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Remembered Today:

Aubers Ridge, 1915


AKEY

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Hi,

I have been reading a brief artical about Aubers Ridge and something about all the ammunition being faulty. Does anyone know more about this? Is this why it was such a diaster? Or, was it just bad planning?

Regards,

Akey

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There were multiple reasons. It is always worth looking at the artillery preparatory and support fire when examining a failed infantry attack. Artillery ammunition was an issue. There wasn't enough. This restricted the number of guns that could be used and the duration/volume of fire. As a consequence, wire-cutting was incomplete and the German defenders were not suppressed.

Equally important, the Germans had quickly applied lessons from Neuve Chapelle. There was more barbed wire, compounding the difficulties of wire cutting. German trench parapets had been made much wider. Machine gun nests were built into the parapets, with reinforced ceilings and openings that were almost invisible at ground level. More shelters were available for the defenders, who were better organised for counter-attacks.

Robert

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British artillery ammunition had a large number of duds through 1915 due to the rapid expansion of the armaments industry. This wasn't really sorted out until 1916.

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The lack of artillery, particularly heavy guns and the lack of ammunition for the guns which were available, was made the subject of a complaint to the press just after Aubers Ridge. Sir John French was implicated in this complaint and in the subsequent " Shell Scandal", a political campaign against the Asquith government. This was probably when it was decided to replace Sir John although he was not actually replaced until after Loos in the autumn of that year.

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Presumably almost all these factors (Barbed wire, machine guns, wider parapets and dud shells etc) were known to the British planners?

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"Intense heavy-calibre artillery fire between 6.15am and 7.00am destroyed the wire in front of our positions ..."

(RIR16 report 10.5.15)

"Sector III was swept by light fire from field artillery from 5.15am, and at 5.50am an intense bombardment by artillery of all calibres was directed at our trenches in Sector III a-e, accompanied by heavy shrapnel fire on the ground between the front line and Fromelles. The shelling continued at this intensity for about an hour and, as later became clear, sufficed to destroy our wire in numerous places."

(6BRD report to AOK6, 29.5.15)

(German time = British time + 1hr)

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Presumably almost all these factors (Barbed wire, machine guns, wider parapets and dud shells etc) were known to the British planners?

The state of the wire and parapets would be known locally. MGs were mobile to a fair degree at that stage of the war, pre-pillbox. Dud shells would not be expected in any great numbers and so would not figure in the plans.

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But apparently the % of duds was known:-

"British artillery ammunition had a large number of duds through 1915 due to the rapid expansion of the armaments industry." (post #3)

And the machine gun nests were built in (post #2)

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I wouldn't take post 3 as gospel, it's just some bloke on teh interweb.

It was known that there had been a lot of duds, but it was continually promised that that was in the past and that things were better now.

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But apparently the % of duds was known:-

"British artillery ammunition had a large number of duds through 1915 due to the rapid expansion of the armaments industry." (post #3)

And the machine gun nests were built in (post #2)

The % of duds for a year could only be calculated after the year ended. 1915 involved 5 battles of which Aubers Ridge was the second. There would only be Neuve Chapelle to base any figures on. I doubt if any such calculation was being undertaken after one battle in the short time available. There is a school of thought which attributes the " Shell Scandal" to Sir John passing the buck and that attempt being seized upon by political elements at home, intent on embarrassing Asquith's government.

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The % of duds for a year could only be calculated after the year ended.

Surely you know a shell is a dud immediately it lands? If you don`t know then, you`ll never know. I`m not familiar with RA techniques but the only way I can see the % of duds being checked is if each battery keeps a running total and these would be available on the day. Is there another way?

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Surely you know a shell is a dud immediately it lands? If you don`t know then, you`ll never know. I`m not familiar with RA techniques but the only way I can see the % of duds being checked is if each battery keeps a running total and these would be available on the day. Is there another way?

It is unlikely that an RA battery would know if they were firing dud shells or not as they would not usually be in a position to see the burst. The only defect they would be likely to witness, sometimes with disastrous consequences, would be a misfire or a premature.

Even a FOO would be unlikely to report dud rounds during a barrage or bombardment. If nothing explodes he can't see it.

The only ones likely to know a dud when it landed would be the enemy and they would be unlikely to report it to those who fired it.

