TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[stevenbecker]

Robert,

Cheers mate I missed that.

But the point still holds where LH and ICC soldiers heard MGs firing on them at Madghaba but on taking the redoubt found no MG in there?

Only one dismantled/damaged MG was found in a redoubt facing the 3rd LH Bde, where the casulties reflect its use, particulary the 8th LHR.

I can't add any more to this other then what I have given before, I surpose we will never solve this at Anzac.

S.B

[VinceB]

Steve

Judging by the variety of views expressed by the men landing and the Turks, if their accounts cannot agree, there is no hope of sorting that out today.

The problem with this discussion is the attempt to prove a negative. It cannot be done.

There are contradictory contemporary reports. Some say there was machine gun fire, others do not mention it. One cannot cherry pick this issue. To establish the end argument that there were no machine guns, it is essential to discredit the witness statements who claim the existence of the machine guns. That is an impossible task. So we are left with a number of contradictory stories and no ability to determine the truth.  That doesn't stop cherry picking but it makes any of these analyses fraught.

Vince

[michaeldr]

I was alerted to this by an article in The Gallipolian (the journal of The Gallipoli Association) which arrived here yesterday: it is edition No. 124 – Winter 2010. The article is on pages 37-41 and it is based on a report in the War Diary of the 29th Div.'s 86th Infantry Brigade: WO 95/4310

The author of the report is probably Capt. G. W. Geddes (Company Commander of X Company, 1st RMF) as it bears a strong resemblance to another report already given in hand writing and signed by him.

Page 5 of the report (which appears as page 37 of the pdf doc. supplied by the NA for only ₤3.50) has the following with ref to V Beach on 25th April 1915:

"I estimate the strength of the Turks at 400 to 500, with 2 Pom-Poms and 6 Machine Guns. They had Machine Guns.*"

The * refers the reader to a note at the foot of the page which gives the following detail

"* C.S.M. J. O'Shea, D.C.M. now serving in the 15th Foot picked up Turkish Machine Gun belt boxes."

... … … … … … … … … … … … … …

Something else which I have been meaning to raise here but have not got around to until now, is Edward J Erickson's recent book 'Gallipoli – The Ottoman Campaign' [iSBN 978 1 84415 967 3]

The author uses single colour maps which appear to originate with the modern TGS, and his Key for the symbols used (see page ix) makes the interesting differentiation between 'Automatic Weapon' and 'Machine Gun'

On page 74 we have Map 2.6, on which appear 11 of these 'Automatic Weapons':

two on Gully Spur, two at the mouth of Gully Ravine (Gully Beach), two half way between there and X Beach, three at aprox. X Beach and two half way around Morto Bay, mid-way between The Camber and S Beach.

In view of the placement of three of these weapons at aprox. X Beach, and since we already have Lockyer's account of the disabling and capture there of two, 4-barrelled 1-inch Nordenfeldts, then I presume that the rather coy reference by Erickson to 'Automatic Weapons' is in fact to these Nordenfeldts

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Notwithstanding the lack of a symbol for 'machine-gun' on the map mentioned in the post above, the following text is from Edward J. Erickson's 2010 book - see page 70

"About the same time [06.00 hrs, 25th April 1915] the 12 Coy's platoons observed over forty boats in lines heading for Teke Koyu (W Beach). At the 400m range line, Turkish heavy machine-guns began to engage the lead boats, but the riflemen withheld their fire until the British were within 40m of the shore. The British landing was centered on the beach and, therefore directly into the centre of a prearranged Turkish 'beaten zone.'* The forward Turkish platoon reported at 07.05 am that an actual landing (as opposed to a demonstration or feint) was underway.**At nearby Sedd el Bahr (V Beach) at 6 am, the men of the 10 Coy observed, with great puzzlement, in the middle of masses of boats, a steamship (the converted collier River Clyde) heading inshore. At the 400m mark, the Turks began to engage the enemy with machine-guns and light artillery. At 6.30am, five of twenty enemy boats became separated from the main body and the Turks engaged them with very heavy rifle fire. The steamship continued on until it grounded out in the surf and it was apparent to the Turks that it contained hundreds of enemy soldiers as well as numerous machine-guns. The ship immediately became a magnet for heavy Turkish fire as the company commander directed rifles and machine-guns against it. The Turkish official history refers to the River Clyde as a Trojan Horse."

