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Books on the BEF 1914


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Hi Martin,

Terence Zuber is a member of this forum, posting under the name of Schlieffen. His books are provocative (Mons and Battle of the Frontiers) but shouldn't be dismissed for challenging accepted wisdom as you learn a lot from their prompting you to dig deeper. Here's a link to the "Zuber and Mons" thread:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=142793&hl=

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Hi Martin,

Terence Zuber is a member of this forum, posting under the name of Schlieffen. His books are provocative (Mons and Battle of the Frontiers) but shouldn't be dismissed for challenging accepted wisdom as you learn a lot from their prompting you to dig deeper. Here's a link to the "Zuber and Mons" thread:

http://1914-1918.inv...topic=142793=

Thanks... Hopefully he will be able to answer the questions on German Casualties. How can one make claim or the counter-claim if the data isn't there? I see you made exactly the same observation on Zuber's reliance on German histories without challenging their accuracy.... The thread you highlighted suggest I am very late to this debate..... thanks again MG

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Hi Martin,

Terence Zuber is a member of this forum, posting under the name of Schlieffen. His books are provocative (Mons and Battle of the Frontiers) but shouldn't be dismissed for challenging accepted wisdom as you learn a lot from their prompting you to dig deeper. Here's a link to the "Zuber and Mons" thread:

http://1914-1918.inv...topic=142793=

Blimey. That thread is like open warfare.... It highlights the very best and (sadly) the very worst of the forum, but thanks for pointing it out. It seems clear that Zuber has rattled a few cages and has rather challenged entrenched British views. I have yet to read it all but as a result of reading the thread I have resolved to reading all the books (some again) in their chronological order of publication. Zuber is highly critical of Edmonds' version - something that I have long suspected. The parts of the thread on the (un)reliability of Regimental Histories is very consistent with most of my research in the Gallipoli campaign and it was interesting to see these comments made by a number of published authors.

Thanks again for flagging this. I am about to delve into the Machine Guns at Mons thread. Wish me luck!

MG

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I am already questioning how any the authors above (including Zuber) can make any claims over the German casualties (absolute numbers and relative numbers to the British) if the German archives in Potsdam were destroyed by the RAF in 1945 (bitterly mirroring the Arnside bombing). One assumes the number of dead are known (?) but the WIA or DOW not know for the German side

He relies on the Regimental Histories, Martin, which offer abundant details ; I think that he extrapolates from those and applies a notional total of 1,900 German casualties for the battle of August 23rd. This is less than twenty per cent more than the 1,600 suffered by the BEF.

On the other hand, it's important to remember that while the sixteen hundred British casualties included a large proportion of unwounded prisoners, the German casualties were probably all killed or wounded, which implies that the British fire did probably strike down the enemy at a two to one rate.

Phil (PJA)

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... the introduction seems to be quite punchy, taking Edmonds, Ascoli, Terraine, Lomas Horsfall and Cave , and Cave and Sheldon head-on and refuting their repeated claims that the rapid-rifle fire was mistaken for MG fire, or the Germans advanced in dense massed ranks, or the German casualties were Greater than the British.....
You won't find that Jack Sheldon made claims about rapid rifle fire being mistaken for MG fire ;)

Zuber is very selective in the German sources that he used. The translations are accurate, from all the examples I have checked. But he has left out segments that do not support his claims. And his understanding of the British is woeful. The book is still an important contribution to understanding what happened at Mons and le Cateau.

Robert

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He relies on the Regimental Histories, Martin, which offer abundant details ; I think that he extrapolates from those and applies a notional total of 1,900 German casualties for the battle of August 23rd. This is less than twenty per cent more than the 1,600 suffered by the BEF.

On the other hand, it's important to remember that while the sixteen hundred British casualties included a large proportion of unwounded prisoners, the German casualties were probably all killed or wounded, which implies that the British fire did probably strike down the enemy at a two to one rate.

Phil (PJA)

Phil - thanks for this. I have just spent the last 4 hours reading the Classic thread on Machine Guns at Mons and feel utterly exhausted. Seems to be a fairly simple case of "you either believe certain stats or you don't". By definition it becomes a purely subjective debate if one chooses to selectively disregard published stats without providing alternatives. Interesting nonetheless.

Having done lots of painstaking forensics on the Gallipoli campaign's casualties, including trawling the casualty estimates at Bn, Bde and Div level, that experience would certainly sway me into the camp that the British estimates of German casualties were exaggerated, but that does not devalue the achievements of the BEF. As I think Jack Sheldon (?) points out early on, casualties are not the appropriate measure of 'victory' or 'defeat' in the Retreat from Mons, rather the BEF's main achievement was buying another 24hours and allowing II Corps to disengage whilst in contact - possible the most difficult tactical manoeuvre one can hope to achieve. I think Ascoli alludes to this when he refers to preserving the BEF being the main aim rather than destroying it.

