TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Bryn]

Hi Chris,

Whether Strickland and Gostelow silenced a gun or not is not really my point, so I haven't dwelt on that. Nor am I saying there was necessarily a gun at Fisherman's Hut (though there may have been), which is why I added my emphasis to the previous quote - in the direction of Fisherman;s Hut. Fisherman's Hut was the only landmark on the northern flank consistently referred to. In my opinion, 'towards Fisherman's Hut' means 'north'. It does not necessarily mean there was a gun on the knoll, which is lower than its two neighbouring heights. What I see as relevant here is the fact that another two officers and their men were sent north (left) in the first place, in order to silence a machine gun, when the prime objective of most was to get up onto the heights in front.

Whether Bean is mistaken in stating it was believed two MGs were there is another matter, but it does not follow that, if there were not two, there must have been none.

[michaeldr]

In my post #100 above, I posed some questions based on the 5th Army's Organization chart (19 April 1915) as reproduced in the TGS's 'Brief History...'

where, under the 9th Division we see thirteen 25mm guns listed

It seems likely that these were Nordenfelt 25mm

25mm equals 1-inch, and you will find some details on the 1-inch Nordenfelt gun 2/3rds of the way down the page here http://web.ukonline.co.uk/stephen.johnson/arms/

the illustrations date from the mid-1890s

regards

Michael

[Helen Bachaus]

This photo was provided to our Sideshows yahoo group:

[michaeldr]

Can I offer the following as a summary of where we are at so far

with the invitation to others to correct, comment or expand

Many, many, British accounts mention that the troops landing on 25th April 1915 encountered machine-gun fire on or around the beaches

The Turkish accounts say that at Helles there were no machine-guns available to the regiment in place on that particular morning

and the machine-guns which had been there, were withdrawn together with the previous regiment during the change over one or two days earlier

However, what is not accounted for by this, are the old weapons,

four of 37mm and thirteen of 25mm,

which the Turkish GS's 'Brief History...' lists not as battalion weapons

but rather, they appear listed alongside the divisional artillery

Nordenfelt guns are admitted as having being used at Helles, and indeed one was captured and is on display.

The smaller of the two types of Nordenfelt gun, the 25mm, had a very high rate of fire and could easily have been mistaken for a more modern machine-gun of the Maxim type.

Another problem is the nomenclature used; Peter quotes Aspinall-Oglander (1929, p. 159), four ‘old pattern maxim guns’

Did the Nordenfelt company merge with that of Maxim? and could the reference to 'old pattern maxims' actually be a reference to Nordenfelt guns?

What I suspect is that the term Maxim is widely used in British accounts, since it is the machine-gun which they were most familiar with themselves,

but what in fact it describes is not a machine-gun of that exact name and manufacture,

but rather an older type of gun with a very similar rate of fire

Is this a case where both sides are right?

regards

Michael

[Crunchy]

Michael,

I believe you are correct. The number of rounds being fired at the landing troops from both heavy rifle fire and multi-barreled Nordenfelt guns would give the impression that machine guns were firing at them. It is a moot point whether a Nordenfelt is a machine gun or not. Technically it is not a machine gun in the same sense that a Maxim or Vickers is, as it uses a completely different mechanism and multi-barrels to achieve a high rate of fire. They were known a pom pom guns. My research indicates that these guns were fired by a handle being pulled down which fired all barrels at once. The reloading was done from a box of ammunition set above the barrels when the handle was moved up again. Thus the rate of fire depended on how quickly the operator could move the handle up and down, how quickly the box of ammunition could be changed and how many barrels were on the gun.

At post 75 above, I mentioned the following from a Turkish colleague "There were four old quick firing 37mm Nordenfelt pieces at V Beach, intended for use as anti-aircraft guns, two located in the castle and two above the beach to the west, in the site of what was know to the Allies as Battery No. One." The copy of the 9th Div order I mentioned earlier says there were Nordenfelt guns at Kapa Tepe as well.

Some appear to think that distinguishing between different weapons, particularly when you are on the receiving end of fire at some distance is quite easy, when in fact it is not at all easy, especially when a lot of weapons are firing at once. Thus the rapid rifle fire together with the Nordenfelts could give the impression that machine guns were were firing at them.

Cheers

Chris

[michaeldr]

Thanks for the comments Chris;

have to agree with your last paragraph

If your expecting maxim fire and you hear something going off at the same rate of rounds per minute

then under stress, who could tell the difference?

