Aubers Ridge, 1915

[SiegeGunner]

Meerut Division Diary at 9.26 am on 9th May 1915, from the National Archives.

Not the armoured car in the German report I cited, Tom, as the Meerut Division was down in the southern sector. But it does tend to suggest that the vehicle that drove down the road from Cordonnerie Farm (in the northern sector) was indeed an armoured car and not a lorry or large car. An armoured car equipped with an unusual weapon like a 3pdr Hotchkiss puts me in mind of Samson's RNAS force - I wonder where they were at the time?

[phil andrade]

Putting this in a rather clumsy way, I would like to pose the question : who was dancing to whose tune in the overall strategic developments of 1915 ? This certainly impinged on Aubers Ridge.

For all their defensive fighting in the West, the Germans were extremely aggressive and strikingly successful in the East : the capture of huge parts of Russian Poland, along with a million POWs and Warsaw itself. And then there was the crushing onslaught against Serbia.

It seems that the Germans were calling the tune. The Allied response in Artois and Champagne might be seen as rescue attempts in this light, and this produced the Aubers Ridge nightmare for the British. Even Gallipoli - a strategic offensive if ever there was one - might be interpreted as a venture to save the Russians.

It must be conceded that the entry of Italy into the war rather compromises this interpretation, but that was, to a degree, countered by the entry of Bulgaria as Germany's ally.

Perhaps I strain too much to look at the "big picture" !

Phil (PJA)

[SiegeGunner]

Wasn`t it vital that the wire was adequately destroyed before the first infantry attacks went in? Let`s give the commanders the benefit of the doubt and assume that they were confident the wire was cut - was such confidence, although wrongly placed, justified by the information available to them? Because, if not, this was a disaster waiting to happen?

Several accounts cited earlier in the thread have shown that attacking units were surprised to find that some of the German wire was below general ground level, which suggests to me that the German front line had only been surveyed from the air, from where such features would probably not be apparent. Similarly with quotes about the difficulty of identifying the locations of German machine-gun positions within the breastworks. Both suggest a lack of close-in night-time patrols in advance of the attacks.

[Robert Dunlop]

Some of the attacks were considerable - early summer of 1916 at Vimy and Mount Sorrel.

I don't plan to repost information on these actions and their place in the overall defensive strategy. For those readers who did not follow the previous discussion on this issue, here is a link.

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

... this produced the Aubers Ridge nightmare for the British.

You're over-emoting again, Phil. What's this 'nightmare'? - it was a little local action that went wrong. As regards rescuing the Russians, Aubers didn't even suck in reserves from a five mile radius, let alone divert men or resources from the Eastern Front.

[phil andrade]

You're over-emoting again, Phil. What's this 'nightmare'? - it was a little local action that went wrong. As regards rescuing the Russians, Aubers didn't even suck in reserves from a five mile radius, let alone divert men or resources from the Eastern Front.

Your reply astounds me.

Of course it was a nightmare : a repulse, severe and complete, occassioned by the greatest bloodshed suffered by British arms in a single day since 1644. If that's over -emoting, then all I can say is sorEEE !

The intention of the attack was to lend support to the French, who were themselves, I imagine, endeavouring to support the hard pressed Russians. The effect did not do justice to the intent.

Phil (PJA)

[Tom A McCluskey]

"it was a little local action that went wrong"

Mick

It depends on whose map you are using. Actually, since landing in France, it was the largest offensive battle of the B.E.F., up to that date (09 May 1915), with the Indian, I and IV Corps all involved. The battle honour awarded being Aubers.

Aye

Tom McC

[Robert Dunlop]

...I would like to pose the question : who was dancing to whose tune in the overall strategic developments of 1915 ? It seems that the Germans were calling the tune.

Phil, this issue has arisen before. I would urge caution with this interpretation. This post here contains some information about von Falkenhayn's thinking in 1915. The wider thread expanded on this, though mostly in respect of Verdun. Readers could get the impression that the Germans were free to dictate how the war was being fought. This was clearly not the case. For example, the Russian successes in the Carpathians forced Falkenhayn's hand in the East. The success of Mackensen's attacks became alluring but they did nothing to stop the continued build-up of offensive capabilities on the Western Front.

