Zuber & Co V Traditional narrative. German tactics during the advance from mons.

[David Filsell]

Most disappointing to learn that you are "taking your bat home" both to those who read and who have contributed to the threads which you have started or those who have taken time to pass information to you.

[dansparky]

MG,

In relation to this message and my PM aside.  I thInk you could add snippets that are most relevant.  The diaries I have downloaded from NA have some rather large sections (reports etc) which may be too much to post.  What do others think?  I started the thread but I don't feel I have ownership of it?  anyone can post anything related to the question.

 

Does that make sense?

 

Dan

[dansparky]

Dear David

 

Can you clarify what you mean I do not understand the analogy or saying?   I think you must be referring to me but I do not understand what you are getting at?  Have I offended you?  I am not sure how I have?  If I have I apologise?   

 

DS

[phil andrade]

Dan,

 

You will find, I think, that David alludes to Martin's statement that he is losing interest in this forum and will be moving to another area of research and discussion.

 

I, for one, am dismayed at this revelation.

 

Phil

[stiletto_33853]

Seconded Phil, I would be very sorry indeed to see Martin lose interest in this forum. His threads have always been informative and very very helpful indeed!!!

 

Andy

[MartH]

16 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Thanks,

I think I have much more positive view than you in regard to the OH faults and all if only because the only option is discuss mythical alternatives to the books and because of my examination of CAB 41. Errors - yes of course, but the text was based on existing records, war diaries and material provided by those who claimed to have been witnesses and the and  employing the principal of "two proofs as far as I can see. Of course they are far from perfect - but what is?

 

Regards

David

 

Hi David, are you referring to my response?  I am comparing the UK GW OH's to others, and having nothing but admiration for Edmonds, Newbolt, Jones, etc and what they produced using such a massive amount of data. 

[Guest]

10 hours ago, David Filsell said:

Most disappointing to learn that you are "taking your bat home" both to those who read and who have contributed to the threads which you have started or those who have taken time to pass information to you.

 

David - Not taking my bat home. I simply have interest in an area that goes beyond the GWFs parameters and that will occupy a considerable amount of my limited time. I am grateful for all the information I have been given and I have learned a lot. I hope I have reciprocated in some small way. Anyway, no need to ramble on Dan's thread. 

 

Dan - If you give me the order you would like to see the Mons diaries (I would suggest from right to left i.e East to West along the canal) I will post them as necessary and separately email the spreadsheets to you so you can search them. 

[Guest]

Battle of Mons

II Corps

Battalion War Diaries 

 

By Brigades starting with II Corps, 3rd Div (8th, 9th and 7th Inf Bdes) then 5th Div (3th, 14th 15th inf Bdes). I will post each Brigade (all four Battalions) on separate posts. This one is particularly good as it include lots of detail from the 2nd Bn Royal Irish Regt which reads rather well. Any mistakes in the transcriptions are entirely mine. Transcriptions based on the original War Diaries held at the National Archives UK. 

 

3rd Divsion 8th Inf Bde

 

2nd Bn Royal Scots. 

22nd Aug 1914. Left GOGNIES at 7:00 am arriving SPIENNES in BELGIUM 3:00 pm where we again went into billets.  

Covered by outposts formed by 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT, 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT and C Coy.

 

Appendix: Summary of Events

22nd Aug 1914. Advance through BELGIUM. The march N was resumed at 8:00 am, the Advanced Guard being fund by the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX Regt and the ROYAL IRISH Regt, the route being the GOGNIES - MONS MAIN ROAD.  

 

A halt was made from 12:30 pm to 2:30 pm at ASQUILLIES by the Battalion, when orders were received for it to proceed to SPIENNES, about 5 km east where the Battalion went into billets about 4:00 pm. Here the CO Lt Col H McMICKING  DSO informed the Coy CO that our CAVALRY were in touch with the GERMAN CAVALRY at BINGHE; also that four GERMAN columns, strength unknown were passing N of MONS, and were credited with the intention of circling S towards VALENCIENNES. 

 C Coy was detailed as a picquet near the 7th KS HARMIGNIES and railway line running to ARRET, with a post at the 5 KS on road leading to ST SYMPHORIEN, which was held by the 18th ROYAL IRISH, the remainder of the Coy forming an in lying picquet in SPIENNES.

 

23rd Aug 1914. Order arrived to hold position along MAUBEUGE - MONS Road.  6:00 am  1st Bn GORDON HLDRS on our left, slightly thrown back.  Enemy attacked in force, especially in front of A Coy.  

11:00 pm.  Withdrew by Coys from the firing line, retired to NOUVELLES where we bivouacked in a field.  

Maj G S TWEEDIE slightly wounded during the day.  

Casualties:  1 wounded, 4 missing.

 

Appendix: Summary of Events

23rd Aug 1914. Battle of MONS.  At 3:00 am the remainder of C Coy reinforced the picquet at the 7 KS.  At 4:00 am the Battalion (less C Coy) stood to arms at SPIENNES and remained in readiness until 7:00 am when it moved into position E of the HARMIGNIES - MONS main road between the 5th and 7th KS.  Trenches were prepared and occupied by the Battalion by 2:00 pm, as shown on attacked sketch marked "A".

 

The position being too extensive, support was asked for by GIC 8th BDE, and a Coy of the SOUTH STAFFORD Regt filled a gap in the right centre of C Coy, about 2:30 pm.  

About 4:00 pm the Battalion received further reinforcement from two Coys of the ROYAL IRISH RIFLES who occupied positions in the right centre of the position.  

About 2:30 pm the action commenced, fire being opened by A Coy, and gradually the whole line became engaged, but the GERMAN attack was never pressed home and was evidently of a "holding nature".  The right of the Battalion came under a considerable shell fire between 5:00 pm and dusk, but this was ineffective and casualties were few.  At dusk, the hostile fire ceased, although intermittent bursts of INF firing continued until our retirement commenced.  

About 4:00 pm a message was received that the Battalion was to "hold its position at all costs".  The IRISH GUARDS arrived towards dusk and remained at the 7KD HARMIGNIES - MONS ROAD under cover until about 9:00 pm, when it moved off.  

 

At 9:10 pm a message was issued by Battalion HQ ordering the Coys to be prepared to withdraw at 10:30 pm;  an order from BDE HQ was also sent to C Coy, ROYAL IRISH RIFLES to place itself under the orders of OC 2nd ROYAL SCOTS.  

 

At 11:30 pm the Coys received the order to withdraw, commencing from the right, and concentrate in column of route at the 5 KS which was carried out.

 

24th Aug 1914. Went forward early in morning to complete trenches, started by RE's.  Just after occupying position, order received (arrived) to retire, withdrew to another position in rear, where we occupied a gully, later we retired again and eventually halted for the night, just outside BAVAY, at about 9:00 pm.  

Our MO, Capt MITCHELL last seen at hospital in rear of position occupied in early morning; hospital reported to have been destroyed.

 

Appendix: Summary of Events

24th Aug 1914. Retirement from MONS.  At 12:30 am the Battalion marched to NOUVELLES, via SPIENNES with transport leading, reaching it a t 2:45 pm.  Here, after resting till daybreak, the Battalion (less C Coy, ROYAL IRISH RIFLES, which had left to join its unit) commenced to entrench the NE edges of the woods around the CHATEAU of NOUVELLES.  At this time the GERMANS were shelling the village and its environs, but no INF attack was made.  

 

About 8:00 am the Battalion was now alone and the whereabouts of the remainder of the BDE was unknown.  After a march of some two hours in a SW direction, a halt was made at QUEVY LE PETIT, where the IRISH GUARDS were entrenching a position facing N and here the transport and portions of the 8th BDE passed through the village.  

 

The Battalion moved into a position on the left of the IRISH GUARDS, where it remained under cover until midday, when, coming under enfilading shell fire, it was forced to retire into the village and thence across country in a Southerly direction towards MALPLAQUET on the BELGIAN frontier, which was passed about 4:00 pm, and finally reached a point about 6 km N of BAVAY at dusk.  Here the Battalion bivouacked during the night 24/25th Aug 1914.

 

1st Bn Gordon Highlanders

22nd Aug 1914. 3:00 am Orders received for Battalion to pass starting point at 8:45 am.

4:55 am Fresh orders received for previous time to be advanced by 1 1/2 hrs.

23rd Aug 1914.

[Diary missing]

24th Aug 1914.

[Diary missing]

 

4th Bn Middlesex Regt

22nd Aug 1914. 3:00 am. Orders received to move to advance guard to the DIV starting BONNET at 8:15 am.  

5:00 am.  Starting time put back 1½ hours.  

8:00 am.  Ordered to occupy outpost position from HARMIGNIES to NIMY exclusive including 3 bridges over the canal.  

2:00 pm. Ordered to hold fresh position side .

23rd Aug 1914. Battalion occupied line from AUBERGE to MONS, about 1½ miles, entrenched as far as time would permit.  Order of Coys in line D, C, A B with ½ Coy B in reserve. Battle commenced at 10:15 am, retirement started at 3:00 pm.  Battalion arrived at NOUVELLES after dusk and bivouacked there.

24th Aug 1914. Battalion started at 3:00 am for QUEVY when it entrenched and came under artillery fire for short time.  

Marched to BAVAY about 12:00 noon and then onto AMFROIPRET when Battalion bivouacked.

 

2nd Bn Royal Irish Regt

22nd Aug 1914. Saturday.  Moved northwards and ordered to hold line NOUVELLES - HARVENG, towards HAVAY joining eastwards.  Later, orders were received to hold line, road junction at FAUBG BARTHELEMY (just east of MONS) - HARMIGNIES - GIVRY. 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT holding northern potion, 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT southern part.  

5:00 pm.  Regiment was ordered to hold ST SYMPHORIEN and VILLERS ST GHISLAIN, while MIDDLESEX were detailed to hold canal bridge.  

I).  Immediately north of NIMY. 
II).  Lock No. 5.  
III).  Near OBOURG STATION.  

6:15 pm. Maj S E ST LEGER with ½ Battalion (A & C Coys) proceeded to VILLERS ST GHISLAIN, relieved to CAVALRY Brigade and through the night with help of a Coy RE placed the village in a state of defence. 

Gen HAMILTON met Maj ST LEGER at the village and told him to dig himself well in.

 Report by Maj St LEGER to 8th INF BDE see Appendix III.

Lt Col St J A COX with HQ of Battalion and D Coy having proceeded to ST SYMPHORIEN remained there the night

23rd Aug 1914.
6:00 am.HQ and D Coy proceeded to 2nd Kilo West of road junction MONS-BINCH MONS-GUIVRY when B Coy joined them at 7:00 am

9:50 am. Maj St LEGER ordered to rejoin Battalion at above place, arrived 12 noon. Uhlan patrols seen East of the road enroute. Brig Gen B J C DORAN CB said the Battalion had had a very hard time and would be in reserve.

12:30 pm. Orders received to at once reinforce the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT.* The Battalion at once fell in under Lt Col COX (less 2 platoons C Coy detached by Maj St LEGER under Capt FITZGERALD at 11:50 to accompany the Coy RE who had assisted in defence of ST GHISLAIN with orders to destroy the canal bridge at OBURG. This was found to be impossible and Capt FITZGERALD supportes the right of the MIDDLEsEX REGT). The 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT were reinforced under very heavy shrapnel, Howitzer and MG fire.

Casualties among Officers and men very heavy. Our Artillery apparently unable to oocate that by the enemy who concentrated their fire on 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT and 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT.

 

* Lt RUSHTON put in charge of Machine Guns vice Lt WHITTY who took over Regimental Transport Officer duties. 

4:30 pm.  4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT and 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH retired from forward position to position in front of hospital [see sketch] on left of 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS.  

5:30 pm.  4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT continued their retirement on NOUVELLES.  2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH ordered to gain touch with 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS* and enemy following up very closely prevented this being carried out.  Brig Gen DORAN now ordered retirement to be continued.  

7:00 pm further progress averted by enemy heavily attacking 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS and 2nd Bn ROYAL SCOTS who were lining MONS HARMIGNIES ROAD.  D Coy reinforced 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS - B Coy took up a position in rear facing W.  

8:00 pm.  Ordered to entrench with guns in centre.  

10:00 pm.  Guns manhandled to road and retirement to NOUVELLES successfully carried out and arrived about midnight.  Maj E H E DANIELL DSO with 50 men remained with Maj [blank] who had obtained permission to endeavour to save his guns which had temporarily been abandoned.  This was successfully carried out.    

* Appendix IV.  See sketch where this was attempted shown.

Appendix III: Report to 8th INF BDE by Maj S E LEGER Commanding ½ Battalion 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT at VILLERS St GHISLAIN on night 22nd-23rd August 1914.

8th INF BDE. MAISON COMMUNAL, HYON.
Report from Div Cyclist Officer attached. Stop. There were three camp fires burning the whole of last night, apparently in the vicinity of MAURAGE< BOUSSU, HAVRE and also apparently of a large force. Stop. In the sevent of a serious attack I should require at least two more Companies to hold this village.

OC (" Coys) 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT
VILLERS ST GHISLAIN
8:20 am

 

Appendix IV(A)   MONS 23rd Aug 1914: Account by Major S E St LEGER 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT. 
Ref Map: MONS Sheet 7A BELGIUM Scale 1:100,000
On the night of 22nd-23rd Aug the 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH REGT was distributed as follows:
HQ and D Coy and Regimental Transport at ST SYMPHORIEN under Lt Col St J A COX
A and C Coys, MGs and Regimental Scouts at VILLERS St GHISLAIN under Maj S E St LEGER with a Fd Coy RE attached for the purpose of assisting in defensive works.
B Coy at GIVRY under Maj E H E DANIELL DSO.

5:00 am. Lt Col COX ordered to proceed with the Battalion to HYON (8th INF BDE HQ) when relieved by troops from 1st Army.

 

8:30 am. Maj DANIELL reported that he was on the FAUBOURG BARTHELEMY road near the road junction MONS-BINCHE, MONS-GIVRY roads.
Lt Col COX ordered Maj DANIELL to wait there until the arrival of the rest of the battalion, at the same time he sent back the 1st Line Transport to Maj DANIELL's position.

 

9:30 am. Orders received by Lt Col COX from 8th INF BDE to at once proceed to 2nd Kilo West of road junction MONS-BINCHE, MONS-GIVRY roads - This order was sent on to Maj St LEGER.

 

11:00 am. HQ and D Coy arrived at this point and found B Coy with 1st Line Transport already there.
Lt Col COX reported himself at Brigade HQ, was informed by GOC that the Battalion was in Reserve, to remain where it was for the present and explained the position of the other Battalions within the Brigade.

 

12:10 pm. Maj St LEGER arrived with A & C Coys less 1 platoon C Coy, which he had detached under Capt J S FITZGERALD to escort RE who had orders to blow up canal bridges at OBOURG and in vicinity. This was however found to be impossible as the enemy already held the bridges - Capt FITZGERALD thereupon reinforced the right of the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT.
Heavy shelling was now taking place on outskirts of MONS & towards OBOURG.

