Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

[dansparky]

7 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

But these were portable Maxims, Dan !

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

But there was not such a thing, although they may not have known this.  Phill, Dave, MG let me now if you want a copy of the Fortescue review of 1914.  I can send to you images of the doc, as there are too many pages to put on here. 

 

DS

Edited 13 February , 2017 by dansparky

[Guest]

10 minutes ago, dansparky said:

But there was not such a thing, although they may not have known this.  Phill, Dave, MG let me now if you want a copy of the Fortescue review of 1914.  I can send to you images of the doc, as there are too many pages to put on here. 

 

DS

 

 

DS. Thanks for the offer. Very kind, however, thankfully I can live without Fortescue.. MG

[dansparky]

21 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

 

DS. Thanks for the offer. Very kind, however, thankfully I can live without Fortescue.. MG

 

Ah Ok, i guess it contains criticisms towards SJF that we are all aware of more or less.

[MartH]

Dansparky can I grovel for a copy of the Fortescue volume please.

[dansparky]

Ha Ha lol.  you don't have to grovel.  We are all on this forum to learn and debate-i am only to happy to share :-).  Sharing of Knowledge and information is the strength of this wonderful forum.  It is fairly hard to obtain.   Private Message me with your email and I will forward when I can.  It Will be photographs in order to avoid the fragile binding.

Ds

[Guest]

1 hour ago, dansparky said:

Ah Ok, i guess it contains criticisms towards SJF that we are all aware of more or less.

 It is bandwidth. I have exhausted my capacity to multi-task. I am immersed in the IEF A Western Front and will likely remain that way for some time. 

[dansparky]

ah ok, i see, well let me know if you would ever like to have a copy.

 

DS

[David Filsell]

Martin

Clearly my response about the ‘target audience’ was incorrect - however neither was it as incorrect  or the objectives as cut and dried as you suggest.

Andrew Green Writing the Great War¸ states that Hankey Secretary of the War Council, primarily regarded official histories as being the “... work of education and science...” He also stated “... it is by the standard of their value for professional education purposes that the Official Histories will be judged”.

That said Green adds

“The dual purpose, then, of the Official History, as agued consistently by those who conceived and produced it was very clear.  Firstly it was to use the government’s confidential information to provide a readable account for the public which would at the same time act as an antidote to the unofficial accounts which has sought to criticise the government. Secondly and of no less importance it was to provide a work of education vale to future military officers and strategists  Crucially it was the Official History’s value as a means of learning lessons from the recent conflict which was considered to raison d’être by its creators very clear.2

The problems and complications of these 'dual purpose' decisions, the costs and etc are all discussed in greater detail, but the facts are clear objective – rightly or wrongly the role of the OH was equally weighted and met, rightly or wrongly, the highly influential Hankey's criteria  as a work to educate the military and the 'interested' alike.

Regards

David

[David Filsell]

Boosting this in the hope of a reply!

[Guest]

On 2/21/2017 at 17:47, David Filsell said:

Boosting this in the hope of a reply!

 

David - I assume you mean a response from Mart H (post #117) to your post #96 disputing the purpose of the OH ....specifically where you state that the OH was written

 

"not for public consumption" 

 

and MartH points out the preface of the OH stating the aim was to produce a work

 

"suitable for general readers and for students at military schools"

 

I had not made any comments on the aims of the OH, merely that parts were distorted. A view that I still hold based on some reasonably detailed trawling of the sources quoted and mis-quoted and badly paraphrased by Edmonds and his team. I also still hold the view that this does not mean the OH is worthless, merely that we need to understand its considerable strengths should not blind us to some of its weaknesses; something I mentioned already on this thread. Apologies if this is repetitive but I sense form your PM you may have confused Mart H with me. 

 

Martin G

 

 

Edited 27 February , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

Further, the German tactics at mons.  An excerpt from the entry regarding mons,  the Duke of Cornwall's light infantry war diary states.

 

"At about 4.45 p.m. the enemy began moving along the road southward from Ville Pommeroeul towards the canal.  It presented an extraordinary appearance, mounted men, preceded by jagers all in close order, marching slowly and deliberately forward in one solid mass and occupying the entire roadway.  As has already been stated the only fire that can be brought to bear was from ?????point a.  The o.c. post waited until the head of the advancing enemy reached the level crossing the range of which was known to be exactly 750 yards.  Then with combine sights at 750 and 800 yards fire was opened.  The number of rifles was all too few, but every shot must have taken effect.  The result on the enemy was miraculous.  In a moment the road as clear except a few skirmishers at the level, who opened fire at to long a range as to be absolutely harmless from our trench a few long range shots were fired at the mass of cavalry at Ville Pommeroeul but we failed to find the range………

The enemy had been checked in enormously superior numbers"  

[David Filsell]

Martin G.

i did confuse you both. I apologise. However I have made my points and sadly received no reply from Mr H!

