I need evidence that Germany could still win in March 1918

[EL KAISER]

Hi. I’m searching for evidence (books, articles, opinions either of yours or of historians that you know about, videos, or anything helpful) that proves (to the best extent possible, of course) that Germany, in March 1918, could still win WWI. “Win” as in “comply the allies to a negotiated peace”. In particular, I would like to confirm that the German spring offensives, if they had been carried out in a different, more organized way, could have knock France out of the war (again, “knock out” as in “convince her to initiate peace talks”). I’m of the opinion that yes, Germany could still win WWI in March 1918. I believe its offensives could have been successful if carried out differently, but I lack the necessary… documented support, so to say. Thank you!

[phil andrade]

Welcome, EL KAISER !

 

At Doullens, in the last week of March 1918, Petain made a startling statement, which I’ll cite to the best of my knowledge :

 

The English will be beaten in the field, and then we will be beaten, too.

 

That’s not as accurate as I would wish, but I’m sure others on this forum will give a better rendition of what he said, and to whom he said it.  Was it Briand, or Poincare ?

 

Petain was a pessimist, but he was an accomplished battlefield commander....and if that’s what he said, then I would cite that as evidence that the Germans were in with a decent chance of forcing a peace on the Entente.

 

Russia had been defeated and knocked out of the war ; Romania likewise, and Italy had come perilously close.

 

The very scale and intensity of the Kaiserslacht  attests the sheer might that Germany could bring to bear.

 

There’s a lot more that I could summon up here....but , yes, I agree with you, and will be happy to develop this further if people want to join in the discussion.

 

Phil

 

[AOK4]

Hello,

 

It is a difficult discussion and I think that it would be very difficult for Germany to still win because of the enormous numbers of American soldiers that were available. Even if still largely untrained, they could have been rushed to the front if it would have been really necessary to "hold the line" and "plug the gaps". I am more inclined to say that by March 1918, the evolution for Germany was that winning was impossible, especially considering the state of its allies and the allied unwillingness to negotiate for peace because they knew they had the might of the US on their side.

 

Jan

[phil andrade]

Jan,

 

Do you think that “ impossible “ is too big a word, and that “ unlikely” might suit more ?

 

One of my favourite commentators said that, for the Allies, the crisis of March 1918 was sufficiently serious to qualify as a Change your underwear moment .

 

Petain was in despair, and Haig’s Order of the Day in the second week of April indicates profound anxiety.

 

The fury and determination of the German attack was literally phenomenal .

 

Bearing in mind what was to happen a generation later in the same battlefields, I reckon that it stood a significant chance of bringing the French and British to a negotiated peace.

 

Phil

[kenf48]

You may find this recent article of interest

https://jonathanboff.wordpress.com/2018/03/05/the-german-spring-offensives-of-1918-last-chance-or-forlorn-hope/

 

As the article suggests Germany had already lost.  They could not replace the losses of the Spring Offensive  and the ground gained together with the poor defensive situation they found themselves in after the campaign simply quickened the pace of defeat.  Although 21,000 British soldiers were taken prisoner on the 21st March 1918, the German losses were just as great, in fact slightly more than the British, over 28,000 German soldiers were wounded and 10,851 killed.  Leaving aside the fact these could no longer fight the demand on the medical and evacuation services would be significant.

 

Dr Boff does not mention the success of the Naval Blockade and the logistical consequences, other than to dismiss their immediate relevance to Ludendorff's logistical strategy.  Other authors have commented that due to German ambitions in the East and the need to garrison captured territory which had cost tens of thousands of lives there was little dividend in terms of troops released from that front to the Western Front to support the Ludendorff Offensive.

 

On the 26 March at Doullens in response to Operation Michael the Allies charged Foch with ' co-ordinating the action of the Allies on the Western Front.' This unity of command was key to defeating the Germans.

 

The question surely is not 'could theGermans have won', there's not much mileage in alternative history but 'what factors led to Germany's defeat in March 1918". 

As noted above that is a complex and difficult question, although I like Boff's analogy to the Ardennes Offensive, it was the last throw of the dice and a dangerous gamble.

 

Ken

 

 

 

[Chris_Baker]

I think you will struggle to find "evidence". It is entirely conjecture and as such can only ever be opinion based on assumption or deduction. That will of course be coloured by benefit of hindsight.

 

It may be worth examining why the allied governments were still most concerned about German offensive capability as late as July 1918.

 

 

Edited 13 March , 2020 by Chris_Baker

[phil andrade]

Regarding Petain’s comment at Doullens, it was overheard by Clemenceau, who reported it to Poincare.

