Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

[nigelcave]

On 1/30/2017 at 17:52, QGE said:

On 1/30/2017 at 17:52, QGE said:

 

 

 the account of Bloem, often quoted and by implication a 'typical' experience of the Germans at Mons was, in fact, far from typical. It was written decades after the events (and therefore unreliable). 

What I have always thought extraordinary about Bloem's book is that it was published in 1916 - i.e. give or take a month or two, two years after the events at Mons. Where does the idea come from that it was written decades after the event?

 

On another point, it would hardly have been sensible for I Corps to stay put when its right flank (i.e. the French) had pulled back. If it had stayed where it was it would have done what the Germans wanted it to do and be forced to go into Maubeuge. The reality was that the BEF was small and could best be described as an (awkward, admittedly) adjunct to a French Army (the latter as in a formation). 

 

 

[nigelcave]

Casualties are, I am sure, an interesting area of discussion in their own right (and of course the only thing that mattered for those involved); in the context of the decisiveness or otherwise of a battle they are a part (often an important part) of an outcome. In the case of Le C, we happen to know that they did not really impinge on the importance of the battle's outcome. As regards the disputed casualty figures, obviously this is a perfectly legitimate source of discussion now: the more significant point, surely, is how they were perceived then? Personal accounts frequently talk of mowing down soldiers from one side or the other when the reality was that the vast majority were going to ground. If the British went off at the end of the battle thinking they had caused the Germans huge numbers of casualties, good for morale - whether they had or not simply does not matter. Ditto the Germans.

 

So what is? 

 

1. The BEF one way or the other got away to fight another day and in reality engaged in no further significant actions until the Marne. However, trust between the British and French commands had been severely weakened: whilst French is hardly blameless, Lanrezac has to carry a fair amount of the can for this deterioration - a view which Joffre's action in sacking him seems to support. I notice that nowhere does the French action at Guise seem to enter into the equation.

 

2. von K, for whatever reason, effectively lost a vital 24 hours post Le Cateau whilst he tried to work out what was going on (he remained confused even after the war).

 

3. von K's cavalry was poorly handled; in fact the performance of the German cavalry in 1914 in general can probably safely be described as disappointing.

 

4. The German advance was hindered by the frequent need to go into skirmishing order and deal with relatively isolated incidents of hostile fire - which is an exhausting process; I am full of admiration for the the stamina of these armies of 1914; especially when one considers the proportions of reservists involved, who had been plucked from civilian obscurity and shoved back into uniforms and new boots literally overnight.

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, nigelcave said:

Casualties are, I am sure, an interesting area of discussion in their own right (and of course the only thing that mattered for those involved); in the context of the decisiveness or otherwise of a battle they are a part (often an important part) of an outcome. In the case of Le C, we happen to know that they did not really impinge on the importance of the battle's outcome. As regards the disputed casualty figures, obviously this is a perfectly legitimate source of discussion now: the more significant point, surely, is how they were perceived then?

 

 

And, I would suggest, how they are perceived now .

 

There is an important historiographical dimension to the way that Zuber treats the casualty figures.

 

He cites a figure of, say, 1,900 British casualties in a certain sector of Le Cateau, as against German figures of 900, and uses this to exemplify how the Germans were inflicting double the loss.  All well and good ; until we find out that more thant two thirds of the British casualties were POWs....then we need to be aware that the punishment meted out by British fire - be it rifle, MG or artillery - was effective in cutting down the Germans : indeed, more so than it was the other way round.

 

The prisoners taken were, of course, casualties, and irrevocable, too ; but, in terms of deployment of men under fire, the difference in the number of men killed or wounded in the opposing forces is a crucial criterion of assessment ; and that aspect does not get a mention in Zuber's evaluations of the engagements.  He does, as we've seen, mention the reports of the German officer who buried the dead on a sector of the Framerie -Elouges fighting on 24 August, which I would take as a significant indication of the effectiveness of British fire. This, I would contend, merits more emphasis than Zuber allows.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest]

1 hour ago, nigelcave said:

 If the British went off at the end of the battle thinking they had caused the Germans huge numbers of casualties, good for morale - whether they had or not simply does not matter. Ditto the Germans.

