Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

[Guest]

31 minutes ago, dansparky said:

Fortescue 1914

1. Lord Haldane, we owe a debt for all his work, French also did some great work preparing the forces of the empire.

2. Best trained - best Britain placed into the field.. it was certainly superior to that which Wellington led from Portugal in 1813, etc.french, it was felt that Sir J F was the right man.

3. SirFrench cannot even describe accurately his first day of March.  French tries to find lanrezac-unable aware French in retreat.  He returns to BEF but does not arrest their advance.  

4 Sir HSD says only threatened by cavalry, small bodies of troops at Mons- accounts say the difference.

5 SJF Receives unexpected telegram from Joffre French full retreat, 3 crops to BEF front a forth nearby.  How was it unexpected when he saw French drawing back with is own eyes, he then waits for another telegram before ordering a retreat wasting 6 hours.

6 he makes excuses for I Corps not arriving at the proper halting ground after moral.

7 smith dorrien- decides to stand (le cateau).  We do not believe for one second Allenby warned he might be surrounded. 

8. why does French blame sordet then change tack when he was made aware within three days of Sordet's help.

9 because French and his staff lost their heads and are endeavouring to conceal this he also tries to argue SD faced a smaller enemy then is the case. He then says without sordet SD detroyed- but safe retreat already assured.

10 he is grossly off with British casualties at Le Cateau.  He piles ridiculous praise on the withdrawal from landrecies.  Also, makes a dash for Noyon leaving his army to look after itself for 1 - 2 days.

 

he then begins to discuss the Marne and so on

 

DS

 

 

Kruger doesn't get a mention? Our best general. 

[dansparky]

16 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

 

Kruger doesn't get a mention? Our best general. 

 

Walter?

[Guest]

18 minutes ago, dansparky said:

Walter?

 Paul Kruger. Boer Commander. His most famous monument is a National Park, but the Fourth Plinth in Trafalgar Square should be dedicated to him in my view.  He taught the British a hard lesson in musketry and marksmanship which triggered (excuse the pun) a revolution in British musketry. The other great general is the person who designed the SMLE, which gave the BEF an unprecedented advantage and importantly gave the Cavalry firepower that was significantly above that of its direct rivals. I have never understood why the weapon rather then the training was never given the accolades in the OH that it deserved. 

 

Kruger

Haldane

McMahon

SMLE

IEF-A

 

were the five most important factors behind the extraordinary performance of the BEF in 1914. 

 

If you are looking for parallels in later years I would suggest the US Industry and manpower 1942-1945 and (separately), Bomber Command and (separately) the Bailey Bridge in WWII. 

 

[dansparky]

Ah, yes I know that name but do not know details of the man will look up.

 

I think Fortescue merely points out that Haldane reforms made a difference.  Being a relatively small article where the main content is a criticism of French I suspect there was not room for this.    The mention of positivity of French at the beginning is solely functions to suggest say he did some good work in peace time, but at War he was out of his depth.  

DS

[David Filsell]

 I admit to limited knowledge of Gallipoli, but was aware that Edmunds and  AO had problems over the volumes (and I do have the Donovan Edmonds volume). Equally I accept that Edmunds, like anyone in Army or government employ is subject to, sometimes irresitable, pressure. Like many others I have experienced it.

Nevertheless, the views I have expressed about lack of perspective in sections of this thread and fail to recognise the realities I have outlined remain. Baby and bath water!

That said, as in all threads which you have triggered, much of value has - if placed in correct and carefully balanced  context - come out of this thread!

Regards

David

[phil andrade]

The demolition of the Mons folklore has been painful for me.

 

I would love to see Zuber exposed as  a disingenuous historian exhibiting " confirmation bias " : but I don't hold out much hope.

 

 Martin , you attribute great importance to the impact of the SMLE, which gives implicit support to the narrative that emphasises the effectiveness of the fusillade in the performance of the BEF. This, to a degree, upholds the image of the battle that I had cherished.

 

Then again, you're emphatic that it was the Cavalry that demonstrated a significant edge here ; you also alluded to the underrated role played by British gunners at Mons....leading me to wonder if you are circumspect about the stories of British superiority in the infantry vs infantry aspects of the battle.

 

Phil

[Guest]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

The demolition of the Mons folklore has been painful for me.

 

I would love to see Zuber exposed as  a disingenuous historian exhibiting " confirmation bias " : but I don't hold out much hope.

