Aubers Ridge, 1915

[phil andrade]

...The 8th Division reporting on the disaster

The words "severe check" do not do justice to the nightmare described in the official history of the Rifle Brigade which Tom cited.

Phil (PJA)

[SiegeGunner]

Thank you for the example as it highlights that as well as a lack of destruction and shock action, the attack would fail to be a surprise too.

The attack per se was not a surprise, Tom, but the mine explosions were - and completely devastated the German front line over a distance of approx 100 metres - and the bombardment of the front line positions destroyed the wire and breached the breastwork in numerous places.

[Robert Dunlop]

(1) first, the strength of the German defences and the clever concealment of machine-guns in them;

(2) secondly, the lack on the British side of sufficient shells of large calibre to deal with such defences;

Tom, thank you for posting the quote. Issues 1 and 2 are interesting. German defences were always strong. Their machine-guns were always concealed cleverly. With regard to issue 1, there was nothing unique about Aubers Ridge.

Issue 2 is more interesting. It points to the use of large calibre shells to destroy defensive positions. This concept lay behind the preparatory barrage on the Somme, but not the successes of Cambrai and Amiens for example. Hurricane bombardments could be very successful but not by virtue of their ability to smash the defenses to pieces. Indeed, reducing trench lines to a mass of huge holes and a jumble of smashed up parapets, etc was counter-productive to the rapid movement of assault troops and, more importantly, their supporting artillery. This is not to say that large calibre shells did not have a role to play. Experience demonstrated, however, that this role was not in attempting to destroy strong defences.

The keys to success, from an artillery perspective, were suppression of the defenders until the assault troops were on them, counter-battery fire to suppress the enemy artillery, disruption of command and control, interdiction of supply and reinforcements, and support of the assault troops once their objectives were achieved. I have not listed surprise. As I mentioned before, there are examples of successful infantry assaults where there was no element of surprise, other than the exact timing of the assault itself after days of preparatory fire. Wire-cutting was important but hurricane bombardments coupled with the mass use of tanks could overcome the need to spend days or weeks on wire-cutting with artillery.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...Festubert. Was it any more successful strategically than Aubers?

Phil, it is hard to argue that Festubert was strategically more successful. Both battles were strategically successful in many respects. For example:

1) These battles reinforced the need for the British military to do better. Although the outcomes were tactically similar, there were differences in the tactics used that formed part of the learning process for all concerned. There are some who still believe that the British commanders were incapable of learning, which was not the case. Aubers Ridge and Festubert were just as much a part of the successes of the Battle of Amiens, for example, as any preceding 'successes'.

2) These battles forced the British Government to understand that total war required total commitment in support of the military. As mentioned before, it was difficult for the British commanders to execute lessons learned (and sometimes to understand what were the lessons, as we have seen in the discussions about the cause of failure) because they did not have the resources required. Yet they were forced to keep fighting these battles because of the political commitment to support the French. It took two years, at least, before Britain could transform itself from a country with a tiny little professional army to the enormous conscript army that could engage the German army on the Western Front almost single-handedly in late 1917. Aubers Ridge and Festubert played a crucial part, strategically, in ensuring this transformation. To that end, both battles were as much a part of the final defeat of Germany as any other.

3) Aubers Ridge and Festubert helped reinforce the German High Command's need to dismiss the offensive capabilities of the British. This had a direct result in facilitating the successes that did occur on the first day of the Somme, for example. Von Falkenhayn mistakenly thought that the inevitable British counter-attack in support of Verdun (which actually was an Anglo-French counter-attack) had no chance of succeeding. He assumed it would be as unsuccessful, tactically, as the battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert. Falkenhayn failed to understand that the problems with these attacks was not incompetence on the part of the British commanders (which is how many modern-day commentators interpret these tactical failures) but a lack of adequate resources, particularly in the all important aspect of artillery. Having concluded, wrongly, that the British were incompetent, he thought the existing German forces would be adequate.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

High casualties are tragic but have no military significance beyond their effect on the outcome of the operation.