The retreat from Mons seems to be an extremely interesting phase of the Great War and is my first foray into the Western Front. I am astounded by the high per cent of Reservists in the ranks of the BEF. I had assumed the Bn's would have been up to strength. It would seem that the infantry training from the 1890s and the experience of the Boer War had a major impact on the quality of marksmanship. I have much reading to do.

MG.

P.S. Why does everyone use the term 'musketry'? rather than marksmanship? Was it still in common usage in 1914? It reminds me that one of the aged Historians of the BOH was politely asked to step down for persistent use of the word 'cannons' instead of 'guns' (among other things). I might start a thread.....

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Wasn't there a famous British School of Musketry at Hythe, still functional in the early twentieth century ? Either Hamilton or Birdwood was associated with it....I can't remember, But " Musketry" is a nice word....a bit quaint, even if a little pretentious. Rather like " Cannonade", which is a word favoured by Churchill in his World Crisis.

Phil (PJA)

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MG, thanks for starting the new thread. The simple answer to your question is that musketry included marksmanship and a lot more.

Robert

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Wasn't there a famous British School of Musketry at Hythe, still functional in the early twentieth century ?

Phil (PJA)

Yes there was and was still referred to as such during the GW period. Still the place HM Forces use for 'battle' ranges. I spent many a day there in Basic and before operational tours - and if I remember rightly most of our accomodation 'up the hill' was dated 1901.

Best wishes

Jim

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  • 1 month later...

Yes Jim, I do have a new book coming out in October - the 31st I believe - about the Aisne Campaign 1914. Its taken a year to write and as usual the research bit was the most rewarding! It's called: Battle on the Aisne 1914 - The Birth of the Western Front. I believe you can pre-order on Amazon etc.

Jerry

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Jerry - If it's half as good as your previous book "Retreat and Rearguard" then it will be well worth getting hold of.

MG - If you can manage to find a copy of "Superiority of Fire" by Pridham ti will give you a good idea of what was taught at Hythe and the reasoning behind the "mad minute" of rifle fire in the British Army. Of course, the rifle that was adopted had something to do with it as well...

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  • 1 year later...
Guest Peter Houghton

Hello Ladies and Gentlemen,

I'm looking for a good general account of the BEF in 1914. My interest stems from an idea to produce a documentary

on the subject. I've read unit accounts and some salty histories which seem to capture something of the mood of the

troops but seem a bit unreliable on the details (Tim Carew) - having said that, the sense of drama and his obvious

understading of the soldier (being a vet himself) is useful. I visited the Scots church here in Melbourne Australia recently

and in the church is a flag carried by the Old Contemptibles Association here in Melbourne on Anzac Day and I'm

thinking on rememberance day as well. There were quite a few 1914 men who migrated here after the war. When I asked in the church about the history of the flag, who it represented etc they couldn't tell me. Lest we forget?.... perhaps we have. As a general student of WW1 and despite being an Australian the stand made by the British professionals in 1914 has always seemed to me to be a key series of actions - particularly 1st Ypres, but there is precious little about it in the popular imagination. Understandably the later civilian armies produced several soldiers who came from literary backgrounds and therefore recorded their experiences more eloquently perhaps. But even so, in almost all general accounts these early battles seem to be swept over so quickly. It seems to me that after the stalemate was achieved it was only a matter of time before our surfeit of manpower won the war. But 1st Ypres in particular seems crucial as there was no real reserve to stem any breach at this time. Moreover the lack of war correspondents in the field has left the campaign with precious few images to help us picture those ragged little khaki formations as they tried to hold on.

So any thoughts would be welcome.

Many thanks

Peter Houghton.

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Peter

Have a look at the newly-published Challenge of Battle by Adrian Gilbert Osprey Publishing (ISBN 978 1 84908 859 6). It is a workmanlike treatment and is easy to read. It is comprehensive, slightly polemical in tone and revisionist, but realistically so. Take it as a starting point for further reading - the bibliography is extensive.

Jack

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For what it's worth, I'd second that. I have just read it and found it very interesting - "workmanlike" might sound like damning with faint praise, but in this case I'd say it was a well-deserved comment.

Harking back eighteen months, I'd suggest the difference between "marksmanship" and "musketry" is analagous to that between "horsemanship" and "horsemastership".

