Captured Major - Spring Offensive 1918

[MBrockway]

38 minutes ago, Jon1906 said:

Unfortunately his report ends at the point of his capture. The Fusiliers were holding the canal just south of Jussy. He says "The Germans had penetrated our position on the canal at Jussy and I had launched two counter-attacks with a view to expelling them. I had a strong body of troops on my left flank... so I went forward to use these troops only to find that the Germans were already in occupation of the position." If he was moving to the left, then he was heading into the southern outskirts of Jussy. His final comment was "I had only a runner with me at the time when I was taken - Jussy was then in the possession of the enemy."  Also in his file there is an interesting report from the Govt. Committee on the Treatment of British POWs, but only states "He was captured on 23 March 18 at Jussy, unwounded & aged 33... Like the majority of British officers captured at the opening of the March Offensive he was removed to Rastatt Camp in Baden..." There's more, but it's all about what happened after that, and no details on his capture. The report of Captain George S Pearcy of D Coy shows some entirely natural misunderstanding of what had happened: "Word reached me from left that the enemy had broken right through and Major Dekin (C Coy) had been killed." (He wasn't dead.)  Captain H. Brookling (A Coy) has a little diagram attached to his report, and it shows C Coy to the rear and left of the other Fusilier companies operating as a reserve force, with an arrow pointing to the left (towards Jussy) and the comment "C. Coy. Coy count. attacked + captured 7.30am, 23/3" which matches up pretty well with what Dekin himself said about counter attacking towards Jussy. 

 

 

Any chance of posting this diagram?

 

Regardless of the identity of our major, it sounds like the diagram would be a very useful aid to understanding this action - the KRRC and RB material is thin on detail ... the officers were thin on the ground by the 23rd!

 

Andy & I would greatly appreciate it.

 

Mark

 

[Jon1906]

4 minutes ago, MBrockway said:

 

Any chance of posting this diagram?

 

Regardless of the identity of our major, it sounds like the diagram would be a very useful aid to understanding this action - the KRRC and RB material is thin on detail ... the officers were thin on the ground by the 23rd!

 

Andy & I would greatly appreciate it.

 

Mark

 

 

[Ewan Cormack Wilson]

If you observe the majors ear on the two images ...they are a very good match , both on the large side .

[stiletto_33853]

10 hours ago, pierssc said:

 

 

Somewhere there must be a better version of the photo Jon has found.  Should someone put out a post headed with Dekin’s name and regiment asking for a photo in case fusiliers experts haven’t been looking at what mostly looks like a RB/KRRC thread?

 

Piers

Until a better picture of Dekin can be found then it's supposition again. I have seen pictures of Fusilier officers as prisoners with their collar dogs intact. The reason it became an RB/KRRC thread was this was the area of the 14th Division, not the 18th who were the next division to the right, although the 11th R. F. were in the brigade that was in reserve to support the 14th Div. The helmet insignia is the same as the 8th KRRC, must admit I cannot see a darker fringe around the outside of the triangle, it might be there and I need new glasses.

A small counter attack was conducted by one platoon of the 11th R.F.,  30 men of the Scots Greys and a party of Corps re-inforcements according to the OH, not 2 counter attacks as Dekin claims. However III Corps diary and apps states that the 54th Brigade were at all times being heavily pushed and retiring.

It might be stretching it a bit with the two days, do you know the full story of the Div at this time. Troops of the 14th Div were all over the place, some joining the 18th Div and some the 36th Div as they got separated. Certainly a better image of Dekin would help confirm, but that certainly looks like the embankment.

First glance at the Dekin image did not convince me, and personally I think the Germans and the Major look not so much at ease but reasonably comfortable. There is a good possibility it is Dekin, but once again there are parts that do not fit.

 

Andy

Edited 18 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[Jon1906]

5 minutes ago, stiletto_33853 said:

A small counter attack was conducted by one platoon on the 11th R.F.,  30 men of the Scots Greys and a party of Corps re-inforcements according to the OH, not 2 counter attacks as

Could you tell me what "OH" stands for please.

