Books on the BEF 1914

[Guest]

Re boots and things

The problem was not with the boots themselves as far as I can discern. It was that the reservists had insufficient time to 'harden' feet. As I have said probably aware of this Capper ensured that 7th Div were marched long and hard before being sent to Belgium. On the march from the coast Ypres - long, hard and relatively fast - there seem to few reports of foot problems.

David no doubt this was the biggest factor but I think it was slightly more complex than that. One battalion states that when men went to the Reserves their details including boot-sizes were recorded. These records were lost and consequently the men had the wrong size boots. Clearly some finessing was possible within the ranks but there are plenty of records showing a shortage of boots and a shortage of the right sized boots. Also the Regulars were ordered to hand in their second pair and their secound uniform (presumably to kick-start the new battalions) so there was no immediate 'store' of boots

Lt Col Gibb's 2 nd Bn Duke of Wellington's Regiment Personal Diary

8th Aug 1914. One point came very pointedly to light during the first three days of mobilization, viz the very inadequate allowance of boot oil allowed by regulations in the Mobilization Stores. Parties of Reservists had been sent out for short marches under Company Arrangements each day after their arrival and every endeavour had been made to soften and break their boots in but from reports gathered on the Battalion parade, I found it necessary to send out and purchase large stocks of caster and neat's-foot oil to ensure that the Reservists boots could be well dressed with it and worked on during the weekend with a view to softening them.

10th Aug 1914. On Monday 10th Aug, the Battalion paraded at 8:30 am and marched to PHOENIX PARK for a Brigade Drill, in which the 1st Bn EAST SURREY REGT also took part. Got back to barracks at 2:00 pm. The men did very well considering the heat and heavy Field Service marching order and the pluck of the Reservists was particularly noticeable when one remembers so many had come out of sedentary occupations only a few days before. Although many were "done to a turn" none actually fell out. After dinners and a general clean up, their boots and feet having especially been seen to, under Company arrangements, the men were allowed to make their beds down and have a good rest.

11th Aug 1914. Tuesday 11th Aug was even hotter than the previous days and although possibly necessary, it could be regretted that a further Brigade route march with the whole of the Transport was ordered - the Battalions being ordered to leave their barracks so as to pass a given road junction on the KILBRIDE Road and form Brigade Column of route with any blocking.

The Battalion paraded at 8:30 am.

No hitch occurred and after the Brigade Column had joined up and marched about a mile, the order was given to return to barracks independently about 11:15 am.

The heat was now abnormal and one felt very much for the Reservists, especially remembering what they had gone through yesterday. I made the march home as easy as possible by giving extra halts but although they did their best, the Rear Guard had all their work cut out to get the stragglers over the last mile home.

12th Aug 1914. Wednesday 12th Aug was spent in final preparations. An order was received early that the men's second suit of service dress, 1 pair of boots and one shirt, which had been packed in the overseas kit bag, were to be withdrawn and arrangements made to hand into Ordnance, the men to have £1 credited to their accounts.

This took time as the bags had already been stacked and handed over to "Officer I/C 1st Reinforcement", as the Ordnance sent word they were not ready to receive the articles, they had to be handed over in bulk to the Officer Commanding Details to be disposed of later.

The reason of Lord KITCHENER (now Minister of War) issuing this order, which at the time was somewhat wondered at, was not long in being found out and it was thanks to his foresight in issuing the order that KITCHENER'S Army had a certain amount of clothing to go on with and also as events were so soon to prove, it is doubtful if many of the owners, if any, would ever have seen them again.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin: never heard of the order to hand in second boots and clothing: I wonder how it was promulgated.

Not in AOs or indeed in WOIs [predecessor of ACIs].

Wonder if Graham Stewart has anything?

Will email him

[Guest]

Martin: never heard of the order to hand in second boots and clothing: I wonder how it was promulgated.

Not in AOs or indeed in WOIs [predecessor of ACIs].

Wonder if Graham Stewart has anything?

Will email him

2nd Bn KRR War Diary: 7th Aug 1914. 12:00 pm. An order received cancelling entrainment of Battalion as laid down in Expeditionary Time Table for 8th Aug.

Order received from War Office to send 1 Capt, 2 Subaltern Officers, 15 Sgt and Corporals to Rifle Depot, WINCHESTER, to help raise a new unit. Also an order to withdraw one suit of service dress and 1 pair of boots from (base kit of) each man of the Expeditionary Force and return to AO Depot.

