Books on the BEF 1914

[David Filsell]

Has anyone mentioned 'Farewell Leister Square'. It's a long time since I read it , but I so recall being impressed by it. Equally when it comes to the army's preparedness for war, never forget 'Its was always the navy what got the money, and the army what got the blame'.

Finally, I recall, but cannot reference, information about the money and effort that was spent in improving Southern Railway lines fro Waterloo to Southampton/Portsmouth before 1914 to aid embarkation of the BEF. Does anyone know more about the exercise?

[Philip Wilson]

Has anyone mentioned 'Farewell Leister Square'. It's a long time since I read it , but I so recall being impressed by it.

David - yes a very good book mentioned in 3 posts back in July/August 2012 re Kate Caffreys 'Farewell Leicester Square the Old Contemptibles 12 August - 20 November 1914.' First published in 1980 are to be found these words:

'A correct decision was not so easy to make at the time as it appears now.'

Field Marshal Sir William Robertson (Quarter Master General 1914)

Philip

[charlesmessenger]

Has anyone mentioned 'Farewell Leister Square'. It's a long time since I read it , but I so recall being impressed by it. Equally when it comes to the army's preparedness for war, never forget 'Its was always the navy what got the money, and the army what got the blame'.

Finally, I recall, but cannot reference, information about the money and effort that was spent in improving Southern Railway lines fro Waterloo to Southampton/Portsmouth before 1914 to aid embarkation of the BEF. Does anyone know more about the exercise?

[charlesmessenger]

David

In early 1914 the War Office agreed to pay Southern Railway a six figure sum to construct a second railway line into Southampton (TNA WO 159/6).

Charles M

[paulgranger]

David Owen, or Lord David Owen, ex-Foreign Secretary, has published (or will shortly publish, Amazon is a bit confised) 'The Hidden Perspectives; The Military Conversations of 1906-1914'. The blurb says:

Within weeks of taking office in December 1905, British Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his Foreign Minister Edward Grey agreed to allow the General Staff to enter detailed talks with their French counterparts about sending an expeditionary force to France in the event of a German attack. Neither the Cabinet or Parliament were informed. Grey did not even inform Asquith, Campbell-Bannerman's successor as Prime Minister, until 1911, three years after he had assumed office. In the autumn of that year there were two stormy Cabinet meetings during which the details of the military conversations were at last revealed. The following spring Viscount Haldane, the Secretary for War, failed to slow Germany's rapid naval expansion on a mission to Berlin, despite Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, advocating a land deal for Germany in Africa as an incentive. Recent historical evidence has shown that by July 1914, under pressure to compromise with Germany from Harcourt and Haldane, Grey had relented and a further attempt to negotiate was underway when the war started. All this time there was a hidden perspective of key diplomats alongside Grey Foreign Office. Together - and in some ways prescient of the build-up to the Iraq conflict in 2003 - they contributed to a feeling that there was a moral commitment to send troops to the continent. The Hidden Perspective shows how the 'mind frame' in the Foreign Office influenced political decision making and sentiment. Lord Owen's conclusion as a former Foreign Secretary, analysing the diplomacy and naval strategy, are that better handled at various stages over those eight years the carnage of the First World War was not inevitable and could even have been prevented altogether.

The book should throw light on Governmental thinking about, and planning for, the commitment of land forces in a European conflict.

[David Filsell]

Charles,

Thank you. I wonder if any similar investment was made on lines to Dover or Folkstone? Clearly some one w thinking logistically.

David

[nigelcave]

It could have been avoided, it might have been avoided, it should have been avoided but ....

How many times did the Great Powers almost go to war in the first decade of the century? Agadir and the Panther, the Balkans and the Balkans and the Balkans again ...

I suppose I have become wearied by the 'what ifs ...' - such as if the Kaiser's father had not died so very young, if Franz Joseph had died three or four years earlier, if Moltke had managed to keep Conrad properlly informed ....

[David Ridgus]

It could have been avoided, it might have been avoided, it should have been avoided but ....

I think the most extreme 'what if' I've heard was "The Great War wouldn't have happened if James Simpson hadn't used chloroform on Queen Victoria.."

The reasoning being that his successful use of chloroform in childbirth led to Victoria praising its properties to her daughter Vicky and that it was only her use of it in her confinement that enabled her survival and that of her damaged baby, the future Kaiser!

David

[nigelcave]

Quite!

[Guest]

In an attempt to keep this thread on topic - here is a list of books recommended by members with addition titles from a trawl of Bibliographies. They are in no particular order. They exclude unit histories or books that tend to look beyond 1914 - the exceptions being the memoirs of key players such as French, Smith-Dorrien, von Kluck etc.

