Haig & Landrecies 1914

[Muerrisch]

Whilst I am not in the HAIG = Donkey/monster/murderer camp, I am frankly disturbed by his conduct and decisions 24th to 26th August 1914.

In particular, my understanding is that he disobeyed a direct order for his I Corps to join Smith Dorien's II Corps at Le Cateau after both had passed the Foret de Mormal, thus endangering II Corps and, I suspect, the entire army.

I know about the doctrine of "the man on the spot" or "umpiring", but to halt, as I understand it, at Landrecies during the afternoon of 25th August, rather than to press on, seems a gross dereliction of duty. Next day he did not march to the sound of the guns either. So much for Staff College!

What I do not have sight of is the relevant Orders issued by GHQ, with timings and means of delivery, nor the orders that DH issued.

Gary Sheffield "The Chief" puts a halfway decent gloss on the matters. OK so Haig had the trots, but he had the only permanently constituted Corps staff, and between them they seem to have bottled it.

Comments from the knowledgeable please.

[phil andrade]

At the risk of appearing presumptuous in allowing myself to be included in the " knowledgeable" , I think we ought to allow each and everyone of our great commanders his " bad day".

Wellington had one in India ; Monash had his at Gallipoli ; Monty had his in some Wadi with an unpronounceable name : Haig had his at Landrecies.

Phil (PJA)

[keithfazzani]

But what was his reason for the bad day? Did he think that both Corps would be wiped out if he joined in?

[phil andrade]

But what was his reason for the bad day? Did he think that both Corps would be wiped out if he joined in?

The most charitable explanation is that he was ill.

He lost his equanimity, apparently.

As did so many other senior officers in that campaign.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Here is a rough timeline that I have cobbled together from a number of sources (any mistakes are mine)

24th Aug.

1:00 am. Conference with I Corps, II Corps and Cav Div Chief of Staffs at GHQ. Instructions to retire to the vicinity of Bavai

2:00 am SD received orders delivered by II Corps Chief of Staff Forsetier-Walker.

6:00 am Haig visits II Corp's HQ to arrange the necessary coordination. Haig in his diary describes GHQ's instructions as "impossible".

4:00 pm Haig visits GHQ and speaks with French and Murray. Claims he outlined his plans in a letter subsequently delivered to Murry with his intention of stopping at Landrecies. No evidence of any response from Murray

Evening: SD goes to Bavai for Orders.

8:25 pm Op Order No. 7* issued..Critically this Op Order changes the departure times with instructions that both I and II Corps be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth road by 05:30. It makes no reference to I Corps halting at Landrecies . This casts some doubt on Haig's claims of outlining his intentions to stop at Landrecies. Haig was not at this conference.

9:00 pm Haig retires to bed ill.

late evening - Gough processes these orders as Haig is in bed. This change was not highlighted by Murray and the exhausted Gough allegedly did not notice the change.

25th Aug

2:00 am First units of II Corps start off

5:30 am II Corps clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Rd as instructed.

5:30 am I Corps just starting out. Bulfin (2nd DIv) records not starting until 8:30 am. The key is that I Corps are already 5 hours behind schedule

2:00 pm Haig establishes his HQ at Landrecies.

3:00 pm Haig receives a message from GHQ that II Corps was occupying the Le Cateau position (OH p 122) and asking if Haig is able to join

???? GHQ instructs I Corps to continue its march as per Op Order No.7

???? Haig instructs I Corps to remain in Billets until 02:00 on 26th.

7:30 pm 3rd Bn Coldstream Guards surprised by Germans disguised as French soldiers

7:30 pm ? Op Order No.8 issued ordering the retirement to continue . II Corps War Diary records it was received at 9:00 pm. The copies show no time of issue (Ref OH page 517). The 4th Div copy is marked issued at 7:30 pm

26th

12:30 am Haig instructs I Corps to dump excess kit to accelerate the retreat.

12:35 am 3 Div report to II Corps HQ that three battalions are still at large.

1:35 am Gough (I Corps) reports to GHQ that I Corps under attack by four Divisions

2:00 am Allenby meets with SD at Le Cateau

3:50 am Haig sends message to GHQ requesting assistance from II Corps - Note there was no direct line of communication between I Corps and II Corps at this point

4:00 am SD decides to stand and fight

5:00 am GHQ receives SD's intentions by telegram

6:00 am Dawany (Liaison Officer between I Corps and GHQ) arrives at I Corps with new instructions to retreat southwest on St Quentin or southeast. Haig ignores this instruction.

* the key parts of Op Order No 7

1. The Army will move tomorrow 15th inst to a position in the neighbourhood of Le cateau, exact positions will be pointed out on the ground tomorrow.