Tom, you made some excellent points in this review of the significance of the casualties. Tragic indeed. I weep when I read the details of these battles, especially the anecdotal accounts. But the immediate military consequences were just as you outlined.

Robert

[truthergw]

"High casualties are tragic but have no military significance beyond their effect on the outcome of the operation."

Yes they do, Tom. They have a significant effect on morale and thus fighting power. That is without mentioning the obvious reduction in combat power - of regular infantrymen.

Aye

Tom McC

The casualties will have no effect on morale at the time as they will be largely unknown to fellow participants. It would only be after the battle, when roll calls were made that casualty levels would become apparent. That brings up a point. Men fight in small units. They would probably never know the losses for the brigade nor division. Only after a longish interval, might they know battalion losses. Losses to an infantryman are those of his mates, his section, his platoon. Not one soldier after Aubers would be thinking in terms of hundreds or thousands dead. He would be thinking of perhaps 3 or 4 dead, a dozen wounded with a handful of lucky ba**ds who copped a blighty one. Another 20 at most would be missing, some to be eventually known as prisoners the rest to remain missing to this day. It is repeatedly reported by British and German intelligence that at no time did the British suffer from a severe loss of morale, even during the Kaiserschlacht when losses were immeasurably greater than at any other time and the line was being rolled back many miles. That was the only time when the situation was potentially disastrous. Note well, potentially disastrous. In the end, it proved not to be so. A disaster is when great losses are incurred. That is losses in all kinds of resources. Men, guns, fortified positions, all the ' sinews of war'. Aubers Ridge had none of these hallmarks. It is only the fixation on casualties as the sole measure of a battle which calls up descriptions of battles as disasters. The Somme was a bad defeat for the Germans because they suffered comparable casualties as the attacker. It ought to have been about two to one in their favour as the defending force. They were forced out of well built, strong defensive positions and forced back eventually to a defensive line some miles to the rear. That starts to look disastrous if it were to be repeated and indeed there is a famous quote somewhat to that effect. The reasons for the lack of success at Aubers Ridge are many but lack of manpower is not one of them and so, casualties do not figure in any analysis of what went wrong or how the next attempt could be improved. I believe that the loss of one soldier is a tragedy. I do not know if the laws of arithmetic can be applied to the loss of a thousand or ten thousand. Is the loss of ten thousand men ten thousand times worse than one? I think the loss of a loved one cannot be added or divided. It is a personal and singular loss which must be dealt with by each of the bereaved in her or his own way. My grannies would not have been consoled in their grief to know they were not alone, neither would their grief been made worse by that knowledge. My mother would not be consoled for the loss of her Daddy by knowing that he and his comrades got as far as the second line and caused the deployment of reserves. If we are to interest ourselves in casualties and their effects on the loved ones left behind, by all means let us do so. Start a sub forum and post our thoughts. That has no place in a military analysis of an action. Do not drag one subject into a discussion of the other. Casualties are not the only measure of success or failure in an action they are not even an important one except in rare circumstances.

[squirrel]

Excellent posts Tom, Tom and Robert.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Casualties are not the only measure of success or failure in an action they are not even an important one except in rare circumstances.

Very well made points throughout that post, Tom.

Whilst to a disinterested layman the analysis of military actions without constant reference to the ultimate human cost might appear heartless, it ought to go without saying within the ranks of a military history community that that's not actually the case.

Matthew Cooper wrote a rather good book in 1978 called 'The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure'. He begins his Introduction with a brief but harrowing quote from a letter written by a private soldier trapped and slowly freezing to death within the Stalingrad kessel. Cooper then goes on to make the point that "Although no further direct mention of the suffering of individual fighting soldiers will be made, it is as well to remember from the outset that this, in the final analysis, is what this book is all about. For the political and military failure of the German Army, both in the corridors of power and on the field of battle in the years from 1933 to 1945, had one result: the unnecessary death of two and a half million of its men, and untold suffering for countless others. For the world at large, the victim of Hitler's aggression, this was a cause for great relief; for the German Army, it was a tragedy."

