TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[green_acorn]

Chris,

I was just about to go in and edit my post to agree with Michael and to correct my comment about the orientation of the weapons shown at the symbol, noting the orientation of othe symbols with a "T" base I would agree that it was orientated towards Anzac Cove.

The symbols used in the TGS study are from the 1950's US/NATO standard (our JSP 101) with some unique symbols for what is now obsolete equipments such as the heliograph signalling stations. I most certainly agree with you that the Ottoman, German, Austro-Hungarian and indeed British/Entente map symbols changed during the course of the war to meet unique requirements and adoption of new or captured weapons and there are many examples of that when comparing the 1908 German Fd Svc Regs and the translation of the German 2nd Army symbols guide captured on the Siegfried Line in 1918.

Working back from the 1918 German 2nd Army symbol, I believe the symbol you describe is a Fd Howitzer Battery under 15cms, 15cm guns had a ring around the solid dot. The dot is used for howitzers and may represent the plate that guns like the later British 25pdr gun used. As a guide the pamphlet, available at the AWM, is called "Conventional Signs employed on Maps of the Siegfried Lines. Issued by Second German Army during the Spring of 1917", after capture and translation by GHQ BEF Intelligence it was published as SS 745 in 1918. I hope with time to be able to create a symbols handbook showing all of the symbols used by the primary combatants in WW1, to help those interpreting maps of the period, symbols don't just pop on staff maps without prior agreement, written instruction, changed course doctrine or an explanatory legend, so they will all be documented somewhere.

Regards,

Hendo

[Jeff Pickerd]

Hendo & Chris,

Since forwarding the scan of the segment from the map to Chris, attributed to Esat Pasha, commanding officer of III Corps, Gallipoli, dated 4.8.1015, I have now scanned the whole map at a higher resolution. This map is taken from the rear of the book "Companion To The Feature Length Documentary GALLIPOLI, Tolga Ornek & Feza Toker, EkipFilm.

I stumbled upon the symbol of what appears to be the Nordenfelt gun purely by chance when I scanned the ANZAC sector in an endeavour to confirm the Turkish Regiments holding the Chessboard above Pope's Hill & Quinn's Post. In addition to this, there were several small symbol's that appeared to look like those representing machine guns, the higher resolution scan confirmed that suspition.

At first I took the symbol at Gaba Tepe to form some sort of small artillery piece, but really didn't pay it much attention at the time, but the symbols representing machine guns through out the map were consistent to those that have been posted here prior. Here I was struck by the Gaba Tepe symbol bearing the characteristics of the machine gun symbol, with the addition of the artillery 'T' bar. Hence my suspicion that it stood for the known Nordenfelt positioned at Gaba Tepe. From what I can see, there are no other such symbol's notated anywhere else on the map.

The positioning of this symbol, facing to the North of Anzac, at this stage of the campaign, August 1915, makes perfect sense, it is ranged to cover the the Southern extremity of the ANZAC sector, also the coast and Brighton Beach. It was probably this gun that fired on the abortive raid on Gaba Tepe by Captain Leane's 102 men of the 11th Battalion, 4th May.

I would tend to agree with Chris, that the symbols used on this map by Esat Pasha are more likely to be those in use by the Ottoman army for 1915, as against those used in "The Turkish General Staff" history. For that matter, all notations on this map are in the Ottoman script, the numetrics being the standard Arabic numerals common to all 16 plus Ottoman scripts.

This aspect of the symbols used on this August map, to my mind, give another probability to there having been no machine guns at ANZAC on the 25th April. The machine gun symbols as used here are consistent with those in use on the Ottoman April maps, if there was one, or two, machine guns positioned just above Fisherman's Hut on the 25th, it is fairly reasonable to suspect that they would have been notated on the Turkish maps of the time.

My apologies for not putting up the whole map, for I have lost my program for posting images to the net, yet to down load a new program.

Jeff

[michaeldr]

quote from Hendo,

I hope with time to be able to create a symbols handbook showing all of the symbols used by the primary combatants in WW1, to help those interpreting maps of the period, symbols don't just pop on staff maps without prior agreement, written instruction, changed course doctrine or an explanatory legend, so they will all be documented somewhere.

