Aubers Ridge, 1915

[Terry_Reeves]

Battle honours do not mean a great deal in the larger scope of this or any other war. There is a great difference from looking upwards from the individual/company/regimental point of view, and downwards from from an Army/Corps / Divisional perspective. Much has been said about the shell shortage /duds at Aubers. Little has been said has been said about the same problems in the French and German armies in roughly the same period.

TR

[Tom A McCluskey]

Robert,

I'm sure your comments will be much appreciated by Auld Tam. Regardless of the defeat, The Black Watch are proud of their Regiment's efforts (four battalions) at this battle.

Hi All,

I would like to lead into the southern attacks and I will also bring in 2nd Lieut Sotheby. For that to happen, I have to mention the narrative about the 1st Battalion The Black Watch at the Battle of Aubers Ridge. I make no apologies for this post as there are interesting points, for future discussion, contained within.

The following extract is from: A History of The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War, 1914-1918, Volume 1, Regular Army, edited by Major-General A.G. Wauchope, pages 34-39:

2.— The Battle of Aubers Ridge, May 9th, 1915.

It has been mentioned that a British offensive was considered certain. Sir John French selected the early spring as the opportune time, and the Aubers Ridge, “which guarded La Bassée to the south-west and Lille to the north-east as the objective. The German line there formed a marked salient, and an attack on the ridge, if completely successful, would shake the security of Lille, and if but moderately successful would cut off La Bassée.”

This was the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10th-13th March, in which the Battalion took no part; it was fought on a narrow front, with a limited objective, and was comparatively successful, although the enemy defences had not completely destroyed by our artillery. At the second attempt on the 9th May the front was extended, and the I Corps on the right of the First Army co-operated with the previous attackers, the VII Corps and the Indian Corps.

On the 7th May orders were received that an attack would be carried out on the front of the First Army, with the object of breaking the enemy’s line, occupying the line of the La Bassée—Lille road, and afterwards advancing to the line Beauvin—Don. The First Division was on the right of the attack—but before describing this action, it is necessary to give a short description of the position.

The main feature of the front is the Rue de Bois, connecting Béthune and Lille. Near the line, two smaller roads ran north-west from the Rue de Bois, on to Rue des Berceaux, and one about half a mile to the east of it; these were known as Albert and Edward roads respectively. A few hundred yards further west along the Rue de Bois , and nearer to Béthune, a road known as Princes Road left the main road and ran south-east in the direction of La Quinque Rue. It was the junction of Princes road and the Rue de Bois that has been referred to as Chocolat Menier Corner.

From Richebourg l’Avoué the line kept parallel with the Rue de Bois, and to the south of it, until at Chocolat Menier Corner, it took a right-angled turn to the south-east. It then ran parallel to Princes Road for about threequarters [sic] of a mile, took another right-angled turn to the south-west, crossed Princess Road and ran east of “Indian Village.” The Battalion, with Headquarters at the Rue des Berceaux, had, on moving into the line on the 4th, occupied the sector from Chocolat Menier Corner to Richebourg l’Avoué; these two points were the Divisional boundaries for the attack.

The immediate objective of the 1st Division was a line from the Rue de Marais to Lorgies, about two miles in rear of the enemy’s front line. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades were detailed to carry out the attack, the inter-Brigade boundary being a cinder-track running from the Rue de Bois to Ferme Toulotte.

On the south there was no co-operation, the ground east of La Bassée being impassable. To the north the Meerut Division (in which were the 2nd and the 4th Battalions The Black Watch) was to attack la Tourelle. After the first objective had been gained, it was intended that the 1st Brigade should pass through the 2nd and 3rd Brigades and advance on an objective to be given later. In the meantime the 1st Brigade was held in Divisional Reserve, the Battalion being held in readiness to move first.

These orders were received on the 7th; but at 7 p.m. on that day the Battalion was informed that the attack had been postponed; and it was not until the evening of the 8th that the attacking troops of the 2nd Brigade took over the breastworks. On relief, the Battalion went into bivouac in an orchard a hundred yards west of Chocolat Menier Corner.

The infantry assault was preceded by a continuous bombardment which lasted for forty minutes. It is interesting to compare this preparation with the days and weeks of bombardment which preceded the later and more successful assaults of the war. The Allies had not yet learnt the lesson that where the enemy’s defences consisted of entrenched positions, nothing short of absolute destruction could break them.