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Hello Ladies and Gentlemen,

I'm looking for a good general account of the BEF in 1914. My interest stems from an idea to produce a documentary

on the subject. I've read unit accounts and some salty histories which seem to capture something of the mood of the

troops but seem a bit unreliable on the details (Tim Carew) - having said that, the sense of drama and his obvious

understading of the soldier (being a vet himself) is useful. I visited the Scots church here in Melbourne Australia recently

and in the church is a flag carried by the Old Contemptibles Association here in Melbourne on Anzac Day and I'm

thinking on rememberance day as well. There were quite a few 1914 men who migrated here after the war. When I asked in the church about the history of the flag, who it represented etc they couldn't tell me. Lest we forget?.... perhaps we have. As a general student of WW1 and despite being an Australian the stand made by the British professionals in 1914 has always seemed to me to be a key series of actions - particularly 1st Ypres, but there is precious little about it in the popular imagination. Understandably the later civilian armies produced several soldiers who came from literary backgrounds and therefore recorded their experiences more eloquently perhaps. But even so, in almost all general accounts these early battles seem to be swept over so quickly. It seems to me that after the stalemate was achieved it was only a matter of time before our surfeit of manpower won the war. But 1st Ypres in particular seems crucial as there was no real reserve to stem any breach at this time. Moreover the lack of war correspondents in the field has left the campaign with precious few images to help us picture those ragged little khaki formations as they tried to hold on.

So any thoughts would be welcome.

Many thanks

Peter Houghton.

Peter

Welcome to the GWF. Some thoughts:

1. Scope. Pert Hart's comments about the relative size of the BEF to the French forces in the great scheme of things is a very important point. It had huge implications on the relationship between the British and the French and how the BEF was used.

2. Under-reserached Thematics. Having deep dived in this subject for nearly two years now and I would make the following general observations about areas that are not well understood in the mainstream publications:

a. Cavalry. The contribution of the British Cavalry is often neglected. Dismounted for the most part, they filled critical gaps. Their story is under-researched and needs a voice. It is a thematic that has been largely ignored subordinated to the infantry story by most authors. There are one or two books that do cover the cavalry in detail.

b. Indian Army Corps is at best under-emphasised or at worst almost completely ignored. Technically not the BEF but writing a documentary about the BEF in isolation would rather miss this critical formation.. A new history on the Indian Army Corps is to be published imminently.

c. The Professional Army and Reservists. Just over half of the BEF that deployed in August 1914 were Reservists. The quality of these troops initially had a lot to be desired. Having been softened by anything up to 13 years as civilians with the absolute minimum of annual refresher training, this caused very big problems for the professional Army. These problems continued throughout 1914 and eventually as the supply of trained Reservists began to run dry the quality rapidly declined. By the end of First Ypres the large majority of men who fought in the BEF were Reservists. There is diary evidence that towards the end of 1914 the dregs of the Reserves - mostly Category D men - were so poor in quality as to be almost useless to commanders in the field. This at a time of crisis.

d. BEF's Manning Crisis. The casualty rates far outstripped even the worst expectations of the Kitchener and the War Office. They also nearly outstripped the British Army's supply of trained men. Kitchener's conscious bet when deciding to build a new Army was that the Regulars could hold the line for the six months it would take to train the New Armies. Many Infantry Regiments nearly ran out of trained men and some regiments did run out of trained men in late 1914 early 1915. This forced Kitchener's hand to plug the gap with the Indian Army Corps (see above) and use the much maligned Territorial Force (19 TF Battalions in the line by end 1914) There were enough TF battalions in F&F man more than a Division yet they were put in piecemeal such was Kitchener's distrust of this body of men.

Edit: As just one example of this crisis at Regimental level, the Welsh Regt required 74% of all its available Reservists just to mobiliise its two regular battalions. Before the end of the campaign it had quite literally run out of trained men.

I am not convinced these inter-related dynamics are fully appreciated; just how close the BEF came to a manning crisis and the magnitude of the contribution by the cavalry, Indian Army Corps and the TF through first Ypres. The official returns in WO 114 reveal this dynamic in cold statistics. It was a very close run thing. There is evidence too of Kitchener men having their training cut short to be thrown into the line before their statutory six month's training was up. As an extension of this it is very telling that Kitchener's Army still did not deploy in F&F until May 1915 and was not used en masse in the assault until the second half of 1915 -perhaps telling of just how much longer it took to train these men than imagined. Probably beyond the scope of your mission but certainly directly related.

