TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Eceabat]

Hi all,

just popping in for an all too rare visit.

This piece of information won't add greatly to the question of either the exact positioning of Ottoman troops in the area of the fisherman's hut or whether or not there were machine guns deployed but it might be of some interest.

The present cottage in the area of the fisherman's hut is not the same as the one in 1915. The original hut was located on the seaward side of the coastal road, shown in Bryn's photo. It was located about five to eight metres in from the road, pretty much in line with the present hut on the hill, and was rebuilt after the campaign. However, shifting sands meant that the owners of the hut knocked it down more than 50 years or so ago and used the materials to build the present hut. Some stones that formed the foundations of the original hut remain in the undergrowth.

I was provided this information by a gardener from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, who in turn had been told of this, and show the site, by another gardener of the CWGC many years ago. I confirmed this with the owner of the fisherman's hut, who is the grandson of the original fisherman and have seen the outline of the foundations of a small building in the undergrowth on the seaward side of the road.

It should also be remembered that there were huts, not just one hut, in the area in April 1915. On some of the Turkish maps that have been posted, the area is named as Balikcidamlari. Translated, this is Fishermans Huts.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

Thanks for that Bill. I'd heard vaguely that the original hut had been knocked down and rebuilt, but never knew any of the details. Bean mentions another hut, at the other (inland) end of Fisherman's Hut knoll. He called this the Shepherd's Hut and notes that its existence was unknown to most of the soldiers at Anzac.

[Ozzie]

I would like to clarify my last post to Bryn. As Kim so delicately reminded me. I have not expressed my point as cleary as I should have. I apologise for that.

I do NOT mean to infer Bryn's photo of the Fisherman's Hut is not valid evidence. Quite the contrary, it is very sound evidence that a platoon of 80 -90 men could not fit on the knoll itself and I accept without any qualification, and did so prior to the photo being presented and thought I had made that clear in the post above. I agreed only a small portion of his force could have been on the knoll itself. Looking at the photo I would think it would be roughly 10 -15 men, possibly a few more noting that in those days they were not as dispersed when occupying trenches as we do these days. For the sake of argument lets say there were 10 on the knoll. My point is that we ought not to consider that only the knoll itself was the defensive position occupied by Ibrahim's platoon, we should consider the whole of the Fisherman's Hut/No 1 Outpost area as the the position he occupied - to try to argue where each of his sections may have been is futile as we don't know the layout of his defended locaility. What we should be looking at isthe overall area and what size force that could hold with men manning trenches, and we know some of them were on No 1 Outpost..

What impressed with the photo is the dominent position No 1 Outpost has over the beach and surrounding area. It is much higher than I thought it was and I thank Bryn for sharing it with us. Bryn, if you have any more photos of that area it would be good to see them and try and guage the extent of the high ground and its surrounding. I would also be interested in finding out the area No 1 Outpost occuppies and the what the ground like behind the knoll at the Fisherman's Hut. If the whole area could not hold 80 - 90 men in trenches covering not only the area to the sea but also to the flanks then I would agree that Ibrahim's platoon was understrength.

Again, I am NOT dismissing Bryn's photo, it is a valuable piece of evidence

Regards

Chris

Chris, I didn't think you needed reminding of anything. Your posts are amongst the most researched and thorough on this thread, and the fact that you can bring your experience as a professional soldier to the thread, adds volumes to helping nit wits like myself, learn all that much more.

I was in fact referring to some who post with one eye shut, hence my point that one must look at all the sources, just not one's own side.

Your clarification, and Eceabat's post has made things much clearer for this nitwit.

Thankyou

Regards

Kim

[Bryn]

For those interested (besides the question of whether there were machine guns here or not) in another view from No. 1 Outpost, this is the view from that position looking south. Anzac Cove is of course around the point of Ari Burnu. The landing points and paths taken by the officers sent to silence the machine gun are approximate indications. Other boats landed in the same area, but I have not included any of them here.