'Gallipoli, The Ottoman Campaign' by E J Erickson, Pen & Sword Military

Erickson supplies two footnotes for the above

* "The 'beaten zone' is a technical term in machine-gun employment that denotes the area into which most of the bullets fall. It is elliptically shaped along the gun-target line."

** "ATASE Archive 91/2, 26nci Piyade Alay Tarihçesi, p. 12"

[As far as I understand the book's bibliography, ATASE = Askeri Tarihi ve Stratejik Etut Başkanliği (Turkish General Staff Archive, Ankara)]

Edited 8 December , 2010 by michaeldr

[Robert Dunlop]

The following is from '36 Days: The Untold Story Behind the Gallipoli Landings' by Hugh Dolan (ISBN 9781405039857):

"Wednesday 7th April 1915 [ie prior to the landings at Anzac Cove]

Major Ismet, the officer commanding the Turkish 27 Regiment's 2 Battalion, deployed three of his companies along the coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula from Fisherman's Hut to Gaba Tepe garrison. Each company comprised three platoons of nine sections with nine riflemen in each section.

Ismet placed his No. 1 Platoon on a small knoll behind the old stone fisherman's hut that gave the area its name, allocating the platoon one Maxim machine-gun and ordering the men to dig in. From their trench, the men manning the machine-gun covered a sweeping arc across the beach north of Anzac Cove. The machine-gun had clear fields of fire and its bullets would rip a beaten zone on the surface of the sea. Ismet sited another platoon, also equipped with a machine-gun, on Plugge's Plateau which dominated the seaward approaches to Anzac Cove." pp 193-4

Robert

[michaeldr]

Robert,

Many thanks for bringing us up to date with the latest published work on this

Does Mr Dolan give any references for the source of this information?

One thing which strikes me about Erickson and his book, which we both quoted from a little earlier, is that clearly he has had access to Turkish historical documentation. The question which then inevitably arises is this; why does he (and Dolan) mention the MGs when the Turkish history does not? Why does his text mention the MGs, but not the TGS supplied maps which he uses?

I am presuming that the official three volume Turkish language version of the history is similar to the shorter version in English, (with no mention of MGs) and that that is why this question has arisen in the first place.

regards

Michael

[Robert Dunlop]

Michael, there are no references linked to the section that I quoted above. My guess is that Hugh Dolan would probably give feedback on this, if he were approached by email. I don't have his contact details but it shouldn't be difficult. Alternatively, you could go through the publisher.

I don't have a problem with this level of tactical detail, assuming it is correct, not appearing in the Ottoman official history nor on tactical maps. A single MG per platoon, even accounting for just two platoons being given this option, would have had a significant tactical effect but not be worth mentioning in anything higher than a battalion report.

Robert

[green_acorn]

Robert and Michael,

I know Hugh and his email address and will contact him, he will have the reference somewhere, he is a very thorough chap. I will also have to get my copy of his book, that I had him sign, back and read it!

You may also find he pops up here as I know he knows of and has visited the GWF.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

Nice additions to the debate, Michael and Robert. Michael, I found your question: "Why does he (and Dolan) mention the MGs when the Turkish history does not?" very pertinent. But why would we stop at Erickson and Dolan? I'd include and consider, along with these authors, the many eye-witnesses, and add them to the question. All along it's seemed totally ridiculous to me that, because the Turkish history does not 'admit' to the presence of machine guns (the exact term used in the British Official History), that some contributors have been prepared not only to discount such witness statements, but have actually gone out of their way to invent explanations aimed at discrediting the witnesses themselves.

[Robert Dunlop]

Hendo, I got the impression that Hugh was very thorough from the way the book is written and from his background. It would be great if you could chase this up.

Robert

[michaeldr]

I don't have a problem with this level of tactical detail, assuming it is correct, not appearing in the Ottoman official history nor on tactical maps. A single MG per platoon, even accounting for just two platoons being given this option, would have had a significant tactical effect but not be worth mentioning in anything higher than a battalion report.