3. Primary Material.

a. Unit War Diaries. I would strongly recommend reading the unit war diaries and the personal diaries. The BEF diaries in 1914 are well preserved and they are with very few exceptions quite complete. They have been digitised and are available via the National Archives at £3.30 a shot. I have recently finished transcribing the Infantry and Cavalry diaries for the BEF in 1914. Around 150 unit diaries and over a million words which has created a searchable database of these records; The first eight Infantry Divisions plus the TF and the Cavalry Division. Indian Army Corps (two Divisions) will be finished in a few months. All searchable. I can say with a high degree of confidence that there is plenty of material that has not yet been fully utilised.

b. Personal Diaries. The unit war diaries also contain a few dozen personal diaries written predominantly by Officers and these are gold dust. You will be doubtless aware of the other main archives and the personal diaries that they hold - IWM, NAM, Liddle Collection etc.

4. Secondary Material. If you are looking for a single volume there are not that many that do the job well. Most books on the subject have to be crammed into 200-300 pages, and by definition a single volume can never really do the subject justice. I would recommend reading the OH - poor in my opinion but still essential reading. At around 1,000 pages spread over 2 volumes it still skates over large parts. I would then read every book listed on this thread, probably starting with Ascoli and then Jerry Murland's books (a few posts up) and then read the bibliography in these books. Jerry's book on the Aisne was published not too long ago and I would contact him directly.

As an aside the BBC iPlayer website has documentary clips running at present which include a long monologue by Edward Spears here who had a unique ringside seat as the British liaison officer with the French. His book 'Liaison 1914' is a classic and is essential reading.

MG

Edited for typos

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Good morning Martin,

Your reply to Peter gives much food-for-thought, especially points 2c and 2d for my interest. Thank you for posting

All the best

Jim

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Good morning Martin,

Your reply to Peter gives much food-for-thought, especially points 2c and 2d for my interest. Thank you for posting

All the best

Jim

If I recall correctly some of the best evidence for the early arrival of Kitchener men was in the Royal Sussex Regt.

My other point would be that because of the historical dominance of the hero-romantic school of military history - "they're all heroes" - some of these underlying challenges were largely ignored in the history books. The Revisionist school has (rightly) been focused on dismantling the Oh-what-a-lovely-Blackadder-led-by-donkeys-myths of generalship and the officer class which had left little space (in a book) for tackling some of the grittier issues. Hopefully the Revisionist (I prefer post-Revisionists) school now have strong enough foundations to start developing a broader and deeper understandings of some of the less subtle dynamics such as 'where the hell are the reinforcements?'.

I would also add that there has been little analysis of the recycling of wounded troops. I think there is a tacit assumption that there was a constant and steady recycling of (recovered) wounded men back through the reinforcement chain. Some rudimentary research suggests this was not as constant (read regular) and not as steady (read numbers) as one might assume. The returns of trained men at the Reserve battalions were vastly inflated with men recovering from wounds who were still ineffective but out of hospital. It is quite jaw-dropping to compare the numbers in January 1915 when the War Office finally implemented accurate returns with sub-categories. The numbers of available trained men fit for service nearly halved overnight. It goes a long way to explaining the near crisis in manpower.

MG

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Supplementary to the remarks by Martin in 2d, beware of overstating the role played by the BEF during First Ypres. They fought extremely well, their contribution was probably indispensable but it was an Allied victory. It is a complete exaggeration to claim, as some do, that the BEF 'saved civilisation'. Take a look at this map of the dispositions towards the end of the battle. This puts the relative contributions to the defence of Ypres in perspective.

post-6447-0-01388400-1398943480_thumb.jp

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You're right Martin, 2nd RSR did have early drafts of Kitchener men, as I think we discussed on another post. Mandy Hall recently gave me some details of a 7th RSR man who was whisked away from the 7th to the 2nd in November 1914, no doubt he would have been a GSSR man perhaps, and not sure how unique a case he was. I have been looking at the RSR wounded lists in the Sussex newspapers, a future project being to try to tie them to, where possible, a Bn and/or an event. The 1914 newspapers were not available the last time I went to the Records Office, so I started with 1916 as I was looking for a couple of men (and found them). One of the men I found had been wounded three times (his third a serious spinal injury treated back in Blighty) and he died from wounds on his fourth wound (he was wounded at Loos, Somme, Arras and finally Monchy in August '17). Be interesting to see what the 1914 newspapers can provide (one for next trip hopefully). Another plan is to go through the newspaper cuttings for 2nd RSR held at WSRO, a lot of these comprising 'interviews' with wounded soldiers back from Priez and the Aisne particularly, and seeing what happened to these wounded men, as far as evidence will allow. But as you say, research into the redeployment of the recovered wounded BEF wide is an interesting prospect

Hi Jack and Glen, they say a picture paints a thousand words, I for one had no idea, so thank you, these provide a whole different slant.