Chris, I do have somewhere a photo of No. 1 Outpost from the heights behind it, but its summit area is quite large and is much more likely to have held a large body of men than would Fisherman's Hut. There are still extensive trench remains on top, though these of course would almost all be later allied trenches and even possibly some dug again by the Turks after the evacuation. I did not think you were dismissing the previous photo and you had, as you say, already agreed Fisherman's Hut knoll was too small to hold 80 men. After all, I wouldn't have dared say so if it wasn't true, because I know Bill ('Eceabat') could just nick across and check. At the same time I do not offer these photos as proof of the presence of machine guns, but rather that the Turkish report seems (to me) to be over-simplified.

[green_acorn]

Bryn,

Thank you for posting the picture. I do quite agree the Ottoman platoon would have been on the knoll now known in English literature as Outpost no:1 and probably known in Turkish literature and on the morning of the landing as "vicinity of Fisherman's Hut". Without access to maps at the moment, I would suggest the northern lookout squad was on the spur just above your writing "Lt Rafferty" and possibly as far as the next visible spur.

I would suggest the distinction between "Fisherman's Hut" and "Outpost no:1" is a matter of the time of A&NZAC occupation, the latter name taking prominence when the Australian Outpost was established. Reporting on the day I would imagine makes no such distinction and would have been generically referred to as the Fisherman's Hut area.

If one is looking for evidence of Ottoman machine guns "Outpost no:1" would be the place to look. If they were present they would have been dug in like Ibrahim's soldiers and indeed one would assume dug in first (the priority weapon), the pit or that part of the trench will be distinctive. Properly dug MG pits differ from standard infantry pits in detail to allow in this case the "sled" to be partially below ground and bring the gun down to eye level and the sides of the "platform" are generally dug out to allow the No:2 gunner better access to the feed pawl and for ammunition storage. In trench lines the distinction becomes greater as there is the need for unfettered access behind the gun for movement of the soldiers, in which case the MG pit would appear like a sap forward of the trench.

Having had some limited experience with imagery interpretation, pre-digital and handheld and having read the notes on Aerial Photography Interpretation from Gallipoli (when they were on eBay) and later on the Western Front, I believe that if the balloon observer could identify trenches and the mountain guns during the reconnaissance, it would be likely that he would have noted the "strange" (the strange being what draws your eye to it) unique machine gun pits that would have been present in such a prepared defensive position. Indeed I would suggest that with very good aerial photography today and access to previous imagery to determine change, a professionally qualified military imagery analyst (which I am not) would find the necessary evidence for archaeologists reasonably quickly.

cheers,

Hendo

[Eceabat]

Hi all,

just thought I'd add a bit of info on possible Turkish positions in the Fisherman's Hut/Number 1 Outpost discussion.

In 1988, during my first visit to the peninsula, I found spent Ottoman rifle cartridges and rifle clips near the peak and on the southern side of the hill that became Number 1 Outpost, finding the same also on the hill above the present day Fisherman's Hut. As the only time these positions were occupied by Ottoman troops during the fighting was 25 April, though of course they were held prior to any action, this may serve as evidence that both areas were held by Lt Ibrahim's small force.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

I've said all along in this thread that it has never been stated in any allied account that there was a machine gun firing from Fisherman's Hut. It is stated again and again that this fire came from the direction of Fisherman's Hut. The hut was the only artificial landmark on the northern flank, and so was always given as the reference to that area generally, and therefore what is being stated in these accounts is that a gun was firing from the north.

As far as I'm aware the Manica, the balloon-ship, was never in the vicinity of the Outposts and Fisherman's Hut. On 25th April it was anchored almost directly west of Gaba Tepe - about 5 km to the south. It was used for observing for the firing of the battleships Triumph and Bacchante.

[Ozzie]

Bryn, sorry to be pedantic, but I think that the perceived gist of your posts was the fact that MG's were at Fisherman's Hut.