The bombardment opened at 5 a.m. and at 5.40 a.m. the 2nd and 3rd Brigades advanced. The enemy replied to our bombardment with an artillery fire that could not be called very severe, and the Battalion crossed Albert Road and occupied the rear lines of breastworks, intending to go forward to each line as the Brigades in front vacated it.

These Brigades, when they advanced, were met by a heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the German breastworks. Their start was difficult; they had to surmount the breastworks themselves, cross a dyke about ten feet wide, over which wooden bridges had been placed during the night, and then make their way across No Man’s Land, which was rough and pitted with shell-holes. At the German line they found that the wire was uncut, and in face of the opposition offered they were unable to reach the enemy breastworks.

The failure of this attack was known about 6.15 a.m., and the 1st Brigade was at once ordered to occupy the front-line breastworks and be ready to meet any counter-attack launched by the enemy. It may be mentioned that in no part of the Army front did the attack meet with any greater success than here on the front of the 1st Division.

In this action of May 9th there is ample evidence to suggest that the Germans were well informed as to the impending movement, and were well prepared for it. Their trenches were very deep, and more vulnerable to high explosives in which the British artillery were deficient, than to shrapnel. In addition, the arrangements for cutting the wire proved inadequate.

The Battalion now occupied the front breastworks from Albert road on the right to the cinder track on the left, with three companies in the line and C Company in reserve in the second line. At 7 a.m. the 2nd and 3rd Brigades attempted a second assault, but this was unsuccessful, through the heavy machine gun fire and the difficulty of passing the still uncut wire. At 8 a.m., therefore, artillery began deliberate wire-cutting, and at 9.20 a.m. orders were issued that the 2nd and 3rd Brigades should attack again at 12 noon; this was later cancelled, then postponed until 2.40 p.m., and again until 4.p.m.

For this attack the objective was limited to the enemy’s first system of trenches, and the 1st Brigade was ordered to take the place of the shattered 2nd Brigade. Two battalions carried out the assault, The Black Watch on the right, and the Camerons on the left. At the outset the communication trenches and breastworks were crowded with troops, and so great was the congestion that both battalions found it difficult to reach their jumping off positions. The Camerons, in fact, could not reach their position by the time the attack opened; but such few men as came up in time attacked most bravely on the left of The Black Watch.

After an artillery bombardment of twenty minutes the Battalion advanced to the attack, and made one of the finest assaults it delivered during the war, distinguished by skilful leadership of officers and section commanders under the most adverse conditions, and great gallantry on the part of the men. Throughout the war the Special Reserve officers attached to the Battalion did well, and especially so on this day. Many were professional men who in peace time had worked hard, under various difficulties, to make themselves efficient soldiers; they had not displayed the same training as their Regular brother officers yet they displayed, even from the outset, fine soldierly qualities.

As in the original assault, the wire had not been sufficiently cut, nor had the German breastworks and machine guns been much damaged. Against them, A and B companies advanced over the open, followed by the two platoons each from C and D companies. The reserve, consisting of the remainder of C and D Companies, and the four battalion machine guns, remained in the breastworks where was also Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Stewart and Headquarters.

The companies advanced to the sound of the pipes—for the last time—since gas helmets were shortly to muffle the pipers. It was not possible to recognize “Highland Laddie” in the noise of the gunfire, but the pipes themselves could not be silenced, and there is no doubt that they raised the spirit of the attackers. [Prepare to attack, in The Black Watch, would be signalled by the pipe tune The Campbells are Coming. The attack would be piped to the tune Highland Laddie, but played in double quick time.] As soon as our men topped the breastworks, they were met with a terrific rifle and machine gun fire, which seemed to come from every direction; machine guns were not only firing from breastworks, but from tunnels cut underneath them.

The distance between the lines was about 300 yards, so that it did not take more than two minutes for the leading troops to reach the enemy wire. A few gaps existed, and into these the attacking platoons converged; then, forcing their way into the German line, they began to clear the trenches by hand-to-hand fighting. The advantage lay with the enemy from the first, since the platoons could only enter the breastworks on narrow fronts where the gaps existed; and though the Battalion established itself at various points, it was attacked from three sides, being bombed from both flanks, and fired into from the enemy’s rear line.