It was war that dictated the tune. Total war, as demanded by major military powers going at things without any prospect of backing down, took time to evolve. Britain exemplified how long it took for a tiny regular army to evolve into a massive military force supported by consciption and hugely upscaled industrial production (including support from overseas). Aubers Ridge (and related battles) represented the nadir in this process, with men outstripping manufacturing. The United States took almost as long to build up their offensive capability, if you think of the time from the declaration of war to the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne, which was the equivalent of the Somme in terms of direct impact on the Germans IMHO.

In 1915, von Falkenhayn knew that time was against a peace that favoured Germany (as opposed to a total military victory).

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, I totally agree with Mick's interpretation of a 'little local action'. You are quite correct that it was the BEF's largest offensive battle to that date. But it was still small biccies compared to what came later. Three corps were involved but the actual frontage was not even continuous across these corps. This map here helps put the scale of the battle into perspective. The battlefield barely registers on the big scale of things. The French attacks in the Artois are illustrated. The geographic spread of this campaign was quite limited too. What the map does not convey, however, was the duration and scale of the French effort in this area, compared to Aubers Ridge. Even this effort is overshadowed by the breadth of the attacks in the Champagne region.

Phil, I hope the map helps put your thoughts into a clearer perspective as well.

Robert

[truthergw]

Your reply astounds me.

Of course it was a nightmare : a repulse, severe and complete, occassioned by the greatest bloodshed suffered by British arms in a single day since 1644. If that's over -emoting, then all I can say is sorEEE !

The intention of the attack was to lend support to the French, who were themselves, I imagine, endeavouring to support the hard pressed Russians. The effect did not do justice to the intent.

Phil (PJA)

The Official German history, " Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918 ", vol 8, covers the British action on 9th May in one paragraph on page 59. To put that in some sort of context. Chapter 3 covers the fighting on the Western front from middle of April to beginning of August. It takes up pages 34 to 102. A section devoted to the actions of the German 6th Army from 9th to 14th May, which includes the above paragraph, takes up 12 pages( 57 - 69). That will give us some sort of gauge as to how important the Germans thought Aubers Ridge was.

Phil, it is a truism that a war consists of a series of battles but to try to draw strategic lessons from a one day action, aborted to all intents and purposes half way through, is stretching the powers of analysis to the extreme. Aubers was a very small action, badly planned and poorly executed which never got off the ground and was finished before it started. It had no discernible effect on Entente strategy after the event and barely impinged on the OHL consciousness either at the time or even years later when the history was being written.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, Tom. You beat me to it. Very telling IMHO. Doughty's book 'Pyrrhic victory: French strategy and operations in the Great War' also puts these operations into better perspective. Charles Huguet was more outspoken in his book 'Britain and the war: a French indictment' - not a book for ardent Anglophiles.

Robert

[Steven Broomfield]

Several accounts cited earlier in the thread have shown that attacking units were surprised to find that some of the German wire was below general ground level, which suggests to me that the German front line had only been surveyed from the air, from where such features would probably not be apparent. Similarly with quotes about the difficulty of identifying the locations of German machine-gun positions within the breastworks. Both suggest a lack of close-in night-time patrols in advance of the attacks.

Indeed: both Tom McC and I have posted evidence that the wire was sunken into the ground, so we can add as a reason for failure "inadequate reconnaisance of the ground over which the attack was to be made", possibly.

[squirrel]

And remember also that ariel photography and, perhaps even more importantly, the interpretation of photographs, was still in its infancy and a very inexact "science" at the time.

[PhilB]

Indeed: both Tom McC and I have posted evidence that the wire was sunken into the ground, so we can add as a reason for failure "inadequate reconnaisance of the ground over which the attack was to be made", possibly.

This would be the military equivalent of the "ha ha" on grand estates, where a trench was dug with the wire in the bottom so as to be out of view? Wouldn`t a trench wide enough to accommodate enough wire to stop infantry (and wide enough not to be jumped over) be visible from the air? The absence of any men in there would be a clue that it is not a normal trench?

[Tom A McCluskey]

"Tom, I totally agree with Mick's interpretation of a 'little local action'. You are quite correct that it was the BEF's largest offensive battle to that date."

