Aubers Ridge, 1915

[SiegeGunner]

Mick, I can't find any evidence in support of an armoured car being involved, FWIIW.

Thanks, Robert. I don't think they could have imagined a motor vehicle of that sort of size, but they may perhaps have misidentified a motor lorry or large car. I'm assuming that they mean that the vehicle drove to the British front line, where the gun was unloaded and carried across NML into the lodgement, but the road from Cardonnerie Farm did continue across NML and through the German lines, so I guess that if it was still passable in May 1915 the vehicle might have driven the whole way. I was hoping to tie the report in with another account of a British machine-gun being carried into the lodgement and its crew being shot down by the defenders before they could bring it into action.

[Robert Dunlop]

Mick, I recalled that armoured cars were used to support an assault in 1915. It was 23rd Division's attack near Armentieres in September.

Next step is to check war diaries for MG units.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Mick,

Where the British managed to effect lodgements, on the 8th Division front, was where the German parapet was badly damaged by 6-inch howitzers. (“The artillery therefore would concentrate upon making a thorough breach along a short strip at the front. The troops would hurry through it whilst the artillery lifted to selected targets.” – from the Rifle Brigade account).

Account of the 8th Division attack from the OH 1915, Volume 2, pages 36-37:

The standstill was reported through the IV. Corps headquarters to General Haig, who, with the object of assisting the French offensive,* and in view of the failure of the first assault of the I. and Indian Corps, ordered General Rawlinson to “press the attack vigorously and without delay on “Rouges Bancs.”** The 8th Division was instructed accordingly, but, in the circumstances, it was difficult to carry out a further general bombardment, since the exact limits of the occupied sectors of the German front trench could not be clearly defined. The G.O.C. IV. Corps therefore decided to concentrate the artillery on the 500 yards of trench south of the Fromelles road, between the road and the lodgement held by the party of the Northamptonshire. The renewed assault was to be delivered by 24th Brigade, with the 2/Queen’s (Major H.R. Bottomley) of the 7th Division in support, and by the 25th Brigade, with the 23rd Brigade in support. To allow time for reorganization, it was ordered to take place at 1.30 p.m. Meantime the leading troops were heavily shelled in their forming-up places—parallel lines of shallow trench in the open—and encountered violent fire from artillery, machine guns and rifles as soon as they attempted to leave them, most of the casualties indeed occurring before they got as far as the original support trenches.*** The attack was therefore brought to nought before it could get under way.

* For the results of achieved by the French, see sketch 5, and note I. at the end of this chapter.

**This message sent first at 8.45 a.m., was repeated at 11.45 a.m.

***The 2/East Lancashire lost 454 men; the 1/Sherwood Foresters 347, although only two companies attacked; the 1/Worcestershire 235 and the 1/5 Black Watch 146, without getting beyond the assembly trenches.

On the failure of this renewed attempt to assault being reported to General Haig, he again urged the IV. Corps to press forward vigorously. To reinforce it, he placed the 21st Brigade, now in the First Army reserve, at General Rawlinson’s disposal; but on General Gough informing the latter that he had convinced himself by a personal reconnaissance of the uselessness of putting in the brigade, and of the certainty of any further attempts by daylight being a failure, the brigades of the IV. Corps, like those of the I. and Indian Corps, were directed to reorganize preparatory to a renewal of the offensive at dusk, at 8 p.m.

Mick,

As can be seen above, attempts to organize the attack went on through the day, so additional bombardments would take place. Although the German reports may state that the British artillery was effective, evidently it was not in destroying and suppressing German firepower in flank and depth positions.

All, back to the Artillery in the Northern Sector

Excepts relating to Artillery from the History of the 8th Division, pages 34-35:

Bombardment in General

At 5 a.m. on the 9th May our artillery bombardment opened, the first ten or fifteen minutes being devoted to wire-cutting and the remainder of the bombardment prior to the of the infantry assaults to the destruction of the trenches to be attacked. In this bombardment and in the subsequent fighting brass mortars dating from 1840 were pressed into service and a battery of them under Lieut. D. Uzielli did particularly good work. So great was our need of artillery. The number of our guns, indeed, proved utterly inadequate for the accomplishment of their tasks in the time allotted. Even at the height of the bombardment of the hostile trenches, the volume of effective fire was not sufficient to compel the German garrisons to keep under cover.

Lack of Destruction & Suppression of German Firepower – Page 35

[Reference 2nd Bn. East Lancashire Regt.] No sooner had they left the protection of the breastworks, than they were met by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire which seemed to be entirely unaffected by our bombardment and caused many casualties.