Casualties amongst the officers were especially high. Major F.M.B Robertson, who had made many attempts to join the Battalion since the outbreak of war, and who had only arrived from home the night before, was hit soon after the assault started, while advancing at the head of his men. Four former non-commissioned officers of the Battalion who had served the regiment loyally for many years died fighting bravely: Second Lieutenants A. Gray, A. Wanliss, and J. Wallace, led their platoons into the German front line, and never returned; Second Lieutenant A. Shand was killed while leading an attack on two enemy machine guns. On the right of A Company, Second Lieutenant T.B. Lyle, with his platoon, reached the second German line, but all lost their lives in a bombing encounter; similarly on the left, Lieutenant J.G. Scott of C Company appears to have broken through the first German line, but was killed, with all his command, in the enemy’s rear positions.

As the Camerons on the left had been stopped by machine gun fire, the two remaining platoons of C Company were sent forward in support of the Battalion left, but were met in their turn by an intense fire; casualties were heavy, and only a few men succeeded in reaching the German breastworks. At Chocolat Menier Corner there was a right-angled turn in the line which has been already described; this allowed machine guns from the left to enfilade the Camerons and The Black Watch; moreover, the 3rd Brigade on the left appeared to have been unable to make any advance.

By this time the Germans had been reinforced; and though the Battalion machine guns had caused some casualties to their reinforcements as they came up communication trenches, the position of our troops in the front line was precarious, and repeated requests for reinforcements reached Battalion Headquarters.

When the information that The Black Watch had entered the enemy’s front line was received at Brigade Headquarters, the 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment was sent up in support; but before its companies had left the front line, the order was cancelled, and instructions were issued that the attacking troops were to be withdrawn from the German lines, presumably on account of the difficulties in which the 3rd Brigade found themselves. The Battalion was therefore withdrawn, although many had to be left in the German lines and in No Man’s Land, and marched to Hinges, which was reached just before midnight.

Two of the many gallant deeds of the day may be mentioned here, though they are in no danger of being forgotten in the Regiment. Corporal Ripley displayed great bravery in leading a platoon up to the enemy’s trenches and was awarded the Victoria Cross. The following is the official description of Corporal Ripley on this occasion.

“For most conspicuous bravery at Rue de Bois on 9/5/1915. When leading his section on the right of the right platoon in the assault, he was the first man of the Battalion to ascend the enemy’s parapet and from there he directed those following him to the gaps in the German wire entanglements; he then led his section through a break in the parapet to a second line of trench which had previously been decided upon as the final objective in this part of the line. In that position Corporal Ripley, with seven or eight men established himself, blocking both flanks and arranging a fire position until all his men had fallen and he himself been badly wounded in the head.”

Private Anderson of C Company asked for permission to remain behind, after the relief, and went out at dusk to find his company commander, Captain W. Green, whom he had seen fall in the attack. He found Captain Green severely wounded and brought him back.

The gallant conduct of the Battalion, which alone in the Division attained its objective, brought messages of thanks and admiration from the 2nd Battalion the Royal Sussex Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion the King’s Royal Rifle Corps; and a further proof of the difficulties of the attack, and of he bravery with which they were faced, is the number killed, wounded and missing in the Battalion—14 officers and 461 other ranks.

Only 8 officers and 354 other ranks could be assembled to march back on the 9th May, and the next two days were needed for the reorganization of the Battalion, which was carried out in Divisional Reserve at Beuvry and Béthune. On both these days H.R.H. the Prince of Wales paid a visit to the Battalion, and interviewed several non-commissioned officers and men who had actually been in the German trenches on the 9th.

Major General R. Haking, C.B., came over to carry congratulations on the Battalion’s gallantry from the Commander of the I Corps and the First Army (Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro and General Sir Douglas Haig); Sir Charles Monro also inspected the Battalion on the 12th May, and referred to its “fine behaviour.” In spite of their heavy losses the men were in good spirits; they sang lustily as they entered Béthune, and bystanders were heard to say, “Those cannot be the men who were so badly cut up three days ago!”