Robert,

I am not looking at this battle from a German perspective. From a military person's point of view a 'little local action' suggests a gun-battle between a British and an enemy patrol - and you know that is not the case. This was a large British attack, in two locations, (by military definition a battle) that failed.

Also, I am not talking about future events. I thought this was clear enough in the conditions set out in my lead in: it was the "largest offensive battle of the B.E.F., up to that date (09 May 1915)"

Aye

Tom McC

[IanA]

Irrelevant I know, but no ha-ha I have ever come across had wire in the bottom.

Not to be confused with Terry Pratchett's hoho.

[PhilB]

No, the ha ha would normally have had a fence (though I`ve never seen one). I did say "the military equivalent" and it would have to have been at least as large to hide barbed wire entanglements designed to stop infantry?

[Steven Broomfield]

My impression of a haha is almost a tank trap: a shallow slope down to a vertical saide. The latter might be of brick (to keep it up), but the point of a haha is to allow the land owner a view of his rolling acres, while preventing livestock from trampling on the lawn and rose gardens.

The haha would allow cows or sheep to walk up to the edge of the ornamental garden, but the vertical slope would prevent access to the ornamental garden; the slope would allow the livestock to get back to whence they came without needing the fire brigade to hoist them out.

The lack of a fence or wall meant the landowner could see his land and livestock.

Personally, I've always felt the haha, combined with cricket, prevented revolution in this country. If you wish to see a splendid haha, go to Mottisfont Abbey near Romsey (you can also marvel at Rex Whistler's sublime tromp d'oeil morning room).

[Pete1052]

Personally, I've always felt the haha, combined with cricket, prevented revolution in this country.

If Beppo reads that he'll get out his Red Flag and lead an uncouth mob on a march to bourgeois Eastleigh, hardly a ha-ha matter.

[Black Jock]

Robert & Mick

You can't change the history of the British Army. "Aubers" still stands as a Battle Honour and to describe it as something less is to diminish the effort of the men who fought there.

Tom

[widavies]

Indeed: both Tom McC and I have posted evidence that the wire was sunken into the ground, so we can add as a reason for failure "inadequate reconnaisance of the ground over which the attack was to be made", possibly.

Regarding the sunken wire. Logistically digging a forward trench just for running barbed wire would have been a labour intensive operation that would have been spotted by the allies.

So my interpretation is that it might not have been deliberately sunk as such. I have seen some reports that wire had been partly buried by intense shelling in some instances, Also have you ever thought that the Germans may have run out spare spools of wire in their forward trenches at the last minute on a whim just prior to the attack coming in. In this case no one could have known from British intelligence methods just what was awaiting them.

Regards

Will

[truthergw]

..............................

I am not looking at this battle from a German perspective. .........................................................................

Also, I am not talking about future events. I thought this was clear enough in the conditions set out in my lead in: it was the "largest offensive battle of the B.E.F., up to that date (09 May 1915)"

Aye

Tom McC

With the best will in the world, a discussion of a battle which ignores one side's ideas on it, is going to be rather limited, is it not? As far as the largest battle up to that point, I think we should remember that it was only the second in what are known as " The Early Battles". Every battle the BEF fought was larger than the one before with the possible exception of Cambrai when various innovations took the place of increased resources.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Tom,

Don't be cute.

You knew what I meant, so please don't try to twist what I said.

Aye

Tom McC

[truthergw]

It's a long time since I gave up trying to be cute. I don't have the physique for it. I commented on your post as I understood it. If I misunderstood perhaps you can elaborate?

[Robert Dunlop]

"Aubers" still stands as a Battle Honour and to describe it as something less is to diminish the effort of the men who fought there.

Tom, thanks for raising this point. It is not our intention to diminish the effort of the men. Not in the slightest. Mick has provided the German perspective, pointing out that the defenders managed to beat off the attack using local resources. I have, amongst other things, tried to place the scale of the battle in context. Though I regard the battle as small by comparison to others (FWIIW), this does not detract from respecting the efforts of the British soldiers. Mick has given me more respect for the German soldiers, compared to what I knew before. But I don't count their efforts as greater or more worthy. There is no way that we would suggest that Aubers should be regarded as less than a Battle Honour.

Robert