You've set yourself a mamoth task there, but if you can do it then you will have the grateful thanks of so many

Good luck with the project

and thanks to all for the last few posts which have been most interesting, especially that map

best regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Hendo,

Many thanks for your replies and efforts to identify the symbol. They are much appreciated.

I looked at the chart Michael displayed from the TGS history and I am sure he is correct in identifying the symbols marked 37 and 25 as nordenfelts. Nonetheless, they are from the TGS history which was printed much later and thus may be using more modern symbols than those used on the contemporary map from 4 August 1915. Have you any thoughts on whether the symbols may have changed over time? If you look at the map in the lower right quarter just to the S of Chunuk Bair (L of it on the map) is a symbol with what looks like a V or a diamond at the head and a V at the base which we now associate with anti tank weapons.

Again, many thanks for your help.

Best wishes

Chris

Chris,

I just had another look at the "diamond" symbol, it had been crossed out with a black pencil, as had the gun immediately to the South, if you look closely you will see the bottom^ of the X going through the black dot.

Regarding the symbol at Gaba Tepe, which I also believe to be a Nordenfeldt mechanical machine gun, it would appear the owner of the map has dotted in the contour of the small knoll and that the Nordenfeldt is positioned on the SE to provide cover from seaward and put it in enfilade not necessarily along the coast to Anzac Cove, but possibly NNE upwards along the spur of the FEBA.

----------------------------------

I was also looking at Colonel H Maclaurin's 25 Apr 1915 map to see if the small headland South of Gaba Tepe was named and was struck by the alphabetic sub classification of GS 223, offshore of and centred on Anzac Cove. It would seem to me to lend credence to the age old question of the landing being planned partially for the Cove, not just Brighton Beach.

Regards,

Hendo

[bob lembke]

I am looking at an "order of battle" sheet from one of the Schlachten des Weltkrieges volumes published by the Reichsarchiv, this one in 1921 and by a former German General Staff officer. Most of these volumes, which are plentiful and cheap, have such diagrams in the rear.

The artillery simbols used (for a Landwekrkorps) was the basic three line symbol (longer line - barrel between two shorter lines - wheels) for the two 77 mm fieldgun battalions of each field artillery regiment, while the third battalion has the same symbol with the addition of a round blackened ball at the base. One battalion of these regiments were armed with 105 mm field howitzers, so that must be the symbol for this gun. The third artillery symbol was a vertical line, no "wheels", with a circle and a central dot in the middle of the circle superimposed on the middle of the vertical bar (or barrel), and an arrow-head at each end of the barrel each pointing in the direction of firing. This is the symbol of the schw. Feldhaub. or 150 mm field howitzer.

But I don't have a clue as to the particular symbol that might have been used for the Nordenfelt.

If you went thru the various Schlachten volumes one could get an idea of the symbols for crew-served weapons as understood by German General Staff officers at the end of the war. Of course a relevant field manual would be even more authorative.

I will gratuitously add my usual cautionary; I read a lot about the Turkish Army from Central Power primary sources, and the Turkish Army in 1915 had very, very few machine guns.

Bob Lembke

[Crunchy]

I will gratuitously add my usual cautionary; I read a lot about the Turkish Army from Central Power primary sources, and the Turkish Army in 1915 had very, very few machine guns.

Not gratuitous Bob, but be careful; you will be accused of belittling the "British" historians.

Hendo,

You mentioned you had found out how many Maxim MG's were allocated to the Turkish 5th Army in April, which from what I can recall supports Bob's comment above. How many across the two Corps in 5th Army?

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

, I have now scanned the whole map at a higher resolution. This map is taken from the rear of the book "Companion To The Feature Length Documentary GALLIPOLI, Tolga Ornek & Feza Toker, EkipFilm.

The full map Jeff has scanned for information

Cheers

Chris

[johnshep]

Chris

I'm not sure how relevant this is because a lot of water flowed under the bridge between 25th April and 4th August, but for what its worth here is something that caught my eye (whilst looking for something else) whilst at TNA yesterday. Its from CAB 45/217

Apologies for poor image quality due to very thin copy paper on the original.

John

[green_acorn]

John,

That is superb and goes towards answering the original question of what machine guns were on the Gallipoli Peninsula at the time of the landings. May I ask what the title of the document is?