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Another question that may be posed about this offensive is why was it launched in the first place? My, not very deep reading, leaves me with the impression that the C in C felt the need to show that the BEF was pulling its weight. The BEF had expanded to quite a large extent in terms of formations but the quanity and quality of artillery equipment was well below that which was essential to assault well prepared positions. To what extent this was apprecated at this stage seems uncertain. This took a long time to correct; there were still shotcomings on the Somme a year latter.

Old Tom

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Surely you know a shell is a dud immediately it lands? If you don`t know then, you`ll never know. I`m not familiar with RA techniques but the only way I can see the % of duds being checked is if each battery keeps a running total and these would be available on the day. Is there another way?

You asked about a plan which would allow for a percentage of duds. That is nothing to do with observing that a shell was a dud. Further to that notion. Are you seriously suggesting that OOPs could observe the fall of every shot and record whether it was a blind?

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Another question that may be posed about this offensive is why was it launched in the first place? My, not very deep reading, leaves me with the impression that the C in C felt the need to show that the BEF was pulling its weight. The BEF had expanded to quite a large extent in terms of formations but the quanity and quality of artillery equipment was well below that which was essential to assault well prepared positions. To what extent this was apprecated at this stage seems uncertain. This took a long time to correct; there were still shotcomings on the Somme a year latter.

Old Tom

The 3 early battles were fought in support of major French offensives. At the time, that was the BEF's function as they were not in a position to plan and fight their own campaigns. They were very much under the overall command of the French CiC Joffre. This was made very clear in September when they were most reluctant to fight at Loos but the French brought pressure to bear to force Sir John to launch a full infantry attack at the time and place which suited the French plans. It was late 1917 before the British could launch their own battles and they were never free of French overall command.

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Hi Akey,

British

The artillery barrage was not of the same comparative coverage and destructive power as the previous one at Neuve Chapelle.

Suppressive fire was weak to non-existent (especially High Explosive).

German

They had learned the lessons of Neuve Chapelle and strengthened their defences.

Aye,

Tom McC

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The artillery barrage was not of the same comparative coverage and destructive power as the previous one at Neuve Chapelle.
But not because the British wanted less coverage and less destructive power.

Robert

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Aubers Ridge was a British offensive under the aegis of the huge French attack in Artois, in the Vimy Rdge sector. As such it was very much a subsidiary affair. I wonder if this engendered a kind of half hearted approach : Neuve Chapelle was very much a British party, albeit on a local scale, and human nature being what it is, it's crossed my mind that preparations are more meticulous, morale considerably higher, staff work that much better when it's one's "own show". Terraine wrote that the ratio of officer casualties at Aubers was unusually high, suggesting that all was not well with morale.

Phil

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Phil, I don't know of any evidence to support your suggestion. Aubers Ridge, like so many other battles prior to Messines in 1917, was driven by the French High Command's needs. That is true. But there was too much pride at stake for British officers not to make the best go of it. General Haig, for one, was never half-hearted about trying to achieve success. He always paid careful attention to the planning of battles and, later, campaigns.

It was a huge problem, however, that the British forces lacked the firepower that had been available for Neuve Chapelle. In answer to the other Phil's comment earlier, the British planners knew they didn't have the firepower. But they knew, in some part but not entirely, what they were up against through the use of aerial reconnaissance photos. Every effort was made to make up for the deficiencies. Rather than plan in a half-hearted way, the British looked to solve the problem of poor artillery support. Haig asked for additional guns but the fighting around Ypres meant the British Second Army could not spare any. Stocks of shells were husbanded as much as possible. The attack on Aubers Ridge was split into two, enabling maximum concentration of firepower for each of the two pincers. By using a double envelopment approach, the potential was there to pinch out and destroy a larger German force than if the attack was made with the same numbers on a single front. The bombardment was as short and sharp as possible, to give the maximum suppressive effect from the very limited number of shells. Other ideas were looked into. Experiments were carried out to see if 18 pounders could be used in the front line to cut the thicker wire and punch holes in the wider German parapets, given the limited duration of the bombardment (mountain guns had been used in this role so the concept was not new). Tremendous efforts were put in to make up for the fact that more than one arm was tied behind the back.

The Battle of Loos illustrated another attempt to make up for the artillery deficiencies, namely the widespread use of gas to supplement the preparatory bombardment.