 

 Martin , you attribute great importance to the impact of the SMLE, which gives implicit support to the narrative that emphasises the effectiveness of the fusillade in the performance of the BEF. This, to a degree, upholds the image of the battle that I had cherished.

 

Then again, you're emphatic that it was the Cavalry that demonstrated a significant edge here ; you also alluded to the underrated role played by British gunners at Mons....leading me to wonder if you are circumspect about the stories of British superiority in the infantry vs infantry aspects of the battle.

 

Phil

 Short version..well, my theory at least...

 

1. The SMLE was a far superior weapon to the equivalent carried by the French and German armies. It was a killer factor, literally and metaphorically, but only in trained hands.

2. The British Army, spurred by its severe shortcomings during the Boer War embraced the lessons. The technological step change with the SMLE allowed the British Army to radically overhaul the human element of musketry. It was a major differential. 

3. Champions of the BEF have largely misunderstood Musketry and have allowed the romantic idea of the 'mad minute' to obscure the broader, deeper and more complex, multi-factor musketry skills. All covered in the mad minute thread. Fire control, individual marksmanship and collective musketry were far more important than the ability to fire 15 rounds in a minute (incidentally less than 5% of the musketry test). The mad minute was not representative of the skills that mattered most but has evolved as a convenient anchor for tabloid narratives.

4. Ammunition supply is not well understood as a limit factor. Some historians' versions of events were simply impossible to sustain given this limit factor. 

5. The Cavalry's contribution is underestimated. The SMLE gave the British Cavalry the same firepower as the infantry. Their musketry skills were as good as that of the infantry. When it mattered most (Ypres) they were able to act as infantry - giving the BEF options that were not available to any other Army at the time, namely Cavalrymen who were interchangeable as infantrymen. 

6. The IEF-A's contribution is underestimated.

7. All the above positive factors were heavily diluted by the heavy dependence on Reservists, who were demonstrably poorer at musketry, and marksmanship and fitness. Few historians acknowledge this. This was particularly important in the infantry where 60% were Reservists and as casualties mounted this proportion increased. 

8. British Non-battle casualties were a massive factor and not very well understood in the context of 1914. I suspect but cannot yet prove that that this might be a dominant factor. It warrants further research. 

9. The RFA's contribution is underestimated. 

10. Junior Officer leadership in the regular British Army particular was a major factor that is underestimated. They died in greater proportions than any other section of the British Army of any period of the Great War; doing the very hardest job imaginable ; leading men in near impossible circumstances in the full expectations that they would not survive. That they did this,  unflinchingly in such large numbers and so consistently in 1914 is a thing of wonder. Nothing comes close as a killer factor for the BEF.

 

I have no idea who were 'superior'  and I don't really care; British or Germans and I don't think it mattered. The stalemate should tell us that. Some historians with strong patriotic biases, particularly those writing in the 1960s to the 1980s have anchored on some rather simplistic and distorted interpretations of the first months of the war that paradoxically over-emphasise some factors (mad minute) and underestimate others (junior leadership). 100 years after the events I still think this period is misunderstood.

 

Just a theory as yet unproven.  

 

If I had to choose one factor it would be: "Subalterns"

 

Ten men well led

will beat a hundred

without a head. 

 

To me they are as important as The Few of 1940. 

 

MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

 

Many thanks for that comprehensive and convincing assessment.

 

Intrigued at these non battle  casualties : what differentiated them in 1914 from those of later years ?

 

Certainly not the scale, unless memory plays me false.

 

I suppose the untimely death of Grierson might be cited.

 

Phil

[dansparky]

As well drilled as any man may be, the weapon would have to facilitate this.  There may be many that think British Clearly miles better than the Germans at marksmanship.  Maybe in some small, they were, but any idea of rapidity was mostly down to the that of the SMLE.  This is known, but I guess narratives for wide readership gloss over this and make it seem as it was solely the men themselves.   I think cavalry returns were more or less up there, the slightest of difference.  Much of this thanks to Lord Roberts and later Smith Dorrien at Aldershot emphasis of the cavalry shooting ability at Aldershot.

 

I certainly agree that the Mad Minute has received too much attention.  It was reserved until needed, possibly close range for the maximum effect due to expenditure and that of fatigue.  It was not as Martin has pointed out an integral part of training but was the culmination of, other aspects received more attention.  I would have dearly loved to delve into point 7 in more detail, I have made reference but did not have the time to research this as much as I wanted.  some CO.s attest to the musketry levels of regulars being much better than expected.  It is unlikely that this was so, I think Martin began to provide some evidence for this.