 

12:30 pm. Dinners were being prepared for the Battalion on side of road when order was received to at once support the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT.
Lt Col COX ordered 1st Line Transport back under cover of houses in the town and proceeded with the battalion with utmost sped to SE corner of Cemetery. The battalion was then turned about and moved around the SW corner of the Cemetery - A and C Coys and 2 Platoons of B Coy under Maj St LEGER moved forward at the double into the quarry NW of Cemetery and prolonged to the right under cover of a sunken road. Col COX meantime hearing that the enemy were close up  to the SE corner of the Cemetery turned D Coy and the remaining 2 Platoons of B Coy about and ordered Capt G A ELLIOT with D Coy to take up a position N of the road running E from the Cemetery. 
Orders having just been received to reinforce the 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS at X roads  MONS-BINCHE , MONS-GIVRY roads, 2 Sections B Coy under 2 Lt J D SHINE were despatched to this point.
2 Sections of B Coy under Lt F C FERGUSON were placed within field W of Cemetery covering the exit between the Hospital and the Cemetery, the remaining platoon of B Coy under Maj E H E DANIELL were ordered to prolong to the right of D Coy.
Brig Gen B J C DORAN on conclusion of these movements rode up and Col COX informed him of his disposition at the same time Col COX found about a dozen men of D Coy near SE corner of Cemetery and taking these men with him endeavoured to place them in a covering position on the slope leading up to the FAUBOURG-BARTHELEMY road and eventually placed them in a small pit between this and the MONS HAVRE road. Covering the road leading NW past the W side of the Cemetery. They came under fire here from the East and also a MG was turned on to them  - as they were being enfiladed Col COX retired to the FAUBOURG-BARTHELEMY road and placed these men behind the large trees lining this N edge of the road.

 

2:45 pm. Shortly after this, owing to our MGs coming into action near to the X roads about 200 yards East of Col COX’s position a very heavy MG and rifle fire was brought  to bear on this road, also it was heavily shelled.  At this time Col COX observed a very gallant action on the part  of Pte M REDMOND: Maj LYON RFA was hit while galloping up this road and fell from his horse. Pte REDMOND and two of the GORDON HIGHLANDER’s MG Section gallantly ran out under an exceptionally heavy fire and carried Maj LYON to the Hospital, a distance of about 100 yards. They were under fire the whole way. 

 

3:15 pm.  Col COX, as the FAUBOURG-BARTHELEMY road was now being partially enfiladed from the East, retired with the few men with him across the road into the wood on the high ground East of the Hospital thinking it would be possible to find a better position there – Col COX sustained a severe shock in going through the wood due apparently to the near explosion of a high explosive shell and eventually reached NOUVELLES without further incident.
D Coy after advancing to the position assigned to them by Col COX were almost at once driven back by concentrated MG and rifle fire and retired on HYON and rejoined the remainder of the battalion under Maj St LEGER, East of that place at about 7:00 pm. Maj DANIELL covered this retirement with 1 platoon B Coy and then extricated his own platoon and retired to the position held by Lt FERGUSON with 1 Platoon B Coy, SW of the Cemetery.

 

1:15 pm. It will now be necessary to follow the movements of A and C Coys and the 2 Platoons of B Coy under Maj St LEGER who had occupied the quarry and sunk road to the right. They had at once come under a very heavy rifle and shell fire. The movements of these Companies was no doubt located by a Taube that flew over the position at this time as almost immediately shrapnel and high explosive shell fire was concentrated on this point and the ground directly in front.
Maj St LEGER in consultation with Col HULL, commanding the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT, considered that the German advance might be checked by a vigorous counter-attack.  Bayonets were at once fixed and the men on their own request were allowed to slip off their packs. An erroneous impression seems to prevail that the battalion threw away their packs – this is absolutely without foundation. The men were allowed to slip their packs by Maj St LEGER to allow them greater freedom in charging the enemy. That we should be forced to retire was never contemplated and it was most unfortunate that in this way the majority of the Battalion lost their packs.

 

FIRST POSITION
On reconnoitering the ground however Maj St LEGER found it to be so cut up with wire fences, broken ground, sunken roads etc that anything in the nature of the vigorous counter-attack contemplated would have been impossible, he therefore directed A Coy to reinforce 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT who had natural cover only at this point and C Coy under Maj PANTER-DOWNES to advance ad hold high ground on the left front which dominated the position. He then directed the 2 platoons of B Coy to prolong to the left of A Coy. These two platoons reached a position just short of the MIDDLESEX REGT’s trench which was then being evacuated. Maj St LEGER took up the last Platoon of A Coy to reinforce a Company of the MIDDLESEX REGT in his immediate front, the above operations having been directed by him from a position directly above the quarry. The movements were carried out under exceptionally heavy rifle and shell fire, both shrapnel and high explosive, the Companies having to advance across open stretches of ground and get through wire and other fences. The losses from shell and rifle fire were now considerable and Maj St LEGER was severely handicapped by loss of Officers. In addition to Lt & Adjt R E G PHILLIPS who was assisting him, he only had the following Company Officers left with 2 ½ Companies:-
C Coy: Maj PANTER-DOWNES and Lt A E B ANDERSON 
B Coy: Lt D P LAING and 2 Lt A R NEWTON-KING
A Coy: Nil
Of A Coy Officers, Capt MELLOR had been killed, Capt I B GEORGE severely wounded, 2 Lt C F T O’B FFRENCH and E C GUINNESS wounded. C Coy – Capt J S FITZGERALD had been detached and wounded, and Lt C B GIBBONS severely wounded and reported killed.

 

3:15 pm. The enemy was now within 250 yards and presumably working round both flanks. The situation was desperate, the German Artillery had complete ascendency and it was obviously impossible to withstand the fierce onslaught of the advancing hordes of German Infantry much longer or prevent the position from being outflanked on the left.
2 Lt WILLIS of the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT was the only unwounded Officer with Maj St LEGER at this time and after directing him how he was to carry out his retirement when ordered, he made his way to Col HULL, who was on the sunken road near the quarry and consulted him on the situation. Col HULL fully agreed that it was impossible to hold this position much longer and went back with Maj St LEGER who proceeded to select a position in rear. The only possible one was found to be the open ground in front of the Hospital on FAUBOURG – BARTHELEMY road

 

Collecting all the men he could, Maj St LEGER placed them in position behind a slight rise in the ground just N of the road to cover the retirement of the left of the line which was now being driven back.
On Maj PANTER-DOWNES’ arrival, Maj St LEGER directed him to hold this position. Lt & Adjt R E G PHILLIPS assisted in organizing this line of defence and was subsequently severely wounded.

Maj DANIELL materially assisted in covering this retirement. Directing Lts LAING and NEWTON-KING with the two platoons of D Coy which they had retired through the Cemetery, to hold a position facing the road leading East past the Cemetery, in order to stop the enemy from coming over the crest of the ridge, he retired his remaining 2 platoons to a trench immediately North of the X roads (MONS-BINCHE, MONS-GIVRY roads), that had been previously dug by the 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS. When he had secured this position he retires Lt LAING’s 2 platoons.

 

SECOND POSITION.
The battalion (less D Coy) now in position from the X roads to the outskirts of FAUBOURG BARTHELEMY came under a very heavy shell, MG and rifle fire p the X roads being swept by MG fire from the East. The Battalion was lying in the open except for the trenches occupied by B Coy. The buildings at the X roads and configuration of the ground however afforded a certain amount of cover from rifle fire. The enemy could e seen coming over the ridge vacated by Maj PANTER-DOWNES in great numbers.
A section of Artillery in position on the left of the Battalion valiantly tried to keep down the enemy’s artillery fire but drew on themselves a terrific fire. The Hospital also in rear of the position suffered severely and all wounded had to be carried down to the cellars.
Maj St LEGER now endeavoured to find a position on high ground South of the Hospital; but owing to the dense wood and the buildings in front it was quite impossible to gain any field of fire; the wood also was being heavily shelled and the open ground in the rear. Regaining the road SW of the Hospital he reformed the Battalion which had commenced retiring. 
Maj PANTER-DOWNES and Maj DANIELL having, owing to the very heavy shell fire found their position untenable retired as follows: A and C Coys by the road leading due South from FAUBOURG BARTHELEMY and B Coy through the wood in rear of the Hospital. 
It was necessary now, owing to the loss of Officers and NCOs to reorganise the battalion – this was carried out as rapidly as possible – meantime the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX under Col HULL retired past the Battalion and turned down the first road running due West.

 

THIRD POSITION.
Maj St LEGER followed to this point and then made the following dispositions;-
A Coy under Lt TANDY was placed astride the bridge, holding road running due West
B Coy under Lt LAING was sent up the wooded slopes of the hill with orders to gain touch with the 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS who Maj St LEGER was informed by Col HULL were on his right. This Officer shortly afterwards returned having failed to locate the GORDONS.
C Coy under Maj PANTER-DOWNES were in Reserve on the road.
Maj St LEGER was issuing orders to Lt LAING to again occupy the high ground on his right and make every endeavour to gain touch with the GORDON HIGHLANDERS. Maj DANIELL and Brig Gen DORAN came up. General DORAN told Maj St LEGER that touch with the GORDONS must be gained and with this view he led B and C Coys forward.  After advancing 200 about 200 yards German Infantry were seen to have reached the road about 100 yards ahead. As there was a high wall banking up the side of the hill on the right with buildings above and buildings on the left, it was impossible to open out off the road; these Companies were at once turned about and the Battalion under Gen DORAN’s orders retired to the 4th position.

 

FOURTH POSITION.
D Coy rejoined the Battalion here. When the Battalion reached point [blank] the enemy were making an attack from the NE on the 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS and 2nd Bn ROYAL SCOTS ho were holding  a line extending along the MONS-GIVRY road. This attack was delivered in perfect formation, there was however no Artillery support.
Maj St LEGER was now ordered to reinforce the GORDON HIGHLANDERS with one Company and to take up a position covering the guns facing West. 
The enemy followed up the Battalion as far as the enclosed ground to the West but evidently in no strength as no further attempt was made to advance or attack us. At dusk the enemy were seen to be closing in on the GORDON HIGHLANDERS and ROYAL SCOTS but a heavy outburst of rapid fire beat off the attack. Gen DORAN now ordered Maj St LEGER to entrench round the guns* in conjunction with Col NEISH of the GORDON HIGHLANDERS who was holding the South edge of the wood. Maj St LEGER with the help of Maj DANIELL at once marked outline of entrenchments round guns, joining with the GORDON HIGHLANDERS and the men began to dig themselves in.
At about 10:00 pm orders were received to man handle the guns as quietly as possible on to the road. Bayonets were fixed, the necessity of marching in absolute silence and without lights having been impressed upon all, with a small advanced and rear guard the remainder of the battalion strung out on each side of the guns in the pitch blackness of the night we retired to NOUVELLES at about 12 midnight without opposition.

 

50 men with Maj DANIELL were left with Maj [blank] of [blank] Battery 40th Bde RFA who had applied for leave to attempt to get his guns away (1 Section of the Battery had previously been lost) which had been temporarily abandoned about 150 yards in front of our 4th Position. This was successfully accomplished without opposition. This Officer had only reached this position by galloping his guns through German Infantry on the road. 

Notes
(i) Maj St LEGER had only just arrived from VILLERS ST GHISLAIN with ½ Battalion when the order to reinforce the 4th Bn MIDDLESEX REGT was received. This ½ Battalion (A and C Coys) had been up the whole night entrenching and placing this village in a state of defence – no rations had reached them and the move to VILLERS ST GHISLAIN had been suddenly ordered before the diners had been cooked the previous day – He subsequently found himself in Command of the battalion without having received any information whatever of the general situation, that of the troops on either flank, the Battalions in his own Brigade or even the Brigade HQ
(ii) The times given are approximate. 
Note on the Positions Occupied & The Attack
Weather: The day was cloudy but fine – roads and country were dry

 

First Position.
Natural cover behind banks, sunken roads etc – every advantage was taken of the cover available both in the positions occupied and in advancing to it but the field of fire was very poor, being much interfered with by fences running parallel to the position. The country was very enclosed consisting of small fields bounded by banks with hedgerows and further broken up by wire and sunken roads.

 

Second Position:

The position for the most part was behind a small ridge which gave cover from view in the open in a ???? field. B Coy occupied a trench but the cover was inadequate against shell-fire.
The field of fire to the North and NE was good
Firing took place at 700 yards.

 

Third Position. 
The Company on the left lined the road each side of a small bridge over a stream. Cover obtainable behind a low boundary wall and bank. Good field of fire over flat low lying country to the front.
The want of machine guns to sweep the roads leading North was severely felt
the high ground on the right was thickly wooded, view obstructed by buildings – there was no command over approaches at foot of rise. This position was rendered more difficult through want of knowledge of position of Battalion on our right

 

Fourth Position. 
Coy facing West was lying in the open behind small ridge
Coy facing East obtained cover behind bank bounding the road. There was a clear field of fire for 300-400 yards
Preponderance of Enemy’s Artillery and MGs. The preponderance of enemy’s Artillery and MGs, the latter being most difficult to locate was solely responsible for the ultimate untenability of the 1st and 2nd Positions. The cover from Artillery fire was quite inadequate. The enemy were enabled to advance to close range under cover of their Artillery which had complete ascendency over ours. A large number of guns must have been massed against the position. 

Want of more MGs per battalion: More widely dispersed in forward positions. Had the Battalion possessed  more machine guns and had them more widely dispersed the enemy would have  had difficulty in beating them, though it is doubtful whether at the time the Battalion advanced to the firing line, it would have been possible to push the forward unobserved as the Germans were. As it was the two Battalion machine guns were located and shelled almost immediately in each successive position taken up and were both very soon put out of action. 
Telephones. The want of telephone communication was one of the greatest handicaps. There was no communication between the Infantry and Artillery or between the Battalion and Brigade HQ except by orderlies.
Notes on the German Attack.
The skilful location of our position and the accurate range of the Enemy’s Artillery were most noticeable. The bold use of MGs which were pushed forward to command open ground and roads and under cover of which their advance was made deserves every praise. The enclosed country materially assisted the attack.
Confident Advance of Infantry. The advance of the German Infantry during the attack on the GORDON HIGHLANDERS and ROYAL SCOTS in the evening was carried out with every confidence and in faultless formation in dense lines. Fire appeared to be completely reserved and to all appearances the idea seemed to be to overwhelm our line with weight of numbers by charging at dusk. There was no Artillery to assist them and personally I did not notice any machine guns which probably accounts for the advance being made without covering fire. The outburst of rapid fire that met them was no doubt a revelation.

 

Lack of Initiative. There appeared to be a lack of initiative, however and want of dash in allowing us in the first place to extricate ourselves from a difficult situation and secondly for allowing us to get away with all our guns from the final position taken up, without making any attempt to thwart us.
For Casualties see Appendix

 

MACHINE GUNS
The Battalion MGs under Lt F H RUSHTON first took up a position about 150 yards East of the Cemetery and inflicted considerable loss on a party of Uhlans debouching from a wood about 600 yards East. Thy however came under a terrible fire and were forced to retire and came into action at X roads MONS-BINCHE, MONS-GIVRY roads. They came under a heavy shell fire here and Lt RUSHTON endeavoured to come into action  about 300 yards down the road leading due North from X roads but one gun was almost at once knocked out of action and had to be abandoned and Lt RUSHTON again came into action (2:45 pm) with the remaining gun at X roads but this gun brought a very heavy shell fire on to this point and also MG fire from the East and was soon disabled and all the MG Section killed or wounded except one man, and the gun abandoned. This gun was subsequently recovered, repaired with the help of parts recovered from the first gun abandoned, brought into action and finally carried away by RQMS FITZPATRICK.
SAA Carts. Two SAA Carts were with the Brigade Reserve at HYON. One Cart accompanied the MGs. Three Carts were halted on the road near SE corner of Cemetery and ammunition was  sent up from here via SE corner of Cemetery to firing line. These carts retired with D Coy through HYON. Coy pack animals were killed or wounded within the first hour.