2. Corps will march so that their rear-guards are clear of the Maubeuge - Bavai - Eth Road by 5:30 am

[Muerrisch]

Martin, many thanks as ever.

Surely both Corps were to be brought together at Le cateau? I believe I Corps stopped short,at Landrecies, at 4pm., not highlighted in your approximate timeline.

I just cannot understand that decision.

[Guest]

Martin, many thanks as ever.

Surely both Corps were to be brought together at Le cateau? I believe I Corps stopped short,at Landrecies, at 4pm., not highlighted in your approximate timeline.

I just cannot understand that decision.

French's intention (and orders) were that I and II Corps should meet at Le Cateau. Due to the Gen Staff mess-up, I Corps started off anything up to 5 hours late. I think this had a huge knock-on effect. Small changes bringing large differences in outcome. If the Staff had realised the departure time had changed, arguably I Corps would have passed Landrecies before the Germans appeared and things might have been different.

I am not sure when the first troops arrived at Landrecies (I will revert and amend the time-line: Edit - according to the OH 2:00 pm) but Haig claims he discussed this plan with Murray. In his memoirs he provides a copy of the letter he sent to Murray with his plans to stop at Landrecies. There is no record from GHQ/Murray of this discussion. French's Op Order was issued about an hour after this alleged meeting, and does not mention I Corps stopping at Landrecies. Critics suggest Haig made an executive decision to stop. Given he was 5 hours behind schedule it seems an odd decision, although there may well be mitigating circumstances.

At some stage it seems that Haig's orders to his Divisional commanders did not mention Le Cateau as a destination. These orders may well give us some indication of exactly when Haig decided to abandon any attempt to reach Le Cateau.

My understanding (and this may well be wrong) is that Haig decided on the 25th to ignore GHQ's instructions. The fact that GHQ instructed Haig to retreat beyond Le Cateau (i.e. abandon any attempt to reach II Corps) at 7:30 pm on 25th (OP Order No.8) is a rather inert order as Haig had by then no intention of trying to reach Le Cateau. In effect both SD and Haig were making executive decisions simply because they were the men on the ground (FRS etc) and French/GHQ were out of touch with the reality on the ground.

For SD and II Corps he had no idea when he made his decision to stand and fight that Haig had no intention of even trying to get to him. The most bizarre part (I think ) is that there seems to be no mention of GHQs instructions to Haig to retreat beyond Le Cateau (made at 7:30 am on 26th) when Wilson was speaking to SD. Unless I am missing something the whole command and control was a bit of a shambles and in that context I think both SD an Haig made understandable decisions. Part of this mess can surely be traced back to I Corps' late departure on the morning of 25th.

I Corps' Infantry fatal casualties at this stage had been less than 50 and were only 169 for the whole of August. I Corps was 5 hours late and only 8 miles short of Le Cateau where SD was forced to gamble with half of the Army.

Any mistakes are mine. MG

[Guest]

I'm a bit out of my depth, yet, at Corps level, but, maybe Haig thought it just wasn't possible to get there. Roads jammed with civilians etc?

Mike

[squirrel]

When or not was Haig informed that Smith Dorrien had decided to make a stand at Le Cateau?

[Guest]

I'm a bit out of my depth, yet, at Corps level, but, maybe Haig thought it just wasn't possible to get there. Roads jammed with civilians etc?

Mike

Certainly Le Cateau was jammed with refugees when II Corps approached the area. If Haigs. HQ was established in Landrecies at 2:00 pm on 25th, only 8 miles from Le Cateau it certainly raises questions. On aspect of the Op Order is that it does not establish a time by which I and II Corps should link up. The last lines does say "A Staff Officer...will report to GHQ Le Cateau at 5:00 am to receive orders as to positions." The other implication being that GHQ would be at Le Cateau form 5:00 onwards. This did not happen either.

MG

[Guest]

When or not was Hiag informed that Smith Dorrien had decided to make a stand at Le Cateau?

I think shortly after around 06:00 on 26th

The earliest this could have been was in the 06:00 orders send from GHQ given they knew at 05:00. He certainly knew as a result of these orders that II Corps could not come to the aim of I Corps. Dawnay, who delivered the message would probably have been aware as the descriptions of the gloom that fell over GHQ when they discovered (Murray fainted etc) must have been palpable.

[Glengarry1950]

I believe that Sir John French and his staff are at fault for this sorry episode due to the gross lack of leadership combined with personal prejudices. Murray and Wilson simply did not know their jobs as staff officers. SJF lapsed into panic when he heard of the German advance and leaped to the conclusion the French soldiers were not 'proper chaps' with whom he wished to continue fighting with. SJF C-in-C at 1am on the 24th issued an order to both Corps commanders to retreat, this was unassisted by guidance on how it was to be carried out, thus leaving it to the corps commanders, who as we know were not in communications with each other. Haig's stop at Landrecies, although not mentioned in orders before hand, may have been forced on him due to the fatigue of his men. Forced retreat for some 15 miles in blistering heat and getting tied up with retreating civilians clogging the roads.