I think that's a point that most military historians and the interested laity appreciate to the full without, as Cooper notes, the need to constantly punctuate military analysis with it - unless it is one of those relatively rare occasions where it has a direct and decisive bearing upon the outcome of the operation under discussion.

George

[phil andrade]

Who wrote " death and wounds are the currency of war " ?

Tom, at first glance your comments about casualties appear excessively complacent...but I do understand how important it is that your argument plays the foil to those of us who allow our perceptions to be distorted by the emotional impact that these statistics make.

Casualties certainly are important in so far as the exchange rate is concenred, because this to a large degree indicates how the opposing armies stacked up in terms of tactical skill etc., especially in fixed positional warfare which dominated the greater part of the war on the Western Front.

The two to one ratio you alluded to as the norm a defender might expect in his favour did apply to the Germans on the Somme as far as their fightng against the British was concerned : the overall balance was adjusted because the French, with great tactical skill and lavish artillery, mananged to inflict equal or even greater losses on the Germans than they themselves sustained.

In this regard, Aubers Ridge was shocking. I have just read an account which cites German casualties for the whole action as 1,551, which is hardly more than one eigth of the British loss.

This account, incidentally, is followed by a description of the battle written by a young subaltern of the Black Watch, who survived by feigning death in front of the German trenches. His name was Lionel Sotheby, he was an old Etonian. He wrote to his mother and gave a description of the action that was so harrowing that I'm surprised the censor passed it ( maybe officers' letters were not scanned?). Out of fifteen officers who went over the top with him, eleven were killed and three were wounded...he being the only one to escape unwounded. I was shocked to read that he saw Germans throwing petrol bombs at the British wounded, and that those members of his battalion who got into the enemy trenches were stripped of their equipment and then shot and thrown over the parapet. Sotheby himself was killed in the Loos attack a few months later, not far from the spot where he had mimicked the real thing. His body was never found.

Phil (PJA)

[SiegeGunner]

In this regard, Aubers Ridge was shocking. I have just read an account which cites German casualties for the whole action as 1,551, which is hardly more than one eigth of the British loss.

Phil,

You and I discussed 6BRD's casualties in posts 66 and 67 earlier in this thread. What is the source of the figure of 1,551, which is some 900 more than the 643 casualties (including 249 dead) reported by 6BRD? Unless I am mistaken, the Aubers battle took place entirely within the sector defended by 6BRD, so there are no other German casualties to be taken into account.

Mick

[truthergw]

...................................

Tom, at first glance your comments about casualties appear excessively complacent...but I do understand how important it is that your argument plays the foil to those of us who allow our perceptions to be distorted by the emotional impact that these statistics make.

Casualties certainly are important in so far as the exchange rate is concenred, because this to a large degree indicates how the opposing armies stacked up in terms of tactical skill etc., especially in fixed positional warfare which dominated the greater part of the war on the Western Front.

.................................................................

Phil (PJA)

I was referring to the Battle of the Somme not the first day which the casualty obsessed continually refer to.

In what way do I appear complacent? Complacent about what? I went to great lengths to show that I was well aware of the anguish imposed by fatal casualties to the bereaved. I pointed out that my own family suffered casualties. Of three men who went to war, only one returned and he was a gas casualty. I was making the point that that was not a factor in a military analysis of a battle.

Name me one action or battle in the Great War where action was broken off because of casualties incurred. The British continued to fight at the Somme, Ypres I, II and III and Arras. They fought on after Amiens . The French continued to fight in Artois and Champagne, Verdun and Chemin des Dames, despite casualties which dwarfed those of the British. The Germans continued to fight at Verdun and on the Somme then during the Kaiserschlacht although these casualties really were irreplaceable and brought them to the point where they were no longer able to resist the allied assault. No German account of the war ever claimed that they had suffered too many casualties. They blamed the British blockade or stab in the back or Jews or communists. That was despite casualties far in excess of the Britsh.

[phil andrade]

Phil,

You and I discussed 6BRD's casualties in posts 66 and 67 earlier in this thread. What is the source of the figure of 1,551, which is some 900 more than the 643 casualties (including 249 dead) reported by 6BRD? Unless I am mistaken, the Aubers battle took place entirely within the sector defended by 6BRD, so there are no other German casualties to be taken into account.