Here is another short excerpt from The London Scottish in the Great War, edited by Ly.-Col J.H. Lindsay, pages 59-60:

As the Scottish [the London Scottish] came up they found themselves next to the 1st Black Watch and were heartily cheered by the Highlanders, with whom that day the Battalion was to form a new link of friendly comradeship. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades attacked at dawn, but came up against uncut wire in front of the German support line, and after a persistent struggle to get forward had to abandon the attempt. The Camerons and the Black Watch were sent forward to a second attack at four o’clock in the afternoon, but simply melted away under the concentrated fire of the enemy. The Scottish, now in support, eagerly awaited the word to advance, and indeed one platoon went over the tops to help the Black Watch without receiving the expected command. It was called back, and then came a sudden decision that the further prolongation of the battle would mean only useless loss. The troops already in action were withdrawn,* and the following night the Brigade (with the whole 1st Division) was relieved and went into billets near Béthune. The London Scottish casualties were between forty and fifty, and must have been much more serious but for the good leading of the officers. Lieut. J. Findlay was killed and Captain H.E. Stebbing and Lieut. F.A.J. MacFarlane were wounded.

*Of this action Major Paterson, then a Scout Officer of the London Scottish, writes: “I was at 1st Division H.Q. during the six weeks before this as a scout. When I first went there the Germans had only one line in their advanced position, but our artillery ‘registration’ and our construction of support lines for the assembly of troops was seen by them, and they started hastily building a second breastwork some 30 to 80 yards behind the front. On the day of the attack all our 18-pounders fired at the wire at the front of the first line. The Germans waited on his second line and shot all our men as they went over the first line.

Aye

Tom McC

[phil andrade]

.

Phil, it is a truism that a war consists of a series of battles but to try to draw strategic lessons from a one day action, aborted to all intents and purposes half way through, is stretching the powers of analysis to the extreme.

This is not what I was advocating. To do so would be to confuse cause and effect. Aubers Ridge was, to my mind, a battle that was fought to comply with strategy. The lessons were of a tactical nature.

Phil (PJA)

[Tom A McCluskey]

Phil,

There are operational and strategic levels of command issues too. I will get to them in a bit; I did not want to get too involved in that aspect, as yet, because it just ends up in a fight between the pro-Haig and anti-Haig camps. Result = thread closed + none wiser. There are many issues concerned with planning for this battle that need to be explored - but not yet. I have laid a trail of how poor planning has manifested itself in some of the narratives I’ve posted.

Aye

Tom McC

[Steven Broomfield]

Unless I missed it, have you had a chance to look up the reference to the petrol-bombi incident yet, Tom? I'm neither pro- nor anti-Haig particularly, but that story does interest me and I'm eager to see the reference you have.

[IanA]

Me too.

[George Armstrong Custer]

I agree with Steve and Ian. I must confess to a certain interest in seeing how Tom will pull together and sum up the disparate and extensive series of extracts he's posted in a way which will, apparently, lay the blame for failure at Aubers at Haig's door on the basis of poor planning - and in a manner which will convincingly refute the, already discussed, conclusions on the salient reasons for that failure arrived at by Haig himself and the OH.

To delay doing so because of some alleged fear of 'pro- and anti-Haig camps' causing the thread to be closed, leaving we benighted 'none the wiser', seems to me a specious argument for delaying getting to the point, if there is one. It also casts unwarranted aspersions on the ability of most people here to construct a reasoned argument on the basis of facts, and confuses them with the one or two well-known trolls on this and other forums who slip out from under their stones whenever Haig comes up for discussion. I have every confidence that the moderators are more than capable of spotting these should they appear, and of dealing with them appropriately without the need to close the thread.

You have centre stage, Tom; we await enlightenment on where this has all been going.

George

[Tom A McCluskey]

George,

I am on holiday. I am not at your behest to deliver more material to this argument, nor am I taking the route that you would like this argument to go. Get used to this, because that is how it is. Once I am back down in England, and when I feel like it, I’ll contribute more.

I’ll talk to you about your supercilious manner tomorrow, and how this is not conducive to a reasonable debate.

Aye

Tom McC

[George Armstrong Custer]

Tom, I don't think I or anyone else has suggested you are at their 'behest'. I merely confessed a certain interest in seeing where you are finally going to take this. As it is, your reference to an 'argument' has lost me. I can see plenty of transcribed published material, but I still await it being related to any argument which challenges the conclusions on the main causes of failure at Aubers already posted.

As I can see no argument, I'm certainly not trying to take it down any particular route as you suggest. On the contrary, I can, though, see where the direction of this thread has been manipulated on several occasions. Some of those who had queried the relevance of several extended posts on the subject of casualties and their relationship to morale to the question of why Aubers failed, had snippets of their own posts quoted out of context to make it appear as if they were saying they were unappreciative of the human cost of combat. They weren't. Similarly, those who held the opinion that Aubers was, in the overall scheme of the Great War, pretty small potatoes, were met with regimental kilt-waving as if they had impugned the courage or achievement of the men who fought at Aubers. They hadn't. And we've more recently had the totally spurious idea of 'pro-and anti-Haig camps' leading to the thread being closed if you post whatever it is you have to say. They won't.

