I need evidence that Germany could still win in March 1918

[Chris_Baker]

12 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

The unattributed article is frankly a load of b0llocks, embarrassing to have on the GWF.

 

I agree completely.

 

[charlie2]

Had the German Army, as stated in the article, been able to redeploy 100 fresh divisions from other theatres I‘m sure they could well have defeated the allies. Fortunately the Germans did not and could not deploy these divisions for the simple reason that they did not have 100 divisions on other fronts. 33 were redeployed to the west leaving the other 40 and 3 mounted cavalry divisions on the other fronts.

The article could perhaps form the basis of another American war film script.

 

[AOK4]

46 minutes ago, charlie2 said:

Had the German Army, as stated in the article, been able to redeploy 100 fresh divisions from other theatres I‘m sure they could well have defeated the allies. Fortunately the Germans did not and could not deploy these divisions for the simple reason that they did not have 100 divisions on other fronts. 33 were redeployed to the west leaving the other 40 and 3 mounted cavalry divisions on the other fronts.

The article could perhaps form the basis of another American war film script.

 

 

And those that could be redeployed were usually not up to fighting standards of the Western Front, there were not enough horses to make them mobile for an offensive etc etc

[josquin]

The article is unreferenced because it is an opinion piece published in "Time" magazine rather than an exemplary historical essay.

The author, Geoffrey Wawro, is a military historian with several well-regarded books to his credit.  The article, clearly, is far from

his best work and it should not be deployed as a major reference for any serious analysis of the German Spring Offensives

and their aftermath. I doubt that Wawro ever intended the article to serve as a definitive reference.  Rather, I believe, his

objective was to awaken interest among the general public in a time, and a war,  long forgotten

 

Josquin

[David Filsell]

An essay put forward as fact! 

Is this the guy? He has "previous".

"In a review of Wawro's 1996 book on the Austro-Prussian War, Lawrence Sondhaus criticizes Wawro for falsely claiming that the Austrian Empire intended to destroy the Kingdom of Italy in the Third Italian War of Independence of 1866. Wawro gives no evidence for his thesis of Austrian aggression and then proceeds to lambaste the Austrians for not achieving "goals they never intended to pursue". Indeed, Wawro always portrays the Austrians as incompetent fools. Wawro also ignores Italy's "sweeping war aims"; her intentions of seizing Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia, aims that were prevented by the Austrian victory at the Battle of Lissa, and claims the Italians only wanted to acquire Venetia. ^(Wikipedia) 

 

If this is the guy - and I think it is - I wouldn't buy an old car - or a piece of  history - from him. I seem to recall that  a Stand To review of one of his books gave it a real and well deserved hammering. I am by no means anti-America but such an unattributed piece is an apology for history. You've seen some of the facts in this thread  - forget any belief that America won the war - or prevented it being lost. Like Britain and the other allies the US contributed to victory. Bear in mind too that the US  did little else but supply munitions for a long time during the Great War - at high prices - to Britain until one of the its ships was sunk. They  were far, far, more significant in extra time (WW2)   - but even then the loan of the fire hose came at a very high price - one we as a nation have only frequently repaid. 

 

Edited 20 March , 2020 by David Filsell

[David Filsell]

Mr EK

Are we talking about the same war?

Are we ignoring the dependence of the US on the supply of aircraft and tanks and logistical support provided by Britain and France and the efforts to help train the untrained US Army  - untrained in terms of the newly recruited officers and other ranks - its ignorance of modern war and its many incompetent senior officers - who had to learn that massed assaults were things of the past, poor US logistics and  its untrained staff officers? 

And why anyway do certain Americans seem to need to believe that they won the war. Is it simply to belittle us Brits? I even met one citizen of your fine country who considers the the USA gained victory in Viet Nam believe me or believe me not!

As I have said final victory was an allied achievement. 

As an afterthought  perhaps the Brits should have simply retired from the fray and left victory to the Americans (and the French?) 

Anyway this is all a rather pointless argument - the reasons given already by a number of forumistas  it is clear why Germany lost the war - it was beaten both in the field and in the home land by an allied army.

The fact is that America's threat, and final decision to enter the war, concerned  Germany  greatly and rightly, The mere threat of US  intervention created graveyards full of those who participated in the Spring Offensive which failed. The British retreated and were weakened but were not overwhelmed.  Calais was never threatened and by 1918 the British, but not the Americans or the Germans , were employing all arms tactics effectively and efficiently to break through strong German lines while US troops largely struggled. .

David 

 

Edited 20 March , 2020 by David Filsell

[Muerrisch]

I did write that I had no more to say than b0llocks.

 

I am however heartened by the opinions of highly respected members, who, whilst not employing gross language, appear to agree.

 

I rather think that the thread has completed its downward course toward oblivion.

[Interested]

I'd recommend downloading and reading a copy of Dr Fritz Fischer's book:

"Germany's Aims in the First World War".

He researched the available documentation in the German government and Army to try to uncover what "went wrong".

