TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Now getting back to 25 April 1915.

For those interested in, but have not been able to wade through the mass of material, I have catalogued the available material on the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre Website. All the War Diaries are transcribed from those who took part in the action. One can see the mention of machine guns in the commentaries. Interestingly enough, there is also mention that the steam pinnaces also had machine guns which did open fire too, especially when approaching the shore at Fisherman's Hut. An alternative explanation?

In addition is a translation of Lt-Col. Sefik Aker's chapter on this subject, possibly the key source of Turkish information.

There are over 100 entries, all catalogued in a contents page with appropriate links. Go to:

http://alh-research.tripod.com/Light_Horse...-1915-contents/

Just one thought - "... as more Turkish sources become available ... " This information has been freely available since the 1930's for anyone who chose to access it. And that is the cornerstone of research - checking all available sources regardless of location or language.

I accept Jeff's comments regarding the AWM's attempt at new speak which is grammatically incorrect. Who ever thought out the idea of Capitalising ANZAC when it is used as an Acronym, correct use, and as a proper noun, incorrect use, and then altering Bean's work as a consequence introduced one of the most risible aspects of AWM newspeak. Nonsense and stupid. But collective stupidity allows such a thing to occur.

Cheers

Bill

[green_acorn]

Bill,

Thank you for lisiting all of these documents at your site.

Which officer's were designated to have the clipboard's out with the blank War Diary sheets and cabon paper, pencil at the ready, to make out the War Diary's in triplicate as they landed? That would have been a b*gger. In the absence of the Signallers Log Books, we must remember that these diaries are, like so many other forms of diary, are written after the event, sometimes even days later, from an assembled jumble of field messages and personal recollections, in addition to the pre-operation orders, to form an agreed (the Commanders) understanding of events at the time.

Cheers,

Hendo

[michaeldr]

For those interested in, but have not been able to wade through the mass of material, I have catalogued the available material on the Australian Light Horse Studies Centre Website. All the War Diaries are transcribed from those who took part in the action. One can see the mention of machine guns in the commentaries. Interestingly enough, there is also mention that the steam pinnaces also had machine guns which did open fire too, especially when approaching the shore at Fisherman's Hut

A good idea Bill and I am sure that it is much appreciated

Not for the first time you're ahead of us in your application to this subject;

the Helles Front awaits a similar effort, from someone, somewhere, sometime... ...

regards

Michael

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Hendo

"like so many other forms of diary, are written after the event, sometimes even days later, from an assembled jumble of field messages and personal recollections, in addition to the pre-operation orders, to form an agreed (the Commanders) understanding of events at the time."

Depends on how low in the food chain the author of the War Diary lay which determined the timing of War Diary construction. That in itself makes the reading of the various Diary entries from the GOC's of ANZAC, Aust Div and NZ & A Div most interesting. The diary entries occurred during the day as they had both the staff and the luxury of time and protection to do so. As the battle on that day unfolded and the three generals realised that they had stuffed things up badly, the blame game began. And they were quick to blame the Navy and Turkish ruses for their problems. Their lack of planning and poor follow up had little part to play in the fiasco which they saw in front of their eyes. These diaries are an interesting catalogue of blame shifting and covering of the big "A". All this while men were dying before their eyes.

Here are some features:

Birdwood's staff ordered the cease firing of Naval gunfire at 10.30 am. No one owned up to giving the order so it was claimed to be derived from a "Turkish Ruse" - anyone who believed that whopper was more stupid than the author.

Birdwood had to be forced to come ashore by his generals and show himself to the troops.

Bridges refused to allow the artillery ashore. Those sections which did come ashore were promptly reshipped back thus denying the men on the ground artillery cover. Thus only one Aust Div gun remained on shore during this day - more by accident than intent. This led to the slaughter of many of the men through Turkish shrapnel by their artillery which had free reign - also very demoralising for the troops on the ground who felt they had been abandoned - and they were. The only other artillery support was offered by the Indian mountain guns, but they were too few to have any impact. Reading the Field Artillery War Diaries reveals this situation in all its horror but also confusion and incompetence.