 

Haig corroborated to a degree, writing that Petain was in a bad state of nerves, and had a dreadful look about him.

 

Again, I cite that from memory , not from the books.

 

Quite significant evidence, wouldn’t you say, that things looked alarming, and with damned good reason  ?

 

If battles are lost or won in the minds of commanders, then this episode lends some weight to the argument that the Germans could have “ won”....which entailed securing a peace from the Entente instead of the bitter outcome that was to follow in November .

 

Foch, of course, was the antidote to Petain.

 

Since we know the end of the story, it’s tempting to conclude that the German offensive was bound to fail....but I think that we should never lose sight of the contingencies, and, above all, should resist attributing “ inevitability “ to outcomes in military endeavour.

 

Quite a close run thing, this business !

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

[Terry_Reeves]

It's interesting. As early as December 1917 the RN were looking at plans for evacuating the BEF in the even of a break through in March 1918. They also also started to draw up a plan know as the FP Scheme which stood for the French Ports Scheme. This involved the demolition of port facilities  because they were worried that if the Germans did break through the northern French ports might be used for submarine bases which give them a shorter distance into the Atlantic, instead of having to continue use the longer northerly route.  The scheme was quite complex to start with,  requiring some 50 demolition parties mainly provided from naval sources , with help from the Royal Engineers for actual operations and the training of some of the naval demolition teams. To this end, a demolition training school was set up at Shoreham in Sussex under the command of RE Lt Colonel William Lowe Lowe Brown (two Lowe's , no hyphen) of the Inland Water Transport.  Lowe Brown was a hugely experienced civil engineer who had amongst other things worked on railways in Argentina had worked in New York  as joint resident engineer on a bridge project, and from 1917 was heavily involved in the construction of the Richborough Military Port in Kent.

 

During the German March offensive, the QMG BEF became concerned that the important railway junction at Amiens might be captured thus threatening the supply train. The continuing offensives caused concern that the northern armies might have to evacuated. To this end the RE railway organisation along with Canadian railway battalions were instructed to form a demolition plan after the evacuation. This included roads, bridges, railways, including lines at docks and various railway depots such as Audrique. The instructions were very detailed explaining how to destroy steam engines in steam or with cold boilers and instructions to extend railway lines at ports so that rolling stock could be pushed into the harbour. Other measures included inundations at Dunkirk and Calais. Having evacuated the Northern army, it was hoped that these troops could be sent back to join the Southern army to continue the struggle.

 

When you look at the plans in detail it is obvious that there were genuine concerns that the German offensive was seen as a serious, credible threat.

 

 

TR

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 13 March , 2020 by Terry_Reeves

[David Filsell]

There is very little feeling in the German works - fact and fiction - that I have read that there Any expectation of victory amongst German troops in late 1918. Quiet the reverse in fact

[phil andrade]

An anecdote comes to my mind in which German troops were being transferred from Italy - where they had triumphed so spectacularly at Caporetto - to the Western Front.

 

The soldiers were speaking very candidly about Germany’s prospects, and they were actually countenancing the loss of one million men as the price that the nation was prepared to pay in pursuit of victory in a do or die offensive : it was the consensus that it was to be an all or nothing effort, and that if it failed the game was up. They knew that time was limited, but they were “ up for it” and quite confident.

 

Forgive me for not citing the source ; I will try and authenticate it.

 

The sharp repulse of the Mars  attack in the Arras sector on 28th March 1918 was, I think, a very significant episode and merits more acknowledgement as a major step towards German defeat.

 

Yet within two months of that bloody failure, the Germans gave the French a mighty scare when they broke through along the Chemin des Dames. 

 

By mid June, with some serious and successful Allied counter attacks developing , I think the Germans were well and truly on the slippery slope.

 

On the 25th March, though, I reckon that things had been grim for the Entente, and it’s legitimate to think that the Germans were in with a good chance at that point.

 

It’s astonishing how quickly it all happened : the Great War remained hanging  in the balance until the last  months.

 

Phil

 

 

[charlie962]

17 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

I believe its offensives could have been successful if carried out differently

Wasn't that demonstrated in 1940 ?  They should not have 'won' then but they did.

 

Charlie

[Muerrisch]

Another way of looking at the matter is to ask a few questions and answer them as believed at the time.

 

1. Did the German High Command think that they could "win" as defined by them? Yes, or be utterly immoral.

2. Did the Allies think the Germans could "win" as defined by the Allies?. Yes, or at least a very high risk.

 

This compares with the Ardennes offensive in 1944.

