I need evidence that Germany could still win in March 1918

[phil andrade]

The stories above speak volumes.

 

Better to go for  an all out offensive, in full awareness that failure means  death by the fall of the axe, than face  death by a thousand cuts.

 

Phil

Edited 22 March , 2020 by phil andrade

[David Filsell]

Dear EK

Looks to me as if the evidence you require simply does not seem to exist - not simply in my opinion, but in that of others too.

Regards

David

[charlie962]

On 22/03/2020 at 12:33, phil andrade said:

A pedantic point by me, here, but he was asking for evidence to cite.

Yes, sorry.  I think what I was trying to say was that for the Germans to have succeeded in 1918 would require not only faultless action by the Germans but additional elements outside their control- eg Good Fortune  plus significant mistakes by their enemy.

They had good fortune on that first day with the fog seriously favouring their infiltration.

But their enemy did not make the required mistakes due, I believe,  to learning from 4 years of warfare. The appointment of a Supreme Commander confirmed this.

 

I previously suggested comparison with the offensive of 1940 and the Battle of France. The tactics used in the latter (‘improvised’ Blitzkreig) were a development of the highly successful Infiltration tactics and Command and Communications suppression of 1918, updated for technological improvements in armour, transport (?), communications and air support. This time the Allies did make the necessary contributory mistakes that they’d largely avoided in 1918 - failures of liaison, failures of intelligence, failures of communications – let alone unpreparedness for modern (mobile) warfare.

 

Between the wars the German High Command studied the causes of failures (and successes) in the Spring Offensive. Evidence of the potential for the Germans to have reversed that overall failure should be set out in those studies ?

 

Even the Germans were surprised by the level of their success in 1940 . Which poses the question ‘Could the Germans have lost in 1940 ?’ Indeed they could have but that’s for another forum.

 

Charlie

 

[phil andrade]

Charlie,

 

Good of you to make that reply.

 

I felt that I had been left “twisting in the wind “.....anxious not to endorse the Mosier view - an affront, in my opinion - but also determined to uphold the view that it’s a sad day for history when we ascribe inevitability to pivotal events.

 

An indulgence on my part, I suspect : stories are so much more interesting when we allow for uncertainties and contingency , especially if we can reflect on the importance of great personalities.  I still like to see the desperate days of late March 1918 in that light, and I think a good case can be made that the Germans were in with a chance of gaining a victory of sorts : I use the phrase “ of sorts”, because obviously this was going to be a compromised outcome, rather than one of conquest. The frightening five days from 21st March offer fertile ground for  this interpretation .  I feel strongly that the Germans lost that advantage when they took that sharp blow of 28 March.

 

In Foch we have the “ Whatever it Takes ! “ man and moment....in front of Amiens, behind Amiens, and, if need be, in Amiens.  Not a certainty, that attribute, when we countenance the implications of Petain’s declaration.  Look again at 1940.

 

There are two battles that were fought in 1917 that we don’t acknowledge sufficiently, which were harbingers of final Allied victory.

 

Lens in August, and Malmaison in October.  Limited, set piece attritional battles that inflicted disproportionate damage on the Germans and must have reinforced Ludendorff’s determination to launch an all out attack rather than endure a prolonged ordeal of sustaining such well planned and executed local offensives.  Cambrai didn’t help much, either....although the riposte spoke volumes about German reflexive skills.

 

It was hardly surprising ( I’ll scrupulously avoid the word “ inevitable” ! “) that a man of Ludendorff’s temperament and  outlook sought to try conclusions in the most grandiose manner, and the subsequent crash was disastrous.

 

Phil

[brianmorris547]

I have just noticed this in the WD of 3 Div A&QMG. (WO 95/1389/1-5 Ancestry p 246/978)

Extract from the Times 05/11/1918:  "Resistance of the British on March 27 near Arras caused the failure of the German campaign".

Brian

[EL KAISER]

On 24/03/2020 at 13:04, phil andrade said:

I felt that I had been left “twisting in the wind “.....anxious not to endorse the Mosier view - an affront, in my opinion - but also determined to uphold the view that it’s a sad day for history when we ascribe inevitability to pivotal events...

Phil

 

And what is the name of the principle (if said name exists) of the concept that historians uphold about "nothing in history is inevitable?"