Mick

Yes, Mick, that disparity was not lost on me. I was tempted to draw this to your attention, and ask if this could be attributed to German units other than 6BRD being engaged, My source for the 1,551 figure is The Great War, edited by Robert Crowley : Perspectives on the First World War. The chapter's title is A Bad Afternoon at Aubers Ridge, on page 66 of the book. The editor, commenting on Sotheby's depiction of the battle, writes "...in reality, the total enemy casualties were just 1,551." He doesn't cite his source.

It did occur to me, reflecting on the horrific anecdote about Germans trying to set the British wounded alight, and killing prisoners, that this might be indicative of an especially murderous character to the fighting, as indicated by the abnormally high ratio of 249 dead among 643 German casualties. Apart from the mine explosions, which are bound to be lethal, do we have evidence here of a battle in which little quarter was being given ?

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

I was referring to the Battle of the Somme not the first day which the casualty obsessed continually refer to.

In what way do I appear complacent? Complacent about what?

Yes, the two to one ratio against the British on the Somme that I allude to was for the entire battle, too Investigations conducted in the compilation of the Military Effort revealed British casualties for the entire Western Front July to December 1916 to have been 481,842 against German losses of 236,194...indicative of a two to one ratio for the Somme fighting. The French inflicted 200,000 casualties on the Germans on the Somme, and suffered a comparable figure themselves.

Please don't imagine that I see you as complacent about casualties. If I conveyed that impression, then profound apologies...you make it perfectly clear from your own family history that you are anythng but complacent about them.

I would argue that you underrate their significance in determining the outcome of military operations.

Phil (PJA)

[SiegeGunner]

Where abouts on the attack frontage was Sotheby, Phil? I am not sure where the southern end of the southern attack was, but I believe 6BRD's neighbours on their left/southern flank were battalions from 13 and 14BRD.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Casualties certainly are important in so far as the exchange rate is concenred, because this to a large degree indicates how the opposing armies stacked up in terms of tactical skill etc., especially in fixed positional warfare which dominated the greater part of the war on the Western Front.

I would argue that you underrate their significance in determining the outcome of military operations.

Just remind me - what was 'the outcome of military operations' on the Western Front in November 1918? Given that you are convinced of the tremendous disparity between British and German casualties to the detriment of the British, and the significance of those casualty ratios in determining the outcome of military operations, how do you account for the astonishing series of final victories by a BEF which had by then become one of the finest British armies ever fielded? And, I'd add, a BEF which during the 'Hundred Days' was sustaining some of its highest casualties, with no commensurate loss of morale and was absolutely capable of achieving military superiority over an enemy who had supposedly suffered so many less casualties over the preceding years.

George

[phil andrade]

Where abouts on the attack frontage was Sotheby, Phil? I am not sure where the southern end of the southern attack was, but I believe 6BRD's neighbours on their left/southern flank were battalions from 13 and 14BRD.

In the Southern pincer of the attack...sorry, I don't know any more than that. Do you think the figure of 1,551 is feasible ?

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Just remind me - what was 'the outcome of military operations' on the Western Front in November 1918? Given that you are convinced of the tremendous disparity between British and German casualties to the detriment of the British, and the significance of those casualty ratios in determining the outcome of military operations, how do you account for the astonishing series of final victories by a BEF which had by then become one of the finest British armies ever fielded? And, I'd add, a BEF which during the 'Hundred Days' was sustaining some of its highest casualties, with no commensurate loss of morale and was absolutely capable of achieving military superiority over an enemy who had supposedly suffered so many less casualties over the preceding years.

George

Dear oh dear, I'm really in the lions' den now ! Please don't mistake me for a Donkeyite. The Germans, it would appear, got much the better of the casualty exchange with the British for 1915 and 1916. For 1917 the disparity was markedly reduced. For 1918 it was reversed. You do me an injustice in your depiction of my argument.

Phil (PJA)

[George Armstrong Custer]

You do me an injustice in your depiction of my argument.