[Muerrisch]

I don't for a minute doubt that the order was given, and I have the 1 x Capt 2 x subs order, but did not pick up the boots/clothes when I copied WOIs.

Curses!

[Guest]

I don't for a minute doubt that the order was given, and I have the 1 x Capt 2 x subs order, but did not pick up the boots/clothes when I copied WOIs.

Curses!

I pasted the second one for the date... the dates are different in each account which might help you trace the AO. Apologies for not being clear.

[Muerrisch]

I think I missed it!

I do have:

WOI 40/7th Aug

New Units

............ it is notifiied to GOs CinC that the recruits on the new 3 yr engagement will be supplied with clothing and equipment under instructions which will shortly be issued.

But my next scan was of WOI 49, so I am guessing that if the order was a WOI its number will be in the block 41-48.

[Guest]

2nd Bn Sussex record it on 10th Aug.

[David Filsell]

I was not aware of the oil problem, but your post underlines that insufficient marching was done before embarkation which would have revealed boot problems. Not that the boots were in themselves faulty. As a softener, neatfoot was frequently poured into the boots to infuse. A book by a land girl in WW2 - A Pullet in the Midden - tells the story that she asked an Irish farm labourer how to ease uncomfortable boots. He apparently told her, "You'll not be able to wear those till you've worn them for a while" I think illustrates the point perfectly.

[Guest]

There have been a few suggestions the (British) Official Histories for 1914 were slightly economical in their reporting, particularly when it came to British fatal casualty figures. I thought it would be interesting to see if there is any truth in the allegations using some of the main acknowledged sources for British fatal casualties:

In the final chapter titled 'Retrospect' of the OH France and Belgium 1914 Vol II, the author Brig James Edmonds provides a summary of British losses which are qualified as "The grand total from the commencement of the campaign as reported by the Adjutant General in France" The numbers run to the end of November 1914. The total killed is put at 9,473*. Edmond's reported figure does not compare well with the figures from CWGC or Statistics 1914-19:

British Army Fatal Casualties to end Nov 1914

Official History................9,473

Statsistics 1914-19......14,499

CWGC data.................14,177**

The numbers shown by Edmonds do show nearly 42,000 MIA to end Nov 1914, but it is interesting that Edmonds chooses to use the reported data from the Adjutant General in France when there was a far more accurate figure available. The OH France and Belgium Vol II was first published in 1925, three years after 'Statistics 1914-19' was published. It can be seen from the above that the reported fatal casualties in the OH were roughly speaking 5,000 short of the numbers understood in 1922. To save you the calculation the OH number was 34.7% short of the number known three years earlier. One in three fatal battle casualties were missing from Edmonds' summary pages. To be fair to Edmonds, one might argue that he was simply reporting what was known to the Army in 1914. On page 465 he does state that;

" the cost [to the British] was overwhelming. In British battalions which fought at the Marne and Ypres there scarcely remained with the colours an average of one Officer and thirty men of those who landed in August 1914. The old British Army was gone past recall...."

These last lines were from the very last paragraph of the narrative of Vol II. It does not appear that Edmonds was trying to suppress the true picture, in fact he gives a fairly bleak picture but I wonder why he did not take the opportunity to explain that the numbers known in 1914 were a significant understatement. I don't know if the subsequent volume made and correction to the figures.

MG

Sources:

Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC)**

Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War 1914-1919 (Statistics 1914-19) - Published in 1922.

Official History of the Great War: Military Operations: France and Belgium Vol II by Brig Gen Sir James Edmonds CB CMG RE published in 1925.

* Page 466-467 of the OH France and Belgium 1914 Vol II. Note 1 British Losses. The original only shows the first two columns. The All Ranks column is my addition.

..................................Officers.....Other Ranks........All Ranks

Killed..............................842..........8,631..................9,473

Wounded....................2,097........37,264.................39361

Missing..........................688.........40,342.................41905

...........................................................................................

..................................3627........ 86,237................89,739

** CWGC data and SDGW/ODGW data are extremely close. CWGC data is shown for clarity and are easy to check online here. The difference between the CWGC data and the Statistics 1914-19 is 322 and might be easily explained by men who died of wounds in Hospital in the UK. The CWGC data shown only includes the British Army (Reg and TF) commemorated in France and Belgium. It does not included the Indian Army Corps and is the best proxy for the number shown in Statistics 1914-19. By way of reference, 1,236 men from the British Army died in the UK in this period.