Given me lots to think about this afternoon, so thank you gents

Jim

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One think that strikes me about the mobile phases of the Retreat from Mons and the Advance to the Aisne is just how fragmented the experiences were.

In the sometimes chaotic retreat, there are simply scores of accounts written by men who were aware of their immediate surroundings and very little else. Even within Battalions there are huge gaps in the knowledge of what actually happened as men were scattered by the unfolding events. To me, the Retreat especially, was a very complex mosaic of small scale actions where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole.

In British military doctrine, breaking contact with the enemy while retreating is one of the most difficult military operations to execute successfully. It didn't always work and some actions saw Battalions isolated during the Retreat when messages to break contact failed to get through. I am thinking of actions such as the stand by the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers against (allegedly) vastly superior forces first at Fesmy and then Etreux on the 27th Aug 1914. Gen Maxse's two messages sent at 1:00 pm to "retire at once" both failed to get to Maj Charrier commanding three and a half companies of the 2nd Bn RMF. If Edmonds' account in the OH is to be believed what happened next optimised the spirit of the BEF. Outnumbered six-to-one (some sources claim nine-to-one) Charrier led his men in a rearguard action under relentless fire; the Germans having cut the Battalion off, slowly surrounded his tiny force. The account is full of individual acts of raw leadership by young officers who led charges against entrenched German positions blocking their only escape route. Charrier was eventually killed and all his other officers killed or wounded except one - Lt E W Gower - who undaunted formed what was effectively a square "facing all points of the compass" in an orchard to fight it out. With ammunition almost expended, the remnants of the battalion finally capitulated after twelve hours of fighting. Gower survived and so does his short account.

What really struck me was not the heroic bayonet charging and desperate fighting but the cool and collected business-like way the regular battalion officers went about their work. Clearly in an impossible situation years of ingrained training kicked. Despite what must have clearly been a lost cause, the 2nd Bn RMF sold themselves dearly under Charrier's raw leadership; in the process grinding out a valuable six hours' delay of the German pursuit of the remainder of 1 Div and I Corps. One can only try and imagine what was running through their minds at the time. Charrier personally led three charges before being killed. He must have known his chances of survival were minimal yet he continued to organise, attack, reorganise, attack again and again and inspire his battalion to fight it out, even after he had been killed. Quite remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the near annihilation of this battalion was not a rare thing during this phase. The battalion that replaced it in the 1st Guards Brigade - the 1st Bn Cameron Highlanders eventually suffered the single largest number of casualties of any unit in the BEF in 1914. The other units in the Brigade being reduced at times to around 150 men each in their own isolated destinies with fate.

Tiny isolated episodes of organised chaos like this seem to have been critical elements of the story of the retreat. Trying to weave a coherent narrative together from this patchwork of isolated actions is a challenge for the historian and documentary maker alike. The Retreat feels to me like an amalgam of battalion level retreats, each with their own remarkable thread. MG

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Martin

A very sound analysis - with which I fully agree. As I did your views on the under examined and evaluated role of British cavalry in1914.

David

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Interesting thread, very much in my period.

So what makes a "good" source book of the early days?

1. style matters: does the author speak to me, or annoy me?

2. how high is the derisiive snort count per page [as in: I know that is factually incorrect]

3. are the maps/ illustrations/ footnotes/ indices relevant and adequate?

4. does the book achieve what it sets out to do [assuming that we are informed of this objective]

5. was it worth writing, and was it worth buying?

6. did I learn anything?

and finally, there seems to be a dearth of books written from infantry brigade perspective. I can understand why, but I have yet to see a good one. The levels seem to be:

personal memoirs, unt histories, and then a jump to over-arching treatments.

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Has anyone read "Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914" by Adrian Gilbert?

The use of the word "Real" in the title really does put me off buying this. Any thoughts would be welcome. The Author appears to have a slightly less positive view of the BEF's performance in 1914 than most. Large chunks are available to read in the 'look inside' sections on Amazon, particularly the intro in the Kindle version.

MG

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Has anyone read "Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914" by Adrian Gilbert?

The use of the word "Real" in the title really does put me off buying this. Any thoughts would be welcome. The Author appears to have a slightly less positive view of the BEF's performance in 1914 than most. Large chunks are available to read in the 'look inside' sections on Amazon, particularly the intro in the Kindle version.

MG

Ridgus (David) has Martin, he has put details about it here

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=9458&page=82&hl=%2Bchallenge+%2Bbattle#entry2057738

One for me yet to read, but from what coverage I have seen of it in the forum it seems to have gone down very well

Hope this helps

Jim

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