Poor surveying of the land meant that maps were also poor which meant that objectives were poorly framed. In addition, no one was trusted sufficiently too allow the ordinary man on the ground to understand his specific objective. "Going forward at all costs" is not a specific objective but a general idea. Consequently, due to the loss of battlefield control by the junior officers, the firing lines fell into pure chaos. This was reflective of the training regime that was given - all management by junior officers over their men was by line of sight. In the scrub, no one could see any more than two or three men on the firing line. Consequently none of the men had any idea of what to do except stay where they were or go back to the beach and await orders. No junior officer had any idea of the strength of the unit or area he commanded. This was a training problem compounded by poor communication of plans to the ordinary soldier.

So we see the GOC's making their excuses to preserve their image for the public record. A most disingenuous display of craven behaviour. But nothing changes. SSDD.

For that reason, I find signals being the most unvarnished form of history. As abbreviated as they are, they paint a dot point picture of the events as they unfold. They are immediate and aim to solve an immediate problem or answer an immediate need. They are not written with posterity in mind and so the expressions are natural. I have learned a great deal of history from the signals. They have an unpleasant habit of contradicting the known history and historians who ignore them, do so at their peril.

The other source of history which I find unvarnished are the Routine Orders issued in every formation. These are aspirational in that they lay out clearly what the CO wishes to achieve within usually the next 24 hours, but they also detail events that have occurred that need articulation for one reason or another, usually for disciplinary reasons. And then there are the historical actions of the formation - promotions, reversions, transfers and punishments. All of these tell us something of the daily history of a formation that is not recorded in the War Diary but is none the less just as important for the men involved. They were never seen as a historical document and thus the information contained in them was never embellished to suit the vanity of the CO or author, or put together with an Imperial gloss. Similarly they are ignored at the peril of being contradicted.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Michael

Thanks for your kind words.

"the Helles Front awaits a similar effort, from someone, somewhere, sometime.."

Looks like a vacancy that you should think about filling in the near future.

Cheers

Bill

[Auimfo]

An excellent article researched and prepared by Crunchy that appeared in the latest edition of the AWM's Wartime magazine. I see that he identified the machine guns on the steam pinnaces to as a possible source of confusion amid all the chaos of the 25th April.

Very nice of Bill to follow Crunchy's work and provide public access to the documentation so diligently researched by him for the article.

Cheers,

Tim L.

[Andrew Hesketh]

Two replies deleted.

The first breached the rule "You will not make any statements that could be construed as defamatory of an individual..."

The second, a response, would allow viewers to work out the nature of the comment in the first post and has been removed for that reason.

Let's not have personal attacks please gentlemen. Thanks.

[green_acorn]

Bill,

You are indeed correct about the timing of the War Diary, I have generally been referring to those of battalion's in my comments regarding the landing.

I would generally agree about your comment on the signal logs, having been an infantry signaller, but nevertheless the orders, plans and strategic or commanders guidance have to be the start point and Routine Orders are useful for putting the administrative context of a unit's situation past and present in place at the time.

With regards to the surveying, I believe far too many of us, past and present, blame the surveyors for the "failures" of Gallipoli and both Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle in their book Grasping Gallipoli make a good defence of the surveyors. Notwithstanding that the British had had a few sporadic opportunities for ground "truthing" by Royal Engineer officers on "long service leave" in the century prior to the campaign, we do need to remember that the mapping of "enemy" terrain, as a whole, was an inexact science and a military secret of the highest order. Often the update of an old map may only have consisted of incorporating the "Route Maps" where the RE officer had been able to travel and could recall his journey at lunch or in the evening. Also at the start of the Gallipoli Campaign the surveyors/Intelligence Officers did not have access to sound aerial imagery to enhance the maps. Then there is the issue of what the "friendly" map was based on, generally a map, in this case Ottoman, acquired "through other means", one of the reasons why "topographical research"/mapping was central to the permanent staff of the War Office's Intelligence Department for most of the previous century and remained a "function" of the GSO Int's for many years into the Twentieth. Finally one of the other primary sources for map data used at the time was quite unreliable and relied on very large samples to improve accuracy, the interviewing of locals.

Noting what I have just said, I nevertheless find the maps they did have remarkably accurate for the day, they didn't have the luxury of converting Belgian or French maps or knowledge of well travelled countries like Germany and were lucky that they could rely on accurate data gathered by the Royal Navy for their Chart panorama's to correct whatever could be seen from the crows nest of passing warships.