If the lead is coming at you at the same rate per minute, then you are not really bothered whose name is on the b***** thing

To supplement Helen's picture above showing one of the thirteen 25mm guns from the Helles front

this link http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:QF1poun...WMApril2008.jpg

is to a photograph showing an example of a 37mm gun produced under the Maxim-Nordenfelt name

quote from here:

It was originally designed in the late 1880s by Hiram Maxim as an enlarged version of the Maxim machine gun. Its longer range necessitated exploding projectiles to judge range, which in turn dictated the shell weight of 1 lb (in fact 400 grams), as that was the lightest exploding shell allowed under the Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868 and reaffirmed in the Hague convention of 1899.[3]

Early versions were sold under the Maxim-Nordenfelt label, whereas versions in British service (i.e. from 1900) were labelled Vickers, Sons and Maxim (VSM) as Vickers had bought out Maxim-Nordenfelt in 1897. They are all effectively the same gun.

regards

Michael

[Bryn]

I've re-read this thread and can find nobody who has said that distinguishing the sounds of different weapons when on the receiving end of them is 'easy'. It's just not impossible, and there are countless accounts of it being done with all manner of weapons in many theatres of many wars.

[Crunchy]

I am sure there are Bryn, but under what conditions were they readily recognised? I never said it was impossible, I said nigh on impossible under particular conditions. In fact I gave the conditions under which it was quite possible to distinguish certain weapons.

[Peter Doyle]

I think Michael's review is about right, and the fact that Aspinall-Oglander used the term 'old-type maxim' suggests a certain vagueness that could apply, potentially, to many types of gun. what is interesting is the fact that contemporary accounts went to great lengths to confirm the presence of MGs in written documents.

Lets not forget that the Ottomans wisely initiated defences were there were there was the most likely chance of assault from the sea. the pre-war reports commissioned by the British services (army, navy, GS) of the potential landing places chime exactly with the defensive positions put in at Helles, etc. the Ottomans and their german advisors used terrain as a force multiplier, and defended vulnerable points where necessary, a sensible approach. Given that, the Helles beaches were strongly held, and there is every chance that MGs of some type were used there. If not, the disposition of the fire trenches and the fire discipline of the Ottomans probably accounted for much.

Not having been in the military, I can give no anecdotal evidence on the sound of various guns, but having approached those beaches on foot and from the sea, and given the glowering cliffs on either side, I cannot fail to think that either way, machine guns of no machine guns, it might well have felt that way on the beaches, particularly when those men hit the beach to be met with the veritable fusilade.

Peter

[Crunchy]

Peter.

I agree with you and the points that have made by others that the troops at Helles, and at Anzac, probably believed they were being fired on by machine guns. In fact, I have no doubt some did believe it. I guess the question is - was their perception correct or is the Turkish view that no MG's were deployed on the beaches correct? I don't think we can simply dismiss the Turkish view on the basis of what could well be a perception on the part of the attackers, no matter how many reported it, for the reasons already presented.

To me it seems strange that no MG's were deployed on any of the beaches. Looking at it from a Turkish commanders consideration, however, it might be explained not only by a scarcity of this valuable resource but also by the method of defence that was employed: deploy lightly on the coast to delay and disrupt while holding the majority of your fighting power in reserve so it could be deployed quickly against the actual landing (s) with the strongest possible effect.

Cheers

Chris

[michaeldr]

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then let's call it a duck.

It is a very fine point indeed whether or not the 25mm Nordenfelt qualifies to fall within the technical scope of the term 'machine-gun'

however at that high rate of fire

and remembering that, per their own records, the Ottoman division at Helles had thirteen of them available

(one of which was captured complete and is on display today)

then I have no problem in understanding the first hand accounts which say that they came under "machine-gun" fire on the 25th April 1915

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

quote: "I don't think we can simply dismiss the Turkish view on the basis of what could well be a perception on the part of the attackers, no matter how many reported it, for the reasons already presented. To me it seems strange that no MG's were deployed on any of the beaches"

Chris,

Just to expand a little on my previous post

Personally, I do not dismiss the Turkish view - I understand them to say that the infantry battalion which met the invaders at Helles on the morning or the 25th April 1915 had no machine guns at that time.

Machine guns were held by the previous battalion, but were withdrawn with them on the battalion relief a day or two earlier.