I appreciate that you might be on holiday now, but you've been leading this thread on for weeks now with promises of various quotes and a statement of whatever argument it is that you've been posting your long extracts in support of - 'all good things come to those who wait' etc. I don't imagine anyone will lose any sleep if you choose not to tell us where it's all been leading, but it does all seem rather a waste if you don't, and I was genuinely hoping to see a case being made for an alternative conclusion as to the main causes of the failure at Aubers to those already posted. I don't believe such a case can be convincingly made, but a well presented argument, with perhaps new archival evidence, would certainly have been of interest.

George

Edit - just noticed you'd added this bit:

I’ll talk to you about your supercilious manner tomorrow, and how this is not conducive to a reasonable debate.

You can try, Tom, but I can tell you that it won't be conducive to a reasonable evening out.

[phil andrade]

One or two of the pals have questioned the veracity of Sotheby's letter.

This is where the reference to Germans throwing petrol bombs at the wounded came from.

I was initially a bit taken back that his letter should be descibed as not ringing true : it seemed a bit out of order to doubt the word of an officer who was himself to die a few months later.

Then I did wonder whether there wasn't a certain "hype" to the letter.....it even occurred to me that it might have been a conscious effort to promulgate the view of the "beastly Hun" ; and the insistence that, given a fair stand up fight, the dastardly enemy was going to get slaughtered.....do we have the intrusion of propaganda here ?

On a more intimate level, it seemed uncharacteristic that a young officer would reveal such horrors to his mother. Wouldn't he try and reassure her and play down anxiety ?

OTOH, Wifred Owen described the nastier realities of the front line when he wrote to his mum, and I think Harold Macmillan did too, when he described the revolting stench of the Somme battlefield. So that puts that idea of mine to rest.....

What do you reckon, folks : was Sotheby's letter a genuine description of an episode he had witnessed ?

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

Might I suggest that it was his, albiet honest and as he saw it, description of what he thought he had seen as opposed to what actually occured?

[Tom A McCluskey]

George,

What are you on about? I would have thought that it was clear to those with an elementary knowledge of fire and manoeuvre, that the extracts I have posted show at least the following:

1. The British Infantry were absolutely deprived of effective firepower which would allow a safeguarded forward movement to their objectives.

2. It is clear that the attack hinged around a short bombardment (with guns that were not up to it and with gunners without the scientific expertise) to fire on precise areas of ground, instead of a bombardment that was effective by neutralising or destroying the enemy.

3. The artillery was not skilled or efficient enough to do this in the time allocated.

4. Too much effort was made to level parapets instead of destroying the Germans’ ability to fight.

5. It is clear that this attack offered nothing in the way of shock or surprise from the British perspective, however, the German machine-guns delivered plenty of both.

6. The design of the attack put the British infantry beyond the poorly-coordinated and insufficient efforts of the artillery to support them in the German front line, or during any planned further forward movement to the ‘breakthrough’.

7. A lack of joined-up doctrine and coordination/communication between the arms impacted on the British ability to win the’ fire-fight’ and ‘fire-and-manoeuvre’ to the objective.

8. The planning was not optimistic or ambitious; it was an underestimation of the enemy and an overestimation of the British infantry and artillery. Or tacticians really did not understand how firepower facilitated movement. The importance of artillery in facilitating movement (and how the various types of equipment contributed to this) was not fully appreciated.

This is just a start and there is plenty more to come. I have only conducted a cursory glance over the extracts I’ve posted and come up with the above (without a great deal of analysis) so to attempt to rubbish them and assume they bring no value to a talk about the Battle of Aubers Ridge is nonsense.

I have more on the artillery and infantry doctrine in my notes and books in England, but if you want to take it from here, please feel free – with no offense intended.

Remember, my stated last objective was to sum up the gunners part of this battle, which I will do when I get back to England.

Aye

Tom McC

[Pete1052]

Why must every message on the forum be classified as being either pro-Haig or anti-Haig? That's an awfully binary way of looking at things.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Pete (Airborne),

How about this for a binary response:

01101110 01101111 00100000 01101001 01110100 00100000 01101001 01110011 00100000 01101110 01101111 01110100

Sorry Pete, I've had to wait a long while to sneak this rejoinder in.