The inadequacy of our artillery preparations and support, indeed, and its failure to destroy the enemy’s defences or to subdue the fire of its infantry decided the whole operation. It did not check, however, the ardour of the attack nor prevent it, despite grievous losses inflicted by murderous fire, from effecting a lodgement in the German trenches in all three sectors.

From a personal point of view, if the British artillery was effective, German firepower on this front, depth, and its flanks would be destroyed or suppressed. It is evident that this is not the case. It would be interesting to know what a German machine-gunner was experiencing during this attack.

1/Sherwood Foresters, Held Up by Uncut Wire – page 37

Despite the difficulties and confusion thereby caused [mix of units and casualties in the British front line trench], the leading platoons of 1/Sherwood Foresters (Major L. St. H. Morley) crossed our breastwork at 6.10 a.m. and, finding the survivors of the East Lancashire held up in front of them, changed direction half-right and advanced against point 373. This new attack got close up against the German wire, only to find much of it was sunk beneath the ground level and that our guns had failed to make any practicable gap. Here also—inevitably—the attack broke down, and by 7 a.m. the whole movement in this sub-sector had come to a standstill.

2/Northamptonshire Regiment, Assisted by Direct Fire from 18-pdrs - page 37

The subsidiary attack by the 2/Northamptonshire, starting ten minutes later than the central assault, was largely dependent upon the success of the main effort. The two attacking companies left in due time the assault trench “D”—“D” which they had dug during the night in front of the orchard where the battalion had assembled; but the misfortunes of the East Lancashire then had their effect and the Northamptonshire became exposed to enfilade fire from the German trenches about points 374 and 375. In spite of this, the two attacking companies pushed forward resolutely and across the wide belt of No Man’s Land which separated them from the German trenches. “A” Company on the left felt the full force of the enfilade fire from across the Layes and was almost completely wiped out; but “D” Company under Lieut. O.K. Parker, aided by the fire of two field guns of 104th Battery, XXII Brigade R.F.A., which had been brought forward to within 350 yards of the opposing lines, reached the breach which the guns had blown in the German parapet and established itself precariously in the shattered trench.

Here is the 8th Division’s assessment of the German defensive response, in their area:

The German Parapets and German Defensive Response – page 38-39

What in fact had happened was that the German garrisons on both flanks of the advance, protected by parapets 15 and even 20 feet thick which our artillery had for the most part been unable to breach and well provided with bomb-proof shelters capable of keeping out all but the heaviest shell, had realized that their own fronts were not seriously threatened. They had thereupon turned their whole attention to containing those of our troops who had broken into the German line and to preventing reinforcements from reaching them. Deprived of the supports they so badly needed, and counter-attacked in flank and even in reverse, the advanced parties of the 2/Rifle Brigade and the 1/Royal Irish Rifles who had reached the outskirts of Rouges Bancs were driven back to the German front line trench, having lost the greater part of their number and almost all of their officers, Here they found Colonel Stephens who had brought his Headquarters across with the second wave of his battalion. Under his energetic leadership our hold on this short length of captured trench, extending from about 50 yards West of the Sailly—Fromelles road to the neighbourhood of point 883, was strengthened and maintained.

The problem faced by the 8th Divisions artillery, unlike the attacks in the south, was that there were British lodgements in the German front line – the exact positions of which was unknown.

Difficulty faced in the delivery of the next 8th Division Bombardment

Such was the position at 8 a.m. when Colonel W.H. Anderson G.S.O.1 to the division, went forward to 23rd Brigade Headquarters to direct General Pinney to take command of all troops East of the Sailly—Fromelles road. In order, if possible, to clear up the situation and to bring relief to the detachments in the German lines, a further general bombardment was ordered; the fire of our guns East of the road being directed upon the German second line, so as to avoid harm to our troops in the enemy’s front line. Following up this bombardment, the 24th Brigade was directed to renew the assault at 9 a.m., while General Pinney was to endeavour to push forward supports to the assistance of our leading troops on his front.

1300hrs – German Bombardment

The attack was not renewed and at 1300hrs the Germans opened up another bombardment, page 40:

... ; for about 1 p.m., the second hour selected for the renewal of the advance, the German artillery, heavily reinforced, opened a concentrated and prolonged bombardment of our lines and assembly positions. Even as it was, our troops suffered severely.

It had become quite evident that any further attack by daylight was doomed to failure. - page 41

The Evening – Reinforcing the Lodgement in the German Lines

The relief of the 8th Division during the night was found to be impracticable owing to the heavy shell fire and the fact that the 7th Division were unacquainted with the trenches. It was decided to postpone the movement till daylight, and the change of plan entailed the abandonment of the proposal for a renewal of the attack on the following morning.