 

 

Nigel - is there really strong evidence that the British thought they had inflicted huge casualties?

 

When reading first hand accounts written by the British of Mons and the Retreat from Mons - written by Battalion Officers rather than British Commanders - my sense is that their focus was on survivability, exhaustion and fighting against the odds; very few accounts by Battalion Officers allude to inflicting large scale casualties. The idea of inflicting large casualties seems to be greater the further up the chain of command and these infected despatches which in turn conveniently infected the British Media, ably assisted by the Bureau of Propaganda, formed (I think) in Sep 1914.

 

Most of the contemporary media versions of events that influenced perceptions in 1914 don't stand up to scrutiny. I think it is important to recognise that perceptions at this time were heavily influenced by a Government-driven propaganda bureau which papered over some of the BEFs failings and exaggerated its successes. This is not surprising as this was its role, however with the benefit of hindsight and the ability to compare scores of contemporary accounts, we can start to unpick the fabric of propaganda. Many of the Bureau's writers were authors of fiction and quite adept at manipulating stories which were then planted in the British newspapers and magazines which infected public perceptions. It is quite challenging trying to separate fact from fiction for this period. In the few areas I have studied in any detail, the received wisdom has been quite far from other versions of the truth - particularly first hand accounts. Even then we often see conflict between participants' versions of events. The VC actions of this period are a particularly rich area of conflict between official views and those of other eyewitnesses. 

 

One can of course find Battalion Officer accounts that lean towards hyperbole about inflicting large numbers of casualties but these need to be counter-balanced by the ones that don't; If we look at a larger body of evidence, my sense is that this is generally not the case. I may be wrong, but that is my perception from reading first hand accounts from Mons to Le Cateau in particular. The 1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers dairy contains accounts written by no less than eight Battalion Officers of their experiences before during and after Le Cateau - the largest set piece of this period and the day of the highest British casualties during the Retreat, so arguably an event where the British could legitimately claim to have some idea. None would fit the idea that they believed they had inflicted huge casualties on the Germans. Add to that at least a dozen personal narratives embedded in other Battalion war diaries as appendices as well as a score of anonymous accounts and detailed reports of actions of this period, we can begin to rebuild the picture; probably close to 40 first-hand accounts written by Battalion Officers that are easily accessible. Add to this correspondence from surviving Officers with the Historical Section preparing the OH in the 1920s. To my mind those at the sharp end of the infantry were not inclined to believe they had inflicted large casualties on the Germans - in stark contrast to the 'official' view. Most barely mention German casualties. 

 

The main reason, I think, is that Armies in full retreat have no way of knowing what the enemy casualties were simply because they do not hold the field at the end of the day. The dislocation between perceptions of casualties and reality were not prevalent among those who were at the sharp end. My sense is that the dislocation was a construct of those higher up the chain of command.

 

I would also argue that (British) professional soldiers and Officers would be under no illusion that they had killed huge numbers of Germans and that they perfectly understood that most would have gone to ground. While the number of Boer War veterans were limited, there would have been enough, particularly among the Officer ranks and SNCOs who had direct experience of coming under fire and would know what the survival instincts cause men to do when under fire. MG

 

 

 

[SteveMarsdin]

I don't want to side-track this thread but to clarify Dan's points re the action at Bleid:

 

Facing the French 7e DI were 10^th ID (Kosch) of 5AK and 53^rd Brigade (von Moser) of 13AK, units from different Korps with different objectives. The Wurtemburgers advanced over the same crest of hills as the French. The valley of the Ton, in which Ethe sits, was shrouded in fog for most of the morning and even when the canicule heat of the sun "burnt the fog off" the valley was still full of the smoke of battle:

This is from Grasset's book on the Battle of Ethe (he participated in the battle). Perhaps his use of arrows around Bleid is over-dramatic but it does show the predicament Laplace found himself in. Having inflicted heavy casualties on the French battalion, the Wurtemburgers pursued the retreating French, who mainly moved towards Ethe, over the hill at Gevimont, knowing that their (French) 14e Brigade is there.

