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Remembered Today:

Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.


dansparky

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The significance is surely that they were first encounters. "Mons" engaged the whole (British) Expeditionary Force (in theory if Battle Honours are any indication*) and Le Cateau half of the (British) Expeditionary Force in the Field. It is therefore understandable that the opening encounter battles should receive disproportionate attention. The problem is that the BEF's first large scale encounters were both followed by a retreat, which doesn't read well and by necessity (for reasons of morale) needed to be carefully positioned in the minds of the public. I suspect very few people, including the Secretary of State for War imagined that the BEF would be 170 miles further south only two weeks after its first encounter. This re-positioning was cemented by the Official History which in turn has understandably influenced most (but not all) subsequent authors.

 

Some battles later in the war that saw multiples of the levels of casualties barely get a mention in the OH. ...but this really misses the point. The casualties at Mons and Le Cateau are meaningless, arguably irrelevant in the context of the War. The significance is first encounter and the sudden and brutal re-alignment of the BEF's expectations and the realisation that the BEF's priorities were Survival. Their role after Aug 1914 was simply to hold on until the New Armies could be trained. They did this by the skin of their teeth with some considerable assistance from the Indian Army. 

 

I am not convinced that nailing the exact number of casualties at Mons or Le Cateau will tell us anything other that the known fact that causlaties are elusive things and can distort narratives if carefully selected. 

 

MG

 

Mons Battle Honour. In theory if the whole of the BEF was engaged at Mons all 52 battalions would 'qualify'. As Battle honours were awarded to Regiments rather than Battalions we need to adjust this number down for Regiments with more than one Battalion present. This comes to 48.  ...however only 44 infantry regiments were awarded the honour. the 'missing' from the Orbat are the Scots Guards, Black Watch, Cameron Highlanders and Royal Munster Fusiliers (all 1st Guards Bde, 1st Div). That still leaves 44 regiments. We can add 18 Cavalry Regiments to the list: Total: 62 Regiments. 

 

There are six infantry Regiments that carry the battle honour "Mons" who did not suffer a single fatal casualty at the battle, or indeed during the whole of August 1914. There are a further 11 regiments that carry "Mons" which lost less than 10 men each in the whole of August 1914. It perhaps illustrates there is  some gap between 'Battles, Battle honours and casualties, particularly fatal casualties. It is worth repeating: the 4th Bn Worcestershire Regt lost more men killed in a few hours at than the whole of I Corps did during the Retreat from Mons. I would have a quiet bet that few historians could tell us the date or even the year without having to look it up..... which is why casualties or 'honours' are no yardstick for understanding the relevance of battles in the historiography of the Great War. 

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yes, definitely first encounters would attract much intention.  Although, if you were German it did not receive as much scrutiny first encounter for them but seemed insignificant. I think that the other reason it demands so much attention is the (almost) national obsession with adversity.  We are always intrigued with events the demonstrate the British spirit in such circumstances and where despite such adversity we acquitted ourselves well. It's the so-called underdog story (that is why such emphasis is placed on being vastly outnumbered) that is part of the interest it is also is microorganism of command failures and tactical consideration that help us understand later events in the war.  Even though the nature of it changed.  Depicting it as such definitely would deflect away from the fact we were marching very rapidly in the wrong direction.

 

(2ND time of writing the below as my content was deleted again)

I agree what you say about casualties.  However, it always rears its head in discussions of war.  Whether it is about the rapidity of the British, mass advances etc discussions always fall on that of casualties.  Yes, they distort narratives which are exactly why they are still debated.  Narratives are already distorted as the answer is not certain, it's the search for clarity. Ultimately it will always remain elusive but the search will continue as is such an integral part of the whole event.  In the end, i think both narratives are hugely valuable and a synthesis of the two will bring us closer the truth of things.  I think also that every aspect notwithstanding casualties can be carefully selected to promote the point of the author and some of these also remain elusive.

 

I also would imagine that the B.E.F finding themselves 170 further south was definitely a surprise it was to SJF.  He never envisaged it, thought it would be advancing the next day.

 

I think it's a great shame that clasps were not awarded after Mons.  I have a few of them in my collection.  Why were some units not awarded?  Could tell the date of what?  not sure what you mean 4th Worcestershire reg are you referring to here? I think it is worth remember as you say it is not casualties nothing but casualties etc.  It forms part of the picture but does not provide all the answers. 

