Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

[dansparky]

 

As I am sure most of us are aware that Zuber and others since, completely disagree that the German army initially approached mons en masse.  This is not designed to explore British musketry fire as there is a lengthy thread on this.   There are still accounts of the British inflicting heavy loss on their pursuers after Mons but there is also much more testament paid to British losses too. The traditional British narrative does seem to suggest that the Germans adapted their methods relatively quickly and proceeded to attack with greater extension etc.  Although a factor in Mons by Le cateau they german army devote much more time tin establishing fire superiority before they venture forward.  Heavy Bombardment and MG sweeping, cautious infantry advances, bounds, rising from dead ground.  

 

There are reports of German mass approaches all across the line.  Zuber argues that German tactics for crossing the fire-swept.  He does, however,  discuss the approach or IR12 (BLOEM) and the naivety of its approach.   This then does is an admission that some units did display naivety in their advance and did not pay attention to establishing fire superiority.  A synthesis seems to be the truth of things.  Jubilant inexperienced troops unaware of what lay before may have approached in a naive manner, they seem however to have adapted quicky.  Elsewhere other troops that by now were more aware what lay beyond and with greater experience utilised much more sophisticated tactics from the outset.    Neither narrative can be considered completely representative of events across the whole line, but both contain truths. 

 

Apologies if this thread is discussed in a dedicated thread elsewhere.  I did find it if it existed.

 

[Guest]

The British version of events at Mons is well overdue a major overhaul.

 

An alternative view: This was a battle of Battalions; the participants understandably had little idea of what was happening 100 yards to their left or right. Their experiences were far from even and much British propaganda/over emphasis has been built on some shaky accounts written decades after the events. These extreme experiences have been extrapolated across the BEF as representative of the whole front. In reality, the concentration of real fighting was very extreme. More than half of the BEF was barely engaged. The British have until recently had a distinct aversion to grasping the nettle of truth on this battle. It is widely regarded by generations of British historians as a 'victory' in the sense 'we' (the plucky British Army of Tommies, the best trained Army to ever leave the shores of Britain) punched way above its weight due to its superior professionalism and tactics and the **groan** mad minute. Only the numerical superiority of the Germans mad the difference, but 'we' outfought 'them'. It is nonsense. The OH version of events is generous to say the least. It has infected generations of British authors particularly those who were writing in the 1960s. The Corps Commanders had no idea if the position was offensive or defensive. The fact that the BEF was in full scale retreat within a day, when I Corps had hardly been engaged suggest a level of disorganisation on a Crimean level.

 

Quiz:

1. What were I Corps total fatal casualties in August 1914?

2. What were I Corps total fatal casualties in August 1914 ex the 2nd Bn RMF?

3. How many fatal casualties did I Corps suffer on the day of the Battle of Mons (incidentally an event for which 24 infantry Regiments in I Corps 'qualified'  the Battle Honour "Mons")? 

4. What were I Corps fatalities as a % of troops deployed at Mons?

5. How many fatal casualties did the 4th Bn Worcesters suffer in less than 2 hours on 6th Aug 1915? (the worst day of any battalion during the war)

6. Was a battle honour awarded for the action of the Worcesters on 6th Aug 1915?

 

 

Answers:

1. 169

2.  71

3.  32

4. 0.09%

5. 366 (to save you the calc, more than five time the whole of I Corps at Mons)

6. No.

 

It simply illustrates that British historiography of Mons is so heavily influenced by propaganda that it is almost impossible to analyse it from British sources. 

The idea that an Army could be in full flight a day after its first major engagement when half of the Army (I Corps ) had barely been engaged is rarely considered.

 

Jack Sheldon had made what I would consider an extremely acute observation: the account of Bloem, often quoted and by implication a 'typical' experience of the Germans at Mons was, in fact, far from typical. It was written decades after the events (and therefore unreliable). The hard numbers (casualty returns) would suggest a yawning gap between Britsh OH confabulation and facts.  It would be akin to suggesting the experience of the Suffolks or KOYLI at Le Cateau as being the typical British experience during the retreat. Distortions that might be considered when we look at the mythology surrounding this battle.  MG

Edited 30 January , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

I am wondering what descriptions say in the battalion diaries?  if they go to that much detail.  The level of casualties is such a difficult one to nail down.  I believe you are right that they are not representative of the whole line, neither did the germans press forward with tactics such as these for long, if indeed they did?  I am wondering what written evidence exists?  Casualties are an important part of most debates around these debates, but they are foggy.  Zuber says that Bleom cannot be trusted in terms of the effective of British fire, but quotes bleom to demonstrate that maybe some (one) german formations were naive in their approach.   I am not sure if the absence of attacking on mass in german accounts means it did not happen. German accounts do not mention Dease and his MG and do not mention the action of Sordet (according to snow), this does not mean they did not happen.