The Germans from 13AK advanced not only towards the French 14e Brigade in the valley but the Germans from 5AK on the plateau beyond

The above view is from the German artillery position, even on a clear day you can only just make out the tops of the some of the buildings in Ethe. The French advanced from Gomery and Latour, the Wurtemburgers from Bleid

From the infantry position of the German 10 ID, you can see why they would be concerned, in an age where battlefield communications weren't as advanced as other areas if military technology.

Steve

 

[phil andrade]

1 hour ago, QGE said:

My sense is that the dislocation was a construct of those higher up the chain of command.

 

 

 

 

 

Martin,

 

The irony is that the C-I-C of the BEF was adamant that at Le Cateau  his force had lost fifteen thousand men : far from harping on the damage inflicted on the enemy, he was determined to attribute a grossly exaggerated loss on the actions of his corps commander.

 

There is another example of this in military history, which I hope won't be construed as trying to divert the thread : at the Battle of Gettysburg, a Union corps commander disobeyed orders and deployed his command in a precarious position, thereby hoping to deliver his own " stopping blow " on more favourable ground. The army commander was incensed, and insisted that the ensuing action cost close to double the casualties that it actually did. 

 

Toxic relations between corps and army commanders make for a compelling analogy, despite the fifty one year gap !

 

Phil

Edited 3 February , 2017 by phil andrade

[Guest]

25 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

 

Martin,

 

The irony is that the C-I-C of the BEF was adamant that his force had lost fifteen thousand men : far from harping on the damage inflicted on the enemy, he was determined to attribute a grossly exaggerated loss on the actions of his corps commander.

Phil

 

Possibly at the point in time. For a brief period French believed the whole of II Corps was lost.... but surely not in his despatches?

 

Exaggerating British losses and exaggerating damage to the Germans are not mutually exclusive claims. 

[phil andrade]

Yes, point taken, Martin ; and, far from seeking to undermine your comments, I want to emphasise how profoundly impressed I am by your knowledge and the way you deploy it. My own understanding of the events of 1914 has been deeply influenced and enhanced by your contributions.

 

The pendulum has swung so far the other way that I note that there are some who seek to " rubbish " the performance of the BEF in  1914.  I heard one of our most esteemed Great War historians stand up and tell an audience that, at Le Cateau, the BEF suffered eight thousand casualties against two thousand German. "How's that for a stopping blow ? " he said.

 

That troubles me a bit.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

[Guest]

5 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The pendulum has swung so far the other way that I note that there are some who seek to " rubbish " the performance of the BEF in  1914.  I heard one of our most esteemed Great War historians stand up and tell an audience that, at Le Cateau, the BEF suffered eight thousand casualties against two thousand German. "How's that for a stopping blow ? " he said.

 

That troubles me a bit.

 

Phil

 

 With so much information and misinformation and occasional misquoting or partial quoting in published histories it is possible to construct either argument with lots of authoritative references. This is why the Great War continues to fascinate; faced with the same information authors and academics continue to debate these events and sometimes come to diametrically opposite views.. Thankfully a more academic approach is reaping rewards; the evidence is in some very fine publications from Helion and the midlands universities that specialise in War Studies. 

 

I have never seen anyone try to 'rubbish' the BEF so I would be interested in the person quoted above (please PM me). 90% of the originals paid the price with their lives or with some wound and that is something not to lose sight of. Doubtless the residual 10% were mentally scarred in some way.  Analysing past battles has been and continues to be part of Officer training in the British Army. There are notes on Staff Rides of Le Cateau from the 1930s. Critical analysis does not equate to denigrating the participants. As we have seen many times emotions can on occasion run high when long established perceptions of historical events are challenged. I think we have discussed this before so no response is needed. MG

Edited 3 February , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

8 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

 

And, I would suggest, how they are perceived now .

 

There is an important historiographical dimension to the way that Zuber treats the casualty figures.