Robert, Hendo & Bryn,

Robert; I appreciate your comments here and respect your right to a personal preference as to the level of detail which you seek in official histories.

However, my remark was directed more at the Turkish historian whose challenge initiated this debate; see posts 1 & 2, of 29th October 2005

Chris - "Duiring recent discussion with a Turkish academic the efficacy of Turkish MG fire on the landing beaches was challenged. He is not convinced the units in place on 25 Apr 15 had MGs. Most Allied historiography and memoirs comment on Turkish MGs so I am not seeking guidance toward British/AUS/NZ/French material."

&

Bryn - "I had the same discussion, probably with the same man (was it Kenan?) and had to admit that he made good points based on Turkish documents."

At the moment, it seems that using (those same [?]) Turkish documents, Erickson & Dolan have come to another and opposite conclusion altogether, and I feel that if this discussion is to proceed, then we need to hear more from those who believe that Ottoman machine-guns (and/or their 'automatic' equivalent) were not present at the landings.

regards

Michael

[Robert Dunlop]

... respect your right to a personal preference as to the level of detail which you seek in official histories.

Michael, it is more the case that, having read lots of war diaries, official histories, etc, I don't expect this level of tactical detail. I appreciate the point that you are making. Thank you for clarifying it.

Robert

[michaeldr]

Robert,

I think that you make the point very well here.

You, I, & others on this side can, if we so wish, have access not only to the British & Australian OHs, but also to numerous regimental histories, War Diaries at the NA, personal accounts both published and those held at the IWM and other museums, etc., etc. In short, we can check around and fill in any gaps which we find in the official account.

Though I cannot be certain on this point, what I feel has probably happened in this case, is that the absence of a mention in the official Turkish history has mistakenly been read as an indication that none were present on the morning of the 25th April 1915.

While we would have checked other sources, it is not clear to me that that option exists to the same extent on the other side (though Erickson seems to have managed it somehow.)

Regards

Michael

[Jeff Pickerd]

To me there is something that seems to be not quite right about this assertion by Hugh Dolan in his book.

For a start the 7th April is 18 days prior to the landing at Anzac Cove, and from what H. B. Danisman records of the account left by Lt Col Sefik Aker, commanding officer of the 27th Infantry Regiment, in his book, "GALLIPOLI 1915 DAY ONE PLUS", the whole regiment had been operating in the Ari Burnu area up until the night of the 24th April. Headquarters, 1st & 3nd Battalions, plus the machine company, with its four guns, moved to Maydos during the night of the 24th. The 2nd Battalion under the command of Major Ismet Bey remained at Ari Burnu, with Major Ismet setting up his command post at Gaba Tepe.

The ensuing actions of the three companies of the 2nd Battalion have already been covered at length in the pages of this thread.

Jeff

[Robert Dunlop]

It wouldn't be the first time that there are differing anecdotal and war diary accounts of key events. This makes it unlikely we will get to a definitive answer but let's wait for Hugh Dolan's response. I would not assume that Aker's account was any more, or any less, accurate than Ismet's account (assuming that the latter was the source for Dolan's 'assertions').

Robert

[bob lembke]

I recently had a two-hour layover at Heathrow, on my way to Switzerland. I just got back to the US, after the layover was extended to 13 days, I never did get to the Continent.

Having all that time, I bought Robin Prior's Gallipoli - The End of the Myth, 2009, Yale University Press, New Haven, and read it. A good book in some ways, doesn't seem to have much interest in the Turks or the Germans.

My point is that he stated that the Turks had four MGs per company! Really! I believe that the TOE figure was, early in 1915, four per division. Recently poking thru my notes as I entered a bit of material from Prior, noted two items from prior work. (note: as of August 2011 we seem to have definatively established that, ideally, each Turkish regiment, not division, had a MG company of 4 MGs, and that at that time at Gallipoli each division did have 2 or 3 MG companies, 8 to 12 MGs. Sorry for the previous misinformation. Still not many MGs.)

