Books on the BEF 1914

[Guest]

Dave, it was a general comment, not specific to that volume. I have edited the post for clarity.

For the past two years I have been digging into as much primary material as I can find on the BEF in 1914. The variations in accounts of the same events are an area that particularly interests me.

As one example, there are a number of accounts of the KOYLI at Le Cateau and there are differences between all of them. It is more interesting because three of the accounts were written by the same person - the CO - who also wrote the early published history. The mythical version has us believe the whole battalion stood its ground to the last and the ragged remnants refused to surrender and made a last desperate charge - something that is even mentioned in a VC citation. None of this is an accurate description in my view. This is based on the accounts of other eyewitnesses. While the CO (Bond) pulls up short of claiming the charge was made, he makes very strong claims that the battalion did not surrender. Given there were 300 KOYLI POWs and just over 100 of these were wounded, one wonders how 200 men became POWs without surrendering. Bond has us believe they were all 'overpowered'. We are also led to believe there were only 19 men at the end, which is rather at odds with the later established fact that there were 200 unwounded KOYLI POWs. One might argue that the mythical version understates the remaining strength of the Battalion by a factor of ten. Bond's three versions of events make one wonder how much of the history he wrote has been sanitised. The charge that never happened is still being recycled in modern publications; see Bird above.

Thankfully it is not difficult to check the accuracy of these early published histories against the raw material. Even some of the raw material is suspect but if we have enough of it we can hope to establish what probably happened. Some years ago I assumed the OH and early published histories were very accurate narratives of events, but the more one reads the more one sees conflicts in versions.

Looking over this thread, with a slightly better understanding than two years ago, I think I would completely revise the list. Some of the later books on the BEF in 1914 have leaned heavily on earlier publications written by the likes of Bond and make the tacit assumption that the OH is accurate. Bird's book is an example of this. I used to make that assumption too, but now I am a lot more cautious of any publication. While the general narratives are typically very well written and a good description of events, these seem to me to be mostly modern rewritings of earlier material. For people needing a basic understanding of events they are probably sufficient.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Rather fortuitously I spent last weekend at an Anglo-French wedding reception with lots of Frenchmen (quelle surprise) who were pretty educated in things relating to the Great War. Two were particularly animated. Both were bemused that the British see/saw their performance in Aug-Sep 1914 in a positive light. "Incroyable" was the mot du jour. The French (that I met) do not see the British contribution as anything other than slightly disappointing even 100 years later. MG

Fair comment. I find the French contribution in 1940 slightly disappointing.

[lostinspace]

Martin,

Thanks for the clarification. In regards to the K.O.Y.L.I., there was a thread on C.A.L. Yate (one of many threads on the subject) that I responded to with Bond's information about the charge not taking place (having just recently obtained a copy of his history) so I have gone down the same path. But I think you have to look at why Bond had to be careful about describing the end of the battle; after all Yate was awarded a V.C. for the 'charge', and then killed himself while in captivity - actually I'm surprised that he (Bond) mentioned the incident at all as it would cast doubt on Yate's V.C., but I guess he had to say something since they were both captured along with the rest of the battalion and being 'overpowered' but not surrendering seemed to fit the bill (that's my take anyway). When you think about it pretty normal human behavior, how often does anyone write about anything with perfect honesty (especially with a V.C. involved)?

Dave

[charlesmessenger]

My feeling is that the French regarded the original Expeditionary Force as an indication that Britain was serious about its commitment to France in that it was prepared to spill British blood in defence of French soil. I don't believe that they ever thought that militarily it was going to make any significant difference - it was too small for that.