In referring to their infantry battalions' machine guns, I understand the Turks to be referring to the 'maxim' type with tripod stand etc, as seen in photographs earlier in this thread.

If Liman did not know where the landing would be made, then it makes perfect sense for him to have the battalions which do have machine guns to be in reserve, and ready to move off in any direction at a moment's notice to meet the invader, wherever that force should chose to land.

He would be safe in having that battalion which was without MGs holding the line at the beaches

Why?

Because he had available there the thirteen 25mm guns (which are shown on the divisional chart as not being with the infantry, but with their artillery)

While these guns were massively heavy and not at all portable (unlike the maxim type with its tripod stand)

they could nevertheless produce the same amount of fire-power

For a flexible response the Ottoman disposition makes (to my mind) good sense

As the situation developed throughout the day of the 25th, then it became clear to the Ottoman commanders where the landings were, and were not, taking place. So, later in the day the infantry reserves were brought up together with their 'maxim' type machine guns.

Our problem arises when the historian on one side says that this is the first time that their machine guns came into action.

He is right!

But, he is only right when he is referring to the machine guns of the infantry battalions.

As we see from both the Turkish GS's history and from the evidence of the captured gun, other 'machine guns' were available and they were used before that time

regards

Michael

[TonyE]

Michael,

......My research indicates that these guns were fired by a handle being pulled down which fired all barrels at once. The reloading was done from a box of ammunition set above the barrels when the handle was moved up again. Thus the rate of fire depended on how quickly the operator could move the handle up and down, how quickly the box of ammunition could be changed and how many barrels were on the gun.

Cheers

Chris

The Nordenfelt was operated by a horizontal lever that the firer moved backwards and forwards on the right hand side of the weapon. The final part of the forward stroke ripple fired the five or ten barrels, they did not fire all at once.

Also, the Nordenfelt was not the Pom Pom. as the previous poster has pointed out. The Pom Pom was the 37mm Maxim-Nordenfelt, which was a true machine gun.

Regards

TonyE

[Crunchy]

Thank you for this Tony.

Yes, I was wrong, the handle was pushed backwards and forwards. My mistake in writing it down.

How was the 37mm fired and what was its rate of fire?

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Michael,

I agree.

It is the maxim guns I have been referring to.

I had thought the Nordenfelts would have been classed as machine guns because of their high rate of fire, but had been advised that they were not machine guns but a multi- barrelled quick firing weapon using a different firing method. TonyE advises above that the 37mm was a true machine gun. If this is so, then you have no argument from me on that position. Our Turkish colleague advised there were four 37mm Nordenfelts at V Beach. If Tony's information is correct then I think we must accept that they did face machine guns at V Beach, albeit not the maxims we have been discussing.

I have asked Tony about the rate of fire of these guns.

I am most appreciative of all the comments to date as we are beginning to unravel the picture.

Many thanks to all

Cheers

Chris

[Peter Doyle]

Michael - I think you have put it succinctly, and that this seems to fit with the written and anecdotal evidence...

Peter

[michaeldr]

Tony, Chris & Peter,

Many thanks for your help and comments

Turning to Gaba Tepe (and at the risk of getting out of my depth in present company)

It seems to have been a feature of the Ottoman way of recording these guns (Nordenfelt) that they often appear listed together with their artillery rather than with their infantry.

eg: The British naval history [Naval Operations Vol.II, page 319] has a footnote quoting Major E. R. Prigge's "Der Kampf um die Dardanellen" pages 43-4, where he describes the defending Turkish battalion as having attached to it three batteries - "besides some Nordenfeldts."

regards

Michael

[Crunchy]

Michael,

I think the great value of the forum is the ability of people to pool their knowledge, to discuss an issue and to be prepared to listen to other's comments and points of view. It just broadens our knowledge on subjects, allows to us to look at matters from different angles and fill in gaps in our knowledge. This thread has been very valuable for me.

Your point about the nordenfelts being attached to the artillery makes sense. I was thinking about this today. One thought that came to mind was that the fortress guns were pretty much immobile and the nordenfelts may have been allocated to the artillery as close protection for the guns. I am not sure what guns were actually in the Kapa Tepe strong point but it seems, from the 9th Div order dated 7 Aug that Chris Henschke kindly gave me, that there were nordenfelts there. Whether these constituted the main armament of the strong point or supported artillery pieces positioned there I am not sure. Perhaps Peter Williams can assist in this matter? I will also ask my contact in Turkey. The Head Historian at the AWM has offered to show me the Turkish GS map which apparently is quite specific about the Ottoman dispositions prior to the landing. Hopefully I can photograph it and post the details on this thread.