[phil andrade]

8 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

 

And what is the name of the principle (if said name exists) of the concept that historians uphold about "nothing in history is inevitable?"

 

If I knew the name, I would have used it...so I’ve been trying to make the case for it in an amateurish fashion.

 

I think that the word contingencies has been used by American scholars in regard to their Civil War, and, if it applies to  that, then I see every reason to use it in respect of the Great War.

 

Forgive me for being repetitive, but if you seek evidence about the prospects of German success, why not resort to the commentary of Petain at Doullens ?

 

If that’s not evidence, I don’t know what is.

 

Editing : Suggest googling History is only interesting because nothing is inevitable .

 

Plenty of people saying things better than I can.  

 

Phil

Edited 5 April , 2020 by phil andrade

[MikB]

"Suggest googling History is only interesting because nothing is inevitable"

 

Perhaps it's only interesting because you don't know beforehand what's inevitable and what's not - there isn't time or data to find out.

[EL KAISER]

On 05/04/2020 at 10:36, MikB said:

"Suggest googling History is only interesting because nothing is inevitable"

 

Perhaps it's only interesting because you don't know beforehand what's inevitable and what's not - there isn't time or data to find out.

 

Nothing is inevitable. Well, except death.

[MikB]

1 hour ago, EL KAISER said:

 

Nothing is inevitable. Well, except death.

 

Well, I think all that means is that you've just not investigated the other stuff closely enough... 

[Muerrisch]

and taxation.

[phil andrade]

Resurrecting this thread on the heels of a review that appeared in the Times Saturday Review, with Martin Ivens reviewing NOVEMBER 1918, The German Revolution, by Robert Gerwarth : here’s a crucial paragraph from the review :

 

Still, there was always a dangerous ambiguity at the heart of the new polity . Had the country really come to terms with defeat ?  Imperial Germany had won the First World War in the east in 1917 and imposed brutal peace terms on Russia, carving out a new European empire to supplement its overseas one.It very nearly won in the west, too, in 1918.

 

Phil

 

 

 

[Muerrisch]

I weary.

 

In retrospect we are down to looking at opinions, and forming our own from an infinity of evidence. A nudge at chaos theory perhaps?

 

The Germans might have won every battle but the last: the last is decisive, The effort of fighting on more than one front wore them down. They failed to win the naval campaigns, they failed to drive the RFC and allies out of the skies, they failed to feed their people, they failed to keep the USA out of the war, and the Kaiserschlacht failed.

 

Regarding the latter, I have seen no evidence that Britain would have failed to pursue the war if driven back to the Channel ....... such drives usually expose inadequate supply and reinforcement chains.

[phil andrade]

15 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

I weary.

 

In retrospect we are down to looking at opinions, and forming our own from an infinity of evidence. A nudge at chaos theory perhaps?

 

The Germans might have won every battle but the last: the last is decisive, The effort of fighting on more than one front wore them down. They failed to win the naval campaigns, they failed to drive the RFC and allies out of the skies, they failed to feed their people, they failed to keep the USA out of the war, and the Kaiserschlacht failed.

 

Regarding the latter, I have seen no evidence that Britain would have failed to pursue the war if driven back to the Channel ....... such drives usually expose inadequate supply and reinforcement chains.

 

Wearisome or not, the differing opinions and interpretations make the history.

 

In this regard, I'm wondering whether Martin Ivens was citing his own opinion, or whether he was giving us the views of Robert Gerwarth, a young German historian.

 

Phil

[ilkley remembers]

31 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

In this regard, I'm wondering whether Martin Ivens was citing his own opinion, or whether he was giving us the views of Robert Gerwarth, a young German historian.

 

 

Gerwarth appears to be reprising a view point which he alluded to in his previous work 'The Vanquished; Why the First World War failed to end, 1917-1923 (2016), when he suggests that at the beginning of 1918 there was a widespread belief amongst the Central Powers that the war could be brought to a successful conclusion that year. It was of course an illusion borne of a desperation to end hostilities before both empires suffered complete collapse.