[593jones]

16 hours ago, dansparky said:

 the only fire that can be brought to bear was from ?????point a.  T

 

 

 

 

Could the missing words be 'from the breastwork at point A'?  It looks to me as though that's what it could be.

[SiegeGunner]

That's how I read it too:  'from the breastwork at point A'.

[dansparky]

Hmm yes, it could be I will attach a copy of the map showing positions before these entries.  The Duke of Cornwall's diary has a lot of detail.  So does Northumberland fusiliers but i can bearly read it.  Most others feature only a couple of lines.

[dansparky]

The Traditional narrative describes the german attack as a kind of domino effect attack.  As the German Army swings round more and more german units come into the attack.  IX sector around 10 am, III corps 11 am and the IV corps around about 5 pm.  Zuber describes the same but his he asserts these times are different.  There are anomalies in the British War diaries and the times recorded going into action.   This suggests that attacks, when they came in initially, were a little more sporadic that these two opposing narratives suggest.

 

E.G. the 1st Cameronians record the Middlesex heavily engaged (in the section 1pm), The Argyll record 12am (at least i think it says am?) Middlesex reported hard pressed, these must refer to the Middlesex in their sector.  Attacks in the 19th brigade are not supposed to occur this early?  The Middlesex though only record attacks on right flank at 5pm.

 

 

Edited 4 March , 2017 by dansparky

[dansparky]

By Applying Zuber's logic to that of the British Army a picture is beginning to emerge which may with further exploration undermine Zuber's claim of numbers engaged.  It is beginning to bolster the traditional narratives argument that the British were out numbered.

Edited 4 March , 2017 by dansparky

[AOK4]

Another remark: it is not because a certain German regiment participated in the fight, that all its battalions were engaged. Whole regiments were not active (f.i. Füsilier-Regiment 35 on 23 August), while complete battalions were sometimes left as reserves (for the brigade, division or corps). And units that were marching at the rear of the marching columns would have had a very difficult time to reach the front at all as the few large roads would have been completely blocked.

 

Remember also that war diaries (both British and German) were sometimes only written quite some time later, so anomalies may be caused by bad memory or trying to cover up things a bit.

 

Jan

[dansparky]

Thanks Jan

 

That, maybe true, but we have to use what we have i guess.  I have little or No way of checking which German Units were engaged.  Zuber thesis argues that out of the 16 regiments of the German IX corps and III corps 12 were sufficiently engaged.  These, Zuber has he studied in great detail.   Zuber's work is fantastic because it has reignited debate about this topic. 

 

I have stumbled across something in the British war diaries (particularly 2 corps), which is very interesting regarding the whole saga.  I am going to look this afternoon to see how many battalions this is true of.  I may have something interesting to share later.  As i say i had somewhat put this to bed it was only when i

it got me thinking.

 

Jan, are you going by Zuber's thesis or another source?

 

Best

DS.

[dansparky]

Ok Guys, I need your help (please) in trying to establish exactly what British battalions did what on the 23 August 1914 Mons.  Not adding any of 1 Corps into the equation. 

 

Ok Here Goes

 

 

7 Brigade  Seem to have not been significantly engaged (as in reserve)  1 Duke Of Edinburgh's state in their war Diary that they took no part at mons.

8 Brigade all seem to have played significant role 4 Middlesex from 10.15.  I need more info 1/Gordon Highlanders.

9 Brigade Most seem to have come into action from 11 Seem not to have been seriously engaged on the 23rd. (1 Lincolnshire, taking over post from royal scots not much info).

13th Brigade all seem to record action from noon, again 2 King's own Yorkshire light infantry (1 pm moved up in support).

14th Brigade 1 East surreys from 1 pm and 2/suffolks become engaged.  1/Duke of Cornwall's become engaged at 4.45 pm further to the west of the rest of the 14th Brigade.  2/Manchesters need more info

15th Brigade does not seem to have played much of a part as in reserve.  1/Norfolks official history states.  "Did not take part in the early part of the Battle of Mons.

 

 

19th Brigade confusing.....   1/Cameronians Record The Middlesex heavily engaged at 1 pm.   The 2/Argulls record Middlesex reporting (hard pressed) at 12 am (or it might say 12pm?  The Middlesex themselves record r flank in action 5 pm.