As a more recent example I can recall many times from the 70's to the 90's, in Australia, where I was issued maps where the base data was created in the early 1940's solely from aerial imageery and only updated for the grid system and magnetic variation at the time the map sheet was printed (in itself often in the 60's or 70's). Maps of jungle with heavy canopy could (can) be particularly inaccurate as they relied on the map drawer's (the scratchies) judgement of where the underlying terrain is.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Hendo

Mate when you say: "I believe far too many of us, past and present, blame the surveyors for the "failures" ", I am curious as to whom you are referring to in that comment. It seems to be a blanket comment which unfairly slurs most commentators.

I have seen comments that do blame the poor workers at the bottom end of the information chain but they are in the form of "a poor craftsman always blames his tools" rather than anything to be taken seriously.

The staff work undertaken to plan the invasion was flawed at the beginning. The maps are just one element, but not a major elements at all. The staff work undertaken was premised upon charging along flat and rolling plains with excellent soils that lend themselves to movement and entrenchment. Consequently the training of the troops was undertaken on this basis. Most of the training was undertaken in Egypt, and area that conformed to the staff notion of how infantry should be deployed. Until the Somme, the idea was that a platoon should be deployed in such a way as to allow the officers view the whole of his command through eyesight. On rolling fields, this would be so. In addition, the ordinary grunt was not trusted with any information and just seen as a cypher who would stand up when ordered, charge when ordered and lie down when ordered. Nothing else was expected from them. This only changed in 1917 when Monash led the way in letting every man know his place in the scheme of things and also understand the terrain they were going to cover. Before then, the basic soldier was only trusted to carry his pack and go where he was told without rhyme or reason.

Base your staff work on such a training regime and then place them at Anzac Cove and it is bound to fall apart the minute the first boat lands.

The staff work relating to the ships and disembarkation was superb, if one bases such things on peace time disembarkations with little confusion. I just reflect on the frustration of Pompey Elliott when all his plans for disembarkation of his battalion went up in smoke after the first boat departed with the 3rd Brigade.

In essence, even if they were supplied with the best maps in the world with access to google earth and the like, it still would have been a massive bungle. The minute the men set foot on shore and faced the hills, the training in Egypt would have been seen as a failure. There were no rolling plains covered with gentle wheat fields. Anyone 4m from a person became invisible so controlling an advance would have been impossible and so an advance would have been done more by way of luck than strategy. Reading all the accounts of those on the ground make it very clear that command was impossible because of the confusion brought about by the terrain.

If the area had been properly examined and the men trained on similar terrain and the individual soldier trusted with a task, then it might have had some chance of success. At least the officers would have been familiar with the problems of command in these circumstances and developed systems to ensure those problems would be overcome.

However, they didn't and the confusion was overcome by stagnating the lines, swapping the troops, re-organising the dispositions all the while digging trenches to allow this to occur. But since the ANZACs were not dealing with a static enemy, they too did the same so by the time the organisation chain was established at Anzac, the Turks had cut them off from any further action. So the positions remained essentially the same until evacuation.

So in the time between disorganisation and reorganisation, the window of opportunity for victory was traded off. This came down to training for the task which meant that the staff work was flawed because their primary premise was incorrect.

But interesting as this is, it doesn't help find that machine gun.

Cheers

Bill

[green_acorn]

Michael,

Indeed it would be very good to spend as much time on Ottoman machie guns at Helles. A new, clean, thread perhaps?

Cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

No pinnaces approached Fisherman's Hut. All sources state explicitly that the elements of the 7th Battalion that landed there did so in four ship's boats because they had given up waiting for the tows (pinnaces) to arrive and take them off the Galeka.

No pinnaces, therefore the MGs reported by the various witnesses in this area can not have been pinnace-mounted.

And how is it that allied soldiers were apparently quite capable of identifying the sound of a machine-gun firing IF it came from one of the pinnaces, but would apparently have had all kinds of problems identifying the same sound if the machine gun were fired by Turks?

[Guest]

Bryn,

Good to see you about.

The ALH is up again. I hope you will bring your many hours of research back to it.

Have missed your input. Look forward to more chats.

Crunchy, well done on your article in Wartime. Many , many hours of research , and also, the hard won experience of what is, and what is not possible. It is easy to read a page of writing, but it is nearly impossible to read a page of a combat situation unless you have been there and done it. Much to digest.

Many thanks.

Cheers

Kim

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Not having been in that area, I can't say for sure but surely the sound of MG fire would travel and the soldiers in the boats at the Fishermans hut could mistake MGs there for a pinnical firing at some distance away?

The sound of a MG firing and men dying dosn't mean that the gun is firing at you?

Only a gun is firing some where and it could be anyones.