The 8th Division were supported by artillery elements form the 7th Division. From the 7th Division’s history, page 164:

Amount of British Artillery for the Aubers Ridge Battle – page 164

The artillery available considerably exceeded that collected for Neuve Chapelle, and the highest hopes were entertained. It was believed that the reasons for the failure to achieve more complete success had been taken into account, and the causes of delay provided for, so that, this time things would go better than at Neuve Chapelle.

It was because such high hopes were entertained that May 9th was such a bitter disappointment. The greatly increased strength of the German defences was an unpleasant surprise: instead of the attackers finding but few survivors of the garrison of the front trenches, and those mostly demoralized by the bombardment which had destroyed their lines, they were met by determined opposition and heavy rifle fire from behind little-damaged defences, while the German artillery’s reply was much heavier and more effective than at Neuve Chapelle.

25th Brigade’s Lodgement – page 164

On the Eighth Division’s front only a handful of the right brigade, the 24th, managed to reach the German lines, and though on the left a substantial foothold was gained by the 25th Brigade, grazing fire from the well-concealed and protected machine-guns which swept No Man’s Land from both flanks effectually prevented any exploitation of this success. The bombardment was renewed but with little effect, the machine-guns could not be located or silenced, and despite several gallant efforts no effective help could reach the troops in the German lines, and gradually, as they ran short of bombs and cartridges, they were overwhelmed or driven out by the counter-attackers.

7th Division’s Gunners at Aubers Ridge, pages 164-165

Practically the only portion of the Seventh Division to be actively engaged on May 9th were the gunners. They were busy enough, firing away according to the previously arranged programme from 5.a.m. to 6.40 a.m., repeating various phases of the programme to assist the later attempts to advance, firing intermittently during the afternoon in the hopes of keeping back the counter-attacks and assisting the hard-pressed survivors of the first attack to maintain their hold on the captured trenches. “F” and “T” Batteries R.H.A. were mainly employed to form barrages to prevent German supports from coming up, and fired respectively 1,141 and 878 rounds.* In the XXIInd Brigade R.F.A. the 104th Battery had an advanced section up in the trenches for wire-cutting, which work was effectively performed at many points, but unluckily more than wire-cutting was needed. The XXXVth Brigade R.F.A. fired altogether over 3,000 rounds of shrapnel and 313 of high explosive and the practice was reported to be good, though the effect on the greatly strengthened German parapets fell far short of expectations.

* One section of “T” Battery was detailed to accompany the Queen’s who were to lead the advanced-guard of the Seventh Division: it took part in the initial stages of the preliminary bombardment and then came out of action, joining the Queen’s at their assembly position.

The Difficulty in replacing the 8th Division by the 7th Division – page 165

Still less was it possible to readopt a proposal from the Fourth Corps [iV. Corps] that the Seventh Division should replace the Eighth and carry out on the 10th the programme arranged for the 9th. Generals Gough and Davies concurred in opposing this plan. The Eighth Division was much too disorganized and mixed up for the smooth carrying out of so difficult a relief, the routes to the assembly places were much exposed to fire, the assembly places themselves were badly knocked about, and the trenches themselves as a whole hopelessly congested. Accordingly the idea was abandoned and about midnight the remnants of the Rifle Brigade evacuated the trenches they had so tenaciously defended.

Hope the latest extracts build up more of the artillery picture of the 8th Division’s front. It also provides much more information from which a balanced opinion can be formed.

Aye

Tom McC

[Steven Broomfield]

Tom, with no disrespect, I suspect most of those active in this thead have access to the OH, and to quite a few other books as well. Myself (like Mick), I'm still waiting to read the promised account of germans petrol-bombing the wounded mentioned some while ago.

[phil andrade]

Phil, what are you trying to contend? Is it just that Jack's statement about the Germans being on the defensive is incorrect? Or are you trying to push further? It has often been asserted that the British 'failures' in 1915 were due to the inability to learn quickly. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the British commanders were fools. Jack's point is that "the Germans appeared to apply lessons learned more rapidly". The corollary is that the BEF faced a far more difficult task in trying to improve their offensive capabilities. This point has been made several times during this thread. It challenges the commonly-held view, which seems so sensible and believeable. Are you wanting to restore this view?

Robert

What commonly held view ? That the British commanders were fools ?

No way !

Bearing in mind the difficulties that the British army faced, co-operating in a huge coalition war, engaged on continetal warfare on land, without the tradition of a large standing army to sustain the enterprise, I think that the achievement of the British army, from top to bottom, 1914-1918, ranks as a supreme triumph.