 

In 'The Vanquished' Gerwarth's analysis of the events of 1918 are hardly groundbreaking and his chapter about the collapse of will which let the armistice fairly standard fare. He doesn't seem to follow the line of some recent analysis which effectively suggests that Germany and its allies had lost the war in 1914 and were forced into a defensive position because of its inability to finance a long drawn out conflict. His view of the rise of revisionism in Germany and Hungary in the post war years was more interesting and I suspect that it will form a sizeable proportion of this study. 

[phil andrade]

That is most helpful : thank you.

 

Right now, I’m reading Dan Todman ‘s recent work , his concluding book on the Second World War : A Better World, and he alludes to the “disconnect “ between German ambition and capability which had been the cause of so much misery, and the implication is that this was as apparent in March 1918 as it had been in 1914, and was to be again a generation later.

 

Phil

[ilkley remembers]

40 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

Right now, I’m reading Dan Todman ‘s recent work , his concluding book on the Second World War : A Better World, and he alludes to the “disconnect “ between German ambition and capability which had been the cause of so much misery, and the implication is that this was as apparent in March 1918 as it had been in 1914, and was to be again a generation later.

 

I'm familiar with Todman but not this particular book and I am sure that it will be interesting to see how he handles the question of German limitations and ambition in the early part of the 20th Century. I know that there is sometimes a tendency to view the events of WW1 through the prism of WW2 but Todman is probably too good a historian to to follow this easy line. The German state seems to have spent the years up to 1945 in the shadow of Otto von Bismarck and his many achievements, the emulation of which seems to have proved problematic not just for them.

 

 

[Keith_history_buff]

I had interpreted this thread as having a veiled agenda with a nationalistic agenda, to "prove" that the AEF intervention turned imminent defeat into an allied victory in 1918. I was unconvinced, and remain unconvinced, based on the various comments on this thread.

[Buffnut453]

Given that history relies on interpretation of historical records, it's impossible to find true evidence that Germany could have won the Great War.  What we can do is identify critical points within the historical narrative where alternate outcomes could have been achieved, and then wargame through multiple scenarios to determine what decisions may have led to those alternate outcomes.  Unfortunately, such a task is a monumental undertaking which requires detailed understanding of events, high-fidelity computer modelling and simulation, and thorough analysis and documentation of assumptions and starting conditions to ensure the wargame isn't biased towards achieving the desired result.  None of this is evidence, though.  Rather, it's a means of evaluating counter-factual history in rigorous manner.  

[Muerrisch]

I believe "history" is not a written account or accounts, but "what actually happened".

 

Regarding computer simulations they need to include such minutiae as, for example, the state of Napoleon's insides at Waterloo, Haig's when 1 Corps was separated from 2 Corps after Mons, and Bomber Harris's long-term dyspepsia during the bombing campaign 1944/45. 

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

2 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

Regarding computer simulations they need to include such minutiae as, for example, the state of Napoleon's insides at Waterloo, Haig's when 1 Corps was separated from 2 Corps after Mons, and Bomber Harris's long-term dyspepsia during the bombing campaign 1944/45. 

If only the French had invented Proton Pump Inhibitors in 1814.

[phil andrade]

3 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

I believe "history" is not a written account or accounts, but "what actually happened".

 

 

Not so, if you’ll forgive me.

 

Opinionated so and so that I am, I contend the opposite to be the case.

 

Phil

[Muerrisch]

Please what is the opposite of my 

 

""history" is not a written account or accounts, but "what actually happened".

 

 

 

 

[ilkley remembers]

4 hours ago, Muerrisch said:

I believe "history" is not a written account or accounts, but "what actually happened".

 

But in that case doesn't history become almost the equivalent of a medieval chronicle bereft of exposition and interpretation simply recording events chronologically like some list of geological  periods?

 

9 hours ago, Buffnut453 said:

wargame through multiple scenarios to determine what decisions may have led to those alternate outcomes. 

 

Surely it possible to posit  arguments without recourse to what sounds like an extraordinarily mechanistic approach?

[Buffnut453]

1 minute ago, ilkley remembers said:

Surely it possible to posit  arguments without recourse to what sounds like an extraordinarily mechanistic approach?

 

It is entirely possible to posit such arguments but the OP demanded "evidence".  The approach I outlined is probably the closest anyone can get to "evidence" for a counter-factual scenario.  However, it does take a lot of work.