Charles M

[Guest]

Martin,

Thanks for the clarification. In regards to the K.O.Y.L.I., there was a thread on C.A.L. Yate (one of many threads on the subject) that I responded to with Bond's information about the charge not taking place (having just recently obtained a copy of his history) so I have gone down the same path. But I think you have to look at why Bond had to be careful about describing the end of the battle; after all Yate was awarded a V.C. for the 'charge', and then killed himself while in captivity - actually I'm surprised that he (Bond) mentioned the incident at all as it would cast doubt on Yate's V.C., but I guess he had to say something since they were both captured along with the rest of the battalion and being 'overpowered' but not surrendering seemed to fit the bill (that's my take anyway). When you think about it pretty normal human behavior, how often does anyone write about anything with perfect honesty (especially with a V.C. involved)?

Dave

Indeed. I have dug quite deeply into the KOYLI and Yate. I have little doubt that he deserved a VC but I also have little doubt the citation does not describe what happened. It is a very good example of how events can be distorted and how these myths take root. Fergusson the 5th Dov commander at Mons had encouraged his troops to fight to the very end - using their fists if necessary. An order that seems rather at odds with the aims At Le Cateau he was similarly instrumental in ensuring the 5th Div saw their role as 'no retreat' - again at odds with the higher commander's aims. It arguably had fairly negative consequences for the Suffolks, KOYLI and RFA on the right flank. None of this mentioned in detail in any history I have read.

Your last comment "how often does anyone write about anything with perfect honesty ...?" hits the very point. Some regimental historians had a strong propensity to carefully select the facts to fit a more flattering version of events ...which is why I have become extremely cautious of all early published accounts. After your reminder I am re-reading Hopkinson's Spectamur Agendo and may revert. MG

[Muerrisch]

Right Martin: you started it, there is a lot to this thread, but please now list, shall we say, the ten books that seem most balanced and nearly honest.

The more I read of the period 1900-1914, and 1914 itself, the more I tend to these views:

1. Giving up "balance of power" for "committing to France/Russia/Belgium" was a gross error error or judgement by Grey and the War Office.

2. Mobilisation and concentration went remarkably well, reflecting great credit on the planners and the reservists who answered the call.

3. General French and his staff were disfunctional, prone to euphoria or panic and either had no idea, or only believed what suited them. The various power-cliques failed to discharge their duty, exercising their prejudices and dislikes at a time of great national peril. A thoroughly nasty bunch.

4. Haig was disgracefully disobedient on several occasions when he had no over-riding need to act as "the man on the spot", such as stopping at Landrecies.

5. Smith-Dorrien was extremely lucky, and some of his juniors had not a clue about tactics in the face of fire-power [forward slopes etc]

6. The performance of battalions was patchy, and I suspect too many COs were a little too old.

7. Interpreting and understanding the conflicting accounts requires a forensic mind far more agile than mine. Even the War Diaries, although primary sources, are very suspect.

[Guest]

Right Martin: you started it, there is a lot to this thread, but please now list, shall we say, the ten books that seem most balanced and nearly honest.

The more I read of the period 1900-1914, and 1914 itself, the more I tend to these views:

1. Giving up "balance of power" for "committing to France/Russia/Belgium" was a gross error error or judgement by Grey and the War Office.

I think the whole strategic thinking on how Britain planned against any threat from mainland Europe was rather muddled. The idea that the BEF of 4 Divisions (6?) could make any significant impact seems rather poorly thought out.

2. Mobilisation and concentration went remarkably well, reflecting great credit on the planners and the reservists who answered the call.

Mobilisation was well rehearsed in previous years. Battalions providing 'Reservists' for other battalions practising mobilisation etc. Something often overlooked. It certainly went extremely smoothly with the exception of boots which seemed to be a universal problem that caused huge problems on the march.

3. General French and his staff were disfunctional, prone to euphoria or panic and either had no idea, or only believed what suited them. The various power-cliques failed to discharge their duty, exercising their prejudices and dislikes at a time of great national peril. A thoroughly nasty bunch. At risk of stating the obvious with the benefit of hindsight I think French and the dysfunctional General Staff were simply appalling.