 

Action of RQMS FITZPATRICK. With about 40 men at X roads (MONS-BINCHE, MONS-GIVRY). When this NCO was D Coy being driven back, he collected about 40 men of Regimental Transport, Cooks  etc and placing himself under the orders of Maj SIMPSON of the GORDON HIGHLANDERS who had a Company at the X roads in conjunction with him occupied trenches at these X roads and remained there until ordered to retire at about 11:00 pm, only 18 men being left at the time. 
This party materially helped to cover the retirement of the ROYAL IRISH REGT and MIDDLESEX REGT and by sticking to their trenches in the face of a very heavy MG and shell fire prevented the Germans from advancing at this point.
At dusk they scattered the enemy who assembled their Regiments in front of this position. This NCO (since promoted) has been awarded a DCM for his gallantry.

 

 

S E St LEGER, Major
2/ROYAL IRISH REGT 
 

23rd Aug 1914           Ref BELGIUM Sheet.

 

24th Aug 1914. 4:30 am.  Maj E H E DANIELL DSO rejoined at about 4:30 am.  

Lt Col St J A COX got separated from his unit soon after the commencement of the action at MONS, and Maj S E ST LEGER directed the operations.  Lt Col St J A COX rejoined the Battalion.  

7 Casualties at Mons see Appendix V.  

 

8:00 am. Retired via BOUGNIES and GENLY.  

 

9:15 am. Battalion took up a position about 1 mile south of GENLY with 1st Bn GORDON HIGHLANDERS on their right.  

 

3:00 pm.  Orders received to retire and concentrate on road W of BOIS AUTILLEUL.  A & D Coys were immediately ordered back under Maj S E ST LEGER to hold X road N of the wood with 2 Coys KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS.

Lt M C C HARRISON rejoined the Battalion at about  1:00 pm.  Reported himself to Maj ST LEGER, who placed him temporarily in command of A Coy, which at the time had no Officers. 

NB.  under slight artillery fire.  

No casualties.  4:00 pm.  Retired through BAVAY to AMFROIPRET arriving about 10:00 pm and Battalion bivouacked in a small field.  Here supplies were received but as the cooks wagon was lost at MONS, there was no means of cooking.

Edited 7 March , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

3rd Division, 9th Infantry Brigade

 

4th Bn Royal Fusiliers.

22nd Aug 1914.  5:30 am.  Started.  Crossed Belgian frontier near MALPLAQUET.  Advance Guard.

NIMY just North of MONS.  6:00 pm.  Took up an outpost position guarding crossings over the canal.  Had orders to hold on to the position as long as possible.  Quiet night.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Still holding outpost position.  A certain amount of desultory firing took place in the early morning.

About 11:00 am.  We wounded and captured 2 Uhlan Officers.  The Germans started to attack us seriously with apparently at least four Battalions of infantry, also cavalry and artillery.  We suffered severely on the bridge over the canal by rife and artillery fire.

The machine guns had a particularly trying time.  Practically all the detachment including Lt M DEASE, the Machine Gun Officer, were killed or wounded.  Lt M DEASE and Pte S GODLEY both displayed the most conspicuous gallantry in working the guns after they had been wounded.  The guns having finally been disabled by artillery fire, had to be abandoned.

MONS.  1:10 pm.  First order to retire was given.

1:40 pm.  Final order to retire was given.

About 3:30 pm.  Successful retirement through MONS accomplished.  The Battalion carried out this most difficult manoeuvre with the greatest steadiness.

The total casualties sustained by the Battalion at MONS were about 112.  killed  & wounded, including 7 Officers.  Most of these casualties had, unfortunately, to be left behind.

CIPLY.  About 7:00 pm.  Arrived CIPLY and bivouacked there until about 2:00 am 24th Aug.

 

24th Aug 1914.  2:00 am.  Attached to 7th INF BDE and marched to take up a position just North of CIPLY in conjunction with 7th INF BDE.

At dawn on 24th Aug, the Germans attacked; not very heavily but we had orders to retire and did so through GENLY about 10:00 am.

BERMERIES.  10:30 pm.  Marched to BERMERIES, arrived about 10:30 pm having marched about 20 miles, bivouacked.

 

1st Bn Royal Scots Fusiliers

22nd Aug 1914. 5:30 am. Marched north crossed FRANCE BELGIUM frontier and reached GHLIN about 1:00 pm.  

1:00 pm. GHLIN.  Received orders to withdraw and take up entrenched position on south bank of canal from JEMAPPES to MONS guarding the four crossings in that section. 

5:00 pm.  JEMAPPES.  Dispositions made.  2 Coys of 1st Bn NORTHUMBERLAND FUS were on 1st Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUS left and 4th Bn ROYAL FUS on their right.

 

23rd Aug 1914. 11:00 am.  Germans attacked in force at 2 left crossings.  1st Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUS held on until informed that units on both flanks had withdrawn and about 3:00 pm retired to the north edge of FRAMERIES.  

Casualties: Capt T B TRAILL and Lt R W S STIVEN wounded.  50 Rank & File killed and wounded.  

Before the retirement all bridges were blown up and all boats sunk.  

5:00 pm.  FRAMERIES.  The Germans followed up our retirement through MONS over a bridge not successfully destroyed and opened fire from the coal dumps south of FRAMERIES.  They also had brought artillery close up to the firing line.  There had been no time to entrench a position so the Battalion retired to the edge of the town where they were heavily shelled.  At dusk the enemy withdrew and the Battalion went into billets.  

Casualties: Capt T A ROSE DSO and Capt J E YOUNG wounded and missing.  100 killed and wounded. 

 

24th Aug 1914. 5:00 am. Enemy's attack resumed.  Retirement continued to BERMERIES.  

11:30 pm.  BERMERIES.  Bivouacked. 

 

1st Bn Northumberland Fusiliers

22nd Aug 1914.  Left LA LONGUEVILLE at 5:30 am and marched to CUESMES.  

At BLAIREGNIES, B and C Coys were detached to take up an outpost position on the MONS - CONDE road under Maj C YATMAN.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Letter B and C Coys in the position which they had taken up on 22nd Aug and which they had strengthened by barricading the 3 bridges in their area and by fortifying the houses and barricading the streets South of the canal.  The line was continued to the West by the [blank] INF BDE and on the right by the 1st Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS and 4th Bn ROYAL FUSILIERS.

 

The attack developed on C Coy about 11:00 am by heavy shell fire, which was turned on to B Coy about 12:00 pm, in this case supplemented by heavy rifle fire and the enemy gradually moved in large numbers in the dead ground in front of B Coy and were able to bring two field guns to within 150 yards of the main barrier which was blockading the chief street leading to the bridge head.  Owing to the smoke from the houses which were burning and the dust caused by the gun fire, it was impossible to locate transportation accurately but the enemy must have lost very heavily.  

 

Two men of B Coy, Pte GREEN and BATTON were in a house defending the bridge head with Cpl JOHNSON.  This house was blown up and Cpl JOHNSON killed and the 2 men got into the cellar which had a window looking on to the bridge.  Here they remained unable to retire with their Company.  Five minutes after the barrier had been vacated, the Germans started to cross the bridge and were marching across it in force continuously for 3 hours.  These 2 men escaped at dusk and rejoined the Battalion 5 days later.

 

At 10:00 am on this day, A and B Coy with HQ of the Battalion, were sent to the North outskirts of CUESMES to take up a position to cover the reinforcement of the outpost line.  Here they remained till about 2:00 pm, when they were ordered to retire, B and C Coys having made good their retirement to the West.

 

The whole Brigade retired on FRAMERIES and were attacked from the West by a force of Germans who had evidently followed up B and C Coys.  The 1st Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUSILIERS were the first to meet this attack and were severely handled.  A and D Coys were sent to their support and continued doing a Flank Guard Movement until dark when the Battalion concentrated on the high ground West of FRAMERIES with the 1st Bn LINCOLNSHIRE REGT on the right and the WORCESTERSHIRE REGT on our left.

For casualties see appendix No. II [8 killed 11 wounded]

 

24th Aug 1914.  About 3:30 am, the Germans who had located our position over night, opened a heavy shell fire to which our guns were unable to respond for some time.  The German Infantry started to attack about 7:00 am and the Artillery (Maj METCALFE's Battery) found a good target.  The enemy were held in check all along our part of the line and on our right were retiring.

 

The Brigade on our left was now ordered to retire and the left of our line was in grave danger of being turned, however about an hour later the 9th INF BDE was ordered to retire and fell back through the town of FRAMERIES where a certain amount of street fighting took place.  The retirement was unmolested after leaving the town and the Brigade joined up about 4 miles South West of this town, where they halted for about 4 hours to allow the transport to get clear.  In the evening the Brigade continued the retirement and came into bivouacs at BERMERIES at 10:30 pm.

 

1st Bn Lincolnshire Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  6:00 am Left LONGUEVILLE at 6:00 am and marched to CUESMES and halted in the Square and billeted for the night.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Order received at 12:00 noon to move at once to block the approaches at MONS. 4 barricades were erected by the Battalion which were held for a short time only when the order to retire was received. The Battalion retired to NOUVELLES. 

Casualties at MONS - 2 Lt R W CAVE-ORME very slightly wounded in right hand and 1 Pte wounded in the back.

Retired the same evening to FRAMERIES, on arrival at FRAMERIES after dark and took over the posts of the 1st Bn ROYAL SCOTS FUS.

 

24th Aug 1914. 
3:30 am The Battalion were in position in orchard, two Coys of 5th FUSILIERS* on flanks. German guns started shelling position at daybreak and continued to do so until 8:45 am, when the order to retire was given. German Infantry advanced during last hour but never pressed their attack.

Casualties - Capt F C ROSE, Lts L M BULLER, C C HOLMES, E L WELCHMAN wounded.

Other ranks - killed 13, wounded 88, missing 29. Total 134.

Retired from FRAMERIES via EUGIES and BAVAY to BERMERIES.

[*1st Bn NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS]

Edited 7 March , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

3rd Division, 7th Infantry Brigade

 

3rd Bn Worcestershire Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  Marched to CIPLY and went into billets.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Moved out about 12:30 pm and took up an entrenched defensive position.  

Battalion on right - 1st Bn WILTSHIRE REGT, on left, 2nd Bn SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGT  Bivouacked in trenches.

 

24th Aug 1914. Attacked in early morning and fell back through BAVAY and took up line of outposts along railway line about HALTE.  2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH RIFLES on our left.

Casualties 2 killed, 5 wounded, 11 missing.

 

2nd Bn South Lancashire Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  Saturday.  Moved about 6:30 am with remainder of Brigade.  

During the march the Battalion was detached from the Brigade and proceeded to FRAMERIES where it billeted for the night in the railway station.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Sunday.  Battalion moved at 8:00 am to CIPLY and joined the remainder of the Brigade.  

About 12:00 pm the Battalion received orders to move to a position about 1 mile North of FRAMERIES and entrenched itself there.  

The Battalion was in position on the left of the Brigade.  Assistance was given in digging trenches by Belgian civilians.  

About 5:00 pm the enemy fired a few shrapnel at the working parties.  The trenches were immediately manned and occupied during the night.

 

24th Aug 1914.  Monday.  At dawn the enemy opened an attack on the trenches at about 5:00 am.  

The troops occupying FRAMERIES on our left were driven back thus enabling the enemy to eventually enfilade the trenches occupied by C and D Coys who, after suffering great loss, were compelled to retire covered by A and B Coys.  

The Battalion eventually succeeded in retiring to SAINT WAAST and bivouacked for the night about 3 miles to the West of the town.

 

1st Bn Wiltshire Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  Marched at 7:00 am from billets via GOGNIES - BOUGNIES and ASQUILLIES to CIPLY, went into billets, C Coy on outpost to HARMIGNIES.  

German aeroplane passed over.

3:10 pm.  Orders to send one Company to NOUVELLES to protect artillery.  C Coy detailed.  This Company afterwards moved to HARMIGNIES.

 

23rd Aug 1914.   4:00 pm.  Three Companies ordered to entrench position on North of CIPLY facing MONS, were shelled by enemy whilst doing so and until nightfall. Entrenching continued throughout night.

Battle of MONS.  Regiment did not take part in this engagement, beyond entrenching at CIPLY

 

24th Aug 1914.  Battle of CIPLY.  Enemy started about dawn to shell 1st Bn WILTSHIRE REGT trenches and continued bombardments throughout day till about 1:00 pm when 7th INF BDE was ordered to retire to ST WAAST.  

Casualties in trenches, Capt W R A DAWES and 3 men killed, Capt and Adjt P S ROWAN wounded and about 20 men.  

CO's horse shot under him.  

Retirement to ST WAAST effected without further loss, enemy following up leisurely.

 

2nd Bn Royal Irish Rifles

22nd Aug 1914.  FEIGNIES.  3:30 am.  Orders received at 3:30 am that the Battalion was ordered to march at 8:47 am.  

About an hour later, the hour of parade was put forward one and a half hours.  The Brigade marched to QUEVY-LE-PETIT where the troops comprising the column i.e. 7th INF BDE, 42nd BDE RFA, 57th COY RE and 1 SECTION Field Ambulance halted for about 2 hours.  

The march was then continued over heavy dusty tracks to CIPLY, where billets were taken up about 3:00 pm.  

CIPLY is a small industrial village of about 1,000 inhabitants and was about 2 miles due South of MONS.  

The middle of the day was very hot and sultry.  Several aeroplanes were observed circling over CIPLY but it was impossible to say whether they were friendly or hostile.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  2:00 am.  Reveille 2:00 am, orders to march at 4:30 am but Battalion did not move off till 7:00 am.  

Marched a short distance beyond NOUVELLES and halted.  Marched about half way back to CIPLY.  

At 2:00 pm marched to HARMIGNIES where received a report that some of the 15th HUSSARS had been driven back.  Sent forward to reinforce ROYAL SCOTS on hill above HARMIGNIES, commenced entrenching when enemy's artillery opened about 3:45 pm.  

C and D Coys in firing line.  A and B Coys in reserve on GIVRY - MONS road. These latter Companies were afterwards brought up to prolong the line on the left occupying trenches near the road.  D Coy was somewhat separated filling up a gap between two Companies of ROYAL SCOTS.  

Enemy attacked with infantry covered by artillery and came with one machine gun on their left.  Casualties 4 killed, [blank] wounded.

 

24th Aug 1914.  1:30 am.  Orders received  to withdraw.  A and B Coys withdrew at 1:30 am, D Coy 2:00 am.

Battalion assembled at NOUVELLES.  Orders were given that the men's packs, extra ammunition and the picks and shovels, which had been carried down from the trenches, were to be abandoned.

Retired via MALADRIE, QUEVY, BAVAY, ST WAAST to LA BOISCRETE and took up outpost position.

 

Brig Gen Bird's Personal Account.

 23rd Aug 1914. On 23rd Aug, the Battalion stood to arms at 4:30 am.  At about 6:00 am, I was sent for by the Brigadier Brig Gen McCRACKEN and in company with him and his Brigade Major rode, I think, to HARMIGNIES.  I was then ordered to bring up and entrench my Battalion on a very extended frontage from HARMIGNIES to a high bluff, probably BOIS LE HAUT.

 

As we were moving into position, we met some Guardsmen of 2nd DIV who said that they had come to relieve us and soon afterwards orders were received from Brigade HQ to withdraw, I think, to the cross roads at the S of NOUVELLES and go into reserve. T his point was reached at about 11:30 am and arms were piled. 

Between 12:30 pm and 1:00 pm the Divisional Squadron of 3rd DIV came galloping back from the front and the men said that they had lost heavily and that the Germans were advancing.

 

The Battalion was fallen in and extended and while this was taking place, Maj DUNCAN of the ROYAL SCOTS rode up and informed me that we had been detailed to reinforce the 9th (?) Brig Gen DORAN'S BDE and were to move forward and occupy the bluff mentioned above.