 

I agree that the RFA's performances underestimated, but due to the weight of German fire and some insistence still direct fire they could not play as much of a part as they might.

 

Regarding German V British Marksmanship (again from top)...  More concentration at volley fire in the German army and a greater degree of concentration on the beaten zone than that of individual marksmanship.  Rapid fire rate to be achieved in the German Army was between 7-12 rounds rapid fire when used; this is not an indicator of skill though it is the difference in the weapon.  Without the SMLE I don't think .the argument of far better British riflemen would be such a factor.  Martin's wonderful thread on the Mad Minute goes into a lot of detail, and this thread greatly helped my understanding in this area.  

DS

 

 

Edited 12 February , 2017 by dansparky

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

29 minutes ago, dansparky said:

As well drilled as any man may be, the weapon would have to facilitate this.  There may be many that think British Clearly miles better than the Germans at marksmanship.  Maybe in some small, they were, but any idea of rapidity was mostly down to the that of the SMLE.  This is known but i guess narratives for wide readership gloss over this and make it seem as it was solely the men themselves. 

I have an interest in the German side of things out of a general lack of exposure all these decades. Yes, the SMLE produced a higher rate of fire due to ease of use, the M98 Mauser was longer, had a straight bolt and had to be moved slightly to reload giving it a disadvantage. Still, the average German soldier was provided with marksmanship training and many were good shots. Jägers were excellent shots. The Germans also made better use of their machine guns, using them in company formations for better fire power, and then there was the higher availability of howitzers, etc. Still, it all depended upon random circumstances, mistakes and luck in some cases, good or bad.

 

All current research into the events of the war should be directed at understanding the events as best as possible as we cannot alter the historic outcome. All sources need to be looked at for period bias, inaccuracies, etc. Not to change ideas and concepts but to expose them to the light of a modern day and an historian who was not born during these events. Here in the U.S. currently we constantly hear of fake news, 'alternative facts', etc. Facts are facts, and if we dismantle a cherished belief or historic account then all we are doing is getting to know the poor men who were sent out to fight a 19th century battle with 20th century weapons. Sorry for the rambling but facts are facts on both sides and stories and accounts that were once accepted may have to be looked at once again in a new light.

 

Just some random thoughts.

Ralph

[phil andrade]

Reverting to Martin's emphasis on the impact of non battle casualties on the performance of the BEF in 1914, I am reflecting on the high profile psychiatric casualties suffered by Staff Officers, Edmonds himself exemplifying this,

 

First shock indeed, with amplified effect.

 

High intensity battle, following on from belated and hurried deployment ; a lack of clarity as to whether the role was to be defensive or offensive ; a desperate and fragmented retreat in circumstances of great peril.  No wonder staff officers cracked.

 

Phil

[David Filsell]

"Regarding German V British Marksmanship ....  More concentration at volley fire in the German army and a greater degree of concentration on the beaten zone than that of individual marksmanship."

Certainly this fact was proven in pre war tests at Hythe.

  

 

[phil andrade]

There was I,  harping on about the nervous breakdowns among British staff officers, and I failed to remark that the most important nervous breakdown of all was suffered by the German Chief of Staff !

 

Zuber queers the pitch by concluding that British failure to address the proper standards for tactical prowess resulted in the death and maiming of an entire generation of Britons.  That old chestnut.....the generation was decimated, certainly : three quarters of a million deaths from the British Isles, along with commensurate numbers of permanent invalids....yes, that's bad enough.  But to allude to an entire generation being thus is to descend into the very hyperbole that Zuber himself is so keen to repudiate .

 

Phil

[Guest]

11 hours ago, dansparky said:

 

I certainly agree that the Mad Minute has received too much attention.  It was reserved until needed, possibly close range for the maximum effect due to expenditure and that of fatigue.  It was not as Martin has pointed out an integral part of training but was the culmination of, other aspects received more attention.  I would have dearly loved to delve into point 7 in more detail, I have made reference but did not have the time to research this as much as I wanted.  some CO.s attest to the musketry levels of regulars being much better than expected.  It is unlikely that this was so, I think Martin began to provide some evidence for this.

DS

 

 

 

A small point. The Mad Minute was never the culmination of the Musketry Test. This common misunderstanding again perpetuated in some of the post war histories. The idea that the musketry test was a build up to this one final killer test is misplaced.  