S.B

[Bryn]

Steve, as you say, you haven't been in the area, but I can tell you that what you're suggesting is that perhaps the men in the boats couldn't tell the difference between a sound coming from directly in front of them to one coming from more than a mile away to their rear.

Let's consider:

The accounts state the MG WAS firing at the 7th Battalion boats (which were NOT towed by pinnaces). Some people may not be able to tell when a gun is firing at them, but that's them; they are not the men in the boats approaching Fisherman's Hut, and cannot simply graft their own experience onto those men. Or, for that matter, onto others, who claim they are able to tell when a weapon is firing at them.

Col. Clarke, Commanding Officer, 12th Battalion, way back near Walker's Ridge, also identified an MG in the direction of Fisherman's Hut. He did not think it was behind him and to his right, which is where the pinnaces had approached the shore. And he is not the only one.

The men in the boats approaching Fisherman's Hut could see the fall of bullets in the water ahead of them and rowed into that zone. They were therefore being fired at from the front.

It has been stated by a witness in one of the boats that the fire commenced when the boats were about 50 metres from shore. Up till that point they had apparently not mistaken the sound of machine guns, more than a mile away, for guns firing at themselves.

Besides, the suggestion that we can explain all these accounts away because an MG mounted on a pinnace MIGHT have been firing away in or near Anzac Cove at precisely the time the 7th Battalion were approaching within 50 metres of Fisherman's Hut is nothing but pure supposition.

I have a question: Just how long is it being suggested that any one pinnace fired their gun for? How many were armed with MGs? How many fired?

I contend that this is irrelevant to the landing at Fisherman's Hut anyway, because even if the pinnaces far to the south of Fisherman's Hut were all firing their MGs (and no evidence suggests they were), they would have ceased fire at the latest when our troops began reaching the top of Plugge's Plateau, which is not long after actually landing on the beach, and well before the 7th Battalion landed at Fisherman's Hut. The 7th Battalion were part of 2nd Brigade and had not even landed before the 3rd Brigade had already reached the heights. The troops on the Galeka were even further delayed because they waited for pinnaces that never showed up, then had to lower the ship's lifeboats, then row a considerable distance to reach Fisherman's Hut. No evidence at all exists that pinnaces were firing their own MGs - anywhere - this late in the landing operation.

[grantmal]

"...we steamed for Gaba Tepe and midway, about 5 o'clock, heard a very heavy fire from Helles behind us. The Turks are putting up some fight. Now we are off Gaba Tepe! The day was just breaking over the jagged hills; the sea was glassy smooth; the landing of the lads from the South was in full swing; the shrapnel was bursting over the water; the patter of musketry came creeping out to sea; we are in for it now; the machine guns muttered as through chattering teeth--up to our necks in it now. But would we be out of it? No; not one of us; not for five hundred years stuffed full of dullness and routine. By 5.35 the rattle of small arms quieted down..." (Sir Ian Hamilton, diary entry 25 April)

Were the pinnaces still firing their mg's at 5.15am? Were Australian mg's ashore firing at 5.15am? Did Sir Ian Hamilton have enough experience to identify the sound of an mg firing?

CEW Bean claims Percy Harrison and a party of the 9th Battalion captured a Turkish mg on 400 Plateau: [Vol.1, p342] "....Harrison called together his men -- about nine in all. They crawled up the steep bank and found themselves almost under the muzzles of two Turkish field pieces. Round the guns were seven Turks; 50 yards beyond were others, hurriedly loading upon mules the machine guns which had been firing on the advancing Australians. Harrison's party in The Cup had not been noticed. He made his men each pick a member of the guns crew, fire together, and rush the guns. The whole of the guns crew fell. A Turkish officer appeared at the entrance of the gun pit, and raised his revolver; but Harrison fired first, with his rifle from the hip, and the officer fell dead. The Australians at once picked off the Turks who were hurrying away with the machine guns; one driver fell beside his dead mules with the reins still in his hands; only a single member of the Turkish party seems to have escaped. Thomas joined Harrison at the guns. For the moment the resistance of the enemy on this part of the field entirely ceased.

There were either two or three guns -- Krupp field pieces. To one of them mules had already been harnessed. In a small roofed shelter was a quartermaster's store, containing books, papers, bags with spare parts of machine guns, leather equipment, and quantities of tobacco and cigarettes."