It also explains the origins of the myth that the German Army were betrayed by the government; a scapegoat was needed and it certainly wasn't going to be the leadership of the Army.

 

[phil andrade]

Please indulge me in a cri de coeur : especially today, being the  102nd anniversary of the Kaiserslacht .

 

What I like about this thread is the chance it offers us to reflect on the contingencies that make history so interesting to study.

 

Like many of you, I recoil from Mosier’s  approach, and get agitated by suggestions that his arguments should be countenanced, let alone endorsed.

 

To say that the Americans saved the Anglo French armies from defeat in the spring of 1918 is rather like saying that the British saved the US army in the Battle of the Bulge in 1944.

 

Monty entered the stage like Christ coming to cleanse the Temple ......you know where I’m going with this.

 

What worries me more is that, by stating that the failure of the German attack was “ inevitable “, or that the task undertaken by Ludendorff was” impossible” , we remove from the story those attributes that, in my perception , make history so interesting : the way people behave, and the choices they make.

 

If I’ve flogged a dead horse here, then let the thread be abandoned.  If there’s scope for further discussion, then, please, indulge it.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

[David Filsell]

Phil,G'Day

I genuinely do not think that my view of the ultimate inevitable German Defeat limits things discussion in any way.

It's simply that from all my  reading and research - particularly amongst German works - including a fascinating account by a sailor about the 1918 mutiny - triggered by ill treatment, poor food, bad officers- which indicated almost total destruction of morale  in the High Seas Fleet - which had a rippling effect  like that which had built up in the army - the demand and acceptance of Soldier's Councils is another indicator of high command, concern about the state of the military and the nation.

There's interesting life in this old warhorse of a subject that will continue.

But - beaten in the field, near starvation in Germany, logistics of all sorts, industrial in pieces, defeat was in my view.  The debate is well worth while.

Regards

David 

 

[phil andrade]

David,

 

Heartfelt  thanks for your reply.

 

For me, this raises the challenge of how we should approach history : the contingent, versus the inevitable .  Rather clumsily put by me, but I hope that I can make a case for the former approach.

 

The force that the Germans were able to bring to bear against our grandfathers 102 years ago today was literally stupefying.

 

The number of guns, the numbers of troops and the weight of munitions vastly exceeded anything that any army had ever deployed, and the resolve of the German rank and file was - and here I confess that I might be in need of correction - supreme.

 

German failure certain ?   

 

No, Sir !

 

Phil

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

The force that the Germans were able to bring to bear against our grandfathers 102 years ago today was literally stupefying.

And vice versa ( in due course).

But it wasn't all about the force was it?

Many other links in the failed chain have already been listed on this thread.

History has shown where and how their battle plan failed, and where their plan, planning, logistics, manpower, materiel, yes, even horses, failed.

We now can see that clearly, but to the protagonists at the time it might have seemed totally different.

But inevitable.

 

[phil andrade]

DByS,

 

But inevitable

 

Forgive me for having a big problem with that.

 

You’re right : it wasn’t all about the force ; or the plan , or the logistics; or the manpower , material or horses.....all of which were very important : it was also about the way people behaved, and the choices they made, sometimes in extremis.

 

Once we attribute inevitability to those, we lose something rather precious in our humanity .

 

Phil

[Ron Clifton]

What the Doullens Conference achieved was Foch's insistence on not letting the Germans drive a wedge between the BEF and the French around Amiens, causing the French to withdraw southwards to cover Paris and the British to withdraw northwards to the Channel ports. This (or something very close to it) was what happened in 1940, with the consequences which we know.

 

What also happened in March 1918 was that the Germans overstretched their supply lines, and the fact that capture of British supply dumps showed that we were in a better position as regards food resources than their officers had told them.

 

As Petain's attitude and Haig's "Backs to the Wall" message showed, both allies recognised the very real dangers posed by the Kaiserschlacht.

 

Ron

[charlie962]

34 minutes ago, Ron Clifton said:

As Petain's attitude and Haig's "Backs to the Wall" message showed, both allies recognised the very real dangers posed by the Kaiserschlacht.

And just because they were (with their incomplete intelligence  and lack of hindsight benefit) rightly alarmed at the time that the Germans could potentially  break through, does not mean that that the Germans could actually break through.  Which is what the OP was asking at the beginning.

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Forgive me for having a big problem with that.

We'll just have to politely disagree on this Phil.

[phil andrade]

5 hours ago, Dai Bach y Sowldiwr said:

We'll just have to politely disagree on this Phil.

 

There is a saying that I’ve heard at least once when attending lectures on military history..... Remember that in war nothing is inevitable, except for German counter-attack

 

Phil

[MikB]

19 hours ago, phil andrade said:

...

 

Once we attribute inevitability to those, we lose something rather precious in our humanity .