A few months ago I found a document which discussed the number of machine guns available to the Ottoman's, I haven't been able to post from it yet as I have had continuing PC problems, but do hope to do so in the next few days.

Hendo

[johnshep]

Hendo

No problem at all. There are two files at TNA

CAB 45/217

CAB 45/236

The title for both is 'Questions put to the Ottoman General Staff about the Dardanelles Operations and the Answers Received'.

217 mainly covers questions raised by Bean and concerns matters relating to the ANZACs, 236 is a much bigger file covering all sectors.

For the benefit of those who do not know this source it is a record of answers given by the TGS to something like 300 questions on all aspects of the campaign (land, sea and air) raised by the alliance after the war. It is evident from the content that detailed research went into preparing the answers which in some instances are very specific and detailed. On several occasions where detail was considered to be inadequate the questions were referred back to TGS for further research. Frustratingly, a number of answers refer to maps and charts which are not to be found in the files and there is no trace of them that I can find at TNA. I have one or two leads to follow up on these which may or may not prove fruitful. More on this if I have any news.

I have quite a few images from these archives especially those pages relating to Suvla and 2nd Anafartalar so if anybody has any specific queries and cannot get to Kew I may be able to help. I may also be able to answer whether other topics of interest are covered in this source.

Good luck with your computer problems, Hendo. That reminds me, I must do a back-up.

John

[grantmal]

The three 7th Battalion officers who were in the boats as they approached Fisherman's Hut - Captain Jackson and Lieutenants Scanlan and Layh - have apparently not intervened in the writing of the account by the 7th Battalion's historian. Nor is there any evidence of anything written by them at any time to indicate doubt at the presence of MGs during their approach.

Bryn,

Layh's account of the Landing in the Argus (http://ndpbeta.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/1523054) mentions machine guns:

The Argus, Wednesday, June 9, 1915. Capt HTC Layh, 7th Battalion:

"We could hear the firing going on, and the shells from the Turks guns fell very close to us. As there was no tow for us, the colonel decided that we were to row ashore in the boats. I was in the first lot of boats, and we started gaily for the shore. As we drew near we could see that the water was being churned up by the bullets, and that we were in for a hot time. The rowers pulled hard, and we entered the beaten zone at a good pace. The bullet zipped around us like bees. Before the keel grated on the beach five or six of the rowers were shot, together with many others. As a matter of fact, only 10 out of 30 left the boats, the rest being either dead or wounded. As I was climbing out of the boat a bullet hit me in the left buttock. We sprinted across the beach and took cover behind some small sand heaps, leaving some more lying on the beach. I received my second present in the calf of the right leg, but it didn't stop me. Once we were behind cover the Turks turned their machine guns on to us, and gave us a lively 10 minutes. A poor chap next to me was hit three times. He begged me to shoot him, but luckily for him a 4th bullet got him, and put him out of pain. The fire was so hot that we could not expose a finger in safety. I called out to the Sgt behind me, and on comparing notes we found we had only six men well enough to move. I gave the order to fix bayonets and show them above the sand heaps, and whether the Turks thought we were going to charge or not, I don't know, but their fire ceased and they bunked. We went up to their trench at the top of the knoll, and took possession of it, and held it until the stretcher bearers got our wounded away. It turned out that only four boats had landed at that spot, 1 mile and a half from the others, on the extreme left flank. Out of these four boats, each containing 30 men, we had about 35 all told who were not seriously wounded."

I also note Col. Elliott, in the next letter, claims that "5 or 6 maxims were captured by the first men ashore..."

Grant

[bob lembke]

Commenting on Grant's last post, and in the light of the fact that the Turks only had a few MGs per division, it seems unlikely that some of the initial men ashore were able to capture "5 or 6" Maxims. They would not be lightly defended, placed well forward, and left behind in numbers. German MG companies, and probably Turkish, were a bit small, somewhat over 100 men, but with four guns per company there should have been the manpower to get these extremely valuable and scarce weapons away. Note that the letter writer stated that Col. Elliot "claimed" that these MGs were captured. What did this language mean?

Two days ago I was able to inspect and pat a "Maxim-Nordenfeldt", but it was a six pounder gun of the tertiary battery on the Protected Cruiser Olympia, which is preserved in Philadelphia, a ship from about 1892 (not sure here) which was Admiral Dewey's flagship in the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898, and was decommissioned in 1922. It was made in a US Naval armory presumably under license.