I do have a problem with the depiction of Germany fighting on the defensive. Of course, in so far as Germans held their ground against Entente counter attacks, they enjoyed the advantage of fighting on the tacitcal defensive whilst engaged in a huge and sustained strategic offensive against the Allies. I wonder how far the Anglo-French commanders thought that they were on the offensive, particularly at the time of Aubers Ridge when the Germans were giving the British such a rough time at Ypres; as for what the Russians were thinking about this as the German threat to Warsaw began to develop.....

Phil (PJA)

[Tom A McCluskey]

Steve,

I haven't finished my stated obligations, and with no disrespect intended: you'll have to wait.

I'm sure Akey won't mind if he is provided with all the facts of why the battle was such a disaster.

Aye

Tom McC

[Black Jock]

Tom, with no disrespect, I suspect most of those active in this thead have access to the OH, and to quite a few other books as well.

For many of us who don’t own, can afford to own, or can easily access the Official History, any post that provides information to Akey’s original question is not only useful to him but is obviously of interest to a good number of the over 3.500 views this thread has attracted so far.

Hopefully Akey is appreciative of those who have participated in providing details to the discussion.

I for one, am being enlightened, as I don’t have the books mentioned.

[dycer]

This will not add to the debate but is a quote from the History of a Battalion of 22nd Brigade,7th Division,written shortly after the War's end.

Festubert

"May 1915 was a month of trial.The 8th Division,supported by the 7th,was to attack the enemy positions near Fromelles.The Battalion took up their assembly position for the attack on the night of the 8th,but it was not until the 16th that the Battalion occupied the front line.While other Battalions had the incentive of going forward,the Battalion was ordered to hold their position.They were subjected to incessant and very heavy shell-fire,and suffered considerably."

George

[Steven Broomfield]

Hopefully Akey is appreciative of those who have participated in providing details to the discussion.

I suspect he isn't at the moment. He appears not to have visited the forum since he posted the original post in this thread.

No doubt he will return to be enlightened.

The reason I ask again about the petrol bombing is that it was promised way before Tom started posting the OH, so I would have suspected it would be an easier post to make than transcribing the OH. I agree that not everyone has the OH, but it is pretty easily available: the source Tom has for the petrol-bombing story seems to be somewhat rarer, so letting us share that (as promised a while back) would be perhaps more useful to the debate.

Still, I'll just have to be patient like everyone else.

[phil andrade]

the Battalion was ordered to hold their position.They were subjected to incessant and very heavy shell-fire,and suffered considerably."

George

And they were just holding their position.

Phil (PJA)

[dycer]

Phil,

Any History, of events, is never accurate,as it is written with hindsight.

The Battalion History, I quote from, carries on.

"On the 18th(May 1915),the 4th Guards Brigade crossed the left front,and the Canadians attacked through the Battalion at about 5.15 p.m. The Battalion had held on to their position grimly at a critical moment,and so allowed the fresher troops to continue onwards.

In addition to losing its Commanding Officer,31 other ranks were killed,and 11 officers and 148 other ranks wounded and 3 missing.For his work during this engagement,the Battalion's new Commanding Officer was awarded the D.S.O."

George

[Robert Dunlop]

I do have a problem with the depiction of Germany fighting on the defensive. Of course, in so far as Germans held their ground against Entente counter attacks, they enjoyed the advantage of fighting on the tacitcal defensive whilst engaged in a huge and sustained strategic offensive against the Allies. I wonder how far the Anglo-French commanders thought that they were on the offensive, particularly at the time of Aubers Ridge when the Germans were giving the British such a rough time at Ypres; as for what the Russians were thinking about this as the German threat to Warsaw began to develop.....

Thanks for the clarification, Phil. There wasn't a great deal of leeway for German 'offensive' ambitions in 1915. Hence the need to take the tactical defensive on the Western Front.

Second Ypres was a rough time for the BEF, as you say. It looms large in British and Canadian memories post-war. From a French and German perspective, it was barely a blip. Note that Jack did not rate it as worthy of mention in the context of major German offensives prior to Verdun. There was no perceptible effect on the planning for the huge 1915 French offensives that I know of.

Robert

[menright]

Mick,

Where the British managed to effect lodgements, on the 8th Division front, was where the German parapet was badly damaged by 6-inch howitzers. (“The artillery therefore would concentrate upon making a thorough breach along a short strip at the front. The troops would hurry through it whilst the artillery lifted to selected targets.” – from the Rifle Brigade account).