[Guest]

38 minutes ago, dansparky said:

I am wondering what descriptions say in the battalion diaries?  if they go to that much detail.  The level of casualties is such a difficult one to nail down.  I believe you are right that they are not representative of the whole line, neither did the germans press forward with tactics such as these for long, if indeed they did?  I am wondering what written evidence exists?  Casualties are an important part of most debates around these debates, but they are foggy.  Zuber says that Bleom cannot be trusted in terms of the effective of British fire, but quotes bleom to demonstrate that maybe some (one) german formations were naive in their approach.   I am not sure if the absence of attacking on mass in german accounts means it did not happen. German accounts do not mention Dease and his MG and do not mention the action of Sordet (according to snow), this does not mean they did not happen.

 I have no doubt that in some areas the Germans did 'attack' (read: advance thinking the (British) enemy was nowhere near) en Feld-Grau en masse and were fired at by the British at 15 rounds a minute-they-must-think-it-is-machine-gun-fire. The likelihood is that these Germans hit the deck and as has been suggested by a number of authors, they were (mostly) not killed but were simply taking evasive action. The diaries for this event are understandably thin, which gave the OH the opportunity to fill some gaps from rather selective sources.

 

Edited 30 January , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

The leading regiments that were approaching  Mons were entirely ignorant of the strength and the deployments of the British Soldiers they were approaching and many of these men were new to war.[1]  This mixed with the euphoria of a triumphantly advancing army and the exuberant naivety of these young men may explain these grey clad masses. It may be also argued that it was the result of the rigid and repetitive ‘old Prussian drill’, that encouraged close control by using mass formations.[2]  This still prevailed at the tactical level and may have also been utilised in order to maintain discipline among conscripts.  In a similar way, British tactics have been debated on the opening day of the Somme with a new volunteer force.

---

[1] Hastings 208-209

[2] Jackman, Steven, p.73,103-104.

It is also possible that this mostly occurred due to the funnelling effect caused when troops tried to take crossing points on the canal.

The Germans though soon used effective fire and movement tactics in their push forward.   The Torgau history (1916) say the Germans offered peculiarly favourable targets, near to the Gordan Highlanders.  This is a totally different story by the time of Le Cateau.

 

Wonder what Great war Dawning says?

 

Edited 30 January , 2017 by dansparky

[dansparky]

I agree with you MG :-).  I think it is a mixture of evasive action and not knowing what lay ahead.  Additionally, i think some sources have over cooked it and some have been misinterpreted.  Most say that the Germans did change tact but some make it seem it took a little longer for the penny to drop.  In terms of evasive action, this paints a picture of healthy respect of British fire, possible heavy fire, and a possible reaction to what met the unsuspecting initial wave. 

 

The Torgau history is the earliest primary source i have seen that mentions favourable targets. It does not go into detail though.  It sure does when it came to the German approach at Le Cateau.

Edited 30 January , 2017 by dansparky

[phil andrade]

The proof of the pudding must be the number of casualties sustained by the Germans.

 

Zuber researched all available regimental histories and came up with a figure of nineteen hundred.

 

Such a figure is wholly inconsistent with the accounts of the battle as depicted in British histories .

 

Had the Germans deployed as clumsily, persistently and profligately as British folklore insists, then the number would be several times the figure that Zuber produced.

 

As it stands, the figure of 1,900 does attest the effectiveness of British fire, which the Germans themselves acknowledged.

 

But it also testifies to German fieldcraft and success in gaining the advantage at a cost which - though significant - was acceptable.

 

Phil

 

 

[dansparky]

I agree that Casualties would add to the argument but would not completely seal the matter. It depends on how long attacks like this persisted.  In the mons star, it says after half an hour methods of advance were completely changed.    I personally feel that the Grey clad masses is to a large extent due to the continuing belief in the 'old Prussian' drill still held by some, inexperienced troops and largely the fact they had no idea where the British were.  After the shock wore off the German army utilised much more effective tactics. So they did not persist with these tactics for as long as some believe.