 

He cites a figure of, say, 1,900 British casualties in a certain sector of Le Cateau, as against German figures of 900, and uses this to exemplify how the Germans were inflicting double the loss.  All well and good ; until we find out that more thant two thirds of the British casualties were POWs....then we need to be aware that the punishment meted out by British fire - be it rifle, MG or artillery - was effective in cutting down the Germans : indeed, more so than it was the other way round.

 

The prisoners taken were, of course, casualties, and irrevocable, too ; but, in terms of deployment of men under fire, the difference in the number of men killed or wounded in the opposing forces is a crucial criterion of assessment ; and that aspect does not get a mention in Zuber's evaluations of the engagements.  He does, as we've seen, mention the reports of the German officer who buried the dead on a sector of the Framerie -Elouges fighting on 24 August, which I would take as a significant indication of the effectiveness of British fire. This, I would contend, merits more emphasis than Zuber allows.

 

Phil

Thanks Phill, this follows on for what i said about the term casulty meaning entirly different things on each side.  Do you know of a source that says two thirds were casulties.

 

I suppose zuber would argue here that there is only a 25% disparitiy in casulties and that thr britsh artillery performed better in this location.

 

Thanks steve for sharing RE Bleid.  So the retreating french drew pursuing geman formation towards french 14th then?

 

DS

 

Edited 3 February , 2017 by dansparky

[dansparky]

Hi, Phil.

 

Yes he was keen to attibute exaggerated loss on the corps commander.  But not initially, that is prior to French being fully aware of sordet's help, as we know he prasied Smith Dorrien initially.  He would of course always be looking for an excuse to Blame HSD, who acted contrary to his orders and he had a dislike for.  It seems to me he was very keen to blame the French initially, use them as a scapegoat for losses (due to his deep seated mistrust), upon being corrected to sordet he lay the blame on HSD.  I created a thread on this recently.....

 

Edited 3 February , 2017 by dansparky

[phil andrade]

Dan,

 

You asked me to cite sources about the breakdown of British casualties in the Mons campaign .  The casualty figures were compiled in an immense post war work STATISTICS OF  THE MILITARY EFFORT ( SMEBE) which provided some very comprehensive tabulations, including the monthly composition of battle casualties into killed, died of wounds, wounded and missing, along with a number of those included in the missing who were subsequently confirmed as prisoners. 

 

The figure for August 1914 reveals a very high proportion of the latter.

 

I'll go upstairs and fetch my notes, and find the figures for that month :

 

Casualties, France and Belgium, August, 1914 : Total - 14,409

 

Breakdown : Killed - 1,161. Died of wounds - 219 . Missing - 9,765 .  The remainder - over 3,200 -  were wounded.

 

Of those 9,765 posted as missing, it was confirmed that 8,190 were prisoners of war.

 

That equates to about 57% of total casualties.

 

It's quite likely that among them were wounded captives ; I daresay that some were dying.

 

Be that as it may, the indications were that half - more or less -  of the British casualties were unwounded prisoners.

 

If we apply that ratio to Mons, we might reckon  that the 2,000 German and 1,600 British casualties implied fewer than 1,000 British killed and wounded ; and that, in terms of bloodshed, the loss fell twice as heavily on the Germans ; there might well have been some initial shocks for the advancing cohorts who ran into heavy British fire.

 

Phil

[dansparky]

RE casulties.

 

This became very heated on the Rifle mistaken for machine gun thread.  I do not have sufficient knowledge on the different german casulty returns mentioned in that thread (NAZI tinkering, Not going to go there!) .  I still for the life of me cannot find the information on classifcation of British Casulties v german and frequency of returns?  Maybe its in an essay somewhere.  (The baker boys etc, states german casualty figures every ten days), this is similar to what i have read but not classification). 

[phil andrade]

British weekly ; German every ten days.

 

That was standard.

 

There was a conspiracy by British Official Historians to make out that the figures were compiled by different criteria.  They insisted that German returns excluded the lightly wounded and that, consequently, in order to make comparison valid, a significant addition should be made to the German figures. Hence, if the Germans stated that their casualties were, say, 10,000, and the British reported 15,000, the argument was that the real German figure was 15,000 if the same criteria were used for counting the wounded. A mendacious excercise, in my opinion. The intention was to inflate the German figures sufficiently to discredit the critics of Haig.  There was a massive thread about this a few years ago on the forum, which became terribly heated, but did yield some superb research, too. It was titled German Casualties, and was opened by Ralph Whitehead, doyen of German casualty research.