Guided by Maj DUNCAN, the Battalion reached its position at about 2:30 pm. Here one Company of ROYAL SCOTS was found entrenched on ground where, owing to it's convex shape, the effective field of fire was limited to about 300 yards.

 

The remainder of the ROYAL SCOTS were entrenched generally along the GIVRY - MONS road and some 300 - 400 yards further back than the Company on the bluff. Two Companies of the 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH RIFLES were ordered to occupy and entrench the bluff, cooperating with the Company of ROYAL SCOTS and the remaining Companies placed in a deep cutting where the road ascends the bluff.While the two Companies on the bluff were entrenching, a German battery was located about 2000 yards to the front and this was reported to the commander of our nearest artillery brigade who, however, did not engage it.

The German attack began at about 4:00 pm and just before or after this, I received a message from Lt Col McMICKING commanding ROYAL SCOTS that unless he received two Companies, he did not think he could hold his ground.  The two reserve Companies of the 2nd Bn ROYAL IRISH RIFLES were therefore sent to Lt Col McMICKING and report made to Brig Gen McCRACKEN as to the situation.The German attack developed on the lines usually practised in 1914.  Owing to the contour of the ground, the enemy attacking the bluff were invisible from about 1,500 yards until they closed to 300 yards, where they were checked.

The Company flanking the position of the main body of the ROYAL SCOTS and the machine guns, however, caused a good many casualties in the troops attacking the ROYAL SCOTS.

The enemy's artillery fire was fairly heavy, shrapnel only being used.  The bursts however were high and accuracy poor, a good many shell bursting in the trees which lined the MONS road.

 

Between 5:00 pm and 5:30 pm we were joined by a Battalion of GRENADIER GUARDS under Lt Col DRUMMOND  (?)  and one of IRISH GUARDS under Lt Col G MORRIS.

At nightfall the Germans brought up six machine guns and made an attempt to advance but relinquished it as soon as our rapid fire was opened.  I think they then fell back to [illegible] leaving an outpost line opposite to us.

 

At about 7:30 pm, touch was obtained with a Company of 2nd DIV on the lower part of the bluff on our right.

 

Between 8:00 pm and 8:30 pm an order was received from Brig Gen McCRACKEN  that we were to fall back at 10:00 pm and I at once sent an Officer to reconnoitre the route to the point from which we had advanced, where the bulk of our 1st line transport had been left. A report was also sent to Brig Gen DORAN who thereupon directed me not to withdraw until orders came from him to do so. On receipt of these instructions I bicycled about 1 ½ miles down the road towards MONS and saw Brig Gen DORAN who informed me that I was to hold the bluff until the Brigade had withdrawn and was then to retire.  He estimated that I should be able to move at about 12:00 am. During the early part of the night the GUARDS received orders from LORD  CAVAN not to leave the bluff.  As they were under me and I was under Brig Gen DORAN, however, directed them to conform to my movements.  A full report of this was made to Brig Gen MCCRACKEN in writing on evening of 24th Aug.

 

24th Aug 1914.  Actually we got away at about 2:00 am, leaving the GUARDS to cover our retirement and then to follow and pick up the Company of ROYAL SCOTS that was on the bluff and the Company of the 2nd DIV, the Battalion reached the S of NOUVELLES at about 4:30 am - 5:00 am.  Here we found the remainder of our 1st line transport.  After halting under cover, I sent the senior Major and Adjutant to try and find the Brigade HQ but without avail and as large columns of baggage and troops were moving down , what I suppose was, the MONS - MAUBEUGE road, I decided to follow them.

 

As the men were already tired after their exertions and countermarching on 23rd Aug, I ordered them to discard their packs. We moved off to the MAUBEUGE road where the odd Companies left me to rejoin their units and after moving my men clear of the road, I again tried to ascertain the whereabouts of the Division. I now met Capt PRICE-DAVIES of the staff of [blank]  and ascertained that the 3rd DIV was on the left of the army moving towards BAVAY and therefore decided to strike across country to try and join it.   Meanwhile the 1st line transport had unfortunately been swept down the MAUBEUGE road with the other massed of vehicles going in this direction and was not recovered for several days. Eventually we reached BLAIREGNIES and there I met Lt Col MAURICE, GSO of 3rd DIV, who directed me to take up a Rear Guard position in this neighbourhood.

 

We were, however, relieved by Brig Gen SHAW's 8th INF BDE and moved on, reaching TAISNIERES at about 3:00 pm, where a meal was obtained for all ranks. We then moved to BAVAY and took up a position on it's outskirts until about 5:00 pm, when the remainde

[Guest]

5th Division 13th Infantry Brigade

 

1st Bn Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regt

22nd Aug 1914. 12:05 am Orders for move received (7:25 am) Appendix 11

5:10 am Men's breakfasts.

5:15 am Orders received to be ready to move 1.5 earlier than previously ordered.

6:00 am VANGUARD under Maj M P BUCKLE DSO, consisting of C & D Coys, marched. Main body following at 6:30 am (Ref Map MONS, BT 7a)

6:30 am Weather was fine and hot. The march was remarkable, after crossing the BELGIAN frontier, for the extraordinary enthusiasm of the inhabitants especially in DOUR and BOUSSU.

9:00 am DOUR. Brigadier gave verbal orders to OC Advance Guard units for the holding of the line of the canal from MARIETTE to road through POMMEROEUL by the advanced guard. Two Coys of 1st Bn QUEEN'S OWN ROYAL WEST KENT REGT to hold bridges at Lock No 5 (railway bridge) and at Depot (railway and road), north of ST GHISLAIN, remainder of Battalion to be in reserve at ST GHISLAIN. (Ref Map MONS BT 7a). 2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS to hold bridges at LES HERBIERES and then the road running due south through the OE of POMMEROEUL. Brigade HQ to be at A in LES ALMOTTES.

11:00 am Battalion, less C & D Coys under Maj M P BUCKLE DSO arrived at a point in road between LES ALMOTTES and ST GHISLAIN and remained there until 2:00 pm when it went into billets at HORNU. C & D Coys remaining in their positions on the canal.

3:30 pm The MGs and 3 SAA carts left the Battalion to join C & D Coys. (Appendix 12)
Information was received from natives that German patrols had been seen in neighbourhood of TERTRE the previous evening. Telephone communication was established though by the public phone between HORNU and Maj M P BUCKLE DSO at ST GHISLAIN.

 

23rd Aug 1914. SUNDAY 4:45 am Orders received for the troops holding our section of the line of the canal to be strengthened by one Coy and one of our advanced Coys to proceed along TERTRE ROAD to support a reconnaissance by one squadron of the 19th HUSSARS and 5th DIV CYCLIST COY. A Coy under Capt G D LISTER was therefore sent forward to support C Coy and came under the immediate orders of Maj M P BUCKLE DSO. C & D Coys had since their arrival on the line of the canal put their positions in as thorough a state of defence as there was time for.(Appendix 13) 

7:30 am When the mounted troops had moved out north of the canal A Coy took up a position to cover their retirement at the road junction south of the E in TERTRE  Later the cyclists were driven in by superior force of GERMAN INF, A Coy coming under a heavy fire (rifle & shrapnel) and being forced to retire on the line of the canal. (MONS Map BT 7a).

12:00 Noon Their casualties were killed, Lt C K ANDERSON and 6 other ranks, wounded Lt A A E CHITTY and 29 other ranks missing. Capt G D LISTER (known to be wounded) and 58 other ranks.

12:00 Noon to 8:00 pm The buildings along the line of the canal in which C, B, which had been bought up in support and the remainder of A were now located and the trenches in front of the Lock, occupied by D were subjected to a continuous shell fire which did much damage to the buildings but comparatively little to the men and horses. Capt H D BUCHANAN-DUNLOP was wounded but did not go into hospital until the 24th.

9:00 pm Orders received that the line of the canal was to be evacuated and the Battalion was ordered to withdraw after the 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT, which had come up in support of the Battalions about 1:00 pm in WASMES.

The withdrawal was completed about 1:30 am the 24th.

 

24th Aug 1914. 1:30 am The bridges were blown up when all had crossed and the Battalion retired to WASMES, forming up in the market place about 4:00 am. It was not long before the enemy started shelling the town, several shrapnel shells bursting over the square, but the Battalion was formed up under cover in the East side.

10:00 am At about 10:00 am an attack by the enemy's Infantry began to develop and A & B Coys were sent to various points near the square to support the 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT B Coy in taking up their position, immediately came under a heavy rifle fire at close range and were forced to withdraw. Maj C G PACK-BERESFORD, Capt W C O PHILLIPS, 2 Lt M F BROADWOOD and 15 other ranks were killed and Lt D C C SEWELL and 6 other ranks wounded, 9 being returned as missing. (Appendix 14)

1:00 pm Orders were shortly after this received to the effect that the 6th DIV would retire through DOUR & ATHIS, so the 13th INF BDE was withdrawn from WASMES. The march on ST WAAST which followed was an exceedingly trying one, the men being short of food and sleep and the day very hot (MONS Map BT 7a).

8:00 pm The Battalion was not completely concentrated until after the bivouac was reached. Neither supplies nor water of any kind was available here.

 

2nd Bn King's Own Scottish Borderers

22nd Aug 1914. Arrived at Lock No 4 and began preparing that position at the MONS CANAL for defence. 

 

23rd Aug 1914. Lock No 4 at MONS CANAL.  

Action at the CANAL lasting from about noon till dusk.  Maj C LEIGH DSO and D Coy defended the bridge, allowing B Coy, who has been in front to cover the retirement of the cavalry to pass through into reserve.  C Coy was on the right.  

Casualties - Maj C LEIGH missing, Capt C F KENNEDY badly wounded, Capt L D SPENCER wounded.  
Retired about 9:00 pm to WASMES. 

Maj C LEIGH missing.
Capt C F KENNEDY wounded.
Capt GIBBON RAMC wounded.
Capt L D SPENCER wounded.

 

24th Aug 1914. Battalion arrived about midnight 23rd/24th near WASMES, bivouacked for 1 hour and later moved into reserve in WASMES.  
Retired in the afternoon (4:00 pm) and arrived at LE CATEAU on the evening of the 25th.   

 

2nd Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment

22nd Aug 1914.  Arrived WASMES.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Arrived DOURS.  

Casualties Capt R C CARTER & Lt W M OZANNE wounded.  0 ranks killed, 6 killed, 20 wounded and one missing.

 

24th Aug 1914.  Battle of MONS.  

Casualties:
Killed:
Maj P B STRAFFORD 
Capt C O DENMAN-JUBB 
Lt L E RUSSELL 
Lt J H L THOMSON

Wounded:  
Lt Col J A C GIBBS 
Maj E N TOWNSEND
Lt G W OLIPHANT
Lt M C B K YOUNG
Capt E V JENKINS DSO, 
Lt O PRICE wounded and prisoners.  

Other ranks 9 killed, 50 wounded, 244 missing.

 

 

2nd Bn Duke Of Wellington's Regt Lt Col Gibbs account.

22nd Aug 1914.  On Saturday 22nd Aug, we paraded at 6:30 am and followed the Divisional HQ line of advance crossing the Belgian frontier just South of ATHIS, thence via DOUR and BOUSSU to ST GHISLAIN where we outspanned about 2:00 pm in a large field allotted to the 13th INF BDE.  All along the route especially in BELGIUM we had received a great reception and all sorts of comforts showered on the men such as cigarettes, fruit, eggs, milk and even beer.  The days march had been most fatiguing owing to the heat and the men were glad of a rest.  It was a matter of great satisfaction to me to be able to report that with exception of two men we had left at HAVRE suffering from acute colic  (but who subsequently rejoined the Battalion) the Regiment arrived intact without any other casualty.

The general disposition of the British Army at the time was as follows:

The II ARMY CORPS (3rd and 5th DIV) to hold the line CONDE - MONS
The I ARMY CORPS (1st and 2nd DIV) - MONS - Eastwards, to where the French were.  
The CAVALRY at BINCHE.

The KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF and the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT took over outpost duty along the section of the MONS - CONDE canal, allotted to the 13th INF BDE immediately to the North of ST GHISLAIN, from the bridge at LES HERBIERES to LA MARETTE both inclusive, our Battalion being detailed to work in support of and relief of the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT section; the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS doing ditto with the KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.

About 3:00 pm our Brigadier told me he was going to ride round the Brigade outposts and I asked leave to accompany him so as to get acquainted with the ground.  The ROYAL WEST KENT REGT had one Company pushed in advance (under Maj HASTINGS) on the TERTRE Road, in support of the DIVISIONAL CYCLIST COY and when we visited him, news of the enemy was very meagre.  It was the last time we were to meet the poor chap, as he was killed and his Company practically washed out during the following twenty four hours.  On our way back through the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS section, we met the 1st Bn EAST SURREY REGT (14th INF BDE) under LONGLEY, moving up to prolong our Brigade line to the West.

The outpost line seemed to me to be an impossible one to hold, there being no Artillery positions for our guns and a very limited field of fire to the front - whilst good cover existed for an enemy to move up to close quarters.  I think everyone concurred in this opinion.
On arrival at our Brigade field I found the Battalion just parading as orders had been received for the 13th INF BDE to go into billets at HORNU about a mile South East of ST GHISLAIN.  We were also told that, unless the order was cancelled, the Battalion would relieve the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT on outpost duty the following evening & the KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS.

 

We got to HORNU about 5:30 pm and found the Battalion billets were round about the market place.  JUBB and myself put up at the Post Office where the "Directeur des Postes" and his wife, Monsieur and Madame CROSSIAUX made us most comfortable.  After seeing the Company billets I was very glad to go and lay down, as for over twenty four hours, I had been made with toothache and the local dentist was away.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Sunday 23rd Aug will for all times be a memorable one for the Regiment.  A lovely morning broke and we hoped for a peaceful day.
By the kindness of the local coal miners their large baths had been put at our disposal, a welcome luxury indeed, so arrangements had been made the night before for the Companies to go to them in turn commencing at 7:00 am.  I went off at 8:30 am, GRAHAM our MO going with me, to find the dentist - M. JEMAND HENNEBUISSE who took out the offending tooth which gave me instant relief.  He refused payment and would insist on our drinking a glass of wine with him to "wish the Allies all luck" before leaving.
On return to our billets, I learnt that an order had come about 9:00 am for two Companies to go to the canal and support the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT, so STRAFFORD had taken B and C Coys.  The remainder of the Battalion had orders to stand by and had set to work to pack wagons etc.  Poor A Coy by the way, losing their bath as only three Companies had finished.  About 10:00 am a second order had come for the rest of the Battalion to move to the canal.  A and D Coys quickly dressed and fell in.  Leaving the 1st Line Transport (except SAA Carts) under the HQ party as escort, we were just moving off when an order came for the "Divisional Train" wagons to concentrate at DOUR ???.  This ELLAM saw to with his usual skill but not before (as I learnt afterwards) he had done in a Uhlan patrol that had wandered into HORNU from the East, without happily any casualty to the HQ party.
On arrival at the level crossing South of ST GHISLAIN about half a mile from the canal, I heard the first sounds of firing, so leaving our horses and the two Companies there for the moment, I walked on with MACLEOD and JUBB to take stock.  The situation is best explained by a rough diagram.