Account of the 8th Division attack from the OH 1915, Volume 2, pages 36-37:

The standstill was reported through the IV. Corps headquarters to General Haig, who, with the object of assisting the French offensive,* and in view of the failure of the first assault of the I. and Indian Corps, ordered General Rawlinson to “press the attack vigorously and without delay on “Rouges Bancs.”** The 8th Division was instructed accordingly, but, in the circumstances, it was difficult to carry out a further general bombardment, since the exact limits of the occupied sectors of the German front trench could not be clearly defined. The G.O.C. IV. Corps therefore decided to concentrate the artillery on the 500 yards of trench south of the Fromelles road, between the road and the lodgement held by the party of the Northamptonshire. The renewed assault was to be delivered by 24th Brigade, with the 2/Queen’s (Major H.R. Bottomley) of the 7th Division in support, and by the 25th Brigade, with the 23rd Brigade in support. To allow time for reorganization, it was ordered to take place at 1.30 p.m. Meantime the leading troops were heavily shelled in their forming-up places—parallel lines of shallow trench in the open—and encountered violent fire from artillery, machine guns and rifles as soon as they attempted to leave them, most of the casualties indeed occurring before they got as far as the original support trenches.*** The attack was therefore brought to nought before it could get under way.

* For the results of achieved by the French, see sketch 5, and note I. at the end of this chapter.

**This message sent first at 8.45 a.m., was repeated at 11.45 a.m.

***The 2/East Lancashire lost 454 men; the 1/Sherwood Foresters 347, although only two companies attacked; the 1/Worcestershire 235 and the 1/5 Black Watch 146, without getting beyond the assembly trenches.

On the failure of this renewed attempt to assault being reported to General Haig, he again urged the IV. Corps to press forward vigorously. To reinforce it, he placed the 21st Brigade, now in the First Army reserve, at General Rawlinson’s disposal; but on General Gough informing the latter that he had convinced himself by a personal reconnaissance of the uselessness of putting in the brigade, and of the certainty of any further attempts by daylight being a failure, the brigades of the IV. Corps, like those of the I. and Indian Corps, were directed to reorganize preparatory to a renewal of the offensive at dusk, at 8 p.m.

Mick,

As can be seen above, attempts to organize the attack went on through the day, so additional bombardments would take place. Although the German reports may state that the British artillery was effective, evidently it was not in destroying and suppressing German firepower in flank and depth positions.

All, back to the Artillery in the Northern Sector

Excepts relating to Artillery from the History of the 8th Division, pages 34-35:

Bombardment in General

At 5 a.m. on the 9th May our artillery bombardment opened, the first ten or fifteen minutes being devoted to wire-cutting and the remainder of the bombardment prior to the of the infantry assaults to the destruction of the trenches to be attacked. In this bombardment and in the subsequent fighting brass mortars dating from 1840 were pressed into service and a battery of them under Lieut. D. Uzielli did particularly good work. So great was our need of artillery. The number of our guns, indeed, proved utterly inadequate for the accomplishment of their tasks in the time allotted. Even at the height of the bombardment of the hostile trenches, the volume of effective fire was not sufficient to compel the German garrisons to keep under cover.

Lack of Destruction & Suppression of German Firepower – Page 35

[Reference 2nd Bn. East Lancashire Regt.] No sooner had they left the protection of the breastworks, than they were met by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire which seemed to be entirely unaffected by our bombardment and caused many casualties.

The inadequacy of our artillery preparations and support, indeed, and its failure to destroy the enemy’s defences or to subdue the fire of its infantry decided the whole operation. It did not check, however, the ardour of the attack nor prevent it, despite grievous losses inflicted by murderous fire, from effecting a lodgement in the German trenches in all three sectors.

From a personal point of view, if the British artillery was effective, German firepower on this front, depth, and its flanks would be destroyed or suppressed. It is evident that this is not the case. It would be interesting to know what a German machine-gunner was experiencing during this attack.

1/Sherwood Foresters, Held Up by Uncut Wire – page 37

Despite the difficulties and confusion thereby caused [mix of units and casualties in the British front line trench], the leading platoons of 1/Sherwood Foresters (Major L. St. H. Morley) crossed our breastwork at 6.10 a.m. and, finding the survivors of the East Lancashire held up in front of them, changed direction half-right and advanced against point 373. This new attack got close up against the German wire, only to find much of it was sunk beneath the ground level and that our guns had failed to make any practicable gap. Here also—inevitably—the attack broke down, and by 7 a.m. the whole movement in this sub-sector had come to a standstill.