 

I find it very difficult to be precise with any casualty figures. As I understand it German casualty figures covered a lengthy amount of time.  I think if memory serves me correct that they covered the whole month of august or were in two weekly cycles.  It makes it difficult to establish casualties for a specific engagement  (can't remember where i read this).   Then one must distinguish between W.I.A & K.I.A and so forth. 

[Guest]

58 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

As it stands, the figure of 1,900 does attest the effectiveness of British fire, which the Germans themselves acknowledged.

Phil

 

If the German Advance from Mons (as per the OP) equates to the British Retreat from Mons - why does 1,900 'attest to the effectiveness of British [rifle] fire? We don't know if they were killed by the RFA, RHA and RGA, who despite their low numbers relative to the German Army appear by all accounts to have been fairly proficient with their guns. the 15-pdr and 18-pdr appear to have been rather effective weapons, particularly when fired at fuze zero as happened on more than a few occasions. In addition no-one appears to be able to agree on the numbers advancing who were actually in contact with the British. 1,900 (or whatever the real figure is) only has meaning if we know the numbers engaged (i.e. in contact) on both sides, rather than the long logistic tails of both formations. At this stage the RFA and RHA had no HE; it was all shrapnel. Half of the BEF was not engaged at Mons and the infantry had nothing to shoot at for most of Le Cateau. Between Le Catoo and the Aisne there were not many opportunities to bring any actions into play above isolated examples of Rear Guards that almost all failed and were repositioned by the British Propaganda as deliberate sacrifices to 'save' the rest of the BEF. More than a handful of unit histories claim to have "saved" the BEF or a Division of the BEF. Few mention that the aims of a Rear Guard action were ultimately to break free while in contact - someting tht is the most difficult phase of any type of battle. It was still doctrine when I served. The history of the Retreat from Mons is littered with examples of Battalions being destroyed through extremely poor Command and Control in Rear Guard actions.  They are easy to spot as they were all recorded in detail and largely repositioned by the OH and Regimental historians as if the participants actually had a choice. Oddly the ones that mattered such as (my hero) Charrier and 2nd Bn RMF were not recognised with awards, which might suggest that at the time the local commanders thought that they were unmitigated disasters.This was a time when VCs were being doled out quite liberally realtive to subsequent years. 

 

During the Retreat British logistics collapsed. Kit was abandoned by the thousands of tonnes, including ammunition. An early form of the 'rolling replen' was the imagnative solution of one formation: rations dumped along the intended route of retreat. The limit factor on the British ability to sustain this alleged hard fought retreat were numbers of fully trained and effective men, and SAA. Both were being depleted at rather fast rates. 

 

I have just re-edited the accounts of a dozen Officers from the 3 days after Le Cateau and the situation was a complete shambles. This part of the OH needs a major overhaul as the impression of an orderly retreat is often at odds with the personal diaries and the battalion war diaries.

 

Personally I feel that the RFA are the unsung heroes of the BEF 1914, although the Line cavalry might give then a run for their money. We need to recognise that the British Propaganda machine had to explain away the fact that the British were in high retreat and losing heavily. Most Battalions turned over 2 times in 1914. We dont see this level of attrition over such a broad proportion (read: relative losses v relative numbers engaged) of Battalions ever again in the War. 

 

1914 is not very well understood by historians, Primarily because they are mostly (mis) guided by the BOH in my view. It is worth remembering the Author of the BOH 1914 had a breakdown in the middle of this part of the war. 

Edited 1 February , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

In addition to the British accounts and the testament of Bloem.  The is also the testament of Otto von Moser, while this is not applicable to the advance on mons he recalls that Thirteenth Corps was deployed in thick formations to storm the fortified village of Bleid.  In this engagement  "One brigade lost half its captains, all its lieutenants, and over 2,000 men—33% casualties—and the other was hit nearly as hard."(quoted in Brose 2001)  I am not sure of the amount if men in each german battalion, is this right?

 

[dansparky]

I would also think if the casualty figures could be nailed down and 2,000 are correct this seems a very low number.  36,000 men in defence admittedly a few MG's and our artillery were overwhelmed by in large do not seem to have inflicted many casualties at all.  The initial blows may in my view had led to a rethink in german approaches and some went to ground due to the heavy fire they faced.  But after this is the casualty figures are around 2,000 it seems the British had little answer for German infiltration methods and weight of numbers.  (and this is another one that requires a different thread, Zuber and others maintain there was little difference in numbers actually engaged, the German army for the majority of the day did not enjoy superior numbers). 