Things were getting very "warm" and it was difficult to locate the enemy or his numbers owing to the flat country to the North of the canal and the natural cover afforded by hedges and deep ditches.  The field of fire in front of B Coy was barely 300 yards in depth I should say.
I visited MARTYN who told me he would be glad to have TULLOCH'S Company reinforced near the railway bridge (???), he also told me that with exception of an odd cyclist or two who had come back with reports and who gave somewhat different stories, he did not yet know what was in front.
I sent back to the railway crossing and ordered the two Companies up to ST GHISLAIN MARKET SQUARE, telling JENKINS on arrival there to send two platoons to TULLOCH.
It was now about 1:00 pm and oppressively hot.  I sent to where B Coy was in fairly good cover behind some banks just beyond the sheds (D) and from which we could get a fairly good view with the glasses.  Occasional glimpses of Germans creeping along hedge rows at from 400 to possibly 700 yards, were now to be had but CARTER had warned his men not to fire till a really good target offered itself, so as not to give their position away.  When they did begin, I think it fairly staggered the enemy who went to ground at once.  Shrapnel was soon opened on the buildings along the canal but luckily without any serious effects to our men and then ceased.  The hopelessness of having no guns to reply with was most galling but I can't help thinking it puzzled the Bosche and certainly as far as our part of the line went, they had evidently made up their minds to wait till dark before making any further advance, although rifle fire was kept up pretty regularly.  CARTER got a bullet through the calf of his leg necessitating his removal to the dressing station at the town hospital.  Pte SHELLABEAR was killed close to me, about 3:00 pm and was I believe the first man killed in the Regiment.
The Brigadier General came out during the afternoon and told me he heard they were entrenching a position near WASMES to which we should probably fall back after dark.  He had no news as to what was in front of us but in common with the rest of us, felt sure that the German forces were not the small force of two or three Army Corps we had been given to understand it was.  He told me the rest of the Brigade had had a hot time on our left.  Before leaving the General directed me, should things get too hot, to send back a special report.
About 4:30 pm I received an order to make good the Right Flank of the Brigade - as the 9th INF BDE (on our right) was shortly going back, so I sent the following order to TOWNSEND at 4:40 pm "Take your Company and proceed and get touch with 9th INF BDE at MARIETTE.  Should this Brigade be withdrawn you must protect our Right Flank on line of road running QUAREONON ??? - LA CORBELLETTE."  I also sent an order to JENKINS to stay in reserve on the Square with his 2 platoons and to particularly watch the Right Flank.
About 5:30 pm we heard TOWNSEND having a rather busy time on our right towards MARIETTE, so I sent STRAFFORD with his remaining 3 platoons to support him and MACLEOD went off with them to find out how things were going there.
After dusk, firing ceased and shortly we could distinctly hear the Germans entrenching and moving guns to fairly short ranges.  I went along to where MARTYN and the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT were and he agreed with me that the position would be untenable at dawn.  I sent back a report to this effect to Brigade HQ.  MARTYN had had bad news of poor HASTING'S Company - odd men who had got back told him the former was dead and a large number of the Company either dead or wounded in the enemy's hands.

 

 

At 9:55 pm I received the following order:

OC 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT

B M 43 23rd Aug 1914

 

"The Division will retire to the prepared position on the WASMES - BOIS DE BOUSSU line.  The 13th INF BDE will hold the line from the 2nd S in WASMES to the HORNU - CHAMP DES SARTS road inclusive.  14th INF BDE will continue this line Westwards.  All bridges are to be blown up before leaving the canal.  Retirement to commence as soon as possible.   The 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT ??? will hold the line from the right to the westernmost of the two roads running South from the W of WASMES (inclusive).  2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF will hold the left section from above road exclusive.  1st Bn ROYAL WEST KENT REGT will withdraw through the 2nd DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT into a position in support.
2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS will start by withdrawing through the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.  It is not necessary to occupy trenches tonight but to take up a more or less concentrated position behind them covering works with outposts.
The trenches will be fully occupied by dawn. 
Brigade HQ will be at road junction about 3/4 mile South of W in WASMES.  Report when your withdrawal is complete.  OC 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT will be responsible that 2 Companies 15th INF BDE retire with him.  These two Companies are on the CHAUSSEE near HORNU."

 

13th INF BDE
9:30 pm                                       (Sd) CG EGERTON Lt.

 

Owing to it now being very dark and no lights being allowed in the town, I knew it would be difficult to assemble the whole Battalion before moving to WASMES.  I therefore told ELLIS (now in command of B Coy) to collect his men and move as soon as possible to the market place where JENKINS was.
I sent written messages to MACLEOD, STRAFFORD and TOWNSEND to collect and retire direct to WASMES railway station and also stating the position of our trenches.

Before leaving the canal, I saw the ROYAL ENGINEERS CSM who had been in charge of a party sinking barges and preparing demolitions in our Section, who told me everything was ready to destroy the bridges after the 1st Bn ROYAL WEST KENT REGT had all got across the canal.
The town seemed very quiet as JUBB, GRAHAM (MO) and I walked back to the "Place" and none of the inhabitants seemed to know what was going on.  I met JENKINS and told him the situation and also that I had arranged with MARTYN to bring THOMPSON'S platoons back with TULLOCH'S Company.  He had taken up a position with his remaining platoons covering the streets leading from the "Place" to the canal, so I gave him an order to remain in observation until the 1st Bn ROYAL WEST KENT REGT came back and then to join me at WASMES.

I also found an orderly of the CHESHIRE REGT who had come to tell me where the OC detat. 15th INF BDE was (Capt STAPYLTON) and I sent a message telling him I would meet him shortly at the level railway crossing on the HORNU road.
It was now after 11:00 pm but as ELLIS had not yet arrived, I left JUBB to bring him on to the above crossing and went with GRAHAM to the hospital to see if any evacuations had taken place.  To my dismay, I found that except the horse ambulances having been used to their full capacity, no further transport had been arranged.  I sent at once to the station (about 1/4 mile away) and was lucky in being able to arrange for an engine and a few trucks to be ready in half an hour's time.
Hurrying back I gave the order out that any Officers or men who were not dangerously wounded and who could manage to get to the train, could get away.  Many did succeed, I am glad to say I afterwards learnt, including CARTER and OZANNE ???.
I got to the railway crossing about midnight and found JUBB - B Coy - and the 2 CHESHIRE REGT Companies and to my great joy, SHAW with, as I was leg weary, my horse "THE CAMEL".  SHAW told me that DAPPLE, (my second horse) had been hit by a fragment of shrapnel but was luckily not bad.  He had left her in a stable close by and went off to bring her along.  
We moved off and on passing through HORNU I knocked up Monsieur CROISSIAUX, my host of the day before and told him what was happening - poor fellow he was very perturbed.

It took some time from HORNU to WASMES owing to the number of streets and roads not shown on the map and we had constantly to knock people up to ask the best way.  I left guides at cross roads to bring on the others.
On arrival at LITTLE HORNU the CHESHIRE REGT went off to join their Brigade.  Passing through this mining village I reached the rendezvous given at WASMES railway station bridge, NW of the town about 3:00 am with B Coy, where I left them whilst JUBB and I went to look for the trenches.

Crossing the road over the bridge, JUBB went down it to the market square where Brigade HQ was, to report etc, whilst I moved off the road in a NE direction up a stubble field slope, to locate our trenches.  Thanks to the glare from a colliery I saw British uniforms against the sky line and on getting up to them found two Companies of the DORSETSHIRE REGT under Capt MAXWELL-HYSLOP occupying the trenches on high ground, which the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF were to take over.  I soon got the direction of the "dividing" road specified in our orders (local name RUE D'HORNU) and on arrival found TOWNSEND with A Coy and also THOMPSON and his platoon.  It was still dark, so leaving them to rest, I walked down towards the town meeting CURRIE (our Brigade Major) who could give me no information of any dispositions outside those of our Brigade.  JUBB came up and told me he had found the trenches to be occupied by B and D Coys and had them ready to go in and relieve the DORSETSHIRE REGT and BEDFORDSHIRE REGT and also that he knew a way to get them there under cover.

He added the original extent of front to which the Battalion was detailed (about 3/4 of a mile) had had to be considerably increased by the 14th INF BDE owing to a large gap on the right and dead ground and he supposed we had better conform to what the DORSETSHIRE REGT and BEDFORDSHIRE REGT had done.  I concurred.  
I arranged with him to move them in, whilst I went and put A Coy into their trenches on the left of our Section and told him I should then go on to the "bosquet" Knoll about the centre of our Battalion where he should join me there as soon as he could.

(Poor fellow he never rejoined me and I learnt afterwards he had been killed whilst watching our machine guns away to the right).
 

24th Aug 1914.  I returned to A Coy as dawn was just breaking, so we got the men into their trenches as quickly as possible.  These were in the open to the North of a powder magazine and some cottages which were now empty.

C Coy and MACLEOD came up just then and much to my relief as I didn't know where they were.  Apparently they had lost their way among the coal pits in the dark.  This Company I sent down to the "bosquet" as Battalion Reserve.
Before returning there myself, I went again to our Left Flank and found HYSLOP still there awaiting relief by the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.  There appeared to be a big gap between them and where the rest of their Brigade (14th INF BDE) on their left, was.  I was glad afterwards I had gone, as this ground was higher than where our Section began and commanded us, also later on when things began to get warm I was able to send and ask for a Company from the Brigade Reserve to be sent up to the exact place.  I also sent RUSSELL'S platoon from C Coy (Battalion Reserve) to work round on to this high ground to keep touch with our left in case the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF had not arrived, giving orders that if the Battalion was in position, he was to work back to me under cover.

 

NB.  On meeting Lt Col R C BOND about two years later in GERMANY, he told me that on arrival at WASMES on 24th Aug 1914 just at daybreak, when near the railway station bridge, he was told by the Staff Captain that his Right was now to rest on the bridge.  This of course accounts for the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF not taking up their proper position ordered.  I received no intimation of this change and can only imagine the Staff Captain seeing troops on the high ground took them for my Battalion (these were the two Companies of DORSETSHIRE REGT) and also as the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF were late in arriving he therefore thought that this was the best thing to be done.

(NB.  The accompanying map made from the original prepared for me when in the Ambulance at WASMES by the Colliery's Engineer Monsieur HERMANN CAPIAN shows the trenches occupied by the Battalion on 24th Aug and the graves of those buried on the 25th Aug.

All these graves were subsequently opened and the remains removed by the Germans to a cemetery at HAUTRAGE but at the time those killed in the vicinity of the Bosquet and Powder Magazine were collected into one grave, to which also by special arrangement I had the bodies of JUBB and RUSSELL taken so as to be buried with poor STRAFFORD.
The grave to the left marked on map (36B and 16G) is where poor PACK BERESFORD (ROYAL WEST KENT REGT) and his men and some of RUSSELL'S platoon all of whom were killed in hand to hand combat (mentioned later on) were originally interred).

 

At daybreak the battle began by two 15 pounder guns dug in near TOWNSEND'S trenches and a howitzer Battery (which was complete, I believe) in rear of the slag dump of the "HORNU et WASMES" Colliery, opening fire on the enemy but they did not get many rounds off before an overwhelming reply by German guns forced them to go back - presumably to find other positions, which unfortunately did not exist.  This opening fire was the only gun fire in our Section that morning.
About 8:00 am our Brigadier, also the Brig Gen R A (HEADLAM) TULLOCK CRE and CAMERON (AA & QMG) of the 5th DIV came up to "LA BOSQUET" to have a look round but all soon left except Gen CUTHBERT, who had a look round our trenches before returning to Brigade HQ.  I walked with him part of the way back and he said he could tell me nothing new but that as existing orders went, we were to hang on at all costs.

Returning through a large garden leading to the "bosquet" I found JUBB had not yet returned and as RUSSELL had sent no word as to the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF having arrived, I got MACLEOD to make out a message asking for a Company of the Brigade Reserve to be sent up to the high ground where the DORSETSHIRE REGT were.  Maj PACK BERESFORD and his Company of the ROYAL WEST KENT REGT were detailed and moved up in fine style crossing one open bit of ground well extended at the double and before the Germans could "sprinkle" them with shrapnel..

A German "Taube" sailed high over us about 11:00 am but I would not allow the men to fire and disclose our position.  It moved along to the left of our Section where rapid rifle fire was opened on it without hitting it but with the result of its dropping white discs near TOWNSEND'S trenches which led to an immediate burst of gun fire on the spot indicated.  The range however, was luckily over-estimated and the shells burst on the road in rear of A Coy.

Things were now getting fast and furious as far as enemy gun fire went and it became evident that our guns must be out of action as there was no reply.  It rather looked as if the Germans were preparing for an advance, so I sent a message back at 11:30 am asking if it would be possible to have some Artillery support.  I can't tell if this message ever arrived as my messenger did not return before the Regiment began to retire.
About 12:00 pm a platoon of C Coy which had been holding a loopholed wall on the East side of the "Bosquet" came back as the wall was getting so knocked about by shell fire and I told HEALING to get them up into the higher trenches on the slope.

The fire although now "hellish" had up to date done practically no damage to the Reserve Company thanks to the concealed position of the trenches etc but at 12:15 pm three shells burst in quick succession, the first getting in to the advanced trench on the East side of "Bosquet" killing and wounding several; the second burst close to where STRAFFORD and myself were talking.  He fell dead with a piece of shrapnel through his temple and as the same time I got three pieces in my left side and a small piece through my left wrist.  A small trench in front of us had several casualties also.

The third shell went over our heads and burst in a field in rear of the "bosquet".
TAYLOR who was near me tied me up and with the help of another man got me into the shade behind a trench, from which I could more or less see what was going on.
I sent word to tell MACLEOD I was hit and to carry on.

It was now evident that the retirement had begun, although I never received any orders, as we could see the troops on our right going back.
THOMPSON and his platoon being in good cover hung on giving great assistance to those on our right to cross exposed ground.
At about 1:10 pm TAYLOR came and told me all had now gone back except THOMPSON and his men and that the latter was hit.  I therefore ordered the former to take all the remaining men back via the garden in rear of the "bosquet" in the direction of the market square.
The Germans could be seen about 1000 yards to our front.

With the assistance of one of the men I dragged myself through the garden in rear of the "bosquet" and on emerging into the side street in rear, I was just in time to see Sgt SPENCE who had collected a handful of men, charging down the road after some Germans who had worked round from the left.  The latter turned and made off down another street.  This action on Sgt SPENCE'S part without doubt did much to enable the rear platoons to get away without further loss.
I also met TAYLOR who had been hit and was bleeding profusely - he told me it was only a flesh wound and he was going to try and get back.  This I forbade, as he would never have been able to get far, so I told him to go to the hospital which a Belgian said was just round the corner.  (He subsequently was able to escape and got to ENGLAND).
This old fellow got me into his house and sent for some Red Cross men who carried me to the "Ambulance" which had been hastily improvised by the Belgian Red Cross Society in the offices of the Colliery "D'HORNU et WASMES".

Here must end, I regret to say my personal war experiences with the Battalion but I cannot stop without putting on record that during the two days of incessant fighting I had shared with the Regiment, all ranks of the 2nd Bn DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGT kept up the honour and traditions of the Regiment to the highest possible degree, under the most trying ordeals and when pitted against overwhelming odds.

 

2nd Bn Duke of Wellington's Regt Maj McLeod's Personal Diary.

22nd Aug 1914.  Very hot indeed.  Marched about 7:30 am.  Arrived at B??? about 12:00 pm and then ordered to go into billets at H???.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Firing began about 12:00 pm.  Two Companies sent about 1:00 pm to support ROYAL WEST KENT REGT.  Whole Battalion out at 2:00 pm round the bridge over the canal at ST GHISLAIN and exposed to heavy gun fire for several hours.  C Coy in reserve just South of canal.
About 6:00 pm I went with this Company???, STRAFFORD and HEALING to take up another position but after wandering all night and losing our way, we lay down in the open till dawn near the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS.