 

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  In more recent publications Zuber, Gilbert and Hastings have essentially argued that opposing forces were equal at Mons.  1 corps of the BEF essentially did not take part which left to corps facing the brunt.  The British Official History states that III Korps joined in the attack with IX corps about 11 am, later an intensive fire was brought to bear from IV Korps at some point in the afternoon. I think it also stated that there was 8 German divisions present appears to be wrong, I think the German II Korps was held up by Gen D Amande, preventing their participation.  Is this  right?

 

Zuber was first to argue against this stating that both sides were essentially equal.

1) He argues that 2 corps actually contained 2 and a half divisions? is this accurate i know the also had the newly created 19th in their ranks. 

2)Only IX Korps was engaged all day III Korps joining AFTER 2PM (differs from BOH here) and that IV joined in to late in the day for it to amount to anything. 

3) Even if this is correct he adds the misleading line that therefore both sides were equal (possibly on paper, although this is far from certain). 

4)He adds but does not make it Clear that half of the BEF did practically nothing. 

5)In his summary of casualty figures, he states that 12 of the 16 Regiment of III Korps and IX corps played a significant part in the day's actions.

6)If this is the case even if you subtract 4 idle german regiments and you add half a division (still not sure about that).  How do you arrive at equal opposing forces if the whole of 1 corps of the BEF remained largely idle all day?

 

DS

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Dan,

 

When Martin alludes to the 4th Worcesters, he refers to the slaughter of the battalion at Gallipoli in August 1915.

 

Martin,

 

Thanks for your cogent and compelling summary.  As you say, casualties are elusive and have been used to distort narrative.

 

And where would  we be without your research into the distortions regarding Scottish death rates ; or the true extent of the catastrophic damage suffered by the first cohorts of the BEF ?

 

You not only reveal things to us ; you also show us how such matters should be approached.

 

As you say, Mons Campaign = First Shock. It was certainly a dramatic episode in British military history .  The sense of acute peril was all too justified. The distortions in terms of casualty figures reflect the need of British people to impose a special character on the story .  Almost as if to remind the nation that those who followed were standing on the shoulders of giants .

 

I have been left wondering why so many of the British casualties of the campaign have been attributed to Le Cateau. The twenty six hundred prisoners claimed by the Germans and the eight hundred or so dead revealed by CWGC data  - about one third of the respective totals in the two weeks of battle and restreat - suggest  five thousand casualties rather then eight thousand.

 

And, thanks again to your revelations, I now realise that the deadliest day of 1914 for the BEF was not the stand at Le Cateau, and not even the desperate time at the end of October at First Ypres, but a day in the middle of September when Haig's men were trying to wrest possession of the Chemin des Dames from the Germans. 

 

Phil

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Ah ok makes sense.  Yes, I must say Martin posts are cogent and compelling.  I wish mine were, I try my best.  I takes, a while for me to edit comments (it's a dyslexia thing).  Martin is very good at holding together and developing a thread, without him the threads such as British Marksmanship would not be as valuable as it is.  I have found much of what Martin's posts very helpful and it has helped to develop my limited grasp on these events.  

 

Phill, I hope you did not find any of my comments above out of place?   There were not meant in such a way. 

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Dan,

 

Rest assured : I do not take your comments amiss.

 

And thank you for being concerned about my feelings !

 

I like the way you've flirted with the notion that Zuber might be distorting things, too.

 

Phil

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I must say I have become fascinated by this.  I initially thought that Zuber (and I have heard this before) was just trying to sell some books.  Has Zuber distorted facts? yes.  But I suppose most theses do.  It is looking like he has distorted them to a lesser extent than many earlier publications on the subject.

Zuber's work is incredibly valuable just like any revisionist of history.  It has led to a reexamination of events.  The result of which is and I think it's clear than elements of the BOH narrative are exaggerated or distorted. 

Edmonds did the best he could with the material available.  Political considerations, biased testimonies and lack of German sources contributed to the traditional narrative.  

Phill what do you think about the argument of Zuber and forces being equal?  This has been repeated by Gilbert and Hastings.  I think, however, these are based solely on Zuber's analysis.  His conclusions taken at face value.

I still can't see how two crops comprised of 2 and a half divisions.  19th Brigade was on the left, but here there is a contradiction.   IV Korps, it is argued played very little part.  If this is so then, this applies to large sections of 19th Brigade who were slap bang in their path.

Apologies if the follow is incoherent:

I would say that two corps + 19th brigade would be roughly 40,000 BEF.  For argument's sake minus all of 19th Brig =36,000 (on the 23rd).