If you are now saying that

"I've said all along in this thread that it has never been stated in any allied account that there was a machine gun firing from Fisherman's Hut. It is stated again and again that this fire came from the direction of Fisherman's Hut."

then other posters with their research are not wrong at all??

Back to re-reading the entire thread.

Kim

[green_acorn]

The aerial reconnaissance occurred on 14 April during the reconnaissance by HMS Queen, the IO of A&NZAC also conducted an aerial reconnaissance on the same day, the combined results of both reconnaissance are (graphically):

[Bryn]

Kim,

What the perceived gist of my posts may have been is entirely up to the person doing the perceiving. If you go back through my posts, you'll see I've attempted to spell this point out previously, and have constantly used expressions such as 'on the northern flank' as opposed 'at Fisherman's Hut'. Keep in mind also, that these accounts of machine guns are not my observations. They were made by people who were there on the day, and I am merely bringing them to the attention of people on this forum. At the same time I'm arguing that they can't just be written off and made 'untrue' because somebody feels their hindsight, or experience, or modern interpretation of early-WW1-era tactics, or lack of detailed knowledge of the written records, or uncritical acceptance of some records with automatic rejection of those that contradict them, or of being unable or unwilling to recognise that Turkish sources were also written for an audience, somehow makes their judgement superior to the observations of the people who were under fire, many of whom had years after the event to reflect on their experiences and/or to cross-check many different first-hand accounts, both written and spoken.

I don't see that it alters the basic premise anyway though - nobody has yet proved that all (or in fact any) of these reports of machine gun/s on the northern Anzac flank are wrong; no study has ever been undertaken into the deeper sources of Bean's and the other historians' and battalion diaries' accounts of machine gun/s, and there has certainly been no in-depth analysis of the Turkish sources. Now research into these might indeed prove the basis for the reports of a machine gun on the northern Anzac flank is weak - but that has not happened in this thread. Almost nobody posts sources for their claims in order that they can be checked. That's not how proper research works. Nobody, for example, has asked me a single question about the 7th Battalion soldier who stated only eight or nine men were in the trench above Fisherman's Hut. The only reaction to his recounting of what may have been the single most frightening event of his life, and in which he might have been expected to take more than a passing interest in the number of men trying to kill him, was sarcasm.

What I'm getting at is that there seems to be little real interest here in finding the real story, and more in 'solving' the 'problem' quickly and conveniently before moving on to sort out the next controversy. Unfortunately such complex matters can't just be 'solved' by having an opinion one way or the other.

Chris,

The map above extends to nowhere near Fisherman's Hut, and the map is too small to read details on anyway (okay, read your next post now and have found the link - which will bring me to another problem with the Turkish records - that of the 7-gun battery on the 400 plateau).. I've seen similar maps, but since the Turks were ordered only to move at night and to conceal themselves during the day, a lot of them would not have been seen anyway. Liman von Sanders states that British ships patrolling along the coast used to fire even on individual soldiers if they were seen, so there's a big incentive to keep yourselves and your weapons under cover if you're sitting on a hill close to the beach.

[green_acorn]

The above image, http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/AWM4/1/AWM4-1-27-2.pdf corrected to 20 April 1915, is remarkable for the fine detail, given that it is from first a balloon off the west coast and notes made whilst flying in a biplane of the day. Unfortunately it doesn't extend past the present Anzac Cove, they obviously thought only in terms of the enemy in their intended Area of Operations = the landing beach, not those in the Area of Influence (Those forces that could impact on the intended assault). In a staff planning context that failure in itself is worrying, particularly as the Covering Force was expected to cover from Gaba Tepe to Fisherman's Hut.

On the morning seaplanes were operating from Ark Royal observing and providing reconnaissance for HMS Majestic, which was to the WNW of Fisherman's Hut. Whilst balloon operated from the ship supporting HMS Triumph west of Gaba Tepe. Has anyone looked at the Ships Log for Ark Royal and Triumph to see what was reported by the seaplanes? Does anyone know how to find them?