 

24th Aug 1914.  We marched at daybreak to WASMES and found the Battalion about 5:00 am occupying trenches on steep wooded ground.  Whole Battalion subjected for some hours to an awful gun fire.  Splendidly supported by ROYAL WEST KENT REGT, who suffered serious losses.  The Germans ran up their guns by hand to within about 600 yards of a loopholed wall, which they blew to pieces.  The Battalion failed to get the order to retire, though this had been sent out in quadruplicate.  It held its position for 1 1/5 hours after the order had been sent out.  Many hit and missing.  I got back to the town about 2:00 pm or 3:00 pm and found it practically deserted, except for a small Rear Guard on the railway bridge.  The town was full of stragglers.  I finally picked up Count GLEICHEN and some of the 14th INF BDE and afterwards Gen CUTHBERT and the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS REGT.  We collected the remains of the Battalion, marched for several miles and then bivouacked.

 

2nd Bn King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry

22nd Aug 1914. Saturday. Division continues to march Northward. Orders received at about 12:30 am for the Battalion and part of the 13th INF BDE to march tomorrow at 8:15 am via DOUR on HORNU. 

At 5:00 am orders received to march an hour earlier. 

At about 7:25 am Battalion marched (less D Company whom it was impossible to get off the outposts in time and who followed on later) via ATHIS,  DOUR to BOUSSU where the Battalion went into billets in a ?????. 

Very hard marching over the cobbles through the morning hours. Enthusiastic reception all along the route. Brigade is holding the line of the canal from LES HERBIERES - MARIETTE and has two Battalions on outpost duty.

 

23rd Aug 1914. Sunday. During the night 22/23rd  2 Coys (A and B ) hurried to hold themselves in readiness to support the outpost line. 

Morning of the 23rd, C and D Coys told off for this duty. 

1:00 pm Orders received  for C and D Coys to move up close to outpost line in support of 2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS. (illegible) ST GHISLAIN. A and B Coys ordered to  move shortly afterwards

Coys remained in close support 300 yards behind canal trench until 5:00 pm when orders were received from Brigade to retire C and D Coys then went up to canal bank to cover retirement of WORCESTERSHIRE REGT and 2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS. 

Railway bridge was blown up about 6:00 pm but bridge to ST GHISLAIN failed to blow.

Orders came for Battalion to retire about 7:00 pm after dark. 2 Lt J PEPYS was killed and Pte BOFFEY was wounded about 2:00 pm whilst doing admirable work with the Machine Guns which had them in the firing line all day.

 

24th Aug 1914.  Monday. Battalion marched to field in the vicinity of WASMES where it concentrated. Marched into WASMES where it arrived about 7:00 am.

Ordered to take up a position with 2 Companies (A and B ) in firing line, 2 in support. B Coy occupied and advanced position on a Coal Dump. A Coy being slightly in rear on the left on the railway line.

The Divisional Artillery did great execution throughout the day and were of the utmost assistance during the retirement.
Orders to retire in direction of BAVAY received about 1:30 pm, the battalion retiring in conformation with 2nd DIV on the left and 1st Bn QUEEN'S OWN ROYAL WEST KENTS on right. Companies retiring from alternate flanks. 

The Division went into bivouac in a field beyond BAVAY (SW of BAVAY).

 

2nd Bn King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry Lt Col Bond's Diary (note: POW at Le Cateau)

22nd Aug 1914.  (Saturday).  Marched from HOUDAIN about 7:30 am.  The Advance Guard Battalion being late, the Division General ordered the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF to take their place.  Crossed the Belgian Frontier at 9:00 am. 

At 2:20 pm passed BOUSSU STATION and halted in a large meadow North of the railway line.  Officers were sent out to reconnoitre the MONS - CONDE CANAL.  Later two Battalions of the Brigade, (KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS and WEST KENT REGT) proceeded on outpost duty along the canal bank.  The WEST KENT REGT were on the right, with WEST RIDING Battalion in support of them.  The KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS on the left with 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF in support at the brewery.  The Battalion machine guns (under Lt PEPYS) were moved forward to the canal bank, between the forward Battalions, to strengthen the line.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  (Sunday).  Morning spent in preparations and reconnaissance.  At 11:00 am a conference of Battalion Commanders at Brigade HQ, at which it was arranged to relieve the Battalions in the first line at 6:00 pm every 24 hours.  During the preparation of the men's dinner, three shrapnel shells burst over the field outside the brewery building, wounding one man.  Other shells burst over the outskirts of the town.  Dinners were hurried through.  C and D Coys advanced to close support of the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS.  

 

At 1:15 pm, A and B Coys moved forward to the railway HALTE North of BOUSSU.  Some Platoons of the SUFFOLK REGT (14th INF BDE), under 2 Lt GEORGE, joined and remained close to A and B Coys.  While the Brigadier was with the Battalion, news of Lt PEPYS' death came and Lt DENISON was sent to take over the command of the Battalion machine guns (about 2:30 pm).  Two British aeroplanes coming over from the North were followed by American gun fire.  The first aeroplanes seen in action.  Written instructions for taking up a second position near WASMES, in case of a general retirement, were left by the Brigadier.  Capt LEDGARD (YORKSHIRE REGT, attached), was sent back to reconnoitre roads leading to the new position.  C Coy (Capt LUTHER) was ordered to reinforce the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS on the canal bank, one Platoon being in position by our own machine gun section, which continued to do good service from time to time when good targets offered.

 

Towards 6:00 pm, Lt Col STEPHENSON, Commanding KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS, requested O. Commanding 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF to take over the positions held by his Battalion on the canal bank.  This operation completed by 7:00 pm, C and D Coys and Machine Gun Section occupying the canal line, B Coy (Maj YATE) immediately in support, extended East of the railway embankment, with A Coy extended West of the embankment.  By this time, the 14th INF BDE had retired, leaving only the Machine Gun Section of the EAST SURREY REGT in position on the railway embankment.  The KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS Battalion retired to the HALTE previously occupied by A and B Coy's (2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF).

 

The enemy were shelling the bridgehead by the canal lock, 300 yards East of the railway bridge.  The bridgehead was abandoned, an attempt to destroy the drawbridge which it covered, had met with no success.  A second charge was being prepared by the RE Officer on the spot.  Firing was ordered at intervals after it grew dark, to be taken up all along the canal bank, in order to convey the impression that the defence of the canal line was being maintained.  The rifles were directed against the woods on the North bank, in which enemy might concentrate before attempting to rush the bridges.  Up to this time, there had been some casualties among the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS and a few men of the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF were hit.  Targets offered by the enemy had been difficult as the enemy were occupying the ditches and other cover, which concealed them almost entirely.  It was only when a dense body advanced across the right front of our Machine Gun Section, in order to rush a bridge on this flank, that the Machine Gun Section opened fire.  They did great execution and their fire was so well maintained that the attackers retired again into the woods.  The enemy were effectively stopped here for the rest of the day.  It was while observing the result of this firing from a position on the canal bank outside the Machine Gun Section, that Lt PEPYS was shot through the head. 

 

After dark, German bugle calls were sounded all along the line and died away, the distance Northwards.  They appeared to be sounded to give the impression that they were retiring Northwards.  Also, refugees came in from the North, among them a Priest, who declared the enemy to be retiring Northwards.  No credence was placed in their reports and it was judged that the enemy were moving Westwards to envelop our left flank.

Gradually towards 10:00 pm, some Companies were withdrawn to the HALTE.  The Adjutant, Capt ACKROYD, rode in to Brigade HQ for orders.  He brought back verbal orders from the Brigadier to retire to the second position.  C Coy remained to extricate our own Machine Gun Section, whose position it was difficult to reach, owing to the number of ditches to be crossed and to come back without drawing the enemy's attention to the retirement, as Rear Guard.  The enemy all the time was using star rockets to discover our dispositions.  Neither the railway bridge nor the drawbridge had been badly damaged in our attempts to blow them up.

As a point of interest, it may be noted that no Germans in this section crossed the canal during the night, although they were in great numbers on the Northern bank and their fires could be seen.  A small party of the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF, under Sgts MULLINS and WALKER, who were accidentally left in the village by the canal bank, observed German patrols cross the canal at day break, followed by infantry columns.

Following the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS, the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF retired along the road towards DOUR and then Eastwards towards WASMES.  Part of the Battalion Transport, with Capt LEDGARD, who was leading the way, became detached in the darkness owing to the fall of a transport horse in a cart and consequent delay and were temporarily lost to the Battalion.

 

The Battalion was halted for two hours rest in a cornfield one and a half miles from WASMES, near the LES PETITES FAILLIES.  C Coy came in to bivouac, having left the canal bank finally about 12:00 am.  The Machine Gun Section with them.  The Machine Gun Section brought Lt PEPYS' body with them, having had no opportunity of burying him.

 

24th Aug 1914.  Monday.  Those who were wet through from wading across the dykes, found little rest during the two hours halt but all buried themselves in the corn, which had just been cut and the sleepers were hard to awaken and indeed, to discover in some cases, when the word was passed round to fall in.  At 4:00 am, when the dawn was showing, the Battalion was on its way into WASMES.  It was difficult to get precise information about the new line.  The CHESHIRE REGT Battalion (15th INF BDE), was passed in LITTLE HORNU, nearer WASMES.  Artillery positions were in course of preparation and the men of the 15th INF BDE were digging trenches for the incoming Brigades.  The 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF made a detour across the fields to avoid drawing the fire of the enemy, whose batteries were already opening fire further to the East.  All night long, to the North and East, patches of the country had been lit up by the flames of burning villages and it was obvious that the enemy were in close proximity.  A halt was made in an open space under an avenue of trees on the outskirts of the town.  Preparations for breakfast at once commenced.  Lt PEPYS' body was decently buried.   Endeavours were made to gain touch with the HQ and other Battalions of the 13th INF BDE.  The KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS were found to be a few hundred yards further on.  Lt EGERTON, galloper to Brig Gen CUTHBERT arrived and indicated the position to be occupied by the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF.

An advance was then made forward about a mile, a line of half dug trenches was struck, which connected on the left with trenches which the SHROPSHIRE REGT, probably 96th Bn (of 14th INF BDE) ??? were digging and on the right were masked by a long line of railway buildings which presented a blank wall facing us.  Beyond this again, Eastwards, were the WEST RIDING REGT but their trenches could not be seen owing to the buildings in the corner of the town, which intervened.  A party of this Battalion on a slag-heap in advance of the railway buildings, was located.

 

Owing to the fact that the trenches, that apparently had been commenced for our occupation, were commanded by the slag-heaps to the immediate fronts North and East of them, A and B Coys of the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF and the Machine Gun Section, were advanced across the branch railway line which crossed their front and held in readiness for occupation of the line of slag-heaps should the enemy come on.  Maj YATE, who commanded these Companies, himself occupied a position of observation, with one Platoon, (2 Lt HIBBERT's).  Near him was Maj EUSTACE JONES, who, from this forward position, commanded his Howitzer battery, (52nd Bty RFA), which was now in position in the line of the half dug trenches.

 

The other two Companies were in support South of the railway line, with Battalion HQ established on a slag-heap in line with the horses of the 52nd Bty RFA.  Communication was established by cyclist orderly with 13th INF BDE HQ and all Companies and the Machine Gun Section.

 

The forward Companies of the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF occupied their position from about 6:00 am.  Immediately across their front and parallel to it, some Companies of the WEST KENT REGT were entrenched about 400 yards forward.  The ground between the slag-heaps and a village to the North East was absolutely flat and intersected by low hedge rows.  The road to the village ran perpendicularly through the position and the entrances to the village were some 2000 yards to our front.  The enemy's troops were continually debouching from the village but were always caught by the fire of the 52nd Bty RFA, who made splendid practice.  The bulk of the enemy's force seemed to move Southwards towards the position East of us, as no attack was developed immediate against our front, though forces of the enemy appeared to extend as if to attack, covered by their machine guns which occupied a line of cottages on the edge of the village.  These cottages were shelled to pieces by the 52nd Bty RFA, who followed with their fire, the enemy in their Southward advance, until the guns reached the limit of their traverse.

 

Our forward Companies never opened fire or gave away their position until the retirement commenced.

 

About 10:00 am, a preliminary order to prepare for retirement was received.  The retirement was to be conducted in conjunction with the field batteries, to whom the order was to be passed.  After the 52nd Howitzer Battery had been withdrawn, C Coy, 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF, fell back to the HQ slag-heap and took up a position to cover the retirement of the other Companies.  Finally B Coy actually came away at about 12:00 pm.  Positions were taken up by alternate Companies until the whole Battalion had passed the end of the road to BAVAI, by which we were to retire, the enemy infantry coming on very slowly but pursuing vigorously with his artillery fire.  In the meantime, the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS, who had been left by the Brigadier to help cover the retirement, had been able to continue their march.  A Company of the MANCHESTER REGT Battalion of the 14th INF BDE and our own C Coy, who continued to hold the East of the slag-heap, which our HQ had previously occupied, came in for a heavy artillery shelling as they came away.  A little delay again was caused while Maj BALLARD's Battery of RFA extricated itself under a fierce fire.  The 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF Battalion suffered a few casualties from the gun fire in the retirement. 

 

The 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF now formed the Rear Guard, passing Southwards by the road to WARQUIGNIES and HOUDAIN.  Near WARQUIGNIES a halt was made while our guns came into action to the North and orders were shortly afterwards received to resume the march in column along the road.  The road became much blocked and the marching slow, owing to the congestion but HOUDAIN was reached in the evening and directions received there on the bridge to proceed, skirting BAVAI and to join the remainder of the 13th INF BDE, who were found in bivouac, one and a half miles West of BAVAI.  The Division was concentrated here.  The 3rd DIV was hard by.

A roll was called.  Our casualties, (killed, wounded and missing) amounted to, one Officer and 27 NCOs and men only. 

The Quartermaster and part of the Battalion Transport and personnel were absent.  Emergency rations were opened.  Men bedded down in freshly cut corn.  The Battalion furnished one or two small picquets.

Edited 7 March , 2017 by Guest

[Guest]

5th Division, 14th Infantry Brigade

 

1st Bn East Surrey Regiment

22nd Aug 1914.  BERMERIES to MONS CANAL.  Left billets at 7:15 am.  Crossed Belgian frontier about 9:00 am and marching via ELOUGES reached MONS CONDE canal about 3:00 pm,  after a hot march of some 18 miles, made more trying by the cobbled roads of BELGIUM.  

The Battalion held the right half of the line from the canal railway bridge just NW of L in LES HERBIERES to the VILLE POMMEROEUL Road, the 1st Bn DUKE OF CORNWALL'S LIGHT INF the left half of this as the outpost position of the 14th INF BDE, the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS of the 13th INF BDE continuing the outpost line on our right, the 15th INF BDE was in Reserve. At once began strengthening position.  No supplies and men ordered to eat half their rations.

 

The Battalion was disposed as follows:

Railway bridge and immediate surroundings, C Coy under Capt J P BENSON and Machine Gun Section under Lt T H DARWELL.

Road bridge over canal on the left of our frontage, B Coy under Capt E M WOULFE-FLANAGAN, with D Coy under Capt M J MINOGUE along the canal South bank connecting the two.

 

HQ in the Canal Employee's House on the bank between D & B Coys.  
A Coy in Reserve in small wood about 500 yards behind HQ.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  The morning opened misty & wet, clearing about 10:00 am.  Construction of fire trenches continued and clearing of foreground North of canal commenced. Tools for this purpose not arriving previous night.  

 

Owing to houses on North of canal running down to railway bridge, C Coy was obliged to hold advanced position on North bank, so it was decided to hold A Coy up in their immediate support on the South bank, the whole of this section under Maj H S TEW.  