2/Northamptonshire Regiment, Assisted by Direct Fire from 18-pdrs - page 37

The subsidiary attack by the 2/Northamptonshire, starting ten minutes later than the central assault, was largely dependent upon the success of the main effort. The two attacking companies left in due time the assault trench “D”—“D” which they had dug during the night in front of the orchard where the battalion had assembled; but the misfortunes of the East Lancashire then had their effect and the Northamptonshire became exposed to enfilade fire from the German trenches about points 374 and 375. In spite of this, the two attacking companies pushed forward resolutely and across the wide belt of No Man’s Land which separated them from the German trenches. “A” Company on the left felt the full force of the enfilade fire from across the Layes and was almost completely wiped out; but “D” Company under Lieut. O.K. Parker, aided by the fire of two field guns of 104th Battery, XXII Brigade R.F.A., which had been brought forward to within 350 yards of the opposing lines, reached the breach which the guns had blown in the German parapet and established itself precariously in the shattered trench.

Here is the 8th Division’s assessment of the German defensive response, in their area:

The German Parapets and German Defensive Response – page 38-39

What in fact had happened was that the German garrisons on both flanks of the advance, protected by parapets 15 and even 20 feet thick which our artillery had for the most part been unable to breach and well provided with bomb-proof shelters capable of keeping out all but the heaviest shell, had realized that their own fronts were not seriously threatened. They had thereupon turned their whole attention to containing those of our troops who had broken into the German line and to preventing reinforcements from reaching them. Deprived of the supports they so badly needed, and counter-attacked in flank and even in reverse, the advanced parties of the 2/Rifle Brigade and the 1/Royal Irish Rifles who had reached the outskirts of Rouges Bancs were driven back to the German front line trench, having lost the greater part of their number and almost all of their officers, Here they found Colonel Stephens who had brought his Headquarters across with the second wave of his battalion. Under his energetic leadership our hold on this short length of captured trench, extending from about 50 yards West of the Sailly—Fromelles road to the neighbourhood of point 883, was strengthened and maintained.

The problem faced by the 8th Divisions artillery, unlike the attacks in the south, was that there were British lodgements in the German front line – the exact positions of which was unknown.

Difficulty faced in the delivery of the next 8th Division Bombardment

Such was the position at 8 a.m. when Colonel W.H. Anderson G.S.O.1 to the division, went forward to 23rd Brigade Headquarters to direct General Pinney to take command of all troops East of the Sailly—Fromelles road. In order, if possible, to clear up the situation and to bring relief to the detachments in the German lines, a further general bombardment was ordered; the fire of our guns East of the road being directed upon the German second line, so as to avoid harm to our troops in the enemy’s front line. Following up this bombardment, the 24th Brigade was directed to renew the assault at 9 a.m., while General Pinney was to endeavour to push forward supports to the assistance of our leading troops on his front.

1300hrs – German Bombardment

The attack was not renewed and at 1300hrs the Germans opened up another bombardment, page 40:

... ; for about 1 p.m., the second hour selected for the renewal of the advance, the German artillery, heavily reinforced, opened a concentrated and prolonged bombardment of our lines and assembly positions. Even as it was, our troops suffered severely.

It had become quite evident that any further attack by daylight was doomed to failure. - page 41

The Evening – Reinforcing the Lodgement in the German Lines

The relief of the 8th Division during the night was found to be impracticable owing to the heavy shell fire and the fact that the 7th Division were unacquainted with the trenches. It was decided to postpone the movement till daylight, and the change of plan entailed the abandonment of the proposal for a renewal of the attack on the following morning.

The 8th Division were supported by artillery elements form the 7th Division. From the 7th Division’s history, page 164:

Amount of British Artillery for the Aubers Ridge Battle – page 164

The artillery available considerably exceeded that collected for Neuve Chapelle, and the highest hopes were entertained. It was believed that the reasons for the failure to achieve more complete success had been taken into account, and the causes of delay provided for, so that, this time things would go better than at Neuve Chapelle.

It was because such high hopes were entertained that May 9th was such a bitter disappointment. The greatly increased strength of the German defences was an unpleasant surprise: instead of the attackers finding but few survivors of the garrison of the front trenches, and those mostly demoralized by the bombardment which had destroyed their lines, they were met by determined opposition and heavy rifle fire from behind little-damaged defences, while the German artillery’s reply was much heavier and more effective than at Neuve Chapelle.

25th Brigade’s Lodgement – page 164

On the Eighth Division’s front only a handful of the right brigade, the 24th, managed to reach the German lines, and though on the left a substantial foothold was gained by the 25th Brigade, grazing fire from the well-concealed and protected machine-guns which swept No Man’s Land from both flanks effectually prevented any exploitation of this success. The bombardment was renewed but with little effect, the machine-guns could not be located or silenced, and despite several gallant efforts no effective help could reach the troops in the German lines, and gradually, as they ran short of bombs and cartridges, they were overwhelmed or driven out by the counter-attackers.