I know I am imposing modern knowledge, training and experience to the problem, but I would have expected the observer, particularly the IO's to identify unusual aspects of the entrenchments they have marked, that is to say the sap forward for machine guns. I would also note the level of detail the observers have taken in marking the defences at Brighton Beach, the intended landing point and the degree of Ottoman work, including communication trenches, both sides obviously made the same assessment, if a force was to land in this vicinity it would be here.

Reading the War Diary of 1 Aust Div, the first time enemy machine guns are mentioned is at 5-6pm on 25 April when the Ottoman forces counter attacked for the third time. Then the next mention is on the morning 26 April when MacLaglan reported MG cross fire on Spur 400.

The next time I am at the AWM (October) I will get a much better copy of the map and try and find related aerial imagery taken by the RN officer/pilot.

cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

Chris,

If you can, check anything done by Major Charles Herbert VILLIERS-STUART, Indian Army att HQ Staff, A&NZAC. He did a lot of observing from planes over Anzac.

[green_acorn]

Bryn,

I was researching my last post when you made your last and posted before reading your response. I won't comment on some of the issues you have mentioned, but I am trying to work through the primary sources of the day, the War Diaries. I hope my comment on the northern extent of the map satisifes your comment. I have been through the War Diaries of HQ MEF, HQ A&NZAC, HQ 1 Aust Div, HQ's 1, 2 &3 Bde, looking for the machine guns, as I have mentioned the first reporting at these HQ's is at 1 Div.

I will go through the Bn War Diaries tomorrow.

Cheers,

Hendo

[grantmal]

According to David Cameron's '25 April 1915', Lieut Col Sefik Aker (CO 27th Regiment) in Maidos heard the first gunfire at Ari Burnu, phoned Major Ismet (CO 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment) at Gaba Tepe, then prepared the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 27th Regt at Maidos "to force march immediately towards Gaba Tepe in order to support his 2nd Battalion." Cameron quotes Aker (page 44):

“The sound of gunfire continued at infrequent intervals. But between these sounds there was a buzzing noise which came out of the darkness from afar off and this melancholy and mysterious noise had a profound effect on me. This buzzing was the echo of the explosion of masses of infantry rifles and machine guns and it gave the impression that our regimental comrades, far from help and consisting of a mere handful of men at Ari Burnu, were striving to do their duty in the most difficult circumstances against an enemy many times superior in strength.... The intermittent sound of gunfire could still be heard but the melancholy buzzing had become inaudible.”

Sefik Aker seemed in no doubt machine guns were firing during the early stages of the Landing, but it's a little vague just who he thinks is doing the firing. Does anyone have access to Sefik Aker's full account (& is there just one English translation)? Did he think they were Allied machine guns?

I've only read bits of David Cameron's book online, but it seems he places machine guns on the left flank. Does anyone know what sources Cameron used?

Another who mentioned a machine gun was Lieutenant EY Butler of D Company, 12th Battalion. Unfortunately the narrative (first published in London in July 1915, and reprinted in The Daily Post; Friday, August 27, 1915) only begins after Butler is ashore: ..."it was decided that I should take my platoon up the left flank and support the 11th Battalion, while he [Capt Lalor], with what men he could gather together, advanced on my left.

By this time the Turks had been driven back, and except for some snipers who were concealed in the scrub on the steep hills, we were not under direct fire for the time being. We had to cross some terribly rough country, with deep gullies, the sides of which were almost perpendicular in places. Reaching the top of one of these gullies I found Capt R. W. Everett, of the 11th Battalion, and he asked me to go to his left flank and tell Capt Lalor that there was a machine gun in that direction, which was troubling them. When I came up with Capt Lalor I delivered my message and then we pushed up the Gully which was very rough and very thickly covered with scrub."