 

Phil

 

I don't agree there either. Every time I've ever dug deep into the reasons why something happened, I've found there was an antecedent or causal element - call it what you will - that made it so. Sometimes that might be effectively impossible to analyse, like the fall of a tossed coin, but we have enough knowledge of science to know that even in that instance, if you knew the exact starting attitude and all of the forces acting on the coin as it was tossed and during its flight, in principle you could calculate its fall.

 

The precious thing in our humanity is the ability to intuit, in the face of very many unknown unknowns, which is the path with the best prospects of leading somewhere we want to go, and figuring out how to stay on it when outcomes start to drift. That's - maybe - the scope that's left beyond determinism.

 

I don't know whether many of us do that very well with any consistency.

 

 

Edited 22 March , 2020 by MikB

[phil andrade]

20 hours ago, charlie962 said:

And just because they were (with their incomplete intelligence  and lack of hindsight benefit) rightly alarmed at the time that the Germans could potentially  break through, does not mean that that the Germans could actually break through.  Which is what the OP was asking at the beginning.

 

A pedantic point by me, here, but he was asking for evidence to cite.

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

....in fact, the German attacks of March 1918 were the last forlorn hope of a bankrupt regime and their defeat was as inevitable as any event in History ever is.

 

There you have it !

 

This is from the link that kenf48 sent us in post number 5.

 

Jonathan Boff’s summary carries far more weight than what I say , but, even here, there is a qualification in the text as I have emboldened it. There is a nuance there, I think, implying circumspection about ascribing inevitability to historical events.

 

I am no doubt susceptible to confirmation bias, and it’s my preference to interpret history with an eye to stressing the role of contingency, and in doing so I tend to eschew narrative which emphasises inevitability .   

 

In this regard, I would cite the opening days of the Kaiserslacht as fertile ground for applying my notions : the comments of Petain surely lend weight to the view that this was a time of great peril for the Entente.  Walter Reid’s recent revision might bolster my outlook here.

 

Cometh the hour, cometh the man.....Foch’s inspired words about fighting at Amiens cloud be compared with the Whatever it takes ! slogan that we hear a lot today.

 

But even Foch blurted out something like This is a fine thing ! You hand me a poison chalice of a battle lost and expect me to turn things round !

 

I cite that from memory , and forgive error or licence on my part.

 

Phil

 

 

[MartH]

Can I add a personal anecdote I  can remember discussing with my grandfather about the state of the Eastern Front and Germany in 1917 before returning to Finland. They were staving, they were nicked names "The Bread Finns"  because of there constant begging for bread. He was on leave to Berlin at least once. The uniforms where thin, their boots a form a cardboard. Germany was worn down, knackered and  had problem feeding an arming their troops. I know the unit feasted on macaroons when they captured a warehouse full of them, - but that area is famous for marzipan.  He intimated it was far worse then than when they had whole might of Russian focused on them during the Winter War, if things ever seemed desperate he looked back to Germany 1916-1917 to feel better.

[phil andrade]

On 15/03/2020 at 18:27, phil andrade said:

There must have been tremendous  pressure on the Germans to try conclusions in early 1918.

 

The  Kaiserslacht  looks like a monstrous folly now, but if we assess the predicament that Germany was in, it seems understandable .

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

Thanks for that anecdote, MartH.

 

I wanted to pitch in with an earlier post that I’d made, because it ties up nicely with what you’ve told us about your GF.

 

Phil

[MartH]

49 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

Thanks for that anecdote, MartH.

 

I wanted to pitch in with an earlier post that I’d made, because it ties up nicely with what you’ve told us about your GF.

 

Phil

 

Phil

 

It a pleasure, Mofe (Mothers - Farther) was really lover of Germany, he got married there in 1920, and I spoke to him a lot. From what I could gather with winter of 1917-1918 was un-imaginable to us.

[MikB]

16 minutes ago, MartH said:

 

Phil

 

It a pleasure, Mofe (Mothers - Farther) was really lover of Germany, he got married there in 1920, and I spoke to him a lot. From what I could gather with winter of 1917-1918 was un-imaginable to us.

 

Yes - my father was 9 then and living in Berlin. Although his father - Opa - was about 6 ft, my dad never grew above 5 ft 4 in. He was pretty seriously ill with starvation by the end of the war, and was sent to Holland to recuperate. He came back after 10 weeks and his mother didn't immediately recognise him as he got off the train. He would never eat turnip or swede in later life - I guess it held memories.

[MartH]

50 minutes ago, MikB said:

Yes - my father was 9 then and living in Berlin. Although his father - Opa - was about 6 ft, my dad never grew above 5 ft 4 in. He was pretty seriously ill with starvation by the end of the war, and was sent to Holland to recuperate. He came back after 10 weeks and his mother didn't immediately recognise him as he got off the train. He would never eat turnip or swede in later life - I guess it held memories.

 

I find this so interesting.The starvation, Mofe was not recognizable to to people, he had been away for two years. There is a family anecdote they  saw each other on a passing trains as his mother and sister went to his brothers funeral, and he was not recognized by them. I have see photographs of him, and he has the stare and is so thin.