Haig was ill and the sudden unexpected skirmish when he thought his HQ was safe, know doubt scared more stuff out of him at the time, but he was shaken and panic set in. Col James Edmonds, a divisional chief of staff, later a British official historian of the war wrote brutally of this in a private letter to an old comrade. How shaken was Haig, well he drew his revolver and spoke of selling there lives dearly. Therefore, he must have thought his time was up but they would go down fighting to the last, which illustrates some of the orders he was to dispatch later on in the war. Haig selfishly marched off south leaving Smith-D in the lurch at Le Cateau, but then again he was following orders to retreat. It is well known the SJF disliked Smith-D and when he should have been worrying about II Corps formation which were gravely exposed to the Germans he concentrated on a non-existent threat to Haig's I Corps, and continued his weary way southwards also, while their comrades fought the bloodiest battle of the retreat.

When one reflects on Sir Horace Smith-Dorriens action on receiving Operational order No 6 stating that the army will continue its retirement tomorrow 26th, he felt compelled to reconsider because his units were exhausted and hungry and still tramping in darkness and by continuing to retire his corps cohesion would collapse, lagging units would be overrun by Germans hard on their heels. Smith-D consulted his senior officers as much as he could convene of his intention, there was a sigh of relief after the chaos and confusion of direction in the past few days there was now a clear decision and leadership. Therefore, he also took upon himself to ignore an order, but in reflection he had little choice

Throughout this whole episode the person who's action or lack off, is the one who should be under investigation is " Sir John French" word for him escape me. Yes Haig did let himself down but he was debilitated with illness at the time and he did go on to do greater things.

Hiram

[Loader]

I've always admired Smith-Dorrien for his handling of II Corps during this hard time. With all he had to deal with he also had the added burden of his C in C disliking him personally. Under such circumstances I think he did his duty as he saw it & got no help from anyone outside his own Corps.

[Glengarry1950]

I agree top soldier remember he was one of the survivors of Isandlwana, as a young transport officer, following which he was recommender for the VC for his action to save other fugitives also fought at Omdurman came out of the Boer War with an enhanced reputation and a life long friend of Kitchener. He was a soldiers soldier and prior to the war he lectured that it should be avoided at all cost because it would be long and costly and in the end solve nothing he was frank with an independence of thought. Remember also Kitchener put Smith-Dorrien in command of II Corps after the death of Grierson in bitter opposition of French.

[lostinspace]

Grumpy,

Here is an interesting read on Landrecies from the 1930s - http://www.casematepublishing.com/dlc/9781906033767/9781906033767.pdf . Landrecies seems to have been a poor choice for billeting 4th Guards Brigade (as it turned out) since the advanced guard for the German 7th Division (14th Inf. Bde., three batteries of 4th Field Artillery and a squadron of 10th Hussars) didn't have to traverse the Forest of Mormal in order to reach it, so if they had been able to figure out a way through the hedges that night, Haig probably would have been given the chance to "sell his life dearly". I'm also wondering if the Germans had time to disguise themselves as French soldiers.

Dave

[Muerrisch]

Thank you: I certainly don't buy the French disguises!

I suppose a few shouts of "Mon ami", "Vive la France" and a few "hohiho hehough"s might serve to confuse a Guards officer.

[Marilyne]

Hi all, 

just resurrecting this thread after browsing through it... currently reading John Terraine's book on Mons and the issue of Haig in Landrecies popped up... also the problem of having advanced troops stopping at the same place as a Corps HQ. (as our teachers at RMA would say, if you do that: "twee op twintig!") soit... 

I was wondering is anybody had a digital copy of the article DID SIR DOUGLAS HAIG PANIC AT LANDRECIES IN AUGUST 1914 DURING THE GREAT RETREAT? by Elizabeth Greenhalgh. Published in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 91, No. 367 (Autumn 2013), pp. 226-240. 

Should be interesting to read... 

Thanks.

M.

 

[MaureenE]

6 hours ago, Marilyne said:

 

I was wondering is anybody had a digital copy of the article DID SIR DOUGLAS HAIG PANIC AT LANDRECIES IN AUGUST 1914 DURING THE GREAT RETREAT? by Elizabeth Greenhalgh. Published in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 91, No. 367 (Autumn 2013), pp. 226-240. 

If you register with jstor, I think you would be able to read it online, but not download. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44232209

Maureen

[Marilyne]

Thanks, @MaureenE . I've been putting that off (the registering on JSTOR, but I might get over it and finally register one of these days.. 

 

M.