 

Two Coys of the 2nd Bn SUFFOLK REGT were ordered up in Reserve about 12:00 pm.  One of these was sent over canal to assist in clearing the foreground but owing to the advance of the Germans about 1:00 pm all work had to cease and most of this Company was drawn into the fire trenches along with C Coy.  The attack was soon pressed and several casualties quickly occurred in this section including Capt J P BENSON, dangerously wounded.

All posts were ordered to offer as much resistance as possible and adjoining posts mutually arranged accordingly with one another but the Battalion on the left had already been ordered to take up a fresh position further South.

 

By 3:00 pm the attack was being pressed all along the line and A Coy was now absorbed in the firing line.  The Machine Gun Section from its position on the railway bridge did excellent work and coupled with the steady firing of the men in the trenches helped much to delay the enemy's advance.  

About 6:00 pm the enemy's guns at short range blew in the KING'S OWN SCOTTISH BORDERERS barricade compelling them to withdraw South of canal.  This enabled the enemy to enfilade our right section which in turn also withdrew South of the canal, covered by A Coy.  

 

About 7:00 pm the railway bridge, which had previously been prepared for destruction, was blown up.  This was the prearranged signal for the road bridge, held by B Coy, to be also blown up.  This was effected none too soon as the last man had only just left the house loopholed and prepared for defence at the bridge head when an enemy's shell completely destroyed it.  

 

The withdrawal to South of the River HAINE, in accordance with previous instructions received, was then carried out in good order by alternate positions of the line and covered finally by the remainder of the 2nd Bn SUFFOLK REGT.  
 

24th Aug 1914.  The Battalion paraded at 4:00 am and went into Reserve to the 14th INF BDE at DOUR, the remainder of the Brigade occupying a defensive position previously prepared by the 15th INF BDE, the Commanding Officer and Adjt carrying out a reconnaissance in case the Battalion was ordered to reinforce.  

Meanwhile the Battalion, under Maj H S TEW was ordered to WIHERIES to act as a Flank Guard during the retirement of the Division, the Battalion eventually becoming the Rear Guard.  The rear two Coys under Maj TEW were kept out on the flank by a Div Staff Officer under whose orders they were finally withdrawn.  

Meanwhile other units had joined the road in rear of the other half Battalion.  This, coupled with conflicting orders as to destination that night caused Maj TEW's Coy to become detached.  

 

The heat and length of march proved very trying.  

Bivouacked in a field at ST WAAST LES BAVAY about 7:00 pm.

 

1st Bn Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry

22nd Aug 1914.  March continued.  Passed Belgian Frontier at 9:20 am.  Reached the MONS - CONDE canal about 4:00 pm.

LE PETIT CREPIN, MONS CANAL.  Here the Battalion was detailed for outpost duty.  We were practically the left of the line but a troop of the 2nd LIFE GUARDS was watching Lock no 5 and other bridges on our left, while the 1st Bn EAST SURREY REGT continued the line to the right.

 

A Coy (Maj T H F PRICE) occupied the portion of the line of the South bank of the canal from the 1st Bn EAST SURREY REGT westward.  One platoon of B Coy (Capt A H ROMILLY) continued this line, the remaining three platoons being entrenched to form a bridge head in a semi-circle around the buildings of LE PETIT CREPIN.  About one dozen trenches were made in all on the North side of the canal.  Field of fire excellent and enemy's advance obstructed by trenches, dykes and wires.  The weakest point was the difficulty of bringing fire to bear upon the long straight road to VILLE POMMEROEUL.  The railway siding was completely filled with passenger rolling stock on the East side, while on both sides were rows of trees.  The trenches were well constructed, for fire standing and excellently concealed.

 

During the day a party of the 5th DIV Cyclists went to the front to reconnoitre and the OC Section of the outposts did his utmost but without success to find out whether they were still in front or not.  As a matter of fact they had returned by another route.

 

Our machine gun was in action at point A to secure the main road to the North.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  At 6:00 am the first actual contact with the enemy took place.  On the South side of the bye-road at point B 2 Lt F C B SAVILE was occupying a trench with a section of No.6 Platoon.  A sentry post of three private soldiers was established at a bend in the road about a couple of hundred yards to his front.  A strong officers patrol of German Dragoons, apparently unconscious of any danger, taking no military precautions but riding along in close order, laughing and talking, rode up to the group.  Our men were in a ditch at the road-side and withheld their fire.  The German Officer suddenly saw them and began to fumble for his revolver, whereupon Pte SAMBROOK, one of the group, shot him through the body at point blank.  The patrol wheeled about and the remaining two men fired into them with effect.  The German Officer fell forward on to the neck of his horse but was successfully led away by his men.  The sentry post fell back untouched upon the trench in rear.

 

MONS CANAL 6:30 pm.  About half an hour later the hostile patrol returned apparently expecting to find the sentry post in its original position.  Being disappointed in this they advance along the bye-road to within 100 yards or less of 2 Lt F C B SAVILE's trench.  This was so admirably concealed as to be almost invisible.  The first intimation of danger that they received was a hail of bullets in their ranks.  The estimates of the enemy's losses vary greatly but it is a fact that the villages brought in a number of trophies, arms, equipment & clothing while several dead horses remained in the road.

 

At about 8:00 am one of the German Dragoons was brought in by the villagers, badly wounded in the head but quite sensible and able to stand.  He was blubbering and begging for mercy and appeared to be quite unable to understand the kind treatment that he received in our hands.  He was carried in a stretcher to the Reserve of the Outposts.  Subsequently the Medical Officer reported that, from his observation of the mans vomit, his stomach was absolutely empty except for some oats which he has evidently been sharing with his horse, thus testifying to the arduous nature of recent German operations.

No further encounters took place at this point.

 

7:00 am MONS CANAL  In the meanwhile a patrol of German Lancers had ridden towards our post, point A, from the direction of VILLE POMMEROEUL.  This party also was apparently all unconscious of danger.  A machine gun and the personnel of the team was waiting for this near approach when some fool in a trench on our left opened fire prematurely at about 700 yards and having moreover a very bad field of fire.  In the event only one horse was killed.  Later the rider was brought in uninjured.  This man exhibited a similar state of terror to that which had possessed his Dragoon comrade.The result of these little affairs was to establish the fact that representatives of at least two hostile Cavalry Regiments were in our immediate front.

 

Later in the day our mounted troops and Cyclists went to the front and came in contact with the enemy.  They were supported by portions of C and D COYs but the latter did not move far beyond the outpost line.  On their return neither our advanced troops nor any other person gave the smallest piece of information to the OC Outposts at LE PETIT CREPIN as to what he might expect to find himself opposed to but this is merely a symptom of the extraordinary secrecy in all things great and small which is maintained by one and all throughout this war.

 

24th Aug 1914.  The portion allocated to our Regiment began from the Railway Halt of BOIS BOUSSU on our left, across the DOUR - BOUSSU road to the Railway Works on the right.  The front faced Northward.  In spite of the fact that none of the men had any rest at night, that rations had failed on the day before, which had been a strenuous one for all, the men took to their picks and shovels with a will.  Indeed the general impression in the minds of all ranks was that here and now the great battle of the war was to be fought, that at DOUR, with our assistance, France was about to stay the further advance of her foe.

Except for the annihilation of a Cavalry patrol, which, after the manner of German Cavalry patrols, rode straight up to our position in search of its certain fate, our Regiment never struck a blow.

 

At 11:00 am the surprising order was received - a general retirement.  The Regimental Officer can see no further than his own nose and he is not in the confidence of the chiefs of the army.  According to some theories it had never seriously been intended to hold DOURS, according to others the peace had been turned, while some have it that the French have been forced to retire, leaving us unsupported.  Whatever the true reason all that remained to us was to comply with our instructions.  Many units suffered great losses in withdrawing but again fortune favoured us.  Although from every point of vantage the hills were belching forth fire and shell and although death and destruction surrounded our men upon all sides we escaped from the inferno without the loss of more than four or five men, wounded and captured.

 

By 12:30 pm, the Battalion, having covered the retirement of the 2nd Bn MANCHESTER REGT, who had held the right rear flank position to the Brigade, had completed the retirement in good order.  The route then lay first in a South Westerly then Southerly direction.  When a short distance from BLAUGIES we were ordered to take in a temporary position on the East side of the DOUR - BLAUGIES road to cover the retirement of some Artillery and Infantry who were still evacuating DOUR.

 

After holding the position for about an hour the order was received to continue the retirement, which was carried out without further incident, as regards the 14th INF BDE, by way of BLAUGIES  and HOUDAIN to the main BAVAY - ST WAAST LES BAVAY road, when a halt was made to allow the 3rd DIV to cross us en route for a position on our Western flank.  Orders were here received to the effect that the Regiment would billet in ST WAAST LES BAVAY, an order which was most welcome to our much fatigued Troops who had been, practically speaking, perpetually at work since 4:00 pm on the 22nd instant.  However, the situation was not to permit of this much needed rest and on arriving at ST WAAST the order was received that the Battalion was to pass through and entrench an outpost position on the high ground about ¾ mile West of the village, getting into touch on our left with the 3rd DIV.  Accordingly, just as night was falling, the position for the trenches having been selected & the tool wagons brought up, digging was commenced.  

Neither Officer nor man had eaten something since 11:00 am and rations, only of a scant nature, could be issued to the men that night.  Water was also a scarcity.  However the men set to work with a will and by dawn the next morning a position of sufficient strength was prepared to receive such attack as the enemy might thing fit to bring against this flank.

 

2nd Bn Suffolk Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  7:00 am  Marched off at head of Brigade.  A & B Coys forming the Advance Guard.

2:00 pm  Arrived at HAININ and went into billets.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Guns heard all the morning.

1:00 pm  C & D Coys sent off to take up an outpost position along the canal facing N.

4:00 pm till dusk.  Outposts engaged in which 3 men were killed and 2 Lt V M G PHILLIPS wounded.

A retirement was ordered.

 

24th Aug 1914.  A & B Coys took up outpost positions to cover the retirement.

2:00 am  C & D Coys arrive in DOUR.

4:00 am  Battalion occupies trenches at BOIS DE BOUSSU

11:00 am Retirement was ordered.

6:00 pm Bivouac at BAVAY.

 

2nd Bn Manchester Regt

22nd Aug 1914.  Marched to HAININ about 15 miles.

 

23rd Aug 1914.  Battalion took up a position on canal in front of [blank]

 

24th Aug 1914.  Reached DOUR at 2:30 am.  

Marched at 4:00 am to position among dumps & mines.  3 ½ miles off  fought defensive action till 2:00 pm, then retired to ST WAAST 7 miles, lost back parts of machine gun limbered wagon & a few men.

[Guest]

5th Division, 15th Infantry Brigade

 

1st Bn Norfolk Regt

[Diary missing]

 

1st Bn Bedfordshire Regt

22nd Aug 1914. Billeted at BOIS DE BOUSSU (BELGIUM) about 6 miles from MONS

 

23rd Aug 1914. About midday ordered to proceed to WASMES with 2 Companies 1st Bn BEDFORDSHIRE REGT to reconnoitre position and dig trenches. No immediate fighting expected. Started digging. Men were unexpectedly shelled: enemy attacked later in afternoon and we had a few casualties. CO recalled personally and ordered to proceed with remaining half Battalion to PATURAGES to take up line between DORSETSHIRE REGT and 3rd DIV. Half Battalion at WASMES to join HQ of Battalion at PATURAGES. 

Reached PATURAGES after dark. No trace of 3rd DIV. Enemy reported by inhabitants to be approaching in force along road from MONS towards FRAMERIES. Officers patrol sent out to reconnoitre confirmed report and found 3rd DIV left near FRAMERIES nearly 2 miles to our right rear. Enemy located halted about 2 miles from FRAMERIES. 

Reported situation to DIV HQ some miles in rear by breaking into railway telegraph and telephone room and using instruments. Gen HAKING with three Battalions sent up to fill up gap on our right before daybreak. There was also a gap between our left and the DORSETSHIRE REGT which was eventually lightly held by parties from each regiment. The 2 Companies at WASMES were unable to disengage themselves from enemy until after dark when they moved to join HQ at PATURAGES arriving before daybreak.

 

24th Aug 1914. Enemy attacked soon after daylight, C Coy who were holding houses and bridges along the railway line were the first to be engaged. They were eventually driven back slowly as houses were knocked down by shells.

Enemy attacked in strength on our right which rested on a high mound of slag, occupied by other units. Found at about 11:00 am that the Battalion on our right under Gen HAKING had withdrawn or retired, leaving our right in the air, with the enemy in close proximity. Reported situation to Brigadier 15th INF BDE. Soon after 12:00 noon Battalion commenced retirement in three columns moving Westward covered by small rear guard. Then moved SW to ATHIS. A considerable portion of the Battalion detached in action had not yet rejoined.

 

Capt J McM MILLING, Lt C E G SHEARMAN wounded. About 66 Other Ranks killed wounded and missing. On arrival at ATHIS with rather more than Half Battalion (men very tired and footsore) at once called upon as escort to Artillery. Move about 2 miles with guns preceded by Cavalry towards wood. Extended men over open cornfield. Guns at once moved and again moved men. RA officer galloped up and said guns unable to remain as Cavalry had passed. Left in air without orders. Retired slowly and formed up under cover. Proceeded towards BAVAY and found rest of Battalion holding road. Moved South and rejoined remainder of 15th INF BDE.

 

1st Bn Cheshire Regt

22nd Aug 1914. 6:30 am. Marched to BOIS DE BOUSSU arriving at 2:00 pm. Billeted in this town. 

Eleven men admitted to hospital.

 

23rd Aug 1914. At 12:00 noon A and B Coys moved out and entrenched position 1½ miles East of BOIS DE BOUSSU facing North West under Lt Col BOGER. 

At 8:00 pm C and D Coys moved to HORNU under Maj STAYPLTON and took up and commenced to entrench a position facing North East astride the major road.

 

24th Aug 1914. 3:00 am. C and B Coys rejoined  A and B Coys
8:00 am The 2nd Bn MANCHESTER REGT relieved us.

 

10:00 am. The Battalion marched to DOUR STATION arriving there at 11:45 am. The GOC 5th DIV gave Col BALLARD, 1st Bn NORFOLK REGT orders to take the 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT, 1st Bn NORFOLK REGT and 119th Bty RFA and take up a position facing N West along the ELOUGES - AUDREGNIES Road and act as a flank guard to the 2nd Bn MANCHESTER REGT and the troops entrenched round WASMES in their retirement.

1:00 pm. In position. 1st Bn NORFOLK REGT on the Railway Embankment, 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT Right on the 4th Kilo stone D Coy 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT left, B Coy holding the village of AUDREGNIES - Order of Coys; B, A, C, D. 

Masses of the enemy were seen moving out of QUIEVRAIN and their Artillery and Machine Guns opened a very hot fire on the Infantry and Cavalry and RHA who were operating against the German cavalry in the valley 1¼ miles to the SE of QUIEVRAIN.

 

2:30 pm. I am informed that Col BALLARD gave orders to retire in an Easterly direction. These orders never reached the 2 front platoons of D Coy under command of Capt W S RICH who held on to the position he had reached in front of the rest of the line till 4:00 pm by which hour all troops had retired. 

Lt W G R ELLIOT behaved with great gallantry in returning during the retirement and carrying away a wounded man under an intensely hot fire he being shot through both ankles when within 3 yards of the sunken road to which he eventually took this man  -  Lt ELLIOT was left on the field (witness Cpl OFORD 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT).

 

4:45 pm. About 100 men were collected in ATHIS.

 

9:00 pm. At roll call in bivouac at LES BAVAY there were 6 Officers and 1 Warrant officer and 199 men - the Strength marching out at 7:30 am on the morning of the 24th inst was 27 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 933 men -  a loss of 78% most of which was caused in the withdrawal.