Again many thanks for your views and to all the others who have contributed.

Cheers

Chris

[michaeldr]

quote: One thought that came to mind was that the fortress guns were pretty much immobile and the nordenfelts may have been allocated to the artillery as close protection for the guns

Chris,

That was indeed the case. The chart below is from the TGS's Brief History... and it shows the Canakkale Fortified Area Artillery as at 18 February 1915

I am not sure that the fine print will show up ok, but I have made note of the following

37mm (described as 'ucaksavar topu' = anti-aircraft gun)

on the Gallipoli side of the Dardanelles

2 at Kilitbatir

2 at Helles

on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles

1 at A. Hamidiye Tab

2 at Orhaniya Tab

25mm Nordenfild

on the Gallipoli side of the Dardanelles

4 on the coast near the mouth of the Soganli Dere

on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles

6 at Kepez

Interesting to note that in the TGS's Brief History... they have two pages of Turkish/English glossary, but no mention of what I understand to be the Turkish word for machine-gun - 'Mitrailleuse'

quote: The Head Historian at the AWM has offered to show me the Turkish GS map which apparently is quite specific about the Ottoman dispositions prior to the landing. Hopefully I can photograph it and post the details on this thread.

That would be most interesting to see

best regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Michael,

I think the great value of the forum is the ability of people to pool their knowledge, to discuss an issue and to be prepared to listen to other's comments and points of view. It just broadens our knowledge on subjects, allows to us to look at matters from different angles and fill in gaps in our knowledge. This thread has been very valuable for me.

Your point about the nordenfelts being attached to the artillery makes sense. I was thinking about this today. One thought that came to mind was that the fortress guns were pretty much immobile and the nordenfelts may have been allocated to the artillery as close protection for the guns. I am not sure what guns were actually in the Kapa Tepe strong point but it seems, from the 9th Div order dated 7 Aug that Chris Henschke kindly gave me, that there were nordenfelts there. Whether these constituted the main armament of the strong point or supported artillery pieces positioned there I am not sure. Perhaps Peter Williams can assist in this matter? I will also ask my contact in Turkey. The Head Historian at the AWM has offered to show me the Turkish GS map which apparently is quite specific about the Ottoman dispositions prior to the landing. Hopefully I can photograph it and post the details on this thread.

Again many thanks for your views and to all the others who have contributed.

Cheers

Chris

G'day Chris,

You are quite right about the forum and its value.

Not having read the whole thread can I offer a view on the Nordenfeldt guns and their allocation to the Ottoman artillery; they were an asset in small supply and were husbanded for that reason, but given they were either carriage mounted or broken down into team loads and required a degree of technical skill they were "brigaded" as an artillery asset. We can see the same logic in development of other Western Armies useage of machine guns, whether they be manually reciprocating like the Nordenfeldts and Gatlings, or automatically reciprocating like the Maxim's and Vickers, whilst they were few it was more likely they were brigaded and as more became available, the more widespread their distribution.

As to the issue of distinguishing MG fire from others, thankfully I have never been subject to hostile fire, but having, like you, done the odd "crack, thump" exercise and spent many a day in the butts swinging of classification targets, I agree it takes some knowledge of the weapons and exposure to the weapons sound (crack, thump) to distinguish between weapons. To do so under fire, probably for the first time, with the whole range of Ottoman weapons firing at the rapid and emergency rates on Gallipoli would have been hellish. I would also imagine that given the size of the round, and the probable cyclic rate of fire of about 1-200 rpm at the "sustained" rate, the sound characteristics of Nordenfeldt machine guns would have been distinctive and quickly learnt. Nevertheless given weapons development of the period I think it would have been reported as "machine guns" by the unitiaited, whereas only a few years later those hearing it would possibly have identified it as an "automatic cannon" because of the projectile size, distinctive sound and so on.

A one inch Nordenfeldt would not have been a weapon I would have liked attacking, I would imagine the "cover" penetration was quite high.