 

German stumble unsuspectingly upon the British - on mass receive heavy fire after some initial advances on mass they regroup use effective fire and movement with superior fire power in terms of artillery and mg's and boots on the ground.  Amid stiff resistance some British Units are simply overwhelmed they have no answer for this, they are cut off.  Some units also have men that simply make a run for it.   Other units are able to get away in relative order due to these men fighting on.  Providing resistance in a losing cause.

[phil andrade]

In his book on Mons Zuber attributes 1,900 German casualties to the fight of 23rd August ; he assesses this by dint of research into the German regimental histories.

 

The following day, he estimates, cost the Germans rather more : 2,400, if I remember correctly.  He cites the report of a German officer who supervised the burial of the dead in one sector : he admitted that rather more Germans than British were buried.

 

It seems as if he does get a grip on individual daily totals. The Army returns are not so amenable to such specifics of daily battle and unit experience.  The regimental returns appear to imply a significantly higher total than the official army reports.

 

I'll try and get hold of the book and check ; I hope I haven't made errors.

 

Phil

 

 

[SteveMarsdin]

1 hour ago, dansparky said:

 the testament of Otto von Moser, while this is not applicable to the advance on mons he recalls that Thirteenth Corps was deployed in thick formations to storm the fortified village of Bleid.  

 

Hi Dan, Bleid was an ordinary village in Belgium and although defended by a French battalion couldn't be classed as fortified. It is normally classified as part of the Battle of Ethe, one of The engagements that made up the Battle of the Frontiers on 22/08/14. 

 

Overall German dead that day estimated at 10-15,000, French 26-27,000.

 

Steve

[dansparky]

 

1 hour ago, SteveMarsdin said:

Hi Dan, Bleid was an ordinary village in Belgium and although defended by a French battalion couldn't be classed as fortified. It is normally classified as part of the Battle of Ethe, one of The engagements that made up the Battle of the Frontiers on 22/08/14. 

 

Overall German dead that day estimated at 10-15,000, French 26-27,000.

 

Steve

 

Thanks, Steve, I probably should have made it clear I paraphrased the first bit.  Fortified Village of Bleid is according to the quote in Brose,2001.  It is a bit misleading, stick up a few barricades and you can say it is fortified.  Makes it sound more than it was.   Do you think the casualties stated are rather inflated or does it sound about right? Incidentally, it is part of a reserve corps.  The discussion we have had in other threads as to the

competency of reserve formations are applicable here.

[dansparky]

4 hours ago, phil andrade said:

In his book on Mons Zuber attributes 1,900 German casualties to the fight of 23rd August ; he assesses this by dint of research into the German regimental histories.

 

The following day, he estimates, cost the Germans rather more : 2,400, if I remember correctly.  He cites the report of a German officer who supervised the burial of the dead in one sector : he admitted that rather more Germans than British were buried.

 

It seems as if he does get a grip on individual daily totals. The Army returns are not so amenable to such specifics of daily battle and unit experience.  The regimental returns appear to imply a significantly higher total than the official army reports.

 

I'll try and get hold of the book and check ; I hope I haven't made errors.

 

Phil

 

 

 

4

Hi Phil

You are correct on page 193 he states German casualties 2,400.  He adds British and German losses were essentially equal.   On page 243 he adds German losses at Le cateau 950-1000 British losses 1,800.  German officer that supervised burial of the dead at mons belonged to 9/ir35 that buried the dead of 6ID sector.

 

DS

Edited 1 February , 2017 by dansparky

[SteveMarsdin]

Dan, the Troops that attacked Bleid weren't reserves and (intriguingly) included Rommel and     Dirlewanger. LaPlace' battalion was acting as French flanc-garde and ran into the Germans, there would have been little time for even improvised fortifications. They suffered heavily.

 

A lot of Moser's casualties were from friendly artillery fire as they then advanced from ESE towards Ethe. The main German advance was from N and shelled them as they crested the hill separating Bleid from Ethe.

 

Steve

[David Filsell]

The result of the battle is interesting and disregarded here and often elsewhere.

French was under strictures from Kitchener to preserve small his force - the overall quality of which has been questioned by some, there was a likelihood of being outflanked, there was a genuine belief in a lack  support from the French  and awareness of being a long way from safety with slender logistical  support; key  factors.