1. Answer no, thus utterly immoral.

2. Answer no, at worst a year or two delay in winning, and political risk in delay. Russia advance unstoppable, Bomber Command unstoppable.

[FROGSMILE]

It seems unjust that the Royal Navy has not been mentioned in this.  Why, in 1918, was the German Army using paper bandages, and largely sustaining itself on potato and cabbage soup? 

[EL KAISER]

Thanks all for your answers. I have only found one book that deals with what i ask: "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier. He basically says that it's a myth that France and G.B. had won WWI. It was actually Germany who won all the important battles, and that it was the U.S. saved the allies from certain defeat. He even says that it was because of north american troops that the spring offensives were stopped. Many people claim that Germany was on the verge of famine. But let's not forget that they now occupied the whole of the Ukraine (amongst other regions), which could have prevented hunger from actually happening, at least for a long time. If what Mosier says it's true, then knocking France out of the war could have make Germany self-sufficiente during a long time. Since he also claims that it was north american troops what stopped the german advance, then clearly the crucial mistake committed by Germany was to send the Zimmerman telegram. If the US hadn't entered the war, then the Spring offensives would have been successful.

Edited 14 March , 2020 by EL KAISER

[AOK4]

2 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

Thanks all for your answers. I have only found one book that deals with what i ask: "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier. He basically says that it's a myth that France and G.B. had won WWI. It was actually Germany who won all the important battles, and that it was the U.S. saved the allies from certain defeat. He even says that it was because of north american troops that the spring offensives were stopped. Many people claim that Germany was on the verge of famine. But let's not forget that they now occupied the whole of the Ukraine (amongst other regions), which could have prevented hunger from actually happening, at least for a long time. If what Mosier says it's true, then knocking France out of the war could have make Germany self-sufficiente during a long time. Since he also claims that it was north american troops what stopped the german advance, then clearly the crucial mistake committed by Germany was to send the Zimmerman telegram. If the US hadn't entered the war, then the Spring offensives would have been successful.

 

The Zimmerman telegram was basically a propaganda reason for the US to enter the war, there were more underlying reasons. Just as the UK entered the war mainly for economical reasons, also the US.

 

The huge amount of American troops already in Europ by early 1918 meant that time could be bought and in case of a real emergency, these American troops could be sent in without being fully trained, meaning that a huge German victory on the battlefield (the only way a German victory could be achieved) became extremely unlikely.

[phil andrade]

EL KAISER,

 

Please don’t rely on John Mosier : the very thought of that gets me agitated !

 

Phil

[Buffnut453]

I think the ghosts.of the 55th (West Lancs) Div might have a few choice words on the subject of American troops halting the spring offensive!

[phil andrade]

2 hours ago, Buffnut453 said:

I think the ghosts.of the 55th (West Lancs) Div might have a few choice words on the subject of American troops halting the spring offensive!

 

 

Oh, yes.....the Ghosts of Givenchy !

 

That would make a great title, wouldn’t it ?

 

Let me say that the stand of that division has a bearing on our thread : were it not for such superb defensive fighting, who knows what the Germans might have achieved ?

 

Such prowess is not a given ( a good pun on Givenchy!)....it makes the story of the battles all the more challenging, as we try and deal with concepts of “inevitability” and “ impossibility”.  Outcomes are contingent upon how people behave and the choices they make.

 

Phil

[kenf48]

6 hours ago, Buffnut453 said:

I think the ghosts.of the 55th (West Lancs) Div might have a few choice words on the subject of American troops halting the spring offensive!

 

As would all the other heroes on that day, local initiatives and courage denied the German Army its strategic objectives on March 21st 1918, not the Americans. From that point on  "Operation Michael' had failed and the German Army, if not defeated was held and denied victory.

 

Ludendorff's strategy devised at Mons in November 1917 was to defeat the British Army and split the British and French forces before the Americans could bring sufficient numbers to bear.   This he singularly failed to do and 'Operation Michael' was called off on April 5th.  It had certainly been tough for the British but neither they nor their French allies, together with notable contributions from the Australian and other Dominion troops, were defeated.  The only German gain at the end of the offensive was a forty mile salient which was to prove a defensive liability.   It could be argued if they had achieved the envisaged breakthrough the outcome may have been different but the facts are they did not.

 

As Chris has pointed out 'evidence' to prove a German breakthrough would have altered the course of the war can only be speculation. 

Argued more forcibly in this article  it is not only 'unproveable' but a waste of time

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/13/counterfactual-history-what-if-waste-of-time

 

The consequences of the assertion the German Army was undefeated in the Great War has a terrible resonance.