 

For some of the pre-war years it was not part of the test at all. When introduced it comprised of a very small part in the middle of many other parts of the Test conducted over various ranges (distances), positions (kneeling, standing, prone) and time. It also included range finding, snap shooting, judging distances,  etc. Even this did not completely cover the ground as fire control and other elements such as loading practices were just as important. The ability to fire 15 rounds a minute when the scales of ammunition carried were typically 200, meant that at best an infantryman could fire for 13 minutes and 20 seconds at this rate before needing more ammunition. 300 rounds was generally considered the maximum that could be carried  - it is rare to see anything higher - as the weight of other trench kit required to be carried became a competing factor.

 

There are plenty of accounts of units having to scavenge for ammunition, particularly when the mud and waterlogged supply routes made it difficult to shift the many thousands of tons of ammunition required to sustain an Army. One also might consider the logistical challenge of supplying Maxim and Vickers machine guns at Battalion level that could fire 500-600 rpm. A 250 round box weighed 22 lbs (the wooden box weighed 5 lbs). 15,000 rounds would weigh 1,320 lbs which would typically have to be man handled for the last part of the journey to the trenches and certainly man-handled during any advance along with the gun and its tripod. The Maxim weighed twice as much as the Vickers and was the standard machine gun in the British infantry at the beginning of the war, the Vickers having not yet reached sufficient levels of production. Both could in theory fire two boxes in a minute. 

 

I would suggest that in order to conserve ammunition, 15 rounds rapid was about as far as it went unless part of a pre-arranged demonstration by way of creating a diversion. The diary I happen to be working on recorded  in one 24 hour period the Battalion expended 4,500 rounds. The context was that this was a high figure (other, lower figures were also recorded). The Battalion was around 500 strong suggesting 90 rounds per man, equivalent to just 6 minutes at 15 rpm. While it would be wrong to scale this number across the BEF, it is worth wondering why this magnitude of expenditure was recorded. 

 

For a complete understanding of the time spent on various parts of training, it is worth perusing the Grenadier Guards diaries. They were meticulous record keepers and obsessed with three things when out of the line: Steady Drill, Route Marching and Arms Drill. There are scores of records of the amount of time spent on the ranges and the types of shoots as well as frequent shooting competitions outlining the detail of the competitions. Arms training never ceased throughout the war. The pre-war journals of some regiments are also a rich source of this kind of data showing what was considered to be important. What is striking is how other parts of musketry dominated their training. Rapid firing was still part of this but there were many other aspects.  

Edited 12 February , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

Here is a rather imaginative account of Mons, publihsed in 1998. This one claiming that the Germans though every British soldier had a machine gun. 

 

 

[Derek Black]

21 hours ago, phil andrade said:

the generation was decimated, certainly : three quarters of a million deaths from the British Isles
 

Phil

That's the Army only figure.
CWGC present total for the UK - 831,738

Derek.

[MartH]

On 2/11/2017 at 12:56, David Filsell said:

 

Equally the books were primarily written Army For the Use (and Education) of. Not for public consumption or, I suggest, history graven on stone.

 

 

I am too busy to write a full reply about the writing of the early volumes of the OH of the Great War, but this statement is not only wrong but the exact opposite to the stated aims of the production of the British OH.

 

To backup my statement above I quote from the Preface  of 1914 Volume 1 "This history has been complied with the purpose of providing within reasonable compass an authoritative account, suitable for general readers and for students at military schools, of operations of the British Army in the western theatre of war in 1914-1918. It is based upon the official records."  This was expressly put in.

 

British OH's starting with the Crimea war had been a mixed bag trying to copy the Prussian model, even using translated Prussian texts, and it methods of collecting information where simply overwhelmed by the volumes on he South African war .The War Diary returns where introduced to get over this problem of consistent records and were first used in the OH on the operations in Somaliland.

 

When Edmonds took over the writing of the OH the war diaries where in a sad state, it is said that some information/returns for 1914 were missing due to the pace of battle and the retreat, and as a result newspaper adverts where put out in the early 1920's for officers to complete the missing "bits". This is certainly true for the medical units and I believe the other units. I wonder if MG has any evidence to show that War Diaries where completed at a latter date. We know that in 1915 an officer was sent out to encourage units to complete the returns. 

 

The genesis of the great war OH's are some what convoluted, and many did not want it produced since they saw it as taking money away from their own publications, and this includes Churchill.

 

Edmonds was tasked with writing for the general public and the professional soldier, this is contrary to every British OH produced before or after, if he had been writing Confidential Staff Histories he could have been more critical, but the Government of the day where not prepared to fund two works one for he general public and one for the professional military. 