4. Haig was disgracefully disobedient on several occasions when he had no over-riding need to act as "the man on the spot", such as stopping at Landrecies. A better politician than Smith-Dorrien it would seem. The man who stood and fought and succeeded against all expectations lost his job. The man who panicked and left went on to greater things. Stranger things have happened under the aegis of FSR.

5. Smith-Dorrien was extremely lucky, and some of his juniors had not a clue about tactics in the face of fire-power [forward slopes etc]

Luck is omnipotent. It is about optimising the probabilities and making luck. At Le Cateau I think he made a massive gamble but it largely paid off ...... and he extracted the luck from Kluck but it should not diminish his considerable judgement in deciding to fight and his belief in what the Old Contemptibles could do when push came to shove. On his juniors I think Fergusson (5th Div) warrants some detailed research as he seems to be a common factor in a lot of the confusion. One also needs to be mindful of the prevailing 'loose' command and control exercised in early 1914. Just look how amateurish some of the Operational Orders were compared to later years. That said, if the men at the end of the chain of command don't understand what they have to do, in warfare that is not a good thing.

6. The performance of battalions was patchy, and I suspect too many COs were a little too old. I don't have a strong enough feel if the performance of battalions was largely a function of leadership rather than circumstances. With some of the poor decisions at a much higher level one has to sympathise with the Battalion commanders. MSome fought in total ignorance of the aims and what was going on around them. I imagine the OH was an eye-opener for many of the survivors..

7. Interpreting and understanding the conflicting accounts requires a forensic mind far more agile than mine. Even the War Diaries, although primary sources, are very suspect. All material should be treated with caution. It is a numbers game. The more original material that concurs, the more likely one is to be on the right track. Trying to understand the BEF in 1914 by reading any single source such as the OH is something I would not recommend. Preferably multiple sources.

Grumpy

You have asked a rather complex question - or rather a series of questions. I shall do my best to answer first the Books question and secondly the points you list above.

Books. The books I would recommend as primers (my angle in the OP nearly 2 years ago) would be very different to the books I would recommend for anyone with a reasonable knowledge. For starters I can't think of ten books that adequately cover this complex campaign. Most are narrative descriptions of what happened rather than in-depth analysis of the campaigns. There is a big difference. One needs the former to get up to speed with the received versions on events, but I find little difference between a number of the volumes as they tend to lean heavily on the same sources and consequently are rather homogeneous and generally speaking follow the OH script.

As single volumes I would probably put Ascoli's The Mons Star (despite its age) and Murland's Retreat and Rearguard as the two that I found most informative. You would probably have to add Murland's book on the Aisne to complete the story in depth.

For anyone wanting to get past the generally accepted view of the BEF, I would suggest Zuber's The Months Myth - because it is thought provoking (although controversially so) - and Trial by Fire by Gardner which is the most analytical of the volumes. This latter volume attempts to challenge some of the received wisdom on the performance of the BEF and in particular its leadership, command and control. He is not the first to do it, indeed Terraine is critical of GHQ, but for me, Gardner does some fairly forensic and (I think) impartial analysis. I think he analyses rather than narrates. For me this is critical. I don't agree with all his conclusions but I found it particularly useful in the process of opening one's mind to alternative assessments of the BEF. Ironically to appreciate this book I think it is useful to firstly read the mainstream histories such as Terraine, Ascoli, Caffrey etc to establish the mainstream British view of events. My strongest recommendation would be to read Gardner twice as he covers considerable ground.

The caveat is that I have not read all the books recommended in the long list a few posts ago..... and the more I read the more I veer away from the mainstream view, so I am probably not the best person to ask.

MG

My thoughts on your other questions are in blue above...

MG

[joerookery]

I would suggest Zuber's The Months Myth

I would not. While I know little or nothing about the BEF he gives a poor view of the German side. There are more recent works that clarify the German side. I would think based on simple mistakes his view on the BEF might be equally flawed.

[Guest]

I would not. While I know little or nothing about the BEF he gives a poor view of the German side. There are more recent works that clarify the German side. I would think based on simple mistakes his view on the BEF might be equally flawed.