According to Bean this same captured/abandoned mg was later used by an unidentified Sgt Major to drive off a Turkish attack. When the party at the gun pits retired at 11.30pm the 5th Battalion's Lt Derham "and another, wounded but able to walk, carried between them the Turkish machine gun. When halfway to the line, they came upon an Australian with a broken leg. They dropped the machine gun and picked up the soldier."

Bean interviewed Derham in Melbourne in 1920 (AWM38 3DRL 1722/2). Would make an interesting read.

[Jeff Pickerd]

From all of the preceeding posts reference to machine guns mounted in Pinnace's are made. Up until now I have let those references ride for the sake of the ongoing discussion, but there is no direct evidence that any Pinnaces had machine guns mounted in their bow.

The make up of the 12 tows for the covering force to land at Anzac is clearly defined in the 1st Australian Division orders, and there is nothing to suggest that any alterations to that make-up were made.

The 12 tows are divided into three groups of four tows operating from the battleships, Queen, Prince of Wales, and London, running from the first tow, south to north along the Z landing points of Anzac.

The following gives the make up of each tow and the vessle that supplied the boats.

No. 1 Tow - Queen - Picket boat, Pinnace, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 2 Tow - Triumph - Picket boat, Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 3 Tow - Queen - Picket boat, Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 4 Tow - Triumph - Steam Pinnace, Pinnace, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 5 Tow - P of W - Picket boat, Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 6 Tow - Triumph - Steam Pinnace, Pinnace, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 7 Tow - P of W - Picket boat, Pinnace, Cutter, lifeboat.

No. 8 Tow - Banchante -Picket boat, Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 9 Tow - London - Picket boat, Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 10 Tow - Majestic - Picket boat, Pinnace, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 11 Tow - London - Picket boat, Pinnace, Cutter, Lifeboat.

No. 12 Tow - Majestic - Picket boat, Launch. Cutter, Lifeboat.

As can be seen, there were only two stean driven Pinnace's as tows, the remaining ten were all Picket boats.

From the orders it is found that no troops were to be carried in the Picket boats. Each Picket boat had one Maxim machine gun mounted in its bow. There is no mention within any of the orders to the steam Pinnaces being similarly armed.

The orders also state that the Senior Military Officer, General Machlagan, was in Tow number 4, (Steam Pinnace) and if the landing was opposed he would give the order for Maxim gun fire.

Other orders clearly state that the Picket boats were not to fire their Maxim's unless the tows were first fired upon by the Turks.

With every reference to the Maxims, it is always stated as the Picket boats, never the Pinnaces.

C.E.W Bean makes mention of one the tows maxim guns opening fire.

I am probably being just plain pedantic, but if statements are to be made, and repeated, it is imprtant that the true situation and facts are relayed. If information is found that clearly demonstrates that the two steam Pinnace's were armed with Maxim guns, well and good.

Jeff

[Guest]

Jeff, pedantic is good, it helps clarify and sets the bar.

Cheers

Kim

[Bryn]

Thanks Grant and Jeff, very useful information.

Have a look at http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/AWM38/3DR...DRL606-31-1.pdf - PAGE 4 (don't count the pages, use the numbers written). Here is an account, of the fighting on the first day, of Turkish Machine Gun spare parts, among other things, being found in 'Shepherd's Hut', which was located on the inland side of the Fisherman's Hut ridge. Also states that an MG began firing on them shortly after leaving the hut.

This is a really interesting account, apparently originally by a Lieutenant Mason, as it shows that some Australian troops followed retreating Turks off the main range back down onto the coastal flats, ending up inland from the landing-place of the 7th Battalion boats. I'll transcribe the passages and link it with any others I find scattered throughout Bean's diaries and notebooks.

[green_acorn]

jeff,

First can I submit that the differences between a "steam pinnace" and a "picket boat" in 1915 were not great, they were both armed steam driven boats intended for the guarding of capital ships at anchor or quayside, indeed the Royal Navy museum has restored steam pinnace 199 which was built in 1911:

"When armed with a Hotchkiss gun, pinnaces were often referred to as picket boats as a result of their activities as a picket patrolling the capital ship anchorage. The combination of speed and quick firing ability made the steam picket boat a formidable defence against to the torpedo boat threat of the late 1800s and early 1900s. In addition to the Hotchkiss gun, the picket boat would have carried a light Maxim machine gun on the cabin roof and a number of rifles stowed in the aft cockpit." RN Museum site

Without having seen Steam Pinnace 199 or any other steam pinnace until this search Restored Steam Pinnace 199, I offer the thought that in April 1915 the picket boats were simply a newer or modified class of boat that took advantage of the firepower of the Maxim machine gun to dispense with the Hotchkiss gun on the forward universal mount by replacing it with a Maxim machine gun, as seen in this image of HMS Triumph's picket boat returning to the battleship after the mission to destroy crippled British submarine HMS E15, Dardanelles, 18 April 1915 HMS Triumph's Picket Boat.