[stiletto_33853]

Official History, 1918 Volume 1, pages 332, 333 & 334

Edited 18 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[Jon1906]

1 minute ago, stiletto_33853 said:

Official History, 1918 Volume 1

Sorry to be a pain, but could you give me the full title please (or better yet a link to it if it's available online). Official history of the Fusiliers? the KCCR? The 14th Division?

[stiletto_33853]

History of The Great War, Military Operations, France & Belgium, 1918, volume 1, there were 5 volumes for 1918 alone. Compiled by Brig. - Gen.  Sir James E. Edmonds

 

Jon, this is the Official History of the war. Unsure if it's available online, I have a full set at home.

 

Andy

Just now, stiletto_33853 said:

 

 

Edited 18 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[MBrockway]

3 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

History of The Great War, Military Operations, France & Belgium, 1918, volume 1, there were 5 volumes for 1918 alone. Compiled by Brig. - Gen.  Sir James E. Edmonds

 

Jon, this is the Official History of the war. Unsure if it's available online, I have a full set at home.

 

Andy

 

 

Here you go ...

 

Situation map of 36th, 14th (Light) and 18th Division sectors on morning of 22 Mar 1918 ...

 

 

Close-up of Jussy ...

 

The "Bahndamm vor Jussy" of Jens' photo I took to be the railway embankment running ESE to the S of JUSSY.  This was where Lt.-Col. Birch and Captain Redmond set up a defensive line on 23 Mar.

 

'Vor' implies beyond or the other side of Jussy from the German perspective, which seems to fit the ESE embankment better than the two N-S embankments that cross the canal, the easternmost of which is shown on the 11/RF sketch map.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regardless of identifying the captured major, I'm finding this additional examination of the Jussy action most useful.

 

Mark

 

 

[Jon1906]

Thank you so much Andy and Mark. 

A couple of comments. I've been working on the situation of the 11th Fusiliers for a while now, and I'm not very impressed with the OH version of events.   

I don't think it's fair to dismiss Major Dekin's statement that he organized two counter attacks. During the night of the 22nd/23rd German troops made it across the canal and a fight took place on the towpath on the near side of the canal, and the Fusiliers forced the Germans back over the canal. This could well be the first counter attack, and the one the next morning that the OH describes could well be the second one. His claim that "the Germans had penetrated our position on the canal at Jussy and I had launched two counter-attacks with a view to expelling them" seems supported by the facts. 

The majority of the Fusiliers made no attempt to retreat. Only about a platoon under a sergeant retreated across the railway embankment to their south. The rest of the battalion stayed in position and only surrendered at about 2pm after suffering massive casualties. (Even after battalion HQ clerks etc were armed, they had an effective strength of 180 ORs and 8 officers, compared to over 1000 on March 21st). You get rather a different impression from the OH at the top of pg332.

[stiletto_33853]

Jon, Agreed re. the OH to a certain degree, however Edmonds did take into account a lot of personal accounts written many years after the war, a lot of the correspondence can be found in the CAB45 files at Kew between Edmonds, Becke and officers. I have come across a few instances where something has been said in the OH that does not stand up to scrutiny when you look at numerous other accounts. That being said they are a masterful work on what was a momentous task.

Also beware of regimental accounts, there are many cases of these accounts that state such as 11th Blankety blanks retired leaving our flanks open, or we could have made the objective but so and so division retired. The III Corps diaries do make note that the 54th Brigade were pushed heavily and were retiring though.

I have not got the 18th Div diary or the brigade diary. A good division but outside of my area of interest.

There is a good possibility that the picture is of Dekin, but unless confirmed without any doubt then it is just that a possibility, just as the work we did earlier on the KRRC officers were a possibility.