 

DS

 

Edited 6 March , 2017 by dansparky

[MartH]

On 2/19/2017 at 12:44, David Filsell said:

Martin

Clearly my response about the ‘target audience’ was incorrect - however neither was it as incorrect  or the objectives as cut and dried as you suggest.

Andrew Green Writing the Great War¸ states that Hankey Secretary of the War Council, primarily regarded official histories as being the “... work of education and science...” He also stated “... it is by the standard of their value for professional education purposes that the Official Histories will be judged”.

That said Green adds

“The dual purpose, then, of the Official History, as agued consistently by those who conceived and produced it was very clear.  Firstly it was to use the government’s confidential information to provide a readable account for the public which would at the same time act as an antidote to the unofficial accounts which has sought to criticise the government. Secondly and of no less importance it was to provide a work of education vale to future military officers and strategists  Crucially it was the Official History’s value as a means of learning lessons from the recent conflict which was considered to raison d’être by its creators very clear.2

The problems and complications of these 'dual purpose' decisions, the costs and etc are all discussed in greater detail, but the facts are clear objective – rightly or wrongly the role of the OH was equally weighted and met, rightly or wrongly, the highly influential Hankey's criteria  as a work to educate the military and the 'interested' alike.

Regards

David

 

Apologies David I have been traveling for the last week, currently on the train from Barcelona to Madrid, some pleasure (F1 testing) and now work,

 

The writing of the GW OH's was as I  stated in my original post was a unique first for the UK and it was different to anything that had gone before it. There were two schools of writing OH's in the Empire, The British and Empire Armies, produced volumes like the The War in South Africa and there was the Indian Army School that produced such Volumes a Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India. the former being popular accounts and the later being staff histories. The Indian Army had been much more successful with the production of Staff Histories than the UK, I would argue that the UK had not been at all successful in the production of Staff Histories, though I have a soft-spot for The Siege of Valparaiso. 

 

Green is good but The First World War and British Military History edited by Brian Bond and published by Clarendon Press, Oxford in 1991, gives much needed insight into the games behind publishing the after the GW, and the pressure put on not even to produce them

 

The UK GW Histories where dual purpose, and designed that way, and they where always planned to be published in the public domain, so the idea that those who produced it thought they where trying to produce the Staff History side as there main reason doe not carry much weight with me. Edmonds was not a fool and he clearly knew much of what needed to be said in a Staff History could not be produced in a publicly published volume. Only 5 volumes that were restricted, confidential or Secret that could have been Staff Histories. 

 

The other Martin is right, you need to understand all the faults of the OH's and they become more valuable.

 

I often wonder what would have happened if 2 different sets had been produced and quickly came to the conclusion it was a non starter when I did a back of the envelope calculation and figured out that if had been the same depth of the Australian one it could have number some 200 volumes for the Western Front alone.

 

The lessons of the First World War OH's are why the Second World War British OH's are so different, and they too have many faults.

 

I don't think  if any country produced a decent in depth Official History of the Great War, nor could have the have done due to the pressures commercially and politically.  So Edmonds did very well, we nearly ended up with half a series, look what happened in Canada.

 

And then I turn to the Russo Japaneses Official History produced before and after the Great War in the UK, possibly the finest OH ever produced ever in any country, and think even then it could be done.

 

Madrid approaches and time to cycle to Madrid Chamartin and my connection, Adios

 

Edited 6 March , 2017 by MartH
Deleted duplicate line

[dansparky]

RE i need your help guys.  ID 145

 

Sofar :

Battalions in the path of the German III corps entirely concur with the BOH that they were attacked from 11am, not the 2pm Zuber suggests (how i wish i could speak German & had the time and money to look at the german regimental histories).

 

In the Iv  sector

the Duke of Cornwall's record action from 4-45pm and the 1st Middlesex state attacks on their right flank from 5pm this concurs with the OBH and john terraine.   I can't fathom why the 1/Cameronians and the 2/Argylls record mention of Middlesex heavily engaged around lunch time?

 

Other thoughts and i need help with this.

If 7th Brigade and 15th Brigade barely took part and pos a couple of individual batts then this would change the picture along the canal.  The British accounts that suggest they were heavily outnumbered makes sense.   Those engaged were less than those that were available.   Surely if things along the canal were as dire as some argue why were these not all thrown in?  This suggest the situation although was never completely critical.   So what kind of picture do we have here along the canal?