1. Official History of the Great War: Military Operations 1914 Parts I and II by Sir James Edmonds

2. Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 by Nikolas Gardner

3. Mons, Retreat to Victory by John Terraine.

4. The Mons Star : The British Expeditionary Force 1914 by David Ascoli

5. Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914 by Adrian Gilbert

6. Farewell Leicester Square: The Old Contemptibles 12 Aug - 20 Nov 1914 by Kate Caffrey

7. Alarms and Excursions by Tom Bridges

8. Dishonoured by Peter Scott

9. Seek Glory, Now Keep Glory – the Story of the 1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1914-18, by John Ashby.

10. Fifteen Rounds a Minute edited by J M Craster

11. The Old Contemptibles Keith Simpson

12. Ypres 1914; The First Battle by Ian Becket

13. Battles of the British Expeditionary Force: A Historiography and Annotated Bibliography

14. The Aisne 1914: The Dawn of Trench Warefare by Paul Kendal

15. The Mons Myth by Terence Zuber

16. The British Campaign in France and Flanders 1914 by Arthur Conan Doyle

17. Ypres 1914 by Farrar-Hockley.

18. The First Seven Divisions by E Hamilton

19. Riding the Retreat by the late Richard Holmes.

20. "1914" by Lyn MacDonald.
21. August 1914 Surrender At St. Quentin by John Hutton
22. Mons 1914 by David Lomas

23. First Ypres by David Lomas (the pen name of Deborah Lake).

24. There's A Devil In the Drum by John Lucy

25. Old Soldiers never Die by Frank Richards
26. Coward's War by George H. Coward

27. The Phantom Brigade by Vivian

28. The First Three Months by Needham

29. From Mons to the First Battle of Ypres by Hyndson

30. The Land-Locked Lake by Hanbury-Sparrow,

31. Unwilling Passenger by Osburn

32. With A Reservist in France by Bolwell

33. The Breaking of the Storm (Brownlow).

34. Retreat and Rearguard 1914: The BEF's Actions from Mons to the Marne by Jerry Murland

35. The Battle of the Aisne 1914: The BEF and the Birth of the Western Front by Jerry Murland

36. Le Cateau by Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon

37. The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau by A F Becke

38. Mons 1914 by Nigel Cave and Jack Horsefall

39. The German Army at Ypres 1914 by Jack Sheldon

40. The Man Who Disobeyed: Sir Horace Smith Dorrien and his Enemies by A J Sithers

41. Gentlemen, We Will Stand and Fight: Le Cateau 1914 by Antony Bird

42. Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-18 by Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (Eds)

43. Memories of Forty-Eight Year' Service by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien

44. 1914 by Sir John French

45. A Brigade of the Old Army by Aylmer Haldane

46. The Advance from Mons by Walter Bloem

47. The Doings of the Fifteenth Infantry Brigade August 1914 to March 1915 by A E W Gleichen

48. The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne by A von Kluck

49. The Confusion of Command: The Memoirs of Lt Gen Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow by Dan Snow and Mark Pottle (Eds)

50. Old Contemptible by H Beaumont

MG

[nigelcave]

Thanks for the list. I think Nicholas Cave (or possibly Nick), see No 38, is some type of modern musician; I can barely play a DVD player,

[Guest]

Thanks for the list. I think Nicholas Cave (or possibly Nick), see No 38, is some type of modern musician; I can barely play a DVD player,

Will amend....

[Muerrisch]

#25.

Why the "and"?

Not the old chestnut about Robert Graves writing it, surely?

[Philip Wilson]

'Forty Days in 1914' by Major-General Sir F.MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B., published Constable and Company Ltd, London 1919.

See enclosed extract from Preface, 213 pages, no pictures and 4 maps in pocket.

Philip

[Muerrisch]

I have the first six volumes of:

GREAT WAR:The Standard History of the All Europe Conflict

WILSON. HW & HAMMERTON. JA

These cover into 1916, and are profusely illustrated including many photographs. They are, of course, a genuinely contemporary view of matters, propaganda and all.

I no longer need them, and am willing to let them go. They are damnably heavy so any purchaser should at least consider collecting from South Lincs.

Serious offers over £12 for the lot, best offer by this time next week.

Please PM me if genuinely interested.

Mods please move this if unacceptable here, but it sits very well in my opinion!

I also wish to part company with the first ten volumes of

The History of the Great European War by WSM Knight. Again, jolly heavy, and again £2 each at £20 the set. I prefer the Wilsons, because they are better illustrated, but if you want contemporary views, there is a lot of material in the latter.

[Guest]

#25.

Why the "and"?

Not the old chestnut about Robert Graves writing it, surely?

Cut and paste typo. Amended

[charlesmessenger]

Charles,

Thank you. I wonder if any similar investment was made on lines to Dover or Folkstone? Clearly some one w thinking logistically.