7th Division’s Gunners at Aubers Ridge, pages 164-165

Practically the only portion of the Seventh Division to be actively engaged on May 9th were the gunners. They were busy enough, firing away according to the previously arranged programme from 5.a.m. to 6.40 a.m., repeating various phases of the programme to assist the later attempts to advance, firing intermittently during the afternoon in the hopes of keeping back the counter-attacks and assisting the hard-pressed survivors of the first attack to maintain their hold on the captured trenches. “F” and “T” Batteries R.H.A. were mainly employed to form barrages to prevent German supports from coming up, and fired respectively 1,141 and 878 rounds.* In the XXIInd Brigade R.F.A. the 104th Battery had an advanced section up in the trenches for wire-cutting, which work was effectively performed at many points, but unluckily more than wire-cutting was needed. The XXXVth Brigade R.F.A. fired altogether over 3,000 rounds of shrapnel and 313 of high explosive and the practice was reported to be good, though the effect on the greatly strengthened German parapets fell far short of expectations.

* One section of “T” Battery was detailed to accompany the Queen’s who were to lead the advanced-guard of the Seventh Division: it took part in the initial stages of the preliminary bombardment and then came out of action, joining the Queen’s at their assembly position.

The Difficulty in replacing the 8th Division by the 7th Division – page 165

Still less was it possible to readopt a proposal from the Fourth Corps [iV. Corps] that the Seventh Division should replace the Eighth and carry out on the 10th the programme arranged for the 9th. Generals Gough and Davies concurred in opposing this plan. The Eighth Division was much too disorganized and mixed up for the smooth carrying out of so difficult a relief, the routes to the assembly places were much exposed to fire, the assembly places themselves were badly knocked about, and the trenches themselves as a whole hopelessly congested. Accordingly the idea was abandoned and about midnight the remnants of the Rifle Brigade evacuated the trenches they had so tenaciously defended.

Hope the latest extracts build up more of the artillery picture of the 8th Division’s front. It also provides much more information from which a balanced opinion can be formed.

Aye

Tom McC

Tom,

The detail, including the OH map is most appreciated: very instructive for those of us without the full set.

Michael

[phil andrade]

Thanks for the clarification, Phil. There wasn't a great deal of leeway for German 'offensive' ambitions in 1915. Hence the need to take the tactical defensive on the Western Front.

Robert

The amount of harrassment that the Allies endured is what I think needs to be sressed.

We think of the huge attacks that were made against the German positions in Artois and Chanpagne in 1915. We don't hear much about the vicious, local attacks that the Germans made against the French in the Argonne in June, for example. Just browsing through Randal Gray's Chronicle of the First World War reveals a surprisingly large number of German attacks recorded on different sectors of the front..

Phil (PJA)

[dycer]

Phil,

Exactly the point I was trying to make, from the Battalion History I quoted from.

Whilst I take the phrase "incessant shell-fire" with a pinch of salt especially over a ten day period.Could the German gunners have manned their guns continually and would their guns have survived the hammer they were receiving?

Clearly though,due to the inefficiencies of the British Artillery,whether it was because of their standard of ammunition,target finding,range seeking,etc they were unable to eliminate German counter Battery fire.

George

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi Mick,

Reference the armoured car, I wonder if it was one of the vehicles moving a 3-pdr. Hotchkiss gun?

Aye

Tom McC

[SiegeGunner]

I remain baffled by the amount of detail that the British side apparently wrote down about this battle, and I think we urgently need to apply Occam's Razor to get to the nub of the answer to the original question. The brutal truth is that the British attack at Aubers Ridge failed because unprotected infantry was sent to assault largely unbreached German defences that were bristling with unsuppressed machine guns and were backed up by well-supplied and again unsuppressed artillery. For those reasons a very high proportion of the British casualties were taken inside their own lines or within a few yards of their own parapet and the small numbers of men who made it to the German breastworks and even into the German lines were easily dealt with by the trench garrison in situ, without external assistance.

The rest is merely book-keeping and obfuscation.

Perhaps we should raise our sights a notch and consider the question of whether Aubers, although a failure in itself, usefully contributed to the greater French success further down the line. If it did, then perhaps it wasn't such a complete failure after all ...

[SiegeGunner]

Reference the armoured car, I wonder if it was one of the vehicles moving a 3-pdr. Hotchkiss gun?

No idea, Tom - do you have an account of vehicles moving a 3pdr Hotchkiss? If so, which part of the attack frontage did it go to and what part did it play?

[Robert Dunlop]

Just browsing through Randal Gray's Chronicle of the First World War reveals a surprisingly large number of German attacks recorded on different sectors of the front.

Phil, I recall that you have raised this point before in another thread. 'Vicious' these attacks may have been. 'Local' they very much were. Nothing remotely like Verdun though.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

Mick,

Meerut Division Diary at 9.26 am on 9th May 1915, from the National Archives.