 

Andy

Edited 19 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[stiletto_33853]

For example from the CAB files, Brookling of the 11th R.F., who was also captured on the 23rd, says this

There ia also a few reports from 7th KRRC officers present at Jussy

Edited 19 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[pierssc]

The amount of work which went into writing an Official History is staggering, but that’s not to say that the author could turn every stone, or indeed write down every incident.  I wouldn’t say the OH should be taken as implying there was only one counter-attack: this one seems to have been singled out for particular because it was by such a mixed bag including men who didn’t know how to use a rifle, illustrating the desperate situation.  Nor should we necessarily assume that Dekin’s counter attacks were both significant in size or effect.  But there would have been incidents happening everywhere and extreme confusion and the job of the official historian is to try to make sense of and paint the overall picture.  

 

There’s also a world of difference in evidential terms between someone saying that the “11th Blankety Blanks on our flank retired” and “I had launched two counter-attacks”.  Statements such as the first can’t be taken as gospel because it only shows what the witness thought and he may have had no knowledge as to what actually happened.  The second statement is made from the witness’ own knowledge.  Of course one should be alive to the possibility of exaggeration, embroidery, or even lying.  But are the number of counter-attacks significant in this case?  Dekin says he was at Jussy and captured there.  He was a Major.  His Battalion was there.  I think we all agree that it is a Major in Jens photo.  The photo has detailed information as to place and date which we have no reason to doubt.  Therefore there is a strong possibility that it is Dekin, because he was there at the right time and was captured.  Andy, I agree that it is just a possibility that it is Dekin, as it is still a possibility that it is one of the other officers, but I would go a bit further and say that Dekin is a strong possibility.

 

If another Major was captured at Jussy on the 23rd there is also a strong possibility it could be him.  But were there any?  The German Regimental history speaks of a single Major but also mentions Staff Officers.  Quite what they meant by that isn’t clear (might they have meant the quartermaster, adjutant etc?  I don’t know) but there is no evidence of tabs on this guy.  If there weren’t any other Majors captured that day in or near Jussy then the chances of it being Dekin would become, well, pretty good, wouldn’t you say?  Even allowing for the possibility that it might conceivably be one of the guys captured two days earlier?  But I accept that we really need visual evidence.

 

Like others I am not 100% convinced by the photo we have so far though I don’t think the differences are so great as to be able to say it isn’t Dekin.  This is partly due to the quality of the photo.  Points in favour include the eyes and eyebrows; the general bearing, the chin/jaw; and the ear - though for me there are still questionmarks over that.  It may be that there might be a difference between his right and left ears.  There also seem to be questions over the uniform - no collar dogs (for which there might be an explanation), and the two triangles.  Personally I believe I can see a darker edging to the one on the shoulder but not to the one on the helmet - but I couldn’t say there isn’t one, it could be very thin.  

 

I hope I haven’t offended against protocol by starting a thread with Dekin’s name and regiment in it in the hope that it catches the eye of someone who may have access to a photo.

 

Piers

 

 

 

[pierssc]

Let's try this.  I've flipped the Staffordhire photo, tinted it Sepia, tweaked the levels on Jens', and cropped both. 

 

Allowing for the newpaper picture being taken from his RIGHT, and Jens' from his LEFT, I'm not convinced by that ear!  The captured Major's one seems to be more upright and elongated - but that may be due to the angle at which each photo was taken.

 

 

Edited 19 October , 2018 by pierssc

[MBrockway]

On 18/10/2018 at 13:52, pierssc said:

 

The discussion has mainly been concentrating on the close-up, for obvious reasons.  Let’s step back and look at the uncropped picture in Jens’ first post.  I think it’s a great photo.  The British Major isn’t comfortable, he is tense unlike the Germans who are relaxed.  He is determined to put a brave face on it - chin up, shoulders back, hands clasped behind his back, perhaps to stop them trembling from the shock or the cold or a combination of the two - and we can tell it is cold because some of the Germans are wearing overcoats and gloves and have their hands in their pockets - but he doesn’t want them to think he’s trembling because he’s afraid.  He is surrounded by the enemy, a number of whom are officers.  He’s an object of curiousity to a lot of people - so much so that the guy with a camera takes a photo.  This isn’t a man who has knocked around the command post for a couple of days until they’ve got round to dealing with him.  This seems to me to be a man who was captured only minutes before.  They’re trying to pump him for information which may be of use to them.  When they’ve finished in a few minutes he’ll be sent down the line.