Good on you,

Grant

[green_acorn]

I am going to state this straight up, in no way am I trying to cast aspersions on the writer as I don't find this unusual. The text in the following image has been written by a person who does not appear to have been responsible for maintaining the War Diary at that time. I say this because it is in ink, the majority is written in pencil; written by someone of better handwriting; possibly under better circumstances. I also note that the ink writer has listed the officers killed or wounded 2 & 16, whilst making a marginal comment that to find the details of the Other Ranks go to the diary entry for 22 May 1915. Based on these observations I am led to the conclusion that this entry was written in late May, once the situation had stabilised a little and the battalion had the time to try and recall the events of the landing and previous weeks. In the case of the diary maintainer who wrote in pencil, his entries seem quite sporadic and he did not continue into May, which leads me to believe he wrote as he could close to the event and was transferred to the line or was killed before the end of the month.

I apologise that I can't tell you the names of either Captain who maintained the diary, I need new glasses. The entry does describe B Coy landing under machine gun and rifle fire and the disposition of Ottoman forces. From the diary entry I would also raise the issue of the number who made it ashore as the diary writer describes how the Ottoman's retired when B Coy formed up for an assault and that forty men were left unwounded after that they had occupied the Ottoman trenches, not when they made it ashore and that then 3 Fd Ambulance stretcher bearers came forward. Which has to lead me to the conclusion based on this evidence that all the casualties were caused from the time the Ibrahim's 1st platoon commenced fire, to the time B Company 7th AIB occupied the trenches. I believe that if machine guns had been present the toll would have been far greater (far more bullets in the cone of fire from the same point of aim), as they would have been able to exact far heavier casualties particularly whilst B Coy was in the lifeboats and whilst they were preparing to charge the knoll. I would say a B2 for the majority of the entry and a B3/4 for the specific reference about machine guns.

I would also suggest that it is from this entry that the subsequent OH and Unit histories have been written and interpreted. The reference is the 7AIB War Diary page 7 for April 1915 at http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/AWM4/23/AWM4-23-24-2.pdf

cheers,

Hendo

[green_acorn]

Grant,

There was a machine gun in the bow of each steam pinnace, all allied soldiers had been told not to fire until the enemy commenced firing, so yes he may have heard allied machine guns from the boats.

cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

Chris,

You're suggesting that it is from this one diary page that all subsequent Official History and unit history accounts of a machine gun on the northern flank are derived. I have to ask : on what evidence?

Who related to Bean the account of Colonel Clarke's ordering of Lieutenant Rafferty and his men to the north to silence the machine gun? I'd suggest it was Rafferty himself, so unless Rafferty coincidentally also wrote this entry for a battalion not his own, I find I already doubt this.

Where is Lieutenant Gostelow's diary? It was used as a source in the compilation of the 11th Battalion's History, which also mentions the machine gun, as does its war diary. Since Gostelow was one of the 11th Battalion officers sent to silence the machine gun, this diary, you might think, would be worth seeking out.

What about Captain Jackson, Lieutenants Strickland, Scanlan and Heighway? Did they leave any diaries, papers or other records? Has anyone ever looked?

Some of these officers ended the war in high commands. It's not unreasonable to expect they might have left individual accounts somewhere.

How about Private Pearce, of the 7th Battalion, who stated that the death of another Pearce, while approaching shore, was caused by 'machine gun or rifle' fire. I find it highly doubtful that he saw this account before he gave his own.

What about the accounts by 3rd Field Ambulance? Is the suggestion that its medical officers would have to read 7th Bn's diaries before they could write their own? If so, why 7th Bn in particular?

The assumption seems already to be that this account must be wrong, but that everyone else copied it, and that explains why everyone else is wrong. I still see no evidence to support this other than it does not fit neatly into the Turkish account.

I find it incredible to be asked to accept that something written in May 1915 may not be accurate regarding a day near the end of the previous month, when apparently Lieut. Ibrahim's account, written at least 20 years later, is given full uncritical credence.