 

Ken

 

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

7 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

Many people claim that Germany was on the verge of famine. But let's not forget that they now occupied the whole of the Ukraine (amongst other regions), which could have prevented hunger from actually happening,

Then the Germans must have been supremely incompetent in being incapable of transporting the contents of that massive breadbasket back home.

 

7 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

It was actually Germany who won all the important battles,

It was resoundingly defeated in the most important battle of all, The Final Hundred Days.

 

7 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

He basically says that it's a myth that France and G.B. had won WWI.

Read another book.

[phil andrade]

Forgive this rather obvious point, but surely we might do well to cite the opinions of the Germans themselves as they took a reckoning of how things had progressed.

 

No doubt we should beware of self justifying memoirs or “ agenda” based official history : were there significant comments from army commanders who protested that this was not going as well as the triumphant claims were suggesting ?

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

Strategy ? I forbid the use of the word ! One punches a hole and the rest follows !

 

Did Ludendorff really say that ?

 

A good way to win battles and lose wars.

 

The Bavarian General Staff made a counter suggestion :

 

A great tactical victory has been accomplished ; the strategic exploitation must follow.

 

How dare they ?

 

Phil

 

 

Edited 14 March , 2020 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

7 hours ago, Buffnut453 said:

I think the ghosts.of the 55th (West Lancs) Div might have a few choice words on the subject of American troops halting the spring offensive!

 

A generation later, I wonder how the “ Battered ******** of Bastogne “ felt when they learned that the British, under Monty’s leadership, had saved them in the Battle of the Bulge !

 

Phil

[MikeMeech]

13 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

Thanks all for your answers. I have only found one book that deals with what i ask: "The Myth of the Great War" by John Mosier. He basically says that it's a myth that France and G.B. had won WWI. It was actually Germany who won all the important battles, and that it was the U.S. saved the allies from certain defeat. He even says that it was because of north american troops that the spring offensives were stopped. Many people claim that Germany was on the verge of famine. But let's not forget that they now occupied the whole of the Ukraine (amongst other regions), which could have prevented hunger from actually happening, at least for a long time. If what Mosier says it's true, then knocking France out of the war could have make Germany self-sufficiente during a long time. Since he also claims that it was north american troops what stopped the german advance, then clearly the crucial mistake committed by Germany was to send the Zimmerman telegram. If the US hadn't entered the war, then the Spring offensives would have been successful.

Hi

 

Reference the Ukraine, 'Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918' by Gerald D. Feldman (based on German documents) has the following on p. 461:

 

"Unhappily for Waldow, the peace treaty concluded with the Ukraine turned out to be one of the OHL's fiascos.  Conditions in southern Russia were utterly chaotic.  The puppet regime was incompetent and the peasants were uncooperative.  As a result, the German government was compelled to censor optimistic reports concerning the possibility of getting substantial quantities of Ukrainian wheat in the near future."

 

However, as the German military had mismanaged food supplies in Germany almost continually during the war.  Not considering farmers and peasants who produced the food of much importance compared with arms manufacturing labour which meant many gave up growing crops etc. and went to work in the factories getting higher pay and even better 'access' to food!

We should also remember that pre-war that the main countries that Germany imported food and fodder from were France and Russia.  While invading them would have been advantageous in a 'victorious' short war (as planned) with probably  'free food' as part of the reparations, the long war it turned into meant they had lost that supply and they failed to make the loss of that up during the war.  The German Military control of these matters appears to have made the food situation worse in country than it needed to have been with the blockade.

 

The Feldman book covers all this in quite a lot of detail.  A more general book 'The First World War - Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918' by Holger H. Herwig also covers some of this topic.

 

Mike

Edited 14 March , 2020 by MikeMeech

[David Filsell]

It was their declaration of war on Germany that largely triggered the Germans to undertake the Spring Offensives to end the war before US troops were on the on the ground  -  and that the declaration was arguably more important than their military impact. John Terrain was always keen to remind people that in in final months the British army took more ground, more prisoners and more guns than the French and Americans combined. Equally winning more battles in a war does not dictate winning a war- as 1918 proved. As to German sources  revealing the loss of German feelings that final victory, there are many. Not least Ludwig Renn's account of the loss of belief in victory in his regiment when, during the offensives, control of his men was undermined simply by their amazement and the length, breadth and depth of British supples of food, weapons, even boots, available to British troops which they lacked. You can add to that the dregs of soldiery and Bolshevik influenced German troops who were sent to the Western Front from the Eastern Front. One German account records "fragging" of German officers by such soldiers. Add German industrial, supply, food, and manpower problems and the storm of defeat becomes perfect.