 

19th not going to count for now as zuber states that IV arrived so late in the day that they do not matter to equation.  So you cannot count 19th brig as they lay in their path.

 

Zuber tells us only 12 out of 16 German Reg sufficiently engaged.  Someone stated on this forum a german reg 3,300 will check =39,600 (support units and singular units he does not include)

The British at 4000 (i think) men per batt (not including additional personnel, additional units) would be 24,000.  But if we omit 7th and 15th that's 8,000 to subtract from the equation + the 2/manchester's and the 1/lincolshire did not seem to do much.

 

DS

[dansparky]

On 10/02/2017 at 12:05, phil andrade said:

 

 

 

 

Do you mind if I question your arithmetic ?  A German regiment numbered 3,300 at full strength.  The battle strength would be rather lower, especially after wastage caused by fatigue etc.  Twelve regiments would equate to 36,000, not 45,000.

 

 

 

 

 

1

Although there would have been wastage isn't 3,300 x 12= 39,600?  committed out of a possible 52,800 (16 reg)

If we only count the British Brigades just as Zuber only counts infantry reg this is 24,000 or 28,000 if you include the 19th Brig.  Then with have to apply Zuber's logic to the B.E.F a picture begins to emerge that many battalions played little no part on the front line on the 23/08/1914.

Edited 6 March , 2017 by dansparky

[David Filsell]

Thanks,

I think I have much more positive view than you in regard to the OH faults and all if only because the only option is discuss mythical alternatives to the books and because of my examination of CAB 41. Errors - yes of course, but the text was based on existing records, war diaries and material provided by those who claimed to have been witnesses and the and  employing the principal of "two proofs as far as I can see. Of course they are far from perfect - but what is?

 

Regards

David

[Guest]

4 hours ago, dansparky said:

RE i need your help guys.  ID 145

 

Sofar :

Battalions in the path of the German III corps entirely concur with the BOH that they were attacked from 11am, not the 2pm Zuber suggests (how i wish i could speak German & had the time and money to look at the german regimental histories).

 

In the Iv  sector

the Duke of Cornwall's record action from 4-45pm and the 1st Middlesex state attacks on their right flank from 5pm this concurs with the OBH and john terraine.   I can't fathom why the 1/Cameronians and the 2/Argylls record mention of Middlesex heavily engaged around lunch time?

 

Other thoughts and i need help with this.

If 7th Brigade and 15th Brigade barely took part and pos a couple of individual batts then this would change the picture along the canal.  The British accounts that suggest they were heavily outnumbered makes sense.   Those engaged were less than those that were available.   Surely if things along the canal were as dire as some argue why were these not all thrown in?  This suggest the situation although was never completely critical.   So what kind of picture do we have here along the canal?

 

19th not going to count for now as zuber states that IV arrived so late in the day that they do not matter to equation.  So you cannot count 19th brig as they lay in their path.

 

Zuber tells us only 12 out of 16 German Reg sufficiently engaged.  Someone stated on this forum a german reg 3,300 will check =39,600 (support units and singular units he does not include)

The British at 4000 (i think) men per batt (not including additional personnel, additional units) would be 24,000.  But if we omit 7th and 15th that's 8,000 to subtract from the equation + the 2/manchester's and the 1/lincolshire did not seem to do much.

 

DS

 

 

Dansparky

 

If you need every Battalion account for Mons I can provide the transcriptions.  Happy to post them here for the elucidation of anyone interested in this much mis-represented and much over-rated battle. Only the British could associate one of their most famous medals with a failure. Most men who carried the Mons Star never saw the place. An interesting subject for an academic paper one day. A low point for the BEF repackaged as a high point. I am reluctant to swamp your thread without your consent. Alternatively I can email them and you can assess and drip feed. It might be of interest to others and I suspect the content might be surprising to some.

 

An interesting approach is to list the battalions in order in the line right to left and then run down the list. From memory (I did this exercise years ago) doing a diary word-count on this basis showed a high correlation between being right of the (II Corps) Line and recorded commentary. This is consistent with the line being rolled up from the East to West along the canal. Very few Battalions actually became heavily engaged before the whole BEF bolted. 

 

Your call. MG

 

PS. I am losing interest in the GWF rather rapidly and am about to switch to the Indian Army website, so the window of opportunity is narrow. I am extremely interested in your project and, more importantly that young people remain passionate about pushing the boundaries of understanding of the Great War. Ping me an email if this gets to you too late. I am tidying up loose ends before I return to "Inja's sunny climes".... MG

Edited 6 March , 2017 by Guest