 

Piers

 

Sorry, but I see none of that in this man's demeanour!

 

A good friend of mine at college habitually stood like that and with a similar expression - he was not afraid of much physically, intellectually or socially: crossed the North Sea to Norway in a small open sailing dinghy, rowing Blue, double First and a thoroughly A1 Chap.

 

Our major here just looks damned cross IMHO.

[pierssc]

5 hours ago, MBrockway said:

 

Our major here just looks damned cross IMHO.

 

 

On 18/10/2018 at 17:46, Jon1906 said:

 I think of that scene and I look at this photo, and I see someone who is not just putting on a brave face, but who is actually really really mad. You can just picture it ... going forward to organize an attack, finding the damn bleeping troops who were supposed to have been there weren't bleeping there, and instead walking straight into the bleeping Huns, and being captured as easily as that. Damn and blast it! OK, I know this isn't evidence, but that's how I imagine it to be...

 

Well you and Jon both agree on that!  Which is consistent with his only just having been captured.  Personally I thought having his helmet chinstrap so close to his mouth was a tad defensive, but we all see different things.

 

 

Edited 19 October , 2018 by pierssc

[MBrockway]

48 minutes ago, pierssc said:

 

 

 

Well you and Jon both agree on that!  Which is consistent with his only just having been captured.  Personally I thought having his helmet chinstrap so close to his mouth was a tad defensive, but we all see different things.

 

 

If it had been me I'd be cross for a good few weeks, not hours.

[Jon1906]

15 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

Jon, Agreed re. the OH to a certain degree, however Edmonds did take into account a lot of personal accounts written many years after the war, a lot of the correspondence can be found in the CAB45 files at Kew between Edmonds, Becke and officers. I have come across a few instances where something has been said in the OH that does not stand up to scrutiny when you look at numerous other accounts. That being said they are a masterful work on what was a momentous task.

Also beware of regimental accounts, there are many cases of these accounts that state such as 11th Blankety blanks retired leaving our flanks open, or we could have made the objective but so and so division retired. The III Corps diaries do make note that the 54th Brigade were pushed heavily and were retiring though.

I have not got the 18th Div diary or the brigade diary. A good division but outside of my area of interest.

There is a good possibility that the picture is of Dekin, but unless confirmed without any doubt then it is just that a possibility, just as the work we did earlier on the KRRC officers were a possibility.

 

Andy

In this case I think I'm on pretty secure footing concerning the withdrawal of the Bedfords on the right flank of the Fusiliers because I've got their War Diary too, and it says they pulled back. I've actually got that letter from the archives after Jerry Murland mentioned it in his book Retreat and Rearguard. The archives people couldn't find it even with the reference number from Murland, so the initial search money was wasted, but then I found a friendly PhD student who was visiting the archives and sent him a list of papers to copy for me, and he successfully got Brookling's letter for me. Brookling makes a particular point to stress that he never received the order to retreat. It's not a case here that Brookling is accusing the Bedfords and Northants on his flank of falling back through weakness or anything. It was a tragedy that in that situation of broken communications the units on the right got the order, and the Fusiliers didn't. 

 

On the subject of visiting archives etc., I don't suppose anyone here has visited the Imperial War Museum to get a copy of Colonal Julias G Birch's account of the fight at Jussy? I'd love to see a copy of that...

[stiletto_33853]

Jon,

Be careful, The OH is a remarkable piece of work, and although I have come across a few lets say areas that need closer scrutiny, they are few in number. Regarding the Regimental accounts, most Regiments, units (be that Battalion, Division, Corps or whatever) do sometimes paint things in a rosier light. The battalion war diaries are the most likely to do this in my experience. Lets say the 7th Rifle Brigade, virtually wiped out on the 21st, the officer that wrote the diary up for this period was not even in attendance during these hectic events. Is it accurate?? or relying on what he was told??, does he focus on what someone has told him might have happened concentrating on one particular area and not the battalion as a whole??