I would love to see an image of the Ottoman GS Dardanelles map, my desire is to one day apply the modern IPB principles using GHQ MEF reports and then overlay the real Ottoman dispositions, for an int history. I will do it one day but funding has become an issue. I envy our UK friends who can "hop on a train" and get to Kew or the other places in a day and be home very late that night. A bit hard to do the same from Qld to Canberra or Melbourne for the same thing.

Cheers,

Chris H

[green_acorn]

In my posts numbers 28 and 39 above, I have given three direct quotations from the Turkish GS's Brief History, and in the latter post, I have also commented on the style of the writing of that Brief History

quote: "The pattern, or style if you will, which I find to emerge from this writing is that while the Turkish historian makes several references to Allied machine guns/fire in his text, he only mentions his own machine guns in direct quotes eg. in the texts of Turkish orders or reports.

As I said, this may be nothing more than a question of the writer's style or perhaps even the translation. But, having direct quotes from Turkish orders and reports which mention machine guns, means (to me at least) that the Turkish army had machine guns and used them at Gallipoli

What I feel has yet to be decided, is to what extent the absence of machine guns from the general text can be read as there not being used/available at that point?

I am inclined to believe as they are mentioned in Turkish orders and reports, then they were more widely available to the Turkish army than is suggested by the absence of their mention in the general text."

regards

Michael

Michael,

Where can one get a hand on the TGS english translation? Second, on of the issues you are grasping with is the Turkish history is primarily written from the official documents with input by senior officers, whereas beans is written with a broad range of inputs from soldiers as well as officers and available documents,

cheers,

Chris H

[green_acorn]

Fascinating debate, and one that has re-ignited my own thoughts on this since, yes, discussions with Kenan in the field. As a geologist, I have made a study of the terrain characteristics of the Gallipoli battlefield, and have looked at the aspects of terrain multiplication of the Helles Sector. This means that the ampitheatral bowls of both V and W beaches mean that the fire pattern was effective. The following is an extract from an academic paper I have in press:

The question of machine guns

There is a question mark over the use of machine guns at the landing beaches, the use of which would have inevitably increased the fire capability of the Turkish defenders. In Colonel Mahmut’s contemporary account, there is no mention of machine guns, quite the reverse: ‘our force had been reduced to 800 and which had no support from any weapons, except the rifles in their hands’. This view that the defending Turks had no machine guns is supported by Turkish historian Kenan Celik (pers comm.) in his study of Turkish sources, although, apparently the presence of pom-pom type Nordenfeld guns is admitted (one, captured above X Beach, is located in the Royal Fusiliers Regimental Museum in London).

According to Aspinall-Oglander (1929, p. 159), four ‘old pattern maxim guns’ were installed at Sedd el Bahr and V Beach, although the question of machine guns at W beach was a moot point. In a manuscript account of the landing from the beached River Clyde, Captain G.W. Geddes of the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers (copies in the IWM DD and TNA) noted: ‘I estimated the strength of the Turks at 400 to 500, with 1 Pom-Pom and 6 machine guns. They had machine guns [original emphasis]’. Geddes was aboard the ship and was wounded getting ashore, and was therefore in a good position to comment, and his use of emphasis suggesting his strength of feeling on this issue. A footnote added to a version of the manuscript in The National Archives in London comments that machine gun belts were found at V Beach, giving extra credence to the assertion.

In other contemporary manuscript accounts Captain G.P. Dawnay, observing from offshore (IWM DD 69/21/1), noted on 29th April that at V Beach ‘the tows going in [with boats carrying the landing forces] were met by a terrific fire from rifles, machine guns and pom-poms’, while Commander I.W. Gibson, Captain of HMS Albion offshore V Beach noted on 26th April that: ‘When the boats got close to shore a terrific fire [of] rifle and maxim [guns] I think opened on them’ (IWM DD). At W beach, Captain (subsequently Commodore) Phillimore, beach master at Helles, noted that ‘The beach was covered with barbed wire, the cliffs were lined with trenches at the top and had maxims, in sand caves, half way up’ (IWM DD). The map prepared in May 1915 by Douglas and Nicholas also picks out the position of machine guns, sited in enfilading positions on both V and W beaches. These and other accounts suggest, that at V beach at least, machine guns were deployed as part of the defences. As depicted in the map by Douglas and Nicholas, these were sited for maximum effect, sweeping across the open field creating a ‘kill zone’ – similar again to that experienced by a different 29th Division, American this time, that landed at Omaha Beach, Normandy, some 29 years later.