[green_acorn]

Bryn,

Thank you for pointing out my error, I meant the OH and 7 AIB history, not histories. I also accept your other points and once I get enough time to spend at the AWM I will try and find the other material pertinent to the issue. Nevertheless I stand by my thoughts expressed in para 2, that from what this diary entry describes the casualties appear to have occurred not just whilst in the boat, but also in the time ashore during the battle to capture the knoll behind Fisherman's Hut.

In addition to the ships and naval observer's logs, I would like to find the signallers and the Adjutant's "ops" log books if they weren't destroyed, they weren't meant to be but often were. The same can be said for "Field Message Notebooks" they would be the diamonds to find, though probably illegible today with carbon paper fade. I say this as they are the raw data of events as known at the time and would give a direct insight to the commanders thinking (in the notebooks and orders sent) and not post event as most diaries and recollections are.

As you would also note in my last post, I made no mention of 1st platoon's interpretation of events on the morning, though based on my own experience, training and logic, the terrain, the dispersal of 27 Regt, the CO 27 Regt's and LT Ibrahim's statement (which will be flawed) I believe that there were no machine guns in vicinity of Fisherman's Hut and in fact no machine guns deployed in the 27 Regt screen/trip wire/defended localities at dawn on 25 April 1915. I will still try and find evidence to the contrary and assess it accordingly, then my view may change.

I would also not be so disparaging of Turkish accounts, author's and historian's, it can be interpreted in a way that I am sure you do not intend. Obviously there are problems reading the Ottoman text and I am sure that what you mean is; the lack of direct English translation of Turkish accounts and understanding of the resources those Turkish historians had available to them. It would be interesting to see if Bean had much in the way of correspondence or contact with the Turks, but I would imagine they also kept "War Diaries" and to find the records of the German officers attached to the Ottoman Army, now that would be great!

Other than that I don't think this thread is getting far, so until I find something new ..............

cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

I agree, Chris, this thread is at a standstill. Bill stated in a previous post that it had not advanced for a long time, and it's hard to fault that observation overall.

If people want to debunk information that appears in many original accounts, they would need to be prepared to do what you will attempt to do at the AWM and actually find and eliminate original sources. Just seeing the latest bit of evidence and being convinced by it, then 'pronouncing' that the original evidence is 'wrong', is not research by any stretch of the imagination. It's fine to have an opinion one way or the other, but that's not evidence and is no basis for making sweeping statements that assume previous accounts are 'obviously' wrong. It's not obvious at all.

For those who resort to the 'appeal to authority' logical fallacy, I will state there is no current authority on this matter because it has never been investigated in any detail. However, if we're going to be expected to cave in because one researcher has a PhD., then I might remind everyone that Dr. CEW Bean 'outranks' them - as far as I'm concerned - in that he was present at Gallipoli AND spoke to thousands of participants, AND went over years' worth of written evidence AND wrote internationally-acclaimed histories. No other authority who's been mentioned here stacks up to that, and pointing out - fairly enough - that Bean was not always 100% accurate doesn't put much of a dent in his reliability on the great majority of subjects. To state that his account is second-hand, apart from 'stating the bleeding obvious', is no proof of inaccuracy. There must have been first-hand accounts that he based his narrative on. They need to be investigated.

Good luck with finding some of these accounts. For anyone else wiling to do some serious research, rather than issue an opinion, other places to look would probably be the La Trobe, Battye, WL Crowther, Oxley, Mortlock and Mitchell libraries and maybe in the records of some of the old unit associations, wherever they might be.

[michaeldr]

Crunchy,

Way back on the 2nd August '08, you enquired

"What do the symbols of the weapons positioned either side of Gaba Tepe look like?