David

David

Actually, on checking the documents, the War Office was prepared to cover half the cost of making the single line into Southampton a double one, but the Treasury turned it down on the grounds that military use of the line was 'hypothetical' and that the increased mercantile traffic in Southampton port would, in any event, force the london & South Western Railway Company to construct such a line.

I should learn not to respond to posts off the top of my head!

Charles M.

[CPhillips]

Charles,

Thank you. I wonder if any similar investment was made on lines to Dover or Folkstone? Clearly some one w thinking logistically.

David

Southampton was earmarked as the primary embarkation port for the Expeditionary Force, having fulfilled the role during the Boer War and due to contemporary concerns from the Admiralty re: the movements of the German fleet upon the outbreak of war. Churchill refused to guarantee the safety of the transports east of the Dover straits, which helped put the final nail into any proposals to send the force to Antwerp. (Of course, the fact that the three French ports had been thoroughly reconnoitred over the previous couple of years and Antwerp hadn't was also significant in this respect).

For that reason it wasn't envisaged that Dover and Folkestone would play a major role in the mobilisation process.

[David Filsell]

I am certain that I have read/heard about major improvements to the London - Soton line prior to the war, but damned knows where.

[Guest]

I received "Gentlemen We Will Stand and Fight: Le Cateau 1914" by Antony Bird today.

I am not sure it would make my shortlist. Very limited referencing and some small errors including a picture of the KOYLI 'charge' that never happened.

MG

[lostinspace]

I don't think these books are on your list (two battalions in Hunter-Weston's 11 Bde.) -
'1st Battalion The East Lancashire Regiment, August and September, 1914', Captain E.C. Hopkinson, M.C.
'Good Old Somersets, An Old Contemptible Battalion in 1914', Brian Gillard.
Not lengthy volumes but both contain some first rate information, I would recommend them.

Dave

[Guest]

Dave thanks

Bizarrely I own the former (a thin volume courtesy of Mr Donovan).... [edit: I would agree with your assessment ]

The more I read the more I am convinced that some publications are of limited value [Edit: i do not include the book you mentioned as one of these] The Le Cateau experience has left me quite disillusioned. I had assumed (incorrectly) authors would do some basic research. Many have of course, but some have not. I would probably put some of the books in the bin having now ploughed through the raw material. Most early published histories seem to me to be highly selective in their versions of events, perhaps for reasons that are easy to understand.

Someone really needs to write a book on the historiography of the Great War and how later authors' views have been contaminated by what they sometimes (incorrectly in my view) perceive to be accurate first hand accounts

MG

Edited for clarity.

[Muerrisch]

I am reading David Owen's The Hidden Perspective: the Military Conversations 1906-1914.

It is a bit turgid [i.e. he does not write like what I write] but apparently [plausibly] the blame for The Great War is to be shared by Earl Grey and some fairly senior [but not DH] generals and colonels in the war office. I quote from the dust-jacket:

Britain, heretofore the balancer of the balance of power, transformed itself into a direct participant in the power politics of the Continent. The decision, taken essentially in secret by military staffs, was all the more fateful because it induced rigidity in two ways. In their strategic planning, France and Russia counted on British support; Germany half-convinced itself of British neutrality ..................... Britain weakened its capacity to induce restraint by being taken for granted by one side even as the other discounted its deterrence.

The logic that follows [this is Grumpy] seems to be that had it not been for the above, Germany does what it did in August, we sit on our hands, we expand the army rapidly, we tell Germany to back off [fail], we impose naval blockade of German ports and shipping, and either wait until it sorts itself out or use the RN to ensure a massive landing or threat of landing via Schleswig or Denmark and make Germany fight on three fronts.

All of which ignores the treaty with Belgium [much like everybody else did].

This scenario avoids above-said decimation, although the RN would certainly lose ships and men, and gets DH off a sharp stick.

So the villains WERE the military after all [the Cabinet and the Prime Minister were kept well in the dark until 1911 by which time any backsliding on the understanding with France would have made them very anti-British].

Much like they are now.

[Guest]

Rather fortuitously I spent last weekend at an Anglo-French wedding reception with lots of Frenchmen (quelle surprise) who were pretty educated in things relating to the Great War. Two were particularly animated. Both were bemused that the British see/saw their performance in Aug-Sep 1914 in a positive light. "Incroyable" was the mot du jour. The French (that I met) do not see the British contribution as anything other than slightly disappointing even 100 years later. MG

[lostinspace]

I'm not sure I understand your post (#97); which category would you put Hopkinson in? He seems to indicate that there was mass confusion at every level of command - no one seemed to know where they were going or why and a whole lot of time was lost in trying to find out. If I'm not mistaken Hopkinson was awarded his M.C. for covering the retirement of the East Lancs at Le Cateau, so it's definitely a first person account.

Dave