 

Phil

[dansparky]

Hi Phil,

 

Thanks for sharing that.   Is that source still possible to obtain?  British losses were higher but only i the sense that so many were captured due to the retreat.  Most german losses would have been actual dead, i would guess.

 

DS

[phil andrade]

Dead and wounded, Dan. The wounded probably outnumbered the dead by two or three to one.

 

SMEBE is available online.

 

Please ask me anything about the casualty stats.  I'll do my best to answer.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

[dansparky]

6 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

Dead and wounded, Dan. The wounded probably outnumbered the dead by two or three to one.

 

SMEBE is available online.

 

Please ask me anything about the casualty stats.  I'll do my best to answer.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

Do you mean German Or British here?  I just assumed it would include less wounded that those of British captured?

[Guest]

Dan

 

Can I politely suggest you download SMEBE. It is pointless debating these things without the basic 'Official' facts to hand. Regardless of whether these are accurate. I would argue the 'Official' Stats are axiometric and as such 'proof' is still required and the subject is a matter of legitimate debate. Only a gentle nudge; particularly as you are in the academic field and your academic overseers will expect this as a minimum.

 

MG

[dansparky]

Thanks MG,

 

I was flicking through it just as your message popped up :-).  I was speculating on nature of german casualties more than British.  Phil alluded to inflation of casualty figures (due to exclusion of lightly wounded and for political reasons), this may have much less a factor in the early part of the war.

[phil andrade]

47 minutes ago, dansparky said:

Do you mean German Or British here?  I just assumed it would include less wounded that those of British captured?

 

Dan,

 

Both German and British wounded outnumbered the killed by three to one ; after some of the wounded died, the ratio between wounded and dead dropped to about 2.3- 2.5 to one.

 

This would apply to the 1914 fighting ; things were different later.

 

Phil

 

 

[Guest]

The problems with the 'Casualty' debate are compounded for three reasons: Poor record keeping, Stragglers and Non Battle Casualties. 

 

1. British Army record keeping was poor in August 1914. Many of the systematic returns one sees in the diaries from October 1914 were not in place, or at least were not enforced in August 1914. Very few diaries have sufficient details on precise numbers and fewer still recorded the stragglers. Of the original 64 battalions of I and II Corps + 19th Inf Bde only a handful of diaries come anywhere close to providing sufficient detail.

 

2. Stragglers were a large swing factor. Some took weeks to return. While most diaries recorded most reinforcement drafts in 1914, very few differentiated between Reservists from the IBD, recovered sick, recovered wounded or recycled stragglers. Consequently it is extremely difficult to get a handle on the numbers. Arguably it is impossible.Very occasionally one sees numbers for stragglers, however there is no guarantee the diaries were consistent because often the diarist became a casualty and was replaced by someone with different experiences/abilities in record keeping. This lack of consistency makes the diaries - usually the main primary source- unreliable documents. Surprisingly few diaries kept running totals of strengths for these critical periods due to the fluid nature of the retreats. Some of the HQ Infantry Brigade diaries might help, or the A&QMG diaries at Divisional Level.

 

3. Non Battle casualties. 

 

1914 the War Office had no After first Ypres the standards of record keeping within the BEF went through a massive overhaul and new types of forms for returns begin to appear as well as daily strengths and casualty returns. Some diaries by Dec 1914 have many pages of daily returns however I have not seen a single Battalion diary from August 1914 that has these. 

 

Army commanders were more sensitive to Permanent Casualties rather than just Battle casualties. In some periods of the war POWs were an important factor as well as non-battle casualties. Also the recycling of the wounded is an area that I think is not very well understood. Medstats indicates that 59% of the wounded returned to duty, however this does not differentiate between those returning to less arduous roles. I have deconstructed more than a few 1914 Star medal rolls; the most striking aspect are;

 

(i) the number of men who were medically discharged

(ii) the number of men who were transferred to Garrison Battalions. These were typically medically downgraded but fit for a lower grade of military service. Garrison Battalions were formed simply to relieve other troops for active service.