Based on 36 engaged battalions or 12 German regiments this is around 45,000.  If all 16 were engaged, that figure would nearly reach 60,000 plus any of the unattached battalions and corps if any of these were engaged, all of IV Korps excluded are excluded.

So I would say the BEF were outnumbered by maybe 8,000.  Probably not as significant as we have been led to believe.  On the other hand and still with the exclusion of IX Korps, it could be 20,000 plus.

Anyway, I am not sure this can all definitively proven. Then there is Le Cateau, where it is argued we had the majority force.

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Hi Dan,

 

The numbers at Mons ?

 

No appreciable difference : that's been my take on it.  The crucial thing - and this is where Martin is " spot on" - is that the frontage was wide, and only relatively small numbers of the BEF bore the brunt ; so  for the BEF it was a battle of isolated battalions.

 

In the case of these British units, the Germans did enjoy a local preponderance in numbers. 

 

Do you mind if I question your arithmetic ?  A German regiment numbered 3,300 at full strength.  The battle strength would be rather lower, especially after wastage caused by fatigue etc.  Twelve regiments would equate to 36,000, not 45,000.

 

But I don't know.  I get a bit fixated on the casualty figures, and feel more confident in asserting an argument about them.

 

When it comes to numbers engaged, my poor old head spins a bit too easily.

 

Phil

 

 

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Hi Phill,

 

I guess it's the same for all of us.  you end up going round in circles a bit.  So when Zuber argues that the German army consolidated men locally it is not necessarily tactical brilliance of the German army it is largely due to the fact the BEF were spread so thinly.  They remained largely static, but the was very little choice.  They were not enough numbers to d much else.  Ah yes, I see that.  The German army was, therefore, able to bring it's weight to bear locally, Artillery dominance also fixed the British in position.

 

I don't mind you questioning my arithmetic at all.  It's not really that anyway; they only information i could find was that German Divisions were up to 15,000 in strength.  That's where i guess i went wrong i could not find a reliable source on the Constitution of German Divisions, Regiments or battalions.  Do you know of a reliable source on the constitution of German units at full strength?   So if a BEF division equates to 18,000 officers, men and additional units (about 4,000). German units are then roughly 3 quarters the size of a British one?  If the full 16 Regiments were engaged, then that would have been 52,800 (not including Independent Corps and battalion of which there was a few in each German Korps).  By comparison and excluding 19th brig 1 and two corps would have numbered 72,000.  In addition, I did not count for wastage because I had no way to verify.

 

I can't fathom why Zuber says four plus BEF British corps were equal to those engaged in III and IX Corps.  He makes I Corps part of the equation and then says the did nothing.  Why did he not argue numbers?  How many roughly in each German reg etc.  With numbers 1 corps is an irrelevance.   If he is right that other units on both sides did not get involved on and it seems 2 corps did number 36,000.  Then numbers are close to equal with the admission of  19th brig and I corps.  Had they all been more engaged then numbers would have swung the other way.  

 

"In fact, the BEF, with four-plus divisions, was just as strong as the engaged german units"  ???  For this to equal surely more than 4 german divisions would have been required.  Looking at numbers suggested, he could just say forces were equal without 1 Corps participation.  He then adds "Half of the BEF did nothing all day" I know I have already said this but this makes little sense straight after the quote previous.  Which is it four plus divisions or two?  4 changed the picture dramatically if only 16 reg were engaged and their composition is right.

 

This is not concise but can you see what i am driving at ?

 

Dan

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Dan,

 

Forgive my failure to do justice to your questions.

 

I'll revisit my Zuber book ; I'll watch a couple of the Six Nations matches tomorrow, and then I'll try and get something into the pot to make a decent reply.

 

Phil

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Phill,

 

That's perfectly fine :-).  I thank you for all your replies they have been very helpful.  

 

Big game tomorrow, who is going to win the Grand Slam.

 

The main pages that refer to this are 129 and 167 but obviously, is referred to elsewhere.

Thanks DS

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Despite the hyperbole about the efficiency of the British Army's mobilization and Edmonds' claims about the BEF being the best trained etc ad nauseam ..., rather strangely, despite this alleged perfection, the BEF was at least 4 days late from its pre-planned arrival date in France. This might have dictated 'ground'. Defenders are supposed to choose' the ground that the battle is fought over. It is slightly more difficult when one is 4 days late. This is not rocket science.  Attackers 'choose' the exact point and time and concentration. Mons is an abject example of an ill-prepared force with ill-defined objectives facing a force with very well defined objectives. The results were not surprising. The idea that Mons or Le Cateau were British victories are simply preposterous in my view., they were both shambolic disasters. French's alleged comments to Smith-Dorrien when he (SD) allegedly asked if the position at Mons was offensive or defensive - only to be dismissed - if true, tell us all we need to know. They were out of their depth. Given the pre-war knowledge on the relative size and strength of the armies it is astonishing to think that the UK Govt could have committed its tiny Army to the continent. This is not hindsight, it is well documented in pre war writings and the fact that Kitchener immediately required "3 year or the duration" for his New Armies suggested that the men at the very top understood this. 