We might be careful when someone refers to a "Nordenfeldt" or a "Maxim-Nordenfeldt", but it does seem that these references we are citing relate to the 25 mm or 37 mm pom-poms.

Bob Lembke

[grantmal]

In an earlier post (#336) I quoted Charles Bean's Vol.1 in which he referred to "the flash of a machine gun" which could be seen on the "left-hand edge of the plateau above" (p.257) as the first of the 3rd Brigade troops landed at Anzac, and in the Naval Review, Vol.3 of August 1915, a British seaman in charge of a picket boat at the Landing also makes a similar claim:

"... I must preface these few remarks by stating that all I am describing was gleaned from personal experience in a picket boat, of which I was in charge, from the commencement of operations on that eventful day.

...... Suddenly tows on our right commenced crossing our bows. A startled exclamation from the officer 'guiding' the fleet on the left. It seemed a certainty that a terrible confusion must ensue. Tows on my right were at times but 10 yards on my beam. However we managed to keep clear of each other somehow.

....Suddenly a single shot rang out. The alarm! Then the blue and red spurt of a maxim and a perfect hail of bullets are around one. We increased speed, till, in the uncertain light of early dawn, we seemed almost on the beach. The order is given to slip, no necessity for silence now. We shout an encouraging word to the splendid fellows who pull with a will toward the beach. In a miraculously short space of time we hear a British cheer, and very soon that maxim is silent! Then a burst of rifle fire, evidently Turkish by the sound...."

This very interesting account can be read in its entirety at http://www.naval-review.org/ -- click on 'past issues' and download the PDF for August 1915 (Volume III).

Good on you,

Grant

[michaeldr]

Leading Seaman Gilligan from HMS Euryalus in a letter to his vicar published in the Bury Guardian on 16 June 1915:

[this action was at 'W' Beach, Helles]

"We landed at daybreak under a very heavy fire from our ship. It was deafening. There were four boats in tow of a steam pinnace, and there was no sign of the enemy till we touched the shore. Then they opened fire on us in the boats. They were very strongly entrenched above us in the cliffs, with Maxims, Nordenfeldts and 1lb Pom Poms. I was in charge of No 12 boat and I told the men to lie down in the bottom of the boat, leaving myself and six oarsmen exposed to the enemy's fire. I then ordered them all to jump out and get under cover as quickly as they could. As soon as we touched the beach we could see wire entanglements. The fire was terrible; just like a hailstorm. I jumped out of the stern up to my arms in water and pushed the boat in. The sergeant jumped in front of me and got mortally wounded. The cries of the wounded were terrible."

From the journal of The Gallipoli Association, 'The Gallipolian,' No. 100, Winter 2002/2003

ps: A footnote for the Navy; the writer of the article (HMS EURYALUS AND LANCASHIRE LANDING 25 APRIL by Howard Mallinson) states "Sixty-three out of eighty naval ratings were killed or wounded in the operation."

Edited 10 December , 2009 by michaeldr

[RobL]

Has this been mentioned before? Saw this very interesting relic at the Tower of London - a Nordenfelt gun, captured by the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers at Gallipoli

[green_acorn]

RobL,

An example of the same model of Nordenfeldt, with the deck mount/fixed installation stand, is in store at the AWM's Treloar Centre in Canberra, Australia. I will upload a copy of the image later. I don't know the provenance of the AWM's example.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Capt_Starlight]

Treloar Centre weapon would be either:

=> http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/REL/05627

or

=> http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/RELAWM10737.005

or

=> http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/RELAWM07327

(Though the Forts Largs and Glanville weapons appear to be so similar and with similar damage I wonder if they are the same weapon?)

or not in catalogue (yet)....

[green_acorn]

This is the gun I was referring to [behind the French(?) infantry gun], which appears to be the one from Fort Largs, South Australia, but someone appears to have stolen one of its five (according to the record keeper) barrels.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Robert Dunlop]

The gun in the foreground is indeed a French 37mm infantry gun. Interesting camo pattern and not one that I have seen of photographs of this version of the gun. There more photos on this site here.

Robert

[green_acorn]

Robert,

Thank you, the AWM's Renault tank is painted in a similar camouflage scheme.