[Guest]

Peter Hart's book looks promising; here's the publisher's blurb;

" The dramatic opening weeks of the Great War passed into legend long before the conflict ended. The British Expeditionary Force fought a mesmerizing campaign, outnumbered and outflanked but courageous and skillful, holding the line against impossible odds, sacrificing themselves to stop the last great German offensive of 1914. A remarkable story of high hopes and crushing disappointment, the campaign contains moments of sheer horror and nerve-shattering excitement; pathos and comic relief; occasional cowardice and much selfless courage-all culminating in the climax of the First Battle of Ypres. And yet, as Peter Hart shows in this gripping and revisionary look at the war's first year, for too long the British part in the 1914 campaigns has been veiled in layers of self-congratulatory myth: a tale of poor unprepared Britain, reliant on the peerless class of her regular soldiers to bolster the rabble of the unreliable French Army and defeat the teeming hordes of German troops. But the reality of those early months is in fact far more complex-and ultimately, Hart argues, far more powerful than the standard triumphalist narrative. Fire and Movement places the British role in 1914 into a proper historical context, incorporating the personal experiences of the men who were present on the front lines. The British regulars were indeed skillful soldiers, but as Hart reveals, they also lacked practice in many of the required disciplines of modern warfare, and the inexperience of officers led to severe mistakes. Hart also provides a more accurate portrait of the German Army they faced-not the caricature of hordes of automatons, but the reality of a well-trained and superlatively equipped force that outfought the BEF in the early battles-and allows readers to come to a full appreciation of the role of the French Army, without whom the Marne never would have been won. Ultimately Fire and Movement shows the story of the 1914 campaigns to be an epic tale, and one which needs no embellishment. Through the voices and recollections of the soldiers who were there, Hart strips away the myth to offer a clear-eyed account of the remarkable early days of the Great War."

The publisher appears to be a little over-excited. Promoting the idea that much of it is 'revisionary' and it provides a 'more accurate portrait of the German Army' **thinks** more accurate than whose portrait of the German Army? The one now well established in the books by Jack Sheldon? Or Great War Dawning by Buchholz, Robinson and Robinson? I will look forward to reading it, particularly the 'revisionary' parts.

MG

[joerookery]

more accurate than whose portrait of the German Army? The one now well established by the likes of Jack Sheldon?

Martin I too look forward to reading it. I think that the portrait painted by Zuber has permeated much thought. Of course we disagree with this in our book and think that Sheldon has done a masterful job in his book on Yper. Nonetheless people have been influenced by Zuber's popular books.

[Guest]

The blurb implies the mainstream view on the German Army is a 'caricature of hordes of automatons'.

I wouldn't call Zuber's view of the German Army a 'caricature of hordes of automatons'. Quite the opposite in fact. The publisher does not appear to appreciate that this supposed 'caricature' is something that a few respected authors have already challenged. Hardly revisionist. We shall see. MG

Edit: Peter Hart was the first person on this thread to recommend reading Zuber. Both are members of GWF.

[Guest]

Am reading Allan Mallinson's "1914 Fight the Good Fight: Britain, The Army and the coming of the First World War" which has received mixed/positive reviews.

Masses of footnotes which is something I like a lot. MG

[Jack Sheldon]

Martin

Nobody has bit on your casualties post, though Phil Andrade might come along and weigh in. All I should like to add is that Edmonds has form when it comes to casualties. We had a long-running discussion about his obsession with maximising German figures while playing down British ones, most notably over the Somme and Passchendaele. I suggest, if you have not already seen it, that you add to your reading list an article written by MJ Williams for the RUSI in about 1965 and readily available from that source. Title: The Treatment of the German Losses on the Somme in the British Official History: 'Military Operations France and Belgium 1916' Volume II. There are differing views about it; I found it an eye opener.

Jack

[Guest]

Martin

Nobody has bit on your casualties post, though Phil Andrade might come along and weigh in. All I should like to add is that Edmonds has form when it comes to casualties. We had a long-running discussion about his obsession with maximising German figures while playing down British ones, most notably over the Somme and Passchendaele. I suggest, if you have not already seen it, that you add to your reading list an article written by MJ Williams for the RUSI in the 1970s and readily available from that source. Title: The Treatment of the German Losses on the Somme in the British Official History: 'Military Operations France and Belgium 1916' Volume II. There are differing views about it; I found it an eye opener.