Apologies for not having made the distinction in my previous post about the Pinnaces.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Jeff Pickerd]

Thanks Hendo,

Again most interesting, and great photograph of the HMS Triumph Steam Pinnace, but that leeds me to a problem of what I have assumed to be a pinnace from the many photographs of boats along the shore of Anzac Cove.

The Lifeboats seem in the main to be clinker built, and the Picket Boats are as seen by the example of the Triumph's boat. What I have thought to be the Pinnace are the larger, and much broader of beam, possibly steel hulded, boats.

From the orders for the 12 tows we have seven different vessels, that is if we count the Picket Boats seperate from the Steam Pinnace, and I wonder why such a distinction was made in the order of each set of boats from each Warship, with the Triumph's boats alone being descrobed as Steam Pinnaces?

For clarification as to what the boat I assumed to a Pinnace was, I now need to establish what the difference between a Launch, Cutter, Lifeboat and unpowered Pinnace is.

The thing that troubles me, is, the 3rd Light Horse Brigade boarded what is variously called, barges or Pinnaces, from the Destroyers that brought them to Anzac Cove, and the photographs of Signaller James Campbell show the type of boat that are either Pinnaces, or what I assumed were Pinnaces. If they are not Pinnaces, what are they? They seem to be too large for a Cutter or a Launch, and definately not the normal Lifeboat.

All of this is what is what I find fascinating about the landing, there are just so many contradictions, and the more one looks into it, the more things are just not as they were supposed to be.

Jeff

[michaeldr]

In such a long thread this may have been mentioned before; if so, then call this a reminder

Quote:

The first approach of dawn was another reason for speed. Everything was absolutely quiet as we approached the shore, and there was nothing to lead one to suppose that the surprise had failed, but as the first boat touched the shore at 5.11 a.m. a single shot broke the stillness, almost immediately followed by others, and the firing became general. The boats were ashore and the men out of them in a wonderfully short time, and, cheering lustily, parties immediately began to fight their way up the steep, scrub-covered hills. One of the picket boats fired a belt or so at the crest of the hill, and the flickering flame of a hostile maxim was seen coming from a little look-out station half way up the ridge at Ari Burnu. This gun disappeared very quickly. Then the shells began to come from Gaba Tepe way, and then, turning to a " bang " from behind us, as we saw our destroyers nearly as far inshore as the picket boats and the soldiers already on their way to land, and thus, as dawn broke amid an ever-increasing shell fire but a rapidly diminishing rifle fire, the last of the covering force landed.

[from The Naval Review, 1916, page 304]

As you will see, Bean's ref to one Naval maxim being fired (mentioned by Jeff in post 466 above) is confirmed by the Navy

And note that mention is also made of "the flickering flame of a hostile maxim was seen coming from a little look-out station half way up the ridge at Ari Burnu. This gun disappeared very quickly."

Perhaps equally interesting (in a discussion which has at times turned on men's possible confusion of the fire of numerous rifles with a machine-gun's fire) is the last sentence which mentions 'a rapidly diminishing rifle fire'

An hour later the writer states – "The situation about 6.30 a.m. was that everything was working at full speed, and the organisation had so far proved successful beyond our wildest dreams. A tremendous battle- judging by the sound - was raging somewhere over the crest of the hills, and it seemed as though our men were advancing." This would appear to indicate that while shelling may still have been a problem on the beach, incoming infantry fire had by then died-down almost completely (?) [This all changed a little later in the day – "Towards the late afternoon it became evident that things were not going very well on shore."]

re pinnaces and picket boats etc; I am not sure how many Naval types are out there watching this saga, but I share with the Pals above, the hope that someone more knowledgeable than I can come along and differentiate for us between these similar sounding small vessels

regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Jeff,

HMS Triumph deployed three steam boats, a Picket Boat and two Steam Pinnaces, the other British Capital Ships deployed two picket boats and the French battleship one. I have seen a picture post wwas of both a Picket Boat and Steam Pinnace being recovered onto their davits. I assum that each capital ship may have had two Steam Pinnaces and Two Picket Boats.