 

 

[phil andrade]

54 minutes ago, Derek Black said:

That's the Army only figure.
CWGC present total for the UK - 831,738

Derek.

 

 

Derek,

 

CWGC give much higher figures.  I wonder why. I suspect that in this case UK includes Colonies : the time remit is extended to 1921.

 

My three quarters of a million comes from 705,000 army, 32,000 navy and 7,000 Air Force ....745,000 in all. 

 

I think they're official figures from SMEBE.

 

Anyway, the entire generation was not killed or crippled.

 

Phil

 

[SteveMarsdin]

5 hours ago, QGE said:

Here is a rather imaginative account of Mons, publihsed in 1998. This one claiming that the Germans though every British soldier had a machine gun. 

 

Martin,

 

Which source is referenced at footnote 51 ?

 

Steve

[Guest]

2 minutes ago, SteveMarsdin said:

Martin,

 

Which source is referenced at footnote 51 ?

 

Steve

 

I wish I knew. I don't have the book. It is a screenshot of a page from the Amazon preview. I strongly suspect it is a misquote of the OH, and not only a misquote but the event it relates to is likely to be Ypres rather than Mons. Ypern 1914 being the ultimate source for the misquote bu the OH. My speculation. Hopefully someone with the book can tell us. 

[Guest]

Some worthwhile background on the mythology of Mons and its original creators can be found in Barbara Tuchman's " The Guns of August". the 2014 paperback edition pages 426 notes that a journalist named Arthur Moore wrote a sensationalist account that was published in the Times on 30th August 1914.

 

"Heavy Losses of British Troops - Mons and Cambrai - Fight Against Severe Odds - Need for Reiforcements" The date is important as it was a Sunday. This was a period when people tended to read national newspapers only on a Sunday. It was a largely captive audience. Interestingly the Censor, S E Smith (later Lord Birkenhead) urged the Times to publish it and Tuchman argues this was a deliberate ploy to spur recruiting in the UK. It would be interesting to read the article in full. 

 

Moore again:

" So great was [the German] superiority in numbers that they could no more be stopped than the waves of the sea" ...... "[the BEF] ...bore the weight of the blow.

 

Tuchman:

"[the article] succeeded in planting in the British mind the conviction that the BEF in the gallant and terrible days of the first  month of Battle saved France, saved Europe, saved Western Civilization or, as one British writer unbashfully put it."Mons. In that single word will be summed up the Liberation of the World""

 

Sadly, Tuchman provide no reference for the last quote, however a small amount of research indicates it was coined by Maj Corbett Smith in his book "Retreat From Mons" Click page 237. It was first published in September 1916.

 

He also seems to be earlier (1916) than the OH with his rifle fire mistaken for machine guns on pages 89-90

 

 

Edited 13 February , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

And tis one, showing the 'real' picture of what was facing the British at Mons. Note the clever annotation showing the French already retreating leaving the plucky BEF to face what appears to be odds of 10:1. You will not be surprised to hear that Thermopylae is mentioned only a few pages before this. The age of 'false news' is not a new thing. 

 

The last time I saw odds like the one below it was in the opening titles of Dad's Army. 

[dansparky]

 

On 12/02/2017 at 01:07, dansparky said:

As well drilled as any man may be, the weapon would have to facilitate this.  There may be many that think British Clearly miles better than the Germans at marksmanship.  Maybe in some small, they were, but any idea of rapidity was mostly down to the that of the SMLE.  This is known, but I guess narratives for wide readership gloss over this and make it seem as it was solely the men themselves.   I think cavalry returns were more or less up there, the slightest of difference.  Much of this thanks to Lord Roberts

 

I certainly agree that the Mad Minute has received too much attention.  It was reserved until needed, possibly close range for the maximum effect due to expenditure and that of fatigue.  It was not as Martin has pointed out an integral part of training but was the culmination of, other aspects received more attention. 

 

 

1

Apologies MG.  Bad choice of words.. I meant was towards the end of testing playing a small part.  What i had written leads one to belive that all test led up to that point they didn't.  It was the penultimate amoung many in in Table B.  I.e. did not recieve the focus to the extent it has been portrayed.  I think what i meant can be seen in the surrounding context of the sentance but it is confussing, apologies.   

[dansparky]

Every British Soilder had a Machine gun.  That was not yet physicaly possible

[phil andrade]

But these were portable Maxims, Dan !

 

Phil