The consequences of Mons are that the German assault is recognised as a huge threat and, although not perfectly managed by any means by a 'learning army' during  the retreat from Mons, French succeeded in saving the bulk of the BEF. Certainly it was not a battle won, but one which delayed the enemy ensured the preservation of the BEF. Is that a defeat?

[phil andrade]

10 hours ago, dansparky said:

Hi Phil

You are correct on page 193 he states German casualties 2,400.  He adds British and German losses were essentially equal.   On page 243 he adds German losses at Le cateau 950-1000 British losses 1,800.  German officer that supervised burial of the dead at mons belonged to 9/ir35 that buried the dead of 6ID sector.

 

DS

 

Dan,

 

Thanks for endorsing my comments about German casualties on the 24th.  You will find, though, that on page 243 Zuber alludes to losses on only one sector of the Le Cateau fight : on page 257 he actually goes on to estimate with a high degree of confidence that German casualties in the whole  battle were 2,900.  These, we might legitimately assume , were nearly all killed or wounded.

 

The British official figure cited ( 7,812 ) is grossly inflated by inclusion of large numbers of stragglers who were captured before and after the battle, and have been attributed to Le Cateau by default. This I cannot prove, but the evidence from CWGC registers is very suggestive. The Germans claimed 2,600 British prisoners from the battle, and it appears that the loss in killed and wounded was roughly similar....indeed, in terms of actual bloodshed, the two sides might have sustained very similar punishment.

 

Did the German officer you mention as supervising the burials at Mons give any numbers as to the dead of the two armies ?

 

Phil

[dansparky]

 

8 hours ago, SteveMarsdin said:

Dan, the Troops that attacked Bleid weren't reserves and (intriguingly) included Rommel and     Dirlewanger. LaPlace' battalion was acting as French flanc-garde and ran into the Germans, there would have been little time for even improvised fortifications. They suffered heavily.

 

A lot of Moser's casualties were from friendly artillery fire as they then advanced from ESE towards Ethe. The main German advance was from N and shelled them as they crested the hill separating Bleid from Ethe.

 

Steve

2

Ah, sorry i thought Infantry Brigade (3rd Royal Württemberg) was in a reserve corps.   So some heavy loss may be attributed to french fire (of some description, small arms or Artillery and so forth).   Interesting as you say some casualties were the result of friendly fire.  Not great on the all arms cooperation here then?  Does anyone know if Otto von moser is in print in English?  Apart from the obvious, Kluck and Bloem is there any other German accounts i am missing?

 

DS

[dansparky]

On 02/02/2017 at 19:41, David Filsell said:

The result of the battle is interesting and disregarded here and often elsewhere.

French was under strictures from Kitchener to preserve small his force - the overall quality of which has been questioned by some, there was a likelihood of being outflanked, there was a genuine belief in a lack  support from the French  and awareness of being a long way from safety with slender logistical  support; key  factors.

The consequences on Mons are that the German assault recognised as a huge threat,  while not perfectly managed by any means by a 'learning'  the retreat from Mons, succeeded in saving the bulk of the BEF. Certainly it was not a battle won, but one which delayed the enemy ensured the preservation of the BEF. Is that a defeat?

 

5

Do you mean they learnt the retreat as they went along? (in bold).   Pre -war testimony suggests the art of retreat was practised more than we are led to believe.  It was supposedly banned or so to speak.  But 10th Brigade practised it (outside of divisional training), Haig practised it at Aldershot, Snow practised it.   Interestingly Sir Charles Douglas initiated a scheme that required 4th division to retreat in 1913.  This scheme also mirrored the positions that 2nd corps and 4t division would find themselves in at Le Cateau.  

 

It's off topic but is my reply to what I thought you meant?

 

It may be considered a loss (dependent on the stance taken on disproportionate losses argument)and the fact that the B.E.F had to retreat.  Overwhelmed units surrounded bought precious time and d,amande helped to an extent.   We lived to fight another day if it had not been for the stubborn resistance of overwhelmed units and the Help Of Sordet and D'Amande at Le Cateau we in all probability would have been surrounded.

 

However debates aside as to the outcome.  It seems to me that the German Army approached on Mass (because it did not have the foggiest idea where we were, nor did we likewise).  So Bulled forward as soon as they received fire into these mass ranks.  But generally speaking, the German Army adopted more efficient tactics relatively early on.  Zuber has a point but I think he ignores the unsuspecting initial blows.  Had the intelligence picture been clearer and some other factors we may have had a tougher day.