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Thanks, MG,

I am not sure that the Best Trained etc alleges perfection.  But it does conjure that idea with the depictions of British performance.   I take it to mean that prior preparation the Boer war was seriously lacking.   There was an effort to learn from this and with some stumbling blocks managed to improve elements within training vastly.  Well trained force in terms of the regulars, but elite that is debatable especially with all the additional numbers it had to absorb that been away from the colours. 

 

Could a different position have been selected bearing in mind where the neighbouring allies were?  Mons was not great for fields of fire. 

 

French certainly and those around him seemed to struggle at the task, they assumed they were to advance the next day.  Additionally, local initiative does not excuse his lack of direction.  I am also in agreement that in terms of Mons and Le Cateau the idea of victory is far from the mark.  Some objectives it can be claimed were met but Victory I struggle with that.  For me it's assessing how disastrous it was, I think fortune smiled on the BEF  and Sordet, and Gen D Amande provided limited but vital assistance.

The force sent over ultimately would not be enough.  But if we sat on our hands for a couple of years would not the French have been overrun?  The is the matter of treaties to but they have been broken before.

 

Best DS

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9 hours ago, QGE said:

   Mons is an abject example of an ill-prepared force with ill-defined objectives facing a force with very well defined objectives. The results were not surprising. The idea that Mons or Le Cateau were British victories are simply preposterous in my view., they were both shambolic disasters.. 

 

As ever threads like this raise much post operative smoke and fire - re-evaluation but once again we come to generalised  'rubbishing', and over rubbishing at that, too often. 

Whilst fully accepting and agreeing with much that has been on this thread. I do not think anyone can, or has put forward, the view that either were victories, disagreed that that the narrative of the battle needs re-evaluation, or that the BEF was that "perfect thing apart." 

That said, let's be realistic, a shambolic disaster would have been the failure to engineer a relatively successful withdrawal of the BEF - a force which had never manoeuvred or fought together before - after its first contact Mons when  the possibility of genuine defeat - loss of the BEF - was recognised. (Retreat if you prefer).

Equally suggestions which have crept into this thread that the Official Historian manipulated the Mons narrative do not stand up to scrutiny or found fact. He made errors in the narrative - which historian does not. He worked with the information available, ensured it was checked and re-checked.  Mistakes certainly, favouritism certainly, but I think it rubbish for us armchair generals to accept suggestions of deliberate manipulation seem totally unproven.

 

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9 hours ago, dansparky said:

Could a different position have been selected bearing in mind where the neighbouring allies were?  Mons was not great for fields of fire. 

 

 

Regardless of where the BEF first stood to receive the Germans, it seems fairly obvious that the aims of the BEF were far from clear at the top two levels of command. That Sir John French thought he would be advancing the next day needs to be weighed against what actually happened and the distance he was from his expecations two weeks later, particularly when half of his force had barely been engaged at Mons. Similarly Smith-Dorrien had no initial idea whether the position at Mons was offensive or defensive and had to ask. This doesn't really convey any confidence that the command structure had clear objectives. The default position in the historiogrpahy is that the French were to blame, leaving the British flanks exposed. 

 

When the IEF-A arrived in France in Sep 1914 they were given a printed set of notes on the German Army, assessing its ability.  The general tone was that the Germans were inferior to the British Army. In the light of what was unfolding, these official assessments were still steeped in jingoism and some way from the harsh reality. 

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10 hours ago, QGE said:

The idea that Mons or Le Cateau were British victories are simply preposterous in my view.,

 

Lipstick on a pig ?

 

Phil

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13 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

 

As ever threads like this raise much post operative smoke and fire - re-evaluation but once again we come to generalised  'rubbishing', and over rubbishing at that, too often. 

Whilst fully accepting and agreeing with much that has been on this thread. I do not think anyone can, or has put forward, the view that either were victories, disagreed that that the narrative of the battle needs re-evaluation, or that the BEF was that "perfect thing apart." 