Aye

Tom McC

[PMHart]

Or to sum up points 1-8 succinctly:- it was 1915!

Pete

[Tom A McCluskey]

Pete (H),

Indeed. However, there are areas in which the infantry and artillery could and should have done better.

Aye

Tom McC

[Pete1052]

What do you mean, it's not?

[Tom A McCluskey]

Pete,

Thank you, I knew only an airborne guy would be hardcore enough to work that out

Aye

Tom McC

[Pete1052]

Maybe someone could explain it to George.

[Guest]

010101110110111101110101011011000110010000100000011010010111010000100000011011100110111101110100001000000110001001100101001000000110011101101111011011110110010000100000011010010110011000100000011001010111011001100101011100100111100101101111011011100110010100100000011000110110111101110101011011000110010000100000011010100111010101110011011101000010000001100111011001010111010000100000011011110110111000111111

01001101011010010110101101100101

[Steven Broomfield]

S*d George. Can someone explain it to me?

Broomers, O Level Maths (Failed) (6 times)

[Guest]

S*d George. Can someone explain it to me?

Broomers, O Level Maths (Failed) (6 times)

Morning Steven, I failed maths a few times too. Here's the easy way to do it Binary code converter

Mike

[SiegeGunner]

In sum, it would appear that Tom has seen fit to give us a long-winded and obscurantist notation in place of a short and simple message. Again ...

And he's going to be disappointed to learn that Pete was actually a nine-mile sniper.

[Tom A McCluskey]

"In sum, it would appear that Tom has seen fit to give us a long-winded and obscurantist notation in place of a short and simple message. Again ..."

Mick, I can't help you with that.

I already knew Pete was in the artillery. I am also glad he views the thread as his experience and expertise will be most appreciated in the coming weeks.

Aye

Tom McC

[George Armstrong Custer]

What are you on about? I would have thought that it was clear to those with an elementary knowledge of fire and manoeuvre, that the extracts I have posted show at least the following:

Tom,

Yes, I concede you have a talent for stating the bleedin' obvious - usually in the form of extended extracts from some book or other. As Pete H has demonstrated, however, the only conclusion of any substance to come out of your eight point summary of the pages and pages of transcriptions from books which you've posted can be summed up in one short sentence. That this conclusion is nothing new, and changes nothing about the conclusions already posted as to why Aubers failed, are points which obviously pass you by. Aubers was not an important battle in terms of consequences to the BEF and it is not a difficult battle to understand in terms of why it failed. Your quixotic mission seems to be to change that.

Remember, my stated last objective was to sum up the gunners part of this battle, which I will do when I get back to England.

Well, you've republished here nearly everything written by the OH on the subject. But if your conclusions are not markedly different from those of the OH, which have already been posted - and I cannot see how they credibly can be - then the exercise will have been a pointless one.

You invite me to 'take it from here', but I've already posted my summary of what the salient causes of the failure at Aubers were. I concur with the OH summary and the post battle analysis of DH, and do so on the basis of my own archival research. I have seen no credible alternative argument put forward by you which would cause me to waste time and space posting details of that research, but will be happy to do so if you come up with a credible argument. You are the one who has been hinting for weeks that you can go beyond the summaries already posted of why Aubers failed - we've yet to see you post anything new and sustainable. Your repeated statements that the purpose of all your extended quotes will be revealed at the end has, I think, resulted in you painting yourself into a corner from where there is nowhere for you to go. For unless you come up with substantially new and sustainable conclusions as to the main causes of the failure at Aubers, then the whole exercise of your posting extensive transcriptions from books here will have been futile. You hint at going after Haig for poor planning in post # 261, but if the substance of what you have to say on that is encapsulated in your wishy washy point number 8 ("the planning was neither optimistic nor ambitious"), then you're wasting your time. It will be interesting, though, to see what realistic case you can make for the British having the wherewithall to have been more ambitious in what they planned at Aubers. In short, if you want to retain any credibility after teasing this along for so long with hints of what is to come, then when you get back to England from your holiday you need to literally put up or shut up - with no offense intended, to borrow a phrase of your own. That's not suggesting that you are at anyone's 'behest' - you are the one who introduced the strange concept of being under some 'obligation' to enlighten us, and you can of course please yourself as to whether or not you take that 'obligation' to a credible conclusion.

George