 

Account of the Action of the 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, Monday August 24th 1914 by Capt J L SHORE 

Ref Map: Belgium, MONS, Sheet 7A 1:100,000

At noon on Sunday Aug 23rd A an B Coys under Lt Col BOGER marched out from BOIS DE BOUSSY and entrenched a line from X roads ¼ mile North of P in CHAMPS DES to the 2nd U of BOIS DE BOUSSU facing North West and North. About 8:00 pm on Sunday Aug 23rd C and D Coys under Maj CHETWYND-STAYPLTON marched to HORNU to fill up the gap between the 13th INF BDE on the left and ?? Brigade on the right astride the MONS ROAD.

 

At 3:00 am on Monday Aug 24th C and D Coys were withdrawn to the X Roads in rear of the trenches of A and B Coys.
About 8:00 am the Battalion was relieved by the MANCHSETSER REGT and about 10:00 am the Battalion marched to DOUR STATION arriving at 11:45 am.The GOC 5th DIV ordered Col BALLARD to take the NORFOLK REGT and CHESHIRE REGT and 119th Battery to a position SW of ELOUGES. At 1:00 pm the Infantry were in position facing North West along the ELOUGES - AUDREGNIES road - the 1st Bn NORFOLK REGT on the right.

 

I am informed Col BALLARD ordered the retirement at 2:30 pm in an easterly direction. The strength of the 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT on the morning of August 24th was 27 Officers and 934 men. The strength on marching into bivouac near the V of LES BAVAY at 9:00 pm 24th inst. was 6 Officers and 200 men.

PONTOISE. August 29th 1914. J L SHORE Captain, Commanding 1st Bn Cheshire Regiment

Amplified Account of the Action of the CHESHIRE REGT at ELOUGE by Capt J L SHORE

Battalion lined out in the following order: D Coy on the right, C, A and B Coys facing NW along the ELOUGES - AUDREGNIES road. The Right of D Coy the 4th milestone. B Coy were originally Right Flank Guard to the battalion and on the head of the Battalion halting at the milestone and facing right extending and marching through it the Flank Guards halted and OC B Coy went to get orders from the CO. The Adjt gave him orders to come in on the left of the line on the left of A Coy and on moving along the road to the House on the right of the road several men of the Coy were hit by rifle fire. The CO gave OC B Coy orders to move his Coy down the hill and hold the village of AUDREGNIES. The sunken road at this time was a seething mass of cavalry horses with shell and rifle bullets coming into it and it was with difficulty that the infantry could pass down the road. When about 25 were through they were placed in position facing NW and another 25 collected and placed on their left when the next 25 were collected they were taken down into the village of AUDREGNIES by OC C Coy. Here the CO of the 4th DRAGOON GUARDS gave orders that infantry were wanted at once to hold the village facing NW and to hurry on through the last gate on the left of road to the sugar factory and hold the wall of the garden. These men were afterwards increased to about 50 men by Lt NEWSON's platoon. The 4th DRAGOON GUARDS Machine Gun was in action on the road on the right of the garden wall. 

 

About 3 o'clock the CO 4th DRAGOON GUARDS gave orders that all the guns were moving behind the BOIS d'AUDREGNIES and that he was retiring and this party was to be Rear Guard. Capt JOLLIFFE then came down into the village and reported he was in touch with A Coy Position in the village was explained to him and he was ordered to keep in touch with A Coy. Soon after a Staff Officer of Gen GOUGH's Cav BDE rode into the village and gave orders for a retirement in an Easterly direction adding that the rest if the Infantry had already retired and the Rear Guard was to be  sure and not delay and get cut off. The Rear Guards shortly afterwards retired through AUDREGNIES leaving word with some Cavalry there that they were retiring and they retired by the road running Eastwards North of the BOIS de AUDREGNIES to a point on it  ½ mile North of the N in BOULOGNE. Here as no Infantry we to be seen at all and the BOIS D'AUDREGNIES was being heavily shelled and the village of ????? was also being shelled our attempt  was made  to move back  into the firing line. At the Southern exit of the village of WIHERIES a Staff Officer of the 14th INF BDE directed them to retire in the direction of R??? but as this again led further from the battle a second attempt was made to turn into it by going off in a North Easterly direction towards ??? No sound of rifle fire was heard during the whole of B Coy's retirement. On the way the 14th INF BDE was met with who said they had orders to retire and that the 13th INF BDE were on their left rear. This party was attached to Gen ROLT and marched into ATHIS where the 1st Line A Transport was met with and the remainder of the Battalion with Capt RICH of D Coy and Lt GROVES of C Coy. Col BALLARD of the 1st Bn NORFOLK REGT also joined here with his Battalion. On hearing of stragglers wanting help the Senior Officers of the battalion asked permission of a Staff Officer for leave to take back what men he had to help them in. This permission was refused. 

 

The remainder of B Coy  and A Coy were on the commencement of the action about 200 yards to the North of the Road - they were lying in the open on the  and ridge from the road with a wire fence in front of them and were heavily shelled and fired at by machine guns. There was a hot rifle fire then machine guns and shell fire.

 

Capt JOLLIFFE was arranging with Lt MATTSON for charging the German Infantry which was only 200 yards away when I am informed Maj STAYPLTON gave the order for the retirement. Part of B Coy, all of A Coy and some of C Coy retired into the sunken road. Here the shell fire was very heavy and Maj STAYPLTON gave the order to retire through the BOIS D'AUDREGNIES - Between the road and this wood where 6 wire fences which the men got caught up in and under a heavy rifle fire and machine gun fire and shell fire. They were heavily shelled in the wood and in retiring from it in the direction of ATHIS.

 

The remainder of C Coy which had advanced 200 yards from the road came under an immediate heavy shell fire and rifle fire at 1,100 yards, a force estimated at 3,000 infantry advanced on them on which rapid fire was directed. I am informed Cpl HARRAP ordered the retirement, there were only about 30 men in this part of C Coy's line able to retire the rest were all killed or wounded including Capt JACKSON and Lt K T FROST. Capt DUGMORE twice rallied the men in their retirement but the fire was very hot indeed and he was last seen with 4 men.

 

D Coy was on the right of the line and the two leading platoons advanced as far as the railway Terminus ½ mile North West of the 4th Milestone - these were under the command of Capt W S RICH who received no orders to retire at 2:30 pm and held on till 4:30 pm . He was the last to retire and was very instrumental in delaying the enemy's advance on the column retiring through ATHIS. Most of the casualties of this company occurred in the retirement though Capt RICH believes that some of his Company may have been cut off by the advance of the enemy from the direction of ???

J L SHORE Capt, Commanding 1st Bn CHESHIRE REGT
 

1st Bn Dorsetshire Regt

22nd Aug 1914. Marched via BAVAY, HOUDAIN-LEZ-BAVAY, ATHIS to DOUR, where Battalion billeted, remainder of Brigade being at BOIS DE BOUSSU. 

Distance - 15 miles.

Weather - fine and very hot. Very trying for marching.

 

23rd Aug 1914. Remained in billets at DOUR during morning.
12:00 Noon Orders received for ½ Battalions of Brigade to proceed as follows at once taking all tools for entrenching.

½ Bn NORFOLK REGT - HALTE
½ Bn CHESHIRE REGT - HORNU
½ Bn BEDFORDSHIRE REGT – RAILWAY BRIDGE ½ m North of W of WASMES
½ Bn DORSETSHIRE REGT – RAILWAY BRIDGE ½ m North of W of WASMES

12:30 pm C & D Coys with tool limbers but no ammunition carts marched to HALTE and thence via railway line to rendezvous. Tool limber of Bde HQ which had been ordered to follow the DORSETSHIRE REGT did not form and was not heard of afterwards. As soon as tool limbers could be brought up - they having been delayed on the railway line - C Coy commenced entrenching on the left of the BEDFORDSHIRE REGT, D Coy remaining temporarily in Reserve. Later D Coy was ordered to entrench on the right of the BEDFORDSHIRE REGT.

 

4:10 pm Message received from 15th INF BDE that 3rd DIV was retiring to a position South of MONS and that 15th INF BDE was to block the MARIETTE - PATURAGES ROAD.

5:00 pm Enemy opened artillery fire but shells passed over trenches.

5:30 pm OC D Coy reported Battalion of enemy's Infantry 1000 yards North of his trenches.

6:00 pm Message sent to Brigade asking for SAA Carts.

7:10 pm OC C Coy reported enemy's Infantry scouts approaching his trenches.

7:15 pm Enemy's Infantry seen in front of D Coy's trenches.

7:30 pm Heavy shelling by enemy of street just South of RAILWAY BRIDGE - no casualties.

8:30 pm Maj R T ROPER  with Battalion HQ, A & B Coys, and MG Section and 1st Line Transport assembled at RAILWAY BRIDGE. A Coy sent to furlong left of C Coy, 2 Platoons being subsequently withdrawn to the RAILWAY BRIDGE. B Coy were ordered to proceed at dawn to get in touch with the CHESHIRE REGT about HORNU.

 

24th Aug 1914. 2:00 am Orders received from 15th INF BDE (timed 11:55 pm) ordering Battalion to move to P of PATURAGES as soon as relieved by a unit of 13th INF BDE.

4:00 am Our guns opened, followed by those of enemy.

 

4:30 am Message received from Capt H S WILLIAMS Commanding B Coy (timed 4:00 am) that he was at Bridge 600 yards West North West of W in WASMES in touch with A Coy, but not in touch with the CHESHIRE REGT.

 

6:00 am D Coy relieved by A Coy 2nd Bn WEST RIDING REGT and rejoined at RAILWAY BRIDGE. Subsequently C Coy the 2 Platoons A Coy relieved by same Battalion, but instead of rejoining at RAILWAY BRIDGE these units with the exception of about 1 Platoon under Maj C SAUNDERS retired to position occupied by B Coy (see below) and took part in the retirement with that Coy.

 

8:00 am (about) Battalion HQ with 2 Platoons A Coy, D Coy and MG Section 1st Line Transport marched to P of PATURAGES where HQ was established. The two Platoons of A Coy were at once sent to support the 1st Bn BEDFORDSHIRE REGT in a square near the Church. 1st Line Transport was directed to retire first but in order to avoid steep hill through PETIT WASMES was sent by Brigadier by a more southerly road.

 

10:30 am (about) 1st Line Transport ambushed by hostile infantry. All vehicles escaped except the two SAA Carts owing to coolness of Lt C F M MARGETTS, Transport Officer, who held back the enemy with his revolver, though himself wounded.

 

11:00 am (about) General retirement of 1st Bn BEDFORDSHIRE REGT & 1st Bn DORSETSHIRE REGT via PETIT WASMES - WARQUIGNIES to BLAUGIES.

3:00 pm Halted for one hour at BLAUGIES. There joined by bulk of B and C Coys and 2 Platoons A Coy.
Diary of events as far as B Coy is concerned; B Coy moved at dawn into a railway cutting by a bridge 600 yards West North West of W of WASMES. Two Platoons were pushed forward to entrench, about 6:00 am the whole Coy went into the trenches, having part of A Coy on their right and a part of C Coy on their left. The enemy's infantry advanced supported by heavy artillery fire to within 400 yards, but were repulsed. A lull of about 1 hour followed. The enemy then opened a heavy rifle and artillery fire. It was seen that the enemy had worked round both flanks.

 

About 2:00 pm the Coy was ordered to retire and fell back in the direction of BLAUGIES. After the remainder of the Coy had fallen back Capt H S WILLIAMS collected about a dozen men and returned. It was largely due to his energy and example that the retirement of the rest of the Brigade was carried out successfully.

4:00 pm General retirement continued to neighbourhood of ST WAAST LES BAVAY where Brigade bivouacked.

 

Casualties – Officers wounded - Capt R G B M HYSLOP, Lt C F M MARGETTS, Lt W A LEISHMAN
Missing - Lt G A BURNAND

Other Ranks – 12 killed, 49 wounded, 9 missing.

This battle will be known as the Battle of MONS.

Weather - very fine and hot.

[Guest]

Dan  - the above should provide some material to chew on. Happy to shift it to a separate thread and lock it if you prefer. Your call.

 

Edit. I have posted the same on a separate thread (and hopefully it will be locked). ...so you have a choice whether to keep these here or delete them and simply refer to the separate thread where I have dumped the diaries. If you want to delete these ones simply ping the Mods and they will delete. 

 

Link to Mons War Diaries

 

Martin. 

Edited 7 March , 2017 by Guest

[dansparky]

On 07/03/2017 at 19:17, QGE said:

 

David - Not taking my bat home. I simply have interest in an area that goes beyond the GWFs parameters and that will occupy a considerable amount of my limited time. I am grateful for all the information I have been given and I have learned a lot. I hope I have reciprocated in some small way. Anyway, no need to ramble on Dan's thread. 

 

Dan - If you give me the order you would like to see the Mons diaries (I would suggest from right to left i.e East to West along the canal) I will post them as necessary and separately email the spreadsheets to you so you can search them. 

 

 

 

Thanks

 

East to West is perfect that is exactly as I have been reading them, especially as the 4/Middlesex were hit first on the east.  These are most useful for Mons and le cateau, quite a few add info about mobilisation to which is a bonus.  Where these extracts are placed I will leave up to you Martin, you have spent a lot of time and effort getting these transcribed and you should be applauded.   Martin has some of these available on Amazon, some I have purchased, It is such a useful study aid.  I would also add where you want to lock the content is entirely your decision too as it is your work.

 

Warm Regards

Dan

[dansparky]

 

The penny did not drop till i retired for the day, guess it was a very long day.  I am sure Martin will be back, I understand the pull of examining something new, a new challenge.  

 

 His thoughts and insight have been most valuable.  He started the first thread I ever read and contributed to on this forum, those discussion's helped enthuse me on the subject again.  It had been a very difficult couple of years for me, but the discussions on this forum and input from you all have given me a new zeal.  I am very thankful for it, it is a shame I had not found it easier. 

 

Best

D.S.

[Guest]

Might I point out that "The Mons Myth" by Terence Zuber is currently at reduced price from Postscripts Books- online,paper catalogue and usually on Ebay- Hardback is  £7.99 plus a couple of quid postage.

 

     I must stress that I have no commercial connection with Postscript Books-nor, in this instance, the remotest interest in the Zuber stuff anyway. But Postscript do have a different selection of reduced Great War books to "The Works"  Worth keeping an eye

 

"Tea, Rum and Fags" by Alan Weeks-  known in this parish- looks a good bet from the current catalogue

 

 

Edited 12 March , 2018 by Guest

[dansparky]

It is certainly worth the read, i have several times.

[Ken S.]

In regards to German casualties, some reference was made to sources, and trying to determine figures based on regimental histories which usually only list soldiers that were killed; there is, however, also the German casualty lists which have been digitized and indexed. It's possible to search by unit (in some cases) and date when the casualty was published. Using Bloem's Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 12 as an example:

Casualties for I. Battalion between 23 August and 15 September 1914 were printed on pages 775 (112) and 776 (230) for a total of 342

Casualties for II. Battalion between 23 August and 14 September 1914 were printed on pages 1347 (116), 1348 (276), and 1349 (39) for a total of 431

Casualties for F. Battalion between 23 August and 24 September 1914 were printed on pages 1510 with a total of 105

Additional casualties for I. Battalion were published on pages 1509 and 1510, but these may be for late September, so not included here. 

So total casualties reported would be 878

In terms of Bloem's 2nd Company, initially 72 were reported casualties (15 dead).

source: https://des.genealogy.net/eingabe-verlustlisten/search/index