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

Pleasure, Chris. The camo scheme for the Renault sounds spot on. Perhaps it was extrapolated to the infantry gun too? Or maybe it was the real deal? No reason why it shouldn't have been used for the IG.

Robert

[Pete1052]

The Irish Times

Dublin

Thursday, March 25, 2010

The hell of Suvla Bay: a soldier's letter reveals the horror

THE FULL horror experienced by Irishmen serving with the British army at Suvla Bay in Gallipoli during the first World War is captured in a letter sent from Capt Billy Richards to his father in Dublin on August 10th, 1915.

In the letter, Capt Richards, the uncle of novelist Jennifer Johnston, outlines the high number of deaths he witnessed during the attempt to secure the approaches to Istanbul and the Black Sea.

“We have been fighting for four days and I am sorry to say may have lost most of the battalion,” he writes.

“We were doing fatigues for the first two days and only lost about 10 men but yesterday morning about 3am, we were called up to stop a counter- attack. In about two hours we lost 12 officers and about 450 men. How I got through I shall never understand, the shrapnel and bullets were coming down like hail.

“In the last five nights I have had about five hours sleep but still feel fairly fit in body but my heart is broken for all those fellows I like so much.”

In his letter Capt Richards, who served with the 6th Battalion of the Dublin Fusiliers, talks of witnessing the two divisions sent to replace his coming under heavy fire.

“We are at present much nearer to the enemy than they are, but they are giving us a rest. When they come up we will all attack.”

He also makes reference to those who have stayed behind in Ireland rather than joining the British army.

“I would like to see some of the young lads who are staying at home get a few days of this. If they weren’t killed they would or should die of shame,” he writes.

Capt Richards goes on to describe how some of his closest comrades were wounded in battle, but had survived and expresses hope that he, too, will survive.

“After yesterday I have a feeling I shall get through this ‘job’,” he writes.

Capt Richards died from wounds received in a bayonet charge five days after the letter was sent.

His death is described in detail by regimental chaplain Canon McClean in The Pals of Suvla Bay, a book about a group of young Dublin friends who all joined up and served together in the Dublin Fusiliers during the first World War.

[Jeff Pickerd]

For those of you who have followed, and contributed, to this fascinating topic, you will be pleased to know that Chris Roberts (Crunchy) has had an excellent outline to the proposition of the Turks having no machine guns at ANZAC sector, the morning of the 25th April, published in the latest edition of the Australian War Memorial journal, "WARTIME", the 50th issue, "Gallipoli 95 years on".

Chris' article under the title "TURKISH Machine-Guns at the Landing", outlines most of the evidence that gives sound reasoning for the absence of machine guns that morning, that has been presented over the many pages of this thread, but now, all of that in a concise and logical format.

My congratulations to Chris on a very thorough and detailed article, that presents both sides of the argument, a most enjoyable read.

I suppose Chris' last words sum up this ongoing debate: -

"With such conflicting evidence and no veterans of the landing alive today, we shall never know whether or not there were Turkish machine-guns at the landing. Nonetheless, it seems the view that the Anzac's landed under machine-gun fire on the morning of 25th April may be another myth which is unravelling as more Turkish sources become available and a pragmatic analysis of the available evidence is undertaken"

P.S. Sorry Chris, I cannot, and will not, comply with AWM folly of fully capitalizing the word Anzac, other than when it is referring to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps as a unit identity (ANZAC).

Jeff

[green_acorn]

Jeff,

I want to see the even more interesting thread on the employment of ANZAC machine guns at Gallipoli! I have been waiting with bated breath since you showed me that plan last year, as it really is the most fascinating evidence of superb planning, coordination, cooperation and use of manpower and resources I have seen for MG's.

Indeed I would suggest ahead of its time for the period and possibly presaged development of MG employment theory on the Western Front.

Cheers,

Hendo

[Jeff Pickerd]

Hi Hendo,

Yes the deployment of the combined machine gun sections of the NZ&A Division for No's, 3 & 4 Sections is a most interesting topic, and does indeed warrent its own thread, but to find any great deal of information on this is still a slow and difficult task.

From what I have been able to find, the full credit and genious behind this combined deployment goes to the NZ's.

If you want to kick it off, I'll put in what I have, but really have far too much on at the moment and already falling way behind.

Jeff