Jack

Thanks for the reference Jack. I will certainly follow it up.

It was really more about how the data had been manipulated by Edmonds rather than casualties per se. It could have been on a number of topics related to Edmond's treatment of history but casualties are easier to illustrate the distortions for obvious reasons. I think one of the most interesting books that could be written would be a clinical dissection of the OH Vol I and II. The nearest critical analysis I have seen is Andrew Green's 'Writing the Great War'. . Gardner is quite critical of Edmond's version of events in his Trial by Fire (mentioned earlier in this thread). I am very tempted by Edmond's memoirs as I suspect they might reveal more differences from the opinions expressed in the OH

My experience is that one has to tread very carefully in any matter relating to the Great War and especially so with casualty figures. In the context of the historiography of the BEF in 1914 Edmonds' figures have certainly had a major influence over earlier works, although it is worth noting that in more recent times these figures have been officially challenged; Yours and Nigel's book as well as in Murland's book 'Retreat and Rearguard'. I note the debate over German casualties already has its dedicated thread and opinions are quite strong and emotions run high.

This thread was about Books on the BEF in 1914, and I think should have simply been called 'Books on 1914' as the more I read the more I become aware of the very small part the BEF played in 1914. To understand their contribution without the wider context is really quite difficult.

Thanks for the pointer on the RUSI article. MG

[David Filsell]

Sadly Peter has stopped posting

[Jack Sheldon]

If you want to see manipulation by Edmonds at work, Williams is your man.

Jack

[Guest]

If you want to see manipulation by Edmonds at work, Williams is your man.

Jack

Indeed. Just joined RUSI and hope to have the article later today. RUSI was very helpful and said they would get the article to me asap. Great service. Thanks again for the pointer. MG

Edit: Apparently some of the Great War material from their recent conference is available online too.

[Jack Sheldon]

Good tip, Martin. I shall have to check it out.

[paulgranger]

Indeed. Just joined RUSI and hope to have the article later today. RUSI was very helpful and said they would get the article to me asap. Great service. Thanks again for the pointer. MG

Edit: Apparently some of the Great War material from their recent conference is available online too.

I had a look on the RUSI website and found the article, which looks very interesting, but the price quoted to buy it was a bit eye-watering, so I've had to pass it by.

[MartH]

I had a look on the RUSI website and found the article, which looks very interesting, but the price quoted to buy it was a bit eye-watering, so I've had to pass it by.

Many years ago I got a copy via inter library loan the alternative title was "Thirty Percent: A study in Casualty Statistics" , 1964

[Guest]

Article arrived this afternoon.... a great read. Published in 1966 by the way, before the archives were opened. MG

[Chris_Baker]

I have a copy. If anyone would like one, do let me know.

[Guest]

Many years ago I got a copy via inter library loan the alternative title was "Thirty Percent: A study in Casualty Statistics" , 1964

This was an earlier article, not the same article. The 'Somme' article refers to this earlier work and repeats some of it, but expands on it considerably.

[phil andrade]

That phrase " fatal casualties" is a bit slippery.

Edmonds - I think - committed an unforgivable sin in his presentation of the casualties for the Somme and Passchendaele.

But when it comes to 1914, I suggest that he was not guilty of the same misdemeanour.

He alludes to the 9,473 " killed" , which is surely an authentic figure in so far as it represents only those posted as confirmed killed in action.

To this figure must be added thousands and thousands of ' MISSING', who were subsequently counted as dead, and additional thousands of died of wounds.

You can be pretty confident that ten thousand confirmed killed in action equates to twenty thousand deaths if the missing and mortally wounded are accounted for. Indeed, that might be an understatement.

The French official history offers an extreme example of this....it tabulates casualties for the month of September 1914 as 210,000 ; of these, only 18,000 were posted as killed : but there were 82,000 missing. Most of the latter were prisoners, but at least a third were killed.

Add on to that about ten thousand of the 110,000 wounded who died from their wounds, and you see a figure three times as great as the eighteen thousand posted as killed. " Killed" is one thing ; " fatalities" another.

Phil (PJA)