Also attached are a couple of illustrations that demonstrate the effect...

Cheers

Peter

Peter,

Though I don't disagree that from a defenders perspective an ampitheatre is a far better place to be on the heights than the attacker, I would question your belief that an ampitheatre "amplifies" (my emphasis) the defenders fire. As a former infantryman it is the commanders placement of his weapons with the ultimate desire to achieve (concentrate) grazing enfilade fire from a defilade position, that is to say a long narrow oval-shaped "killing ground" for all of his available weapons with the minimum amount of target area selection by the soldier, that is to say fixed lines, rather than fixed limits, or worse, no limits for both primary and secondary arcs of fire. The annotations on your images don't appear to show any attempt at concentration of fire in the way I have described (along the beach).

In my youth (1970's) as we had a few of them (ten M60 GPMG's per Coy) it was the Company Commanders decision where the MG's were placed in defence, but if it was a deliberate battalion defensive position every one of those gun pits was reviewed and confirmed or moved by the CO. I would imagine the Ottoman Turks and their German advisors were no different, Regimental and possibly even Divisional Commanders reviewed the MG's location to achieve the best possible effect.

I would have to look at the maps, but I would suggest that if MG's were present at the Lancashires landing, the MG in the top of the photo would have been in, or near the defensive line on the far headland with the other troops, somewhere below the white obelisk to the right of the image facing along the beach. The second gun in the foreground would be further too the right, so that beaten ground from its gun covered along the beach to the small cliff and the base of the first gun, thereby providing mutual protection and covering the dead ground of that position. By doing so a skirmishing line of troops to the left would be all that the ottomans may have added to keep individuals getting of the beack and to pick of leaders. Beetter still all of the infantryman are concentrated, the minute the spread out and haven't got their mate in eyesight, they naturally worry and start those first signs of the loss of cohesion.

cheers,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

Not having read the whole thread can I offer a view on the Nordenfeldt guns and their allocation to the Ottoman artillery

Hi Chris,

Nice to hear from you again. Thank you for your comments regarding the nordenfelt guns. I agree with the points you have made; I think the Ottomans may not have been as well equipped as we often attribute them to be and the nordenfelts would not have been easy to move.

At Helles they probably could hear the nordenfelt guns firing 'thump" given the size of the rounds and the charge required to propel them although I am not sure about the "crack". V Beach must have been one crescendo of hellish noise when the Ottomans opened up and I think once the initial bursts of fire had subsided it would have been possible to distinguish between the nordenfelts and the rifles as the morning wore on. Re the "crack, thump' exercises versus hostile fire. I found that there was quite a difference - the sheer noise of the firing in the latter was much louder and more concentrated, making it a lot more difficult to distinguish anything but an all embracing noise. I think there is also a pyschological element that enters the equation: firstly your immediate response is to identify locations rather than what it is, your first reaction is to over estimate the fire you are receiving, you are more interested in firing back rather than trying to identify weapons by their noise signature, and one odd thing that happened to me on occasion - your world goes silent and you feel everything around you is in slow motion for perhaps twenty seconds at a time, like one of those dreams in which you are trying to run forward and your have lead weights on your feet. I have been told the reason for this is that the brain is processing information at such a rate that everything appears to slow down.

Your comments on sighting machine guns are very good - obviously a well trained infantryman You have succinctly stated all the reasons why you would not put a machine gun on the top of Plugge's Plateau. Although I think Peter was giving a general impression of the effects at Helles rather than specific locations to make the point clearer.

Cheers

Cheers

[Bryn]

Does anybody know of any Turkish record of the Nordenfeldt gun that was emplaced on Gaba Tepe? I see it's not noted on the diagram from the TGS's Brief History that Michael's posted.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bryn

G'day mate

I don't think anybody knew what was happening at the time or where any Turkish assets were, neither British intel or the Turks themselves.

The map below is produced from British intel reports prior to the invasion. It overstates the number of guns facing the invasion force by some numbers - although they might be looking at decoy guns and gun pits.

One thing that is not on the map but needs mentioning is that there were no guns of any description located around Fisherman's Hut, just a few shallow trenches.

I suppose this only serves to confuse an already confused issue.

Perhaps our more experienced military folks can give their thoughts on the dispositions of the Turkish forces as seen here.

Cheers

Bill