Brookline's account was written a decade after events and does concur with Edmonds account, the 11th RF had officers captured on the 23rd, did a similar thing happen that happened in the 7th RB??? So many imponderables.

There are many accounts in the CAB files that help piece things together bit by bit, from Fairburns, 9th Rifle Brigade, Collins, 61st Field Coy. R.E., the Cavalry Brigade commanders right up to say Cochranes account regarding staff ineptitude and inability to grasp the new type of warfare that had descended upon the battlefield. There is a lot of material there.

The Birch papers are on my list to copy at the IWM, I am sure that you are aware of his 8 page statement given in the CAB files??

 

Andy

Edited 20 October , 2018 by stiletto_33853

[Jon1906]

10 hours ago, stiletto_33853 said:

 

The Birch papers are on my list to copy at the IWM, I am sure that you are aware of his 8 page statement given in the CAB files??

 

 

 

Damn, no I missed that one. Is it in CAB 45/192?

[stiletto_33853]

193 along with the other papers I have mentioned here.

 

Andy

[stiletto_33853]

Sorry last page a little out of focus

[Jon1906]

That is very very helpful. I can't thank you enough. I've got a stupid question though ... I guess I've misunderstood something about the National Archives filing system. CAB 45/192 is A-G. CAB 45/193 is H-W. I had assumed that it was divided by the name of the author (so Birch would be in 192). I'm guessing now that they're divided by the regiment name? Fusiliers in 192, KRRC in 193? 

[Jon1906]

Yet another question for our resident experts. I recently got a book from inter-library loan called The Great War from the German Trenches, a Sapper's Memoir. It's the diary of Artur H. Boer. Chapter 18 describes the attack on the Crozat Canal, which is why I got it. It's got some very interesting things about German pontoon boats and bridges etc., but it's also infuriatingly vague on crucial details. For example, he describes the area he was as "on the Somme River between St. Christ and Tergnier." He also repeatedly says he's operating against the French. He says the attack on the Crozat Canal was on March 23rd. He describes working with a Bavarian assault battalion, but is clear they are from a different division than his own. He says "the attack was to begin to the left of us, carried out by an infantry regiment and an engineering company from Magdeburg, with whom we often worked together." After the assault was over, he says "new orders arrived at the division for the troops to move to the village of St. Christ that had just been taken by the infantry. This became rather a long road... in order to avoid the enemy's reach and we had to detour by way of a road five kilometers longer. Later in the day we arrived at this aforementioned village..." The introduction of the book says he was born in the Prussian town of Jarotschin (Jarocin Poland). He joined the Pioneer Corps in 1914. He had a diploma from the Royal Academy of Engineering.

 

Now what he DOESN'T say. He doesn't name his regiment or battalion. He doesn't specify where he was on the Crozat Canal. The fact that he says he was fighing the French would suggest the very southern end around Tergnier, but as near as I can tell (though I could be wrong) his description of an attack across the canal doesn't match the fighting at Tergnier. On the other hand, his mention of St Christ presumably means Saint Christ Brioste? That's a LONG way to the NW of Tergnier. That would suggest he was at a more northerly part of the Crozat Canal. Or is there another St Christ? (Or did he just make a mistake and he meant Saint Simon?) So is there any way to work out what unit he was in, and therefore which sector of the Crozat Canal he was actually attacking? His one physical description is "the other side of the canal was most advantageous for those troops who were able to cross. The entire place was so overgrown with bushes that it gave excellent shelter to the soldiers." The Germans are surprised that they manage to get so many men across the canal without direct opposition before there's an artillery response. 

 

That's it. I'd love some help with this. Can we work out where he was on March 23rd?

[Jon1906]

To answer my own question about Artur Boer, I think he must have been working with the 1st Bavarian Division, the force directly assaulting Jussy. Some details don't align (especially his belief they were fighting the French to get across the canal) but I think he was just confused about that, since the 1st Bavarians did indeed engage the French not long after crossing the canal, so the mistake is understandable since he was a signaler and wasn't directly involved in the forced crossing.