I am coming to the belief that the difference lies in the lenght of the boat, with the Steam Pinnace being about 55" long whilst the Picket Boats were somewhat shorter at about 40", this would probably refelect the slightly different role with the Steam Pinnace now being used for general ship to shore and harbour transfer of personnel and some goods, whilst the Picket Boats concentrated solely on ships defence. Noting the other capital ships did not supply Steam Pinnaces to the landing at Anzac, it would be enlightening to know if they were used at helles or were used for courier work between the command and capital ships.

I will speak to a former RAN officer on Friday night and find out the distinctions of all the craft.

Cheers,

Hendo

Cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

While the technicalities of what constitutes a certain type of boat (pinnace / picket boat) are interesting, I'd assume that any kind of boat suitably armed could be called a 'picket boat'. The word 'picket' here surely refers to their role, or employment, rather than a type of boat - as a picket - similar to a sentry, guarding larger ships. The requirements would seem to be a fast, agile boat armed sufficiently to prevent harm being done to large ships at anchor by individuals, small groups, or other small boats.

Such technicalities remain irrelevant to any discussion of the landing of the four boats carrying elements of the 7th Battalion at Fisherman's Hut. These men rowed themselves the entire distance from the Galeka, northeast to the shore at Fisherman's Hut - away from all the other landing craft - in that ship's lifeboats. No steam pinnaces, no picket boats, no cutters.

Spare parts for a machine-gun are stated to have been found in the hut on the inland side of Fisherman's Hut ridge, and now at least three distinct groups - those in the boats, those landing to the south and approaching along the shore, and those who chased Turks off the main range and ended up inland from Fisherman's Hut - all report being fired on by a machine gun or guns in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut.

[Peter Doyle]

The staff work undertaken to plan the invasion was flawed at the beginning. The maps are just one element, but not a major elements at all. The staff work undertaken was premised upon charging along flat and rolling plains with excellent soils that lend themselves to movement and entrenchment. Consequently the training of the troops was undertaken on this basis. Most of the training was undertaken in Egypt, and area that conformed to the staff notion of how infantry should be deployed.

In essence, even if they were supplied with the best maps in the world with access to google earth and the like, it still would have been a massive bungle. The minute the men set foot on shore and faced the hills, the training in Egypt would have been seen as a failure. There were no rolling plains covered with gentle wheat fields. Anyone 4m from a person became invisible so controlling an advance would have been impossible and so an advance would have been done more by way of luck than strategy. Reading all the accounts of those on the ground make it very clear that command was impossible because of the confusion brought about by the terrain.

Rejoining this discussion after many months I was interested to see the sub-section on staff work, and the diversion from the MG question - which is one of my main interests with regard to the Helles Sector - seen by Hamilton et al. as the toughest nut to crack.

As has been stated in one of the posts above, many commentators have blamed the maps. Moorhead, Rhodes James, etc, have made these assertions, and whatever one might think of these authors and their work (certainly Rhodes James had a high opinion of his own!), these have continued to carry forward.

What Peter Chasseaud and I have demonstrated is that there were a series of reports available to Hamilton and Co, and that these give a reasonable account of the terrain. That this was effectively covered up during the Inquiry is perhaps down to human frailty.

Once the land campaign was committed, there was effective terrain information gathering, by air, by land, and offshore. I'm not sure what could have really been done with respect to training here, and as with all aspects of the campaign, it is easy to forget the short time scale over which it was fought. The 29th Division was committed to Helles, given its experience; the cliffs were high, the beaches narrow, the bays constrained. Anzac was, as we all know, very different. The vagaries of the geology here dictate the nature of the landscape, with friable crumbly cliffs, and strong layers like that which formed the Sphinx at Anzac creating a distinctive badland. Whether the training could have prepared men for this in such a short space of time is an interesting question. Whether the full range of terrain could be replicated for all the troops committed to the landings is another.

Now, as for machine guns...

Peter

[VinceB]

Peter

You have said:

What Peter Chasseaud and I have demonstrated is that there were a series of reports available to Hamilton and Co, and that these give a reasonable account of the terrain. That this was effectively covered up during the Inquiry is perhaps down to human frailty.

Not being familiar with your work, can you tell me where it is that you have demonstrated this assertion.

Thanks

Vince