with three "spikes", I don't have an old "Staff Duties" book handy, but believe the symbols to be "searchlights" noting of course that they are on ground covering promontories and two of them cover Cape Helles. Whilst the graduated line is a simple range card for readers.

In the case of the gun positions on the SE coast, I am somewhat perplexed as they have used symbology for mortars. I am assuming those positions marked as an arrow, with two small parallel strokes with a circle at the base are meant to be howitzers, with the figure to each symbols right indicating size of the gun in cms, though the regiment of ten near Tenger Ck appears to be described in mm's. Someone with better knowledge of Turkish deployments could quickly verify or correct this.

The gun at Kerte and the one to its SW are light direct fire guns in fortified positions, with their alternate positions marked as dashed lines to the NE of each.

Jeff,

Your images of the Turkish symbols at Gaba Tepe don't appear (or haven't for me in either IE or Firefox anyway). Can you repost or describe them? As I haven't found any GS Int descriptions of WW1 Turkish symbols yet, I am going through various other foreign symbol guides to try and figure them out.

I also much agree with your final paragraph in post 316. In my past experience once troops started discussing things post event, like anyone, the stronger story told often, takes root as the truth believed by many, who often were not witnesses to the event though they will claim to have been there, it is the weakness of oral history and the bane of the investigator and debriefer. I had come to this discussion with the belief that the Cove was covered by a number of MG's, I no longer believe that, but would like to be able to map the dispositions in three dimensions. I wish I still had access to Arcview GIS, being able to show the line of sight and dead ground helps a lot. I also note that at the end of 25 April, elsewhere on the Australian front in McCay's sector it was not MG's that were described as causing problems, but shrapnel and that once they dug in the effect and losses were less.

Anyway time to start reading Charles Messenger's new book "The Day We Won The War" in which Charles gives a good comment about the GWF in his intro.

Cheers,

Chris H

[Jeff Pickerd]

Chris H,

Even with the image of these symbols that I posted, they are so small that the enlargement did not come out as clearly as I would have liked.

To describe these symbols, the best description is akin to the red rectangular lines marking the Turkish Trenches, with a single short line projecting outwards at right angles in the centre.

Hope you have seen these and can fathom what I am trying to describe. The difference with the symbols either side of Gaba Tepe, is that they are much smaller, square in shape, drawn in red, but not filled in red like the trench symbols. Something in the nature of this ( -[_] ) but a full square (Cannot reproduce the top line).

Now to my mind, they are different enough to stand for something other than a small trench. Advance posts or observation posts, a possibility, but seem to be somewhat poorly sighted for that later.

As I have stated, they must symbolize something, otherwise, why would they have been drawn on both maps.

On the map purported to have been used by Esat Pasha, Commander III Corps, and dated 4.8.1915, (End map, Companion to the Feature Length Documentary, GALLPOLI 1915, Tolga Ornek/Feza Toker.) similar symbols are used to depict what the legend describes as Battalion, Company or Platoon. But with these, all are shaded in red, all are identified, albeit in the Ottoman script, where as on the other two earlier maps, there is nothing in the way of a description. Also on this map, machine guns are depicted as on the other maps, artillery conforming to those as well, but at Gaba Tepe, there is one symbol similar to that for a machine gun, except for a T line at the end, similar to that for a mountain howitzer.

Could this be one of the 25 mm Nordenfeldts, or maybe the remaining Mantelli?

Yes Chris, I would maintain all the evidence seems to aline with the Turkish view piont, but it would appear that the pro and anti camps to the Turkish machine gun question will just have to remain at odds, but that's fine with me, over the whole life of this most interesting discussion a vast array of information, on all the varying aspects to the question, has been put forward.

Very enlightening and definately well worth while.

Jeff

[Bryn]

I'd have to disagree that 'all' evidence seems to support the Turkish view. On the contrary I'd say the weight of evidence highly supports the presence of a machine gun or guns on the northern flank. Most argument against these eye-witness accounts is only personal opinion, and the rest is a single account written 20 years after the event, in which it is not stated that no machine guns were there, and I'm certainly not convinced by that. Evidence also indicates MGs at the Helles landing as well as at Kum Kale.

I've read an account by an 11th Battalion [edited later - correction; 7th Battalion] soldier that only eight or nine Turks were in the trench above Fisherman's Hut, and other accounts confirm that there were others on No. 1 Outpost. So the 'ninety riflemen all firing at once being mistaken for a machine gun' scenario, which is opinion, as nobody has any other source that gives the number of Turkish defenders at Fisherman's Hut, does not convince me either.

And I haven't really done any more than touch on the account of MGs on the 400 Plateau which were evidently in support of the Turkish artillery pieces captured there by elements of the 3rd Brigade during the initial advance from the beach. That would be a whole new topic in itself.