That said, let's be realistic, a shambolic disaster would have been the failure to engineer a relatively successful withdrawal of the BEF - a force which had never manoeuvred or fought together before - after its first contact Mons when  the possibility of genuine defeat - loss of the BEF - was recognised. (Retreat if you prefer).

Equally suggestions which have crept into this thread that the Official Historian manipulated the Mons narrative do not stand up to scrutiny or found fact. He made errors in the narrative - which historian does not. He worked with the information available, ensured it was checked and re-checked.  Mistakes certainly, favouritism certainly, but I think it rubbish for us armchair generals to accept suggestions of deliberate manipulation seem totally unproven.

 

David. I think we will always differ on our views of the BEF in 1914 and how Edmonds positioned them in history.

 

Liddell Hart famously described the OH as 'Official, but not History'. My personal view is the Edmonds and his staff consciously and selectively misquoted one German source in order to deliberately distort perceptions of the BEF in 1914. There is pretty concrete evidence for this which is laid out in some detail in the Mad Minute thread. The OH remains an essential reference book with many strengths, but it is important to understand its weaknesses as well. It is these weaknesses that Zuber was attempting to address.

 

An alternative view: After Mons the BEF was split into two disconnected parts. This was not the original plan and arguably indicates a distinct lack of imagination or forethought among the Staff when considering 'What if Mons fails and we retreat?" It appears there was no consideration for this scenario and when faced with the 'unexpected' (read lack of scenario planning) the BEF was forced to split into two. This is one day after the first encounter. Imagine. Two halves of the British Army unable to cooperate due to poor planning explained away by the OH as 'unfortunate'. The British Army still uses the well worn saying that prior planning and preparation prevents piss poor performance. If ever there was an example of this, Mons and the immediate aftermath are good examples of what happens when the basics of planning have not been covered. At the root of this is the low levels of General Staff training at Division and Corps level pre-war. The British Army was conducting Staff Rides on these battles in the 1920s and 1930s, and not by way of teaching its young officers how things should be done. Within a day, I Corps had abandoned II Corps. This was not the plan either.... well, at least not according to the Operation Orders.  Imagine. An Army where one half had abandoned all hope of being able to support the other half. I Corps Commander was ignoring his written orders to link up with II Corps at Le Cateau having panicked the night before. This was diametrically opposite to the intentions of Sir John French who was 30 miles south and had little idea of what was happening. One senior Staff Officer fainted when he heard about the stand at Le Cateau and was famously revived with a bottle of champagne. At least they had focused on the important things. After Le Cateau  II Corps was scattered and incapable of forming any cohesive formation for many days. The author of the OH incidentally was having a breakdown when this was happening. Smith Dorrien can be rightly applauded for snatching survival out of what could easily have been annihilation. He was dealt an extremely bad hand but in my view the seeds of the problems at Le Cateau were sown by poor or non-existent planning at Mons, specifically the absolute lack of any planning should Mons not work out.  This was compounded by Haig's decision to abandon II Corps when he was spooked by a rather small force. In the battles of the memoirs in the post war years the fact that the main participants were in angry and public disagreement about the basic facts covering these events might suggest that they did not think it was their finest hour. 

 

I would recommend reading the war diaries which include many first hand accounts written by the Infantry Officers who were present at Mons and Le Cateau. Some provide an alternative view to that expressed in most early histories. Specifically, Smith-Dorrien's 'crowd returning from a football match' simile is rather different to the chaos described immediately after Le Cateau recorded in a number of other diaries with Officers occasionally having to threaten to shoot their own men.  I sometimes wonder how he built this 'football crowd' image in his mind when the front was a few miles wide and when he was in fact motoring south trying to find Sir John French who was 30 miles south at St Quentin.

 

 

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1 hour ago, QGE said:

 

 

 

When the IEF-A arrived in France in Sep 1914 they were given a printed set of notes on the German Army, assessing its ability.  The general tone was that the Germans were inferior to the British Army. In the light of what was unfolding, these official assessments were still steeped in jingoism and some way from the harsh reality. 

1

Agreed, more emphasis may have been placed on musketry in the BEF.  Generally speaking, i see little difference between all the combative powers.  Artillery power and Mg fire did assist German forces, particularly, regarding the MG the relative numbers show foresight that we lacked.  The offensive is always difficult against a well-defended position; this fire made this easier and the fact the BEF were stretched and static.