What are these more recent works?

[joerookery]

Try Great War Dawning available from the publisher – http://www.militaria.at/Book.aspx?book=2277660&Language=de

thread here – http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=208059

[Guest]

Try Great War Dawning available from the publisher – http://www.militaria.at/Book.aspx?book=2277660&Language=de

thread here – http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=208059

The penny has just dropped. You are the author ? Interesting. The reviews seem to be very positive. Congratulations.

I have never seen the book before you flagged it. I assume it is a recent publication? MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin G.

Very many thanks: I know you are a busy man so thank you for taking the time and trouble to deal comprehensively with the question.

I see that we agree very substantially on the blue parts!

Regardingthe age of infantry COs, I have the Aug 1914 Army List which would help a little and I think I have access to Harts, which would help a lot. In my tiny tiny sample [two RWF battalions] both COs were old by modern standards. Not really up to diving in a ditch!

I am coming to the belief that Haig behaved very badly by stopping at Landrecies ....... Sheffield puts rather a gloss on it, but Haig stopped early in the afternoon, thus disobeying the order to meet II Corps at Le Cateau and letting down Smith-Dorrien.

I am minded to start a Landrecies thread, but am sitting in chaos as I have started to redecorate my study, of all things.

[Guest]

Regarding the age of infantry COs, I have the Aug 1914 Army List which would help a little and I think I have access to Harts, which would help a lot. In my tiny tiny sample [two RWF battalions] both COs were old by modern standards. Not really up to diving in a ditch!

I am coming to the belief that Haig behaved very badly by stopping at Landrecies ....... Sheffield puts rather a gloss on it, but Haig stopped early in the afternoon, thus disobeying the order to meet II Corps at Le Cateau and letting down Smith-Dorrien.

I am minded to start a Landrecies thread, but am sitting in chaos as I have started to redecorate my study, of all things.

The performance of battalion COs is not something that crops up as a thematic in anything I have read. With the obvious example of the attempt to surrender by two battalion COs I can't think of anything particularly controversial.

A substantial proportion were either killed or wounded of course. One aspect of the BEF in 1914 was how quickly responsibility cascaded down the Officer ranks. Extraordinarily high Officer casualty rates meant that command devolved onto some very young and inexperienced shoulders at Battalion level. One of the interesting aspects of this period is that composition of units were changing very rapidly. By the end of 1914 many infantry battalions had lost and replaced the equivalent of their War Establishment and lost and replaced more that 100% of their establishment of Officers. The Battalions in Dec 1914 would barely recognise the Battalions of August 1914. How Battalions managed to maintain any form of cohesiveness in these conditions is beyond me. Continuity at Battalion level was extremely challenging. One of the most depressing pieces of analysis is to follow the Officers of August 1914 and see how long they lasted. It is truly shocking. How this impacted units is something worth exploring. What has always struck me is the sheer methodical professionalism of the Battalion Officers. The performance of this group seems to have been rather heroic (a word I use very rarely, but I mean it in the sense beyond the call of duty) and rather contrasts with the performance of some at higher levels.

Everyone from French downwards was of course desperately trying to get to grips with a totally new kind of warfare. It is interesting to read how French and the General Staff coped with the pressures. I simply can't understand why French moved to St Quentin at the peak of the crisis on 26th Aug. It is really quite eye-opening and one really does begin to understand the huge challenges in command and control when messages had to be delivered by an individual rather than through the use of technology. I was also very surprised to read how II Corps and the Cavalry Div apparently did not have peace-time staffs - a factor which possibly had gigantic implications and added to the dysfunction. It makes James' comment in the OH on the BEF being the 'best trained' quite a challenging concept. This is one of the reasons why Gardner's book is so appealing.

I think you need to start a thread on Haig and Landrecies lest this shifts away from books.

MG

[joerookery]

I assume it is a recent publication?