Oh.

George

[phil andrade]

The casualty exchange rate is an important indicator. It is certainly not the sole determining factor, the be all and end all, but it is important.

Phil (PJA)

[Tom A McCluskey]

The maintenance of morale is recognized in military circles as the most important single factor in war: outside these circles there is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so. Military historians who have not themselves experienced command in war make the mistake of attributing too much importance to tactics. John Baynes Morale – A Study of Men Courage.

There is no military force, of note, that would not have morale as one of the most important factors in their doctrine. Likewise, I do not think I will find any military person, of note, that would argue with the above.

Because morale is an intangible, and deals with a collective human quality, it does not appear to be seriously studied by the British military until Bill Slim analysed the issue while commanding the 14th Army. Here are his conclusions:

Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves. If they are to feel that, their morale must, if it is to endure - and the essence of morale is that it should endure - have certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual, and material, and that is the order of their importance. Spiritual first, because only spiritual foundations can stand real strain. Next intellectual, because men are swayed by reason as well as feeling. Material last - important, but last - because the very highest kinds of morale more often met when material conditions are lowest.

I remember sitting in my office and tabulating these foundations of morale something like this:

1. Spiritual

a. There must be a great and noble object.

b. Its achievement must be vital.

c. The method of achievement must be active, aggressive.

d. The man must feel that what he is and what he does matters directly towards the attainment of the object.

2. Intellectual

a. He must be convinced that the object can be attained; that is not out of reach.

b. He must see, too, that the organisation to which he belongs and which is striving to attain the object is an efficient one.

c. He must have confidence in his leaders and know that whatever dangers and hardships[/u] he is called to suffer, his life will not be lightly flung away.

3. Material

a. The man must feel that he will get a fair deal from his commanders and from the army generally.

b. He must, as far as humanly possible, be given the best weapons and equipment for his task.

c. His living and working conditions must be made as good as they can be.

These qualities were enshrined in British Military doctrine in 1950 and are the foundation of what became fighting power in current British Military Doctrine. It is probable that an Edwardian society may be averse to studying or expressing, freely, the above qualities – especially to a society that was to present a cool reserve in public persona. That I don't know. Regardless of that, commanders put a tremendous amount of time inculcating an esprit de corps and developing the respect and the trust of their troops. They know that in the principles of war, the one that must have the most investment is morale. It is the one quality that keeps soldiers going regardless of the conditions. That said, morale, like a barometer, has many readings. Sometimes a soldier’s morale is good, at others it may be alright or low. Low does not necessarily mean that there will be a mutiny, however, it may mean that there will not be the same amount of drive to get the job done, if at all. Remember, if all was not well, military discipline has a place in morale too.

Morale comes about due to good leadership, motivation and being well-managed. Confidence in equipment; fair and firm discipline; self-respect; and an understanding of what is going on (or what is required) affect morale too. Being fed and watered, along with being well-administered also tap into the soldier’s well-being. These factors contribute towards group and moral cohesion. Tactical success increases morale considerably: an unsuccessful attack does not. An unsuccessful attack with no gain and high casualties dents morale considerably. Along with the obvious need for replacements, this is why divisions that are hard-hit and no longer of fighting value, spend a long time out of the line taking on drafts of men and training them. Also bonds of trust and respect require to be built between new troops and the organisation that they are to feel part of. In this battle, infantry battalions of the 8th Division attack took 50-60% of their fighting strength as casualties (some possibly higher). So you will be hard-pushed to convince me that morale did not take a dent.

Reference combat power being reduced; I don’t feel I have to explain why a battalion reduced in bayonet strength by 50-60% is reduced in combat power. I thought this would be self-evident. I will cover casualties next.

A picture paints a thousand words. The Lancashire Fusiliers post the 1st Day of The Somme

Aye

Tom McC

[SiegeGunner]

In the Southern pincer of the attack...sorry, I don't know any more than that. Do you think the figure of 1,551 is feasible ?