 

At HQ things were severely lacking,  Gen Snow even says it was fortunate they were at Le Cateau at all as there was no urgency or an indication as to what was going on.  Command issues were common to all powers and communications did not help, within the BEF panic greatly added to this.  Why should this be?  The BEF had the practical experience that the German Army did not.  The fact that the forces were so spread over the Empire is how this is explained.  Fewer troops for manoeuvres, this is a factor.  Practical experience should have made up for this, even though at the time they were not quite as senior.

The BEF at battalion level was a well-trained unit- equal to the German Army on the defensive.  If it was not as well drilled, we would have been blown away due to the problems in high command.  This is why those in high command would be replaced.

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1 hour ago, David Filsell said:

 

As ever threads like this raise much post operative smoke and fire - re-evaluation but once again we come to generalised  'rubbishing', and over rubbishing at that, too often. 

Whilst fully accepting and agreeing with much that has been on this thread. I do not think anyone can, or has put forward, the view that either were victories, disagreed that that the narrative of the battle needs re-evaluation, or that the BEF was that "perfect thing apart." 

That said, let's be realistic, a shambolic disaster would have been the failure to engineer a relatively successful withdrawal of the BEF - a force which had never manoeuvred or fought together before - after its first contact Mons when  the possibility of genuine defeat - loss of the BEF - was recognised. (Retreat if you prefer).

Equally suggestions which have crept into this thread that the Official Historian manipulated the Mons narrative do not stand up to scrutiny or found fact. He made errors in the narrative - which historian does not. He worked with the information available, ensured it was checked and re-checked.  Mistakes certainly, favouritism certainly, but I think it rubbish for us armchair generals to accept suggestions of deliberate manipulation seem totally unproven.

 

 

I agree i do not consider either victory, neither do I completely think shambolic disaster.  Though they could have been without French help and the work put in at Battalion level.  If those at the top had been obeyed no one would have even conducted a retreat in training.  Some valuable problems were ironed out in these exercises.

I think some of us are on the other side of the fence or leaning a certain way.  But I agree that no one is so far to one side that they take the BOH as gospel. 

As, regards with Edmonds, from what I have read I think he endeavoured to produce an accurate account.  He did the best he could with the available information and to sort out the mess left by Fortescue.
That reminds me, i need to read Fortescue's article on 1914, going to dig that out.

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MG,

 

 I think that is a fair comment.  I have no idea how competent Grierson was but i think Smith Dorrien was among the best officers we had at a more senior level.  Haig although ill panicked a little to even though he had very little actual combat.  Smith Dorrien showed that at Aldershot that he was more forward thinking that most at the top.  Even Earl Roberts was more forward thinking that those that came after him. They tried to completely reverse all the forward thinking changes he made in relation to the future role of cavalry and he was from an older generation. 

 

Smith Dorrien by his own hand reveals what was thought about events at the time, initially French placed blame on Sordet, this being reversed and according SD this was an attempt to find a scape goat to explain what had happened.  He thought it 2 corps had suffered to a greater extent than they had and the fact that 2 corps was isolated was isolated was due to his decision making, or lack of.  Without Kluck swing towards bulow and the fortuitous timing of 4th division, french support and SD'S leadership, well we know what would have happened.  Every historian now, Sheffield, Jones, Phillpot etc do not shy away from command failures within the BEF.  Some mitigating circumstances are put forward but they all agree it was not up to scratch.  At Battalion and below is where the strength lay.

 

DS

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I accept - as ever - much that you say. Historiography should accept there were errors, and other sides of the many coins.

I have read many of the comments on drafts sent out by the OH to those involved and noted the considerable care that was taken in addressing them, correcting and re-correcting. Certainly it now appears that the original volume of the OH is, unsurprisingly, flawed - like most works - and that correctives need to be applied to our accepted thinking. 

Nevertheless Green ( "Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official History) certainly accepts that the works were an honest job whilst noting certain of Edmonds biases. 

Whatever the propagandist attitude of government and the press - a norm in any conflict - there seems little if any evidence that Edmonds was prey to it. Certainly he was troubled by many  organisation problems and great pressures. , DS raises an interesting point in his last posting about sorting out Fortescue's 'mess', - a mess created by historians.. I wonder  the extent that Edmonds, new boy on the block, accepted/re-analysed that original work  without the rigorous scrutiny that he certainly sought in later volumes with a larger staff and better facilities (and methodology no doubt). I would be fascinated to read the Fortescue article if he DS can  'dig it out'.

Equally the books were primarily written Army For the Use (and Education) of. Not for public consumption or, I suggest, history graven on stone.

 

I will of course go back and re-read the original thread, but I would say again that positively stated conclusions implying only criticism of the BEF to often do not seem do not seem to recognise on-the-ground realities, the army's innocence of war and the magnitude of Edmond's task and the constant variables he faced in his work.