Reacting to the invasion, the Turkish 15th Division was being sent to Gallipoli from Constantinople, and it had no MGs, so a detachment of 44 German sailors was quickly formed, armed with 8 Maxims from the armories of the Goeben and Breslau in the harbor. This item was from Prigge, a staff officer who was at Gallipoli.

I remember another item in my time-line; the above naval MG detachment was involved in heavy fighting, lost many of the sailors, and all of its MGs were lost or made inoperable. Then the Turks presented them with 11 Vickers that they captured in a counter-attack, and the sailors were back in business. (Note: May have been 13 Vickers.)

Also, in the same notes there was mention that the Turks were able to form more MG companies after they captured some MGs from the Allies.

Turkish MG companies of the time had, I believe, four MGs per company.

I can't authorativily state that the Turks had x MGs at this position, or none at that position. I can state (and have previously) that the Turks had few MGs, communications with Germany were cut off and had been for a while, and with all of these reports of x MGs here, and y MGs there, on April 25th, they all can't be true. (Certainly they wern't handing rare MGs over to the odd lady sniper.) One of the posts recently above had a Turkish company commander positioning two platoons, each with a MG.

If anyone wants me to elaborate on the above, and perhaps give more precise sources (all of the above is from German sources, I think, some participants, like Prigge, some secondary sources, like Schoen.), sing out.

Bob Lembke

[green_acorn]

Gentleman,

I apologise for taking so long to post my conversation with Hugh Dolan which occurred immediately befor Christmas, I blame old age, the xmas holidays and my impending undergraduate entry to the Uni of Qld. Anyway:

Hugh,

In your book you mention MAJ Ismet placing MG's at Fisherman’s Hut and Plugges Plateau, there has been a long running debate at the Great War Forum and in Wartime magazine about this issue, would you care to share your reference and whether you believe there were MG's at those positions on the morning of the 25th?

My own personal view is there probably wasn't as "doctrinally" conventional wisdom of the time deployed the guns in pairs and the MG Company's were organised as such (four gun teams, two range finders and five MG's (one being the Coy spare), plus the CO of the 27th Regt stated that he deployed the guns when the Regt came forward to counter attack on the 25th at about 8am. Then there is the location issue, Plugges Plateau would have meant a great deal of Dead Ground in front of that gun.

Hendo,

.................ommitted personal disucssion ..........

My source - from memory - is Sefik Aker's journal of events. It is in the AWM and is comprehensive, although, it was written 10 ? years after the event.

There is also an account of a British MG on one of the picket boats returning fire onto a Turk MG on Plugges which fits in with Sefik Aker's account.

It is possible that a Turk MG was present - it fired a few rounds before the crew were wounded and dragged to the rear.

I agree that Turk MG fire was minimal and that accounts of heavy fire were mistaken descriptions of rapid rifle fire.

Hugh,

Cheers for the response. I suspect that after the initial deployment in the locations you mentioned that the German staff officers may have varied some aspects, such as the MG's to conform more with their own doctrine and to reduce the forward defence footprint (defence of the beaches) the Ottoman's planned.

[Robert Dunlop]

Well done, Hendo. Thanks for chasing. Thanks to Hugh also.

Robert

[PMHart]

Errr from memory Sefik Aker says nothing of the kind,

Pete

[green_acorn]

Peter,

I think it was a hurried response from the office before Hugh left for the Xmas holidays. I have not gotten around to reading his book yet to comment, but will do so and seek clarification from Hugh in February.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Bryn]

There has been no 'debate' on this topic in Wartime magazine.

[green_acorn]

Sorry Bryn, a single article from one point of view.

Hendo

______________________

Which brings me to how much authority can we put on unit histories, which are written post war generally by people who in the early days were junior and not possibly aware of all events and circumstances? When so many of the "actors" in the events were killed during the individual battle or a subsequent battle; and the effect of constant recalling in conversation, at the Furphy tank, and subsequent post war reunions and pub meetings mean that myth become legends and legends become facts. Then during the editorial process, when many hands will have influence, there is the need to preserve or enhance the memory and standing both of the deceased and living for political and community reasons

In the case of the 8th Aust Inf Bn it did not put out a call to former members of the 8th Bn AIF, for information to include in a unit history, until 1934. On the back of the flyer they distributed to past members they listed the specific dates of events. see image.