I don't know much about the Southern attack, Phil, but my impression is that it was mostly stopped on the British parapet and in NML well short of the German breastwork, so I am sceptical about Sotheby's account. Stripping prisoners of their equipment, killing them and bundling their bodies out over the breastwork seems implausible - and in any case how would Sotheby observe it from his place of refuge in NML, where he was presumably keeping his head down? Throwing bodies (even the bodies of men killed in 'fair' combat) out onto the glacis in front of the breastwork would be pointless because someone would then have to go out and retrieve them later when the machine-gunners at their loopholes started to complain about the smell and the flies. Throwing petrol bombs at wounded men also seems implausible - if they could see them and were intent on killing them, why not just shoot them? The only reason I can think of for throwing petrol bombs from the breastwork would be in the aftermath of the battle in an attempt to cremate bodies that were close enough to pose a nuisance but too far away to be safely retrieved for burial. But how far can a man throw a petrol bomb anyway?

As regards the figure of 1,551, of course it is 'feasible' but I have no idea whether it is plausible. A figure claiming exactitude to the level of '1' would normally come from some verifiable source, but since no source is given, I would not like to speculate. As no mines were exploded in the southern sector and I don't think there was a break-in comparable to that in the northern sector, it seems unlikely that German casualties in the southern sector would have been 900+ compared with 600+ in the northern sector.

Do we have someone among us who has detailed knowledge of the Southern attack?

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi Mick,

Sotheby was an Argyll officer attached to the 1st battalion The Black Watch. The 1st Black Watch was in 1st Guards Brigade of the 1st Division. They attacked at 4 p.m. with some Camerons. They got into the German lines and I think it may be the only lodgement of the 1st Division.

Reference men set on fire, I have seen several references to this by men of the 4th Black Watch (Bareilly Brigade, Meerut Division). One is at hand by Cpl John McDonald, so I will type it out in a moment. However, the wife wants me to pick up the Chinese and grab a couple of beers.

Aye

Tom McC

[truthergw]

The maintenance of morale is recognized in military circles as the most important single factor in war: outside these circles there is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so. Military historians who have not themselves experienced command in war make the mistake of attributing too much importance to tactics. John Baynes Morale – A Study of Men Courage.

...............................................................................

Reference combat power being reduced; I don’t feel I have to explain why a battalion reduced in bayonet strength by 50-60% is reduced in combat power. I thought this would be self-evident. I will cover casualties next.

A picture paints a thousand words. The Lancashire Fusiliers post the 1st Day of The Somme

Aye

Tom McC

Total casualties, officers and men, killed, wounded, missing were roughly 12,000 men. I make that less than a division out of the 8 divisions involved. Approx 12% losses including a large number of men who would have continued to serve in some manner or another. Only on the following day when reports were collated did the losses become apparent to the command. You will have to show me some instance of heavy casualties causing British troops to lose their morale. It took the French 3 years with their millions of casualties, and the Germans with comparable losses, only started to lose their morale in a patchy fashion when they were being decisively beaten in 1918. I think that you are not only allowing hindsight to blind you to how the men on the ground would have reacted, I think you are selling them short. The men knew that the New Armies had not even landed in France. The overwhelming mood was that " We'll get them the next time". Morale remained steadily high throughout the war, regardless of what somebody wrote in 1950. I don't get the relevance of the men at the Somme. That was a year and several battles later. There were many casualties to add to those incurred at Aubers Ridge and yet confidence and morale were sky high.

[Robert Dunlop]

Do we have someone among us who has detailed knowledge of the Southern attack?

Mick, not I. Sotheby's account does not ring true though.

Robert

[Tom A McCluskey]

"It took the French 3 years with their millions of casualties, and the Germans with comparable losses, only started to lose their morale in a patchy fashion when they were being decisively beaten in 1918. I think that you are not only allowing hindsight to blind you to how the men on the ground would have reacted, I think you are selling them short."

Tom don't mistake mutiny with a drop in morale. A drop in morale does not always result in the nth degree. Which officer is going to say his unit is suffering from poor morale?

Okay, and we'll do more on the morale and casualties then. I was wanting to crack on with Aubers Ridge.

Aye

Tom McC