Martin,

Relatively – published at the end of 2013 the publisher is Austrian and even though it is in English most of the traditional English language outlets were not used for marketing. It is still rolling out.

[Guest]

Martin,

Relatively – published at the end of 2013 the publisher is Austrian and even though it is in English most of the traditional English language outlets were not used for marketing. It is still rolling out.

Thanks Joe.

Are you able to briefly summarise where your book disagrees with Zuber's assessment. Perfectly understand if you prefer not to but in the interests of the bibliography of 1914 it might introduce us to some new ideas.

Regards M

PS. am buying the book.

[joerookery]

Are you able to briefly summarise where your book disagrees with Zuber's assessment.

Martin,

Sadly no. It is not that I am not willing it just is that there are so many mistakes. A reader who takes his assessment as is will have a completely different view and the wrong view of a whole lot of issues which have been "generally accepted" because there are no other easy to find resources in the English language. While we found the premise of his book on the frontiers to be totally indefensible he used the same information for his section on training and doctrine in the Mons book. So a reader focusing on the BEF gets a completely distorted view of how these units were formed, trained, and which "doctrine" was used. The subtitle of one of my talks is "it isn't what you learned in school."

The worst is his explanation of cavalry. We put straight the real issues and problems facing the mounted troopers. He does not even use the correct 1914 command concept but rather uses one developed in 1915.

I am of course biased but it is hard to look at the opponents of the BEF and what they were doing without understanding. He does not even address the biennial nature of the training cycle nor the active/reserve fill process on mobilization. I could go on...when he and I started to discuss some of this on this forum he attacked me and the discussion turned into an ad hominem diatribe. I withdrew. He has another book coming out in November… Should be interesting.

[Muerrisch]

Thread Haig Landrecies started at:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=212440

[Guest]

Martin,

Sadly no. It is not that I am not willing it just is that there are so many mistakes. A reader who takes his assessment as is will have a completely different view and the wrong view of a whole lot of issues which have been "generally accepted" because there are no other easy to find resources in the English language. While we found the premise of his book on the frontiers to be totally indefensible he used the same information for his section on training and doctrine in the Mons book. So a reader focusing on the BEF gets a completely distorted view of how these units were formed, trained, and which "doctrine" was used. The subtitle of one of my talks is "it isn't what you learned in school."

The worst is his explanation of cavalry. We put straight the real issues and problems facing the mounted troopers. He does not even use the correct 1914 command concept but rather uses one developed in 1915.

I am of course biased but it is hard to look at the opponents of the BEF and what they were doing without understanding. He does not even address the biennial nature of the training cycle nor the active/reserve fill process on mobilization. I could go on...when he and I started to discuss some of this on this forum he attacked me and the discussion turned into an ad hominem diatribe. I withdrew. He has another book coming out in November… Should be interesting.

Thanks

I recall reading the thread some time ago. With few counterbalances to the the German side of the story it has been difficult to establish if The Mons Myth was controversial for the right or wrong reasons. It would appear that your book addresses a lot that has been debated. I shall look forward to reading it. Very useful to have this synopsis. Thank you.

One last question...do you think it will change British perceptions?

MG

[joerookery]

One last question...do you think it will change British perceptions?

Yes I think so. Zuber gives the impression that the British faced a homogeneous foe. this was absolutely not the case. So I think perhaps analysis from the British side could be affected by which German Army Corps they were facing. Training and doctrinal employment from the German side differed very much by Army Corps. So there might be some benefit in analyzing the methods of Army Corps number one versus the methods used by Army Corps number two when facing the BEF. I don't think that angle has been exploited.

I also think that Great War Dawning would give a British reader a completely different take on cavalry operations. The Germans really screwed this up on a lot of levels. I think we give a completely different view on force distribution than the perceptions in most histories. They did such a poor job of this in the great right-wing plan that the British perspective of why things turned out the way they did could easily be changed. Interested in getting your take on it.