Cheers,

Hendo

[green_acorn]

Details of 8th Bn AIF movements WW1, obverse of call to members for a unit history

[bob lembke]

Here we are. I have brought this forward, following Michael's suggestion.

I think that some of the information that was posted on the other thread was very valuable, and perhaps cast more light than much of this thread. I fear that, due to my dim (false) recollection of the TOE of each Turkish division only having one MG company, I have given false information to the forum. But we still must remember that 8 or 12 MGs for a triangular division is still a very small number. I think that German divisions at this time were or soon would be at 108 heavy MGs (in practice actually more, including captured Russian MGs; the number of MGs per MG heavy company had been increased to 12 from 6), independent companies (such as Fortress MG Companies, which were transferred to the front when any threat to German fortresses was eliminated) of MGs had long existed, and independent battalions of heavy (MG 08) and light MGs (Masden, then Lewis Guns) were being formed. Thanks for the detailed information, perhaps it could even be pasted into this thread.

Bob

[michaeldr]

Part of the problem when discussing Turkish claims that there were no machine-guns facing the allies at the landings, arises from trying to establish who exactly it is that we are talking about – the Turkish infantry, or, the Turkish artillery.

Perhaps it is correct to say that the Turkish infantry stationed opposite the beaches at Helles at dawn on 25th April 1915 had no machine-guns. The 25th and the 27th Regiments did have machine-guns, but at this particular time they were not actually covering the beaches. In the early hours of the morning of 25th April 1915, that was the job of the 26th Regiment who may not have had machine-guns.

But the infantry were only part of the story: they were not alone. The Turkish OoB shows that there were 13 x 25mm and 4 x 37mm guns attached to the 5th Army's 9th Division. These guns are shown on the Turkish OoB as being with their artillery command.

Two of these four-barreled one-inch (25mm) Nordenfeldt guns were captured by the British forces who landed at 'X' Beach. These guns were capable of firing four half-pound steel projectiles at a time, at the rate of 30 aimed rounds a minute (4 x 30 = 120). Captain Lockyer of the Implacable states that just one of these projectiles fired at a line of men in a boat could easily have killed six of them at once.

The men coming ashore in the face of this fire were not concerned about whether the Turkish OoB showed them as infantry weapons or artillery weapons, nor were they concerned about modern dictionary definitions of the precise meaning of the term "machine-gun." As I said in one of the first pages of this thread – "If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then, for heaven's sake, let's call it a duck."

Apart from X Beach, where two were captured, where were the rest of these thirteen 25mm and four 35mm guns situated at dawn on the 25th April 1915?

The American historian Edward J. Erickson has made a deep study, over many years, of the Ottoman army of 1914-1918. His book Gallipoli, The Ottoman Campaign is he says, "based largely on original source documents from the Ottoman Fifth Army residing today in the Turkish general staff's archives in Ankara, and from documents contained in the modern Turkish official histories of the campaign…"

Erickson neatly side-steps the 'machine-guns at the landings' controversy by instead using the term 'Automatic Weapons.' See his Map No. 2.6 on page 74 of his book: it is quite revealing and please note, it is a Turkish supplied map. Around the Helles coast it shows eleven (11) symbols which, according to the key provided by Erickson (see page ix) indicate "Automatic Weapon".

Since at least a couple of these symbols for Automatic Weapons coincide with the position above X Beach where the Nordenfeldts were captured by the British, then I feel that there can be little doubt at all as to what Erickson meant when he used the term Automatic Weapons.

By thus tiptoeing around the subject, a diplomatic solution can be found to the problem, where everyone is correct, and no-one is wrong.

Perhaps there were no Turkish infantry machine-guns at Helles as dawn broke on 25th April 1915. However, there were indeed plenty of Turkish Automatic Weapons with a fire power equivalent to what is today generally termed a machine-gun.

Until more evidence turns-up, this may be as close as one gets to the truth here.

regards

Michael