Robert

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Terraine wrote that the ratio of officer casualties at Aubers was unusually high, suggesting that all was not well with morale.
Officer casualties were high but I have not seen evidence of low morale. This seems a very odd explanation. At that time, officers tended to lead from the front. They were dressed in prominent uniforms, making them easy targets for German snipers and riflemen. In the Indian Corps, the British officers were especially noticeable.

No-Man's Land was a lethal killing ground. The Germans had excellent observation. Their artillery was virtually untouched and the machine guns were unsuppressed. No need to invoke low morale in this context. Indeed, the British officers showed great bravery in the face of this situation. Not only during the attack but also in trying to reorganise things in the chaos that followed. British officers remained vulnerable, especially to shell fire, as they tried to sort things out in the immediate aftermath.

Robert

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Are you seriously suggesting that OOPs could observe the fall of every shot and record whether it was a blind?

Then how did the RA know even roughly what the % of duds was? Was it a case of "The wire wasn`t cut, therefore there must have been a high % of duds"? (Not quite definitive proof!)

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I should think that reports from the attacking infantry and prisoners would give some clue as to the number of dud shells seen on the battlefield.

IIRC wasn't Aubers Ridge the battle where the 4.7" guns were notorious for having prematures?

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Phil, I don't know of any evidence to support your suggestion. Robert

That's just what my post was, Robert - a suggestion. I admit to knowing very little about Aubers Ridge, but the impression is that, while Neuve Chapelle was Haig/Rawlinson's "baby", Aubers was a function of Foch's massive Artois offensive.

It was my supposition only that enthusiasm was therefore somewhat diminished as far as the British were concerned : perhaps I'd better think again.....

Terraine's comment about high officer casualties suggesting low morale comes from his book "Haig: The Educated Soldier".

Phil

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Very important that you raised the suggestion, Phil. On a minor point, Rawlinson did not engage as fully with the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. It was not his best effort, and his behaviour afterwards reflected badly on his character IMHO - but that is another story.

Robert

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This might throw somwe light on the subject.

From “Fatal Avenue” – A traveller’s history of the battlefields of Northern France and Flanders

By Richard Holmes ISBN 9781844139385 published in paperback by Pimlico London SW1

Neuve Chapelle

.........provided both sides with invaluable lessons if only they chose to learn them. For the Germans, the battle did serious damage to the notion that there should be one main defensive line and that building positions behind it encouraged faint heartedness amongst the defenders. The front line had been taken easily, but machine guns further back, along the line of the Leys Brook and the edge of the Bois de Biez, had proved invaluable. The concept of defence in depth, which the Germans were to develop to a fine art, had its genesis at Neuve Chapelle.

The British learned less soundly. The results of the bombardment suggested that there was both a close relationship between shells fired and ground gained, and particular merit in concentrating the shelling in time and space to achieve surprise and achieve moral paralysis. However, the British were often to attack behind a less concentrated bombardment than at Neuve Chapelle, and as often they forfeited surprise by extending it over several days. It was also clear that a plan based on the logic of the Aldershot Tattoo, with a strict time schedule that could be varied only by the corps commander, failed to meet the demands of trench warfare, for promising opportunities passed all too quickly and primitive communications made the passage of formal orders a slow business, enabling the defender to repair his failure quicker than the attacker could reinforce his success.

Aubers Ridge

The Germans were already implementing the lessons of Neuve Chapelle, deepening the barbed-wire belt, improving their front line trenches and building a strong second line with dugouts for its garrison. Communication trenches stretched back to protect supports coming up and help contain break-ins by acting as emergency fire trenches. Between 700 and 1,000 metres behind the front trench system, a line of concrete pill boxes provided a rallying point.

The British answer to improving German defences was to mount a more ambitious attack..........

At five on the morning of 9 May 600 British guns drenched the German positions below Aubers Ridge with a fire that concealed uncomfortable facts. There were no more guns per yard than at Neuve Chapelle but the defences were already far stronger. Worn gun barrels and indifferent ranging in the poor visibility made the fire inaccurate and the Germans were waiting for the assault. When it came the result was predictable. The British, advancing in dense lines, fell in heaps. Few reached the German wire and fewer still got in to the German trench. Repeated efforts fared no better..........

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