Aye

Tom McC

[phil andrade]

Phil, I recall that you have raised this point before in another thread. 'Vicious' these attacks may have been. 'Local' they very much were. Nothing remotely like Verdun though.

Robert

Yes, these were nothing on that kind of scale.

It's a point that I have laboured.

I do wonder if some of the British and French attacks were motivated by the need to supress the harrassing fire that the Germans deployed so effectively : it's my impression that they ( the Germans) were adept at maintaining a peculiar kind of aggression despite their skillful defensive tactics.

Some of the attacks were considerable - early summer of 1916 at Vimy and Mount Sorrel.

I wonder if the German High Command saw it as a morale boosting excercise for themselves and their troops, to show that they weren't content to sit passively and wait for the Allies to try and expel them. Didn't the Germans express some satisfaction with their local offensive against the French around Serre in 1915 ? If I remember Jack's book correctly, the local German commander was pleased to demonstrate that his soldiers had not lost their penchant for attacking.

Heck, I am conscious that it looks like I'm trying to divert the thread from Aubers Ridge. I try and sympathise with the high ranking officers who launched this attack and others. They were under terrible pressure from their allies. How far were the British acting under duress from the French ? And how far were the French themselves - apart from the obvious and paramount objective of expelling the invader - reacting to appeals from the Russians, who were feeling the German pressure on a huge scale ? Aubers Ridge, and the French drive at Vimy, came barely a week after the openiing of the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive.

Phil (PJA)

[widavies]

"May 1915 was a month of trial.."

This was the "return" where in effect it was the British Army's first attempts at going onto the offensive in the weststern front. It failed because of many factors, but primarily it was due to the lack of High explosive shells which meant that the enemy wire and front line trenches were not hardly toouched prior to the first attacks going in. This meant that the attacking thrusts were concentrated into easily defensible lanes as the british soldier searched for a way through the wire into the german trenches. Other contributary factors included, haste in organising the attack due to French pressure, troops being tired before even starting off, lack of concealment, lack of grenades, lack of machine guns and the list goes on and on....

Will Davies

[phil andrade]

Second Ypres was a rough time for the BEF, as you say. It looms large in British and Canadian memories post-war. From a French and German perspective, it was barely a blip. Note that Jack did not rate it as worthy of mention in the context of major German offensives prior to Verdun. There was no perceptible effect on the planning for the huge 1915 French offensives that I know of.

Robert

Between April 21st and May 30th 1915, the Germans made an official return of 35,000 casualties for the 2nd Ypres fighting. At Verdun the following year, their casualties for the entire month of April were 38,000.

Edit : Robert, I'm conscious that I might appear to be point scoring here. I hope you don't think that..... I admit that I was surprised myself at how high the German casualty rate for 2nd Ypres was, especially for an operation that was, judging by one or two accounts, a stricly localised and experimental affair. Ironically, at Aubers Ridge the Germans deployed reserves which they didn't need to use, while at Ypres they were deprived of resources and ended up by using what they had rather intensively.

I'm still reflecting on the more grandiose bakdrop to both episodes...it has been suggested that 2nd Ypres was fought by the Germans to disguise their preparations against the Russians; how far was Aubers Ridge part of an Entente effort to support their eastern ally ? The battles against the Russians were important in the effect they had on the Western Front.

As far as Aubers Ridge itself is concerned, there was a very wide gap between the two pincers of the British attack. How far did this dmage prospects?

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, no problem whatsoever. This is not point scoring but a robust debate. It is very appropriate to post material in this way, not least because it stimulates further analysis of the issues.

I don't have a problem with the point that the Germans were not sitting passively about unless there was a major attack. This approach to maintaining the 'offensive spirit' was seen in all three major armies. There is a distinct difference, however, between a major offensive campaign, such as Verdun, versus a localised attack or series of attacks, such as 2nd Ypres, Mont Sorrel, etc.

The former required a deliberate policy, driven from the top. This is because all sorts of issues that crossed the boundaries of Armies, such as resources allocations, flowed from the policy. Localised attacks could take place within the context of an overall policy of defense on the Western Front. The comparative casualties, with respect, do not distinguish these differences.

Robert

[PhilB]

It failed because of many factors, but primarily it was due to the lack of High explosive shells which meant that the enemy wire and front line trenches were not hardly toouched prior to the first attacks going in.

Wasn`t it vital that the wire was adequately destroyed before the first infantry attacks went in? Let`s give the commanders the benefit of the doubt and assume that they were confident the wire was cut - was such confidence, although wrongly placed, justified by the information available to them? Because, if not, this was a disaster waiting to happen?