 

From the research I have done there are indications that the % who returned to their original battalions was in fact significantly lower than 59%. There is a thread somewhere that has a flow diagram illustrating this. In the context of casualties from the Retreat from Mons it is I think important to understand this. 90% of the original cohorts of the 1914 Star infantrymen became casualties. The data on the 2nd Bn Royal Sussex Regt is very useful in this context as we have a unique recrd of the 'supply' side of the equation: the ledger from the  3rd Reserve Battalion recoding the fate of every man sent out including those evacuated wounded or sick and where they were subsequently sent. In 1914 it was the only RSR Battalion in France, therefore we know that the 3rd Bn ledger is an exact mirror of the 2nd Bn. The 2nd Battalion was very 'typical' in that it suffered the averege number of fatal casualties in 1914. It is as close as one might get to the 'typical' experience of an infantry battalion of the BEF and I think an excellent benchmark. There is another thread with the necessary detail.  

 

 

Slightly related to this is the fact that the War Office had no accurate idea of the numbers of fully trained and effective reserves to fill the gaps until Feb 1915. Their returns simply did not filter the unfit or recovering wounded. At the stroke of a pen the Reserves nearly halved in Jan 1915 as the units were properly categorised.  MG

Edited 4 February , 2017 by Guest

[David Filsell]

"The pendulum has swung so far the other way that I note that there are some who seek to " rubbish " the performance of the BEF in  1914."

 

Certainly I think that in a number of postings sight appears to have been lost. Despite 'bigging up' casualties  - a constant in reports of actions probably since war began - take as recent examples the Battle of Britain and Viet Nam - I certainly feel a number of postings do seem to have reflected a rubbishing view of the BEF either by accident or in some cases deliberate design. Not least context and consequences become lost in those judgements. The facts and questioning them are both important, but in war the outcome of the battle is really all.. In our criticisms we forget that whatever was written, recorded or 'constructed' at the time, and whatever the importance of getting the picture completely 'right', despite all the imperfections - real and imagined - that have been highlighted on the forum in the BEF, in 1914 a small, underequipped the army of regulars, reservists - now it seems condemned as inferior - poor staff work etc etc. did the job of not being truly beaten in the field in 1914 at Mons, during the retreat, or at Ypres.

[stiletto_33853]

David,

 

Personally I think the achievements of the BEF were remarkable in many ways, and I am very keen to learn more regarding 1914. Threads such as this are a great help.

 

Martin, 

Can the W.O. letter number 121/Supplies/100 dated 6/1/19 not assist in finally putting the casualties v. POW of 1914 in some sort of perspective??? From a Regimental perspective I am finding these figures somewhat in error, for example, and this is just one Regiments accounts. On 26/8/14 thirty one of the 1st Rifle Brigade are registered as having died on CWGC against 276 from the previously mentioned letter and The Rifle brigade Prisoners of War Help fund taken as POW's which is quite a considerable ratio of POW's v KIA. Both sources tie in reasonably well with one another. Obviously these do not account for wounded unless taken as a POW or stragglers. Both lists go on for many pages.

 

Please feel free to shoot this down if applicable, as stated I am keen to learn more on 1914.

 

Andy

[phil andrade]

There are anomalies in the casualty records for 1914,which is hardly surprising given the chaos that goes with that first shock.

 

But if we triangulate sources, and cross check between SMEBE, Medical Statistics and CWGC, there is enough harmony to allow for some confident generalisation.

 

For the Mons campaign, it's apparent that three British soldiers  were taken prisoner for every one that died.

 

This is a unique record for the Western Front, surpassing the retreat of March 1918, in terms of ratio of prisoners to dead.

 

Phil

[stiletto_33853]

Thank you Phil,

 

I have gone through SMEBE which is interesting and am well aware that some units suffered high KIA v POW depending on where they were and actions involved in, whereas some units had they reverse.

 

Interesting thread.

 

Andy