 

Sadly some contributions to this and other threads do seem to me to be simply cut and dried criticism of every aspect of the BEF without true perspective of battle and lacking fair perspective of the situation faced. by the BEF. All I ask is better  more perspective and restate my view in the face of its weaknesses, 'relative' failure  Mons and le Chateau, the BEF it was good enough to retire from unwinnable battle and stand at Ypres whatever our post match analysis. 

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On 11/02/2017 at 22:56, David Filsell said:

Nevertheless Green ( "Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official History) certainly accepts that the works were an honest job whilst noting certain of Edmonds biases. 

Whatever the propagandist attitude of government and the press - a norm in any conflict - there seems little if any evidence that Edmonds was prey to it. Certainly he was troubled by many  organisation problems and great pressures. , DS raises an interesting point in his last posting about sorting out Fortescue's 'mess', - a mess created by historians.. I wonder  the extent that Edmonds, new boy on the block, accepted/re-analysed that original work  without the rigorous scrutiny that he certainly sought in later volumes with a larger staff and better facilities (and methodology no doubt). I would be fascinated to read the Fortescue article if he DS can  'dig it out'.

 

 

I will of course go back and re-read the original thread, but I would say again that positively stated conclusions implying only criticism of the BEF to often do not seem do not seem to recognise on-the-ground realities, the army's innocence of war and the magnitude of Edmond's task and the constant variables he faced in his work.

 

Sadly some contributions to this and other threads do seem to me to be simply cut and dried criticism of every aspect of the BEF without true perspective of battle and lacking fair perspective of the situation faced. by the BEF. All I ask is better  more perspective and restate my view in the face of its weaknesses, 'relative' failure  Mons and le Chateau, the BEF it was good enough to retire from unwinnable battle and stand at Ypres whatever our post match analysis. 

 
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Hi David,

Agreed my thoughts on Edmonds are directly influenced by Green's work.   I am not sure how much of Fortescue's work went into the beginning volumes - as I understand it the task was so mammoth, he could not cope with it.  I thought that Edmonds effectively began from scratch to sort the mess.  There is though the idea that Fortescue was even more critical of French than others were could this be a political motive? The size of the task as well is relevant, myself I am researching prewar training and The great retreat.  If I select material that conforms to a far right or left view on this my task is much simpler.  The truth though is a complex web and a synthesis of both viewpoints; this makes it a much harder and longer task.  I am not a gifted writer, but I have seen the thesis that tries to select information that backs a view against another.  This makes a strong argument but does not 'float my boat' so to speak.  Then again I did this with my argument with the Genesis of the attack on Haig's reputation, and not everyone liked that.

 

I digress, I have found the Fortescue article. I may not have time to post it today (tiss my birthday tomorrow and all that)  so will sum up bullet point.  I believe it is quite rare; I will take photos at some point as scanning will damage it, being that it is pulled out from a book.

 

Lastly, I think the failure at Mons was reduced by the performance of the men, von Kluck's distraction and French intervention.  In looking more thoroughly into it I am positive French intervention was vital.  Credit goes to SD as well and Snow for rushing up the 4th without any direction.  Our main deficiencies were that our command structure above that of corps level, though permeating this slightly and the fact that we were under-supplied in modern weaponry.  Mcmahon's and others drive to increase rapidity was to cope with this shortfall.  Ammunition, endurance and just the fact it is men with rifles would make it impossible to completely make up for this shortfall and the sweeping ability of the MG.

 

DS

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1 hour ago, David Filsell said:

QGE

I accept - as ever - much that you say. Historiography should accept there were errors, and other sides of the many coins.

I have read many of the comments on drafts sent out by the OH to those involved and noted the considerable care that was taken in addressing them, correcting and re-correcting. Certainly it now appears that the original volume of the OH is, unsurprisingly, flawed - like most works - and that correctives need to be applied to our accepted thinking. 

Nevertheless Green ( "Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official History) certainly accepts that the works were an honest job whilst noting certain of Edmonds biases. 

Whatever the propagandist attitude of government and the press - a norm in any conflict - there seems little if any evidence that Edmonds was prey to it. Certainly he was troubled by many  organisation problems and great pressures. , DS raises an interesting point in his last posting about sorting out Fortescue's 'mess', - a mess created by historians.. I wonder  the extent that Edmonds, new boy on the block, accepted/re-analysed that original work  without the rigorous scrutiny that he certainly sought in later volumes with a larger staff and better facilities (and methodology no doubt). I would be fascinated to read the Fortescue article if he DS can  'dig it out'.