We are seeking information on what these symbols refer to."

see page 12, your post #284, which included

The following is the translation which I have received this morning;

15:- Military Camps

16:- Military Quarters

17:- Howitzer/Shell [second thoughts on this one; the Turkish word is Obüs, so go with Howitzer and ignore the ref to 'shell']

18:- Howitzer/ Mortar [likewise in this case the Turkish is Havan Topu, so go with Mortar instead of 'Howitzer']

19:- Field Gun

20:- Mounted Gun/Cannon

21:- Heavy Field Gun and Naval Cannon

22:- Aircraft Gun/Cannon [I would guess that this should be Anti-Aircraft Gun]

23:- Untranslatable

24:- Narrow Gauge Railroad

25:- Roads built during the war/combat

regards

Michael

Edited 18 October , 2008 by michaeldr

[Pete1052]

Who knows, now that Crunchy is back from his world travels maybe this thread will get a new lease on life. Welcome back to GWF!

[Crunchy]

Michael,

Have just seen this thread having been away at the time you posted it. Many thanks for the translations. They are much appreciated.

No 19 is interesting. While it is the German symbol for MG, the Turkish translation shows it as a field gun and No 20 is shown as a mounted gun/cannon. Do we know the difference between the two types of weapons?

Both symbols are shown on the maps in Sefir Aker's account at posts 195 to 197 here

No 20 (mounted field gun) is marked where the Turks lost a field gun at the Cup and both no 19 and 20 are shown in the Turkish counter attack in close proximity to each other in the area of Chunuk Bair. You will see that two No19 symbols show guns pushed forward into the front line at Erdina Sirti (Mortar Ridge) and into Kirmizi Sirt (Johnston's Jolly on the 400 Plateau.) in post 197 and hopefully below. Although it is not unheard of having field guns in the front line, having both symbols (as translated) on the map is confusing. Anyone got any ideas on what the difference would be between two the weapons?

Maps of Chunuk Bair at 1100 and in the evening on the 400 Plateau according to Sefir Aker

[Crunchy]

Who knows, now that Crunchy is back from his world travels maybe this thread will get a new lease on life. Welcome back to GWF!

Pete, You must have esp. I was drafting my reply to Michael as you posted. Thanks for the welcome back.

[green_acorn]

Michael and Crunchy,

The original creator of the symbols legend has been smart in only showing classes of weapons and not if they are light, medium or heavy with the cross strokes, which helps a lot in their interpretation of them. Can I suggest that the Mounted Gun is one that is dug in/emplaced permanently "mounted", it would follow the logical design connection of symbols 19, 20 and 22. Symbol 23, barbed wire entanglement perhaps? It does have some similarity to the old apron fence profile! 18 Mortars, were they developed at this stage, I am thinking of the Stokes Mortar and German equivalent, though symbol 18 is logical even today. Could either 17 (if 18 was the howitzer and there were no mortars) or 23 be a flare/signalling rocket stand?

In terms of machine guns I note the field gun "wheels" are quite short in the symbol, but still strokes/lines, which leads me to believe the MG's are not represented on the map legend. Noting that in actual markings on maps the gun wheels are emphasised (longer), I would still stay with the known MG symbols similar to the field gun with "dots" for wheels.

Michael TGS as a PDF Book completed, boxed with Customs Declaration finished, posting awaits! At last!!!

Crunchy I hope your museums tour was enjoyable, will you be attending the conference at the AWM at the end of November, a very good range of subjects on 1918.

cheers,

Hendo

[michaeldr]

Welcome back to the GWF, Crunchy

[now it's my turn - I'm off to Europe in c.36 hours time]

Hendo thanks for the progress report; I will keep my eye on the postie when I return

Crunchy, It is interesting that you say the symbol No.19 is the same as the Germans used for a MG. I will go back to the translator for further comment and clarification on Nos. 19 & 20

Meanwhile, one thing does occur to me and that is that It is worth remembering at this point that the Turkish organization chart which we have seen earlier put their machine-gun-equivalents together with the artillery; Very confusing, but perhaps we're not reading this right

I did suggest to the translator that amongst the words which we were looking for was Mitrailleuse (= Machine gun)

However, as I recollect it, I took this from the British Handbook since the glossary in the Turkish history does not give an Ottoman/Turkish word for machine gun.

Is possible that we should be looking for something other than Mitrailleuse (which I understand is in fact French anyway)?

Best regards

Michael