[lostinspace]

I think Mr. Zuber has a couple of books coming out soon - ' The First Battle of the First World War: Alsace-Lorraine', an edited translation of Karl Dueringer's ' The Battle of Lorraine', first written in 1929 and 'Ten Days in August, the Siege of Liege 1914'. The Amazon blurb referring to the latter - 'Previous accounts emphasize the importance of the huge "Big Bertha" cannon, to the virtual exclusion of everything else: The Siege of Liege shows that the effect of this gun was a myth, and shows how the Germans really took the fortress.' I guess it's the Belgians' turn to be run through the myth buster. Plus Peter Hart will have a new book out on the B.E.F. later this year called - 'Fire and Movement: The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914', here's the link - http://www.amazon.co.uk/Fire-Movement-British-Expeditionary-Campaign/dp/0199989273/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1401716254&sr=1-1&keywords=fire+and+movement

Dave

[Muerrisch]

Martin G.

Battalion COs.

I have not time to pursue this matter systematically but I downloaded Hart's 1914 which gives dates of first commissions, unfortunately not age when commissioned.

I had a speed read of the first 20 regiments in seniority order, and looked at the Lt cols and two senior majors, as being most likely to have a lead role in August 1914.

Only a very few were commissioned in years 189x. where x is a very small integer.

The mean is about 1886

The earliest were 1881.

Making a reasonable assumption that entry via the Militia would imply even earlier dates of birth, I assumed all were Sandhurst men who entered at 18 [or later] and did a one or two year course before commissioning [not checked my facts but I can]

The above implies dates of birth in the range 1860 to 1870.

Thus, most or all of the unit commanders appear to be around 45 to 50 years of age, some perhaps even 55.

Regardless of hurdling walls and diving in ditches, I suspect the ability to learn quickly by mistakes or experience becomes a little curdled by that sort of age.

I have in fact surprised myself by this quick look ....... I consider 40 on the old side for a field officer in war.

I am aware that this is a digression QUOTE The performance of battalion COs is not something that crops up as a thematic in anything I have read. With the obvious example of the attempt to surrender by two battalion COs I can't think of anything particularly controversial.

I will not take the matter further here, but will ponder the subject.

[David Filsell]

Peripheral to this debate is that the loss of 1914 officers is interesting. I did a great deal of work on the last company of Sandhurst cadets who passed out before the outbreak of war. I anticipated in view of losses those not killed , as rising a large percentage were - I do not have statistics to hand being stuck in Majorca - would rise quite highly in rank by 1918 despite their youth - and since it is generally argued that regulars rose in rank better than K btn officers. From memory only one reached the rank of major. Where they all duds. I suspect not three reached high rank in WW2 and from memory three or four were killed in that conflict.

[David Filsell]

Re boots and things

The problem was not with the boots themselves as far as I can discern. It was that the reservists had insufficient time to 'harden' feet. As I have said probably aware of this Capper ensured that 7th Div were marched long and hard before being sent to Belgium. On the march from the coast Ypres - long, hard and relatively fast - there seem to few reports of foot problems.

Whatever else Zuber's writing has in itself forced thinking forward if only by making us re look at things.

Sadly Ascoli's research material - some of which used unpublished material - according to his brother, to whom I spoke, had been lost or destroyed as far as he knew.

[lostinspace]

Grumpy,

I am putting together a spread sheet with all that info in it; battalion commanding officers, date appointed, age in August of 1914 etc., it's still a work in progress (constant revision as I find new information) but all regular battalions are covered, if you're interested send me a pm and I would be happy to share the information with you.

Dave

[Muerrisch]

marvellous: PM on the way thank you.

I have looked at the four most senior officers in each regiment [thus 2 i/cs not covered in the four-battalion regiments].

Only seven out of 120 men have a commission date of 1890 or later, implying that almost all of these COs. were aged 45 or older. Several commission dates 1881, say born 1861 or thereabouts, so aged in the 50s.

Hmmmm !