Equally the books were primarily written Army For the Use (and Education) of. Not for public consumption or, I suggest, history graven on stone.

 

I will of course go back and re-read the original thread, but I would say again that positively stated conclusions implying only criticism of the BEF to often do not seem do not seem to recognise on-the-ground realities, the army's innocence of war and the magnitude of Edmond's task and the constant variables he faced in his work.

 

Sadly some contributions to this and other threads do seem to me to be simply cut and dried criticism of every aspect of the BEF without true perspective of battle and lacking fair perspective of the situation faced. by the BEF. All I ask is better  more perspective and restate my view in the face of its weaknesses, 'relative' failure  Mons and le Chateau, the BEF it was good enough to retire from unwinnable battle and stand at Ypres whatever our post match analysis. 

 

 

I don't doubt for a minute that Edmonds took great care to piece the stories together. I imagine it was like trying to put together a large jigsaw puzzle where some of the pieces are missing. I have seen plenty of evidence by way of correspondence between the Historical Section and eyewitnesses (typically the surviving Officers).. According to Green, Edmonds inherited a mess with his predecessor rather prone to using archaic expressions such as cannonade etc. It seems that the files were in a considerable shambles (that word again) with files scattered and out of order and misplaced, making his job even more difficult. While Edmonds undoubtedly did a wonderful job reassembling such a large and complex series of narratives the end product has an Official agenda. I suspect the Govt was not quite prepared for a warts and all history in the early 1920s when the memory of the Great War was still raw and quite tangible. 

 

Green in his PhD speculates whether any 'Official' History can be perfectly objective. We know from Aspinall Oglander's experience that larger forces were sometimes at play, particularly the opinions of Governments.  As long as we understand these factors they should not detract from the value as a reference document. 

 

On the point of Edmonds bowing to external pressure; he did. It is an established fact and one not really vulnerable to revision.  The ANZAC section of the OH Gallipoli was completely rewritten due to pressure from the Australians. Edmonds and Aspinall Oglander had strong discussions over this. The Aspinall Oglander papers at the Isle of Wight Records Office are worth trawling should you ever have the time and inclination. He had copies made of the correspondence and took them home. I suspect Edmonds didn't enjoy having to bow to pressure from above but he was of course in their employ and had little choice. It at least kept him employed for 20 years. 

 

We also need to be mindful that the records used by Edmonds were classified documents and not available to the public. I suspect he had no idea that they might one day be open to public scrutiny and independent analysis. His advantage of course was that he knew all the key players and could speak directly with thousands of participants. 

 

Edmonds' memoirs have recently been published by Turner Donovan. 

 

MG

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Oh have they.  They memoirs in the Liddel hart achieve?  I have the chapters relating to prewar and early battles.   They other point is Edmonds had to keep reviewing and editing events with participants through correspondence.  So there views may have skewed things which he could not dismiss, he had to get things agreed.

 

DS

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Fortescue 1914

1. Lord Haldane, we owe a debt for all his work, French also did some great work preparing the forces of the empire.

2. Best trained - best Britain placed into the field.. it was certainly superior to that which Wellington led from Portugal in 1813, etc.french, it was felt that Sir J F was the right man.

3. SirFrench cannot even describe accurately his first day of March.  French tries to find lanrezac-unable aware French in retreat.  He returns to BEF but does not arrest their advance.  

4 Sir HSD says only threatened by cavalry, small bodies of troops at Mons- accounts say the difference.

5 SJF Receives unexpected telegram from Joffre French full retreat, 3 crops to BEF front a forth nearby.  How was it unexpected when he saw French drawing back with is own eyes, he then waits for another telegram before ordering a retreat wasting 6 hours.

6 he makes excuses for I Corps not arriving at the proper halting ground after moral.

7 smith dorrien- decides to stand (le cateau).  We do not believe for one second Allenby warned he might be surrounded. 

8. why does French blame sordet then change tack when he was made aware within three days of Sordet's help.

9 because French and his staff lost their heads and are endeavouring to conceal this he also tries to argue SD faced a smaller enemy then is the case. He then says without sordet SD detroyed- but safe retreat already assured.

10 he is grossly off with British casualties at Le Cateau.  He piles ridiculous praise on the withdrawal from landrecies.  Also, makes a dash for Noyon leaving his army to look after itself for 1 - 2 days.

 

he then begins to discuss the Marne and so on

 

DS

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