[dansparky]

 

5 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

Dan,

 

Thanks for endorsing my comments about German casualties on the 24th.  You will find, though, that on page 243 Zuber alludes to losses on only one sector of the Le Cateau fight : on page 257 he actually goes on to estimate with a high degree of confidence that German casualties in the whole  battle were 2,900.  These, we might legitimately assume , were nearly all killed or wounded.

 

The British official figure cited ( 7,812 ) is grossly inflated by inclusion of large numbers of stragglers who were captured before and after the battle, and have been attributed to Le Cateau by default. This I cannot prove, but the evidence from CWGC registers is very suggestive. The Germans claimed 2,600 British prisoners from the battle, and it appears that the loss in killed and wounded was roughly similar....indeed, in terms of actual bloodshed, the two sides might have sustained very similar punishment.

 

Did the German officer you mention as supervising the burials at Mons give any numbers as to the dead of the two armies ?

 

Phil

 

 

 

HI, Phil,

The Burial States 169 German dead 135 British, 24 august 1914, does not help casualty debates to any great extent.

 

The initial figure at Le Cateau is what leads french to believe losses at le cateau worse than they were.  I can remember were i read (most vexing) but German casualty figures cover a much wider expanse of time.  In addition, this (mystery) source also said what constituted a casualty was quite different between British and German Armies.  I personally would add soldiers captured to casualties because they are lost to the enemy.  These men must be replaced as if they were dead.  Wounded (that survive, and are able to serve again) and stragglers get to fight on.  So if the germans lost 2,900 (not sure about wounded captured), then we suffered say the same 2,900 plus 2,600 captured.  Give or take a few Zuber may well be right that we lost double that of the Germans at Le Cateau. 

 

Maybe this needs its own thread?  Although it can help but not necessarily completely answer the initial approaches on mons and the fire they received. I not sure that Zuber was off about everything he argues, I did start off that way, though.  Two years ago i knew next to nothing on this.  Round in circles but fascinating:-)

Edited 2 February , 2017 by dansparky
pressing enter keeps deleating first line.

[phil andrade]

Dan,

 

You're right, of course...men taken prisoner are an irrecoverable loss, as surely as if they had been killed or permanently disabled.

 

My point in citing the burial reports of that German officer is a kind of historiographical one : Zuber is keen to extol the tactical edge enjoyed by the Germans, which might be attributed to better doctrine etc....but he is keen to acknowledge that the BEF was no push over, and, more to the point, that the Germans themselves were candid about the toll that the British riflemen and gunners exacted.

 

Zuber has been criticised as being too ardent an admirer of the German tactical prowess ; but, given the choice between his depiction and that of David Ascoli, I would choose his, and would not take a long time thinking about it.

 

I admit to being disappointed by the revelations of Terence Zuber : in my adolescence I had been weaned on the folklore of fifteen rounds rapid and angelic archers assisting the British on the anniversary of Crecy....but we have to countenance aspects of the story that are unpalatable to our cherished myth .

 

Phil

[dansparky]

Phil.

 

It is a real shame that there is not more little bits of info like this for casualties. 

 

I think on the whole all Armies in 1914 had tactical doctrine flaws. Steven Jackman's analysis point to antiquated ideas still in existence in the German Army.  I think all a synthesis of both sides of the argument gets us closer to what happened.  The problem is I guess all authors want a strong argument they don't want to appear to be sitting on the fence.

 

I am not sure that Zuber that goes to any great length to show the Germans were candid about the toll inflicted by British artillery and riflemen? He, for the most part, tries to persuade the reader it was over-egged and precious little is in the German accounts. 

 

My adolescence mostly comprised of my interest in WW2 and the R.A.F.  Prior to Zuber the traditional narrative had been hardly questioned, so it's not surprising there is resistance to it and that we grew up not questioning it.

 

DS

[David Filsell]

Mr D,

I left a word or so out it should have read 'learning army' (which I have now corrected) reflecting the necessary learning inevitable from the first experience of real war and not suggesting that retirement had not been practised. However, logistically  it was decided that it was necessary of to create dumps of food etc along the retirement routes which I suspect may not have been part of prewar exercises, although others may know better !

David 

Edited 2 February , 2017 by David Filsell

[dansparky]

Hi Dave,

Good point can only cover so much pre-war food dumps etc.  I am don't think was ever practised, well not to any proper extent.  Going to check that :-)

 

Anyone know why message section goes haywire when you press enter the first time.  I have to back out and edit in order to right anything??

 

 

Edited 3 February , 2017 by dansparky