I need evidence that Germany could still win in March 1918

[phil andrade]

There must have been tremendous  pressure on the Germans to try conclusions in early 1918.

 

The  Kaiserslacht  looks like a monstrous folly now, but if we assess the predicament that Germany was in, it seems understandable .

 

Phil

 

 

[charlie2]

9 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Did the nearly 5 million Allied manpower include a large number of US personnel who were not battle ready ?

Phil,

There is no indication as to which nationality they were.

Charlie

[kenf48]

12 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

Did the nearly 5 million Allied manpower include a large number of US personnel who were not battle ready ?

 

 

Between November 1917 and March 1918 the numbers of American Troops in France rose from 78,000 to 220,000, only 139,000 were combatants and of this potential for six Divisions one at most was ready for action. By the end of the war there were over 1,872,000 Americans in France.

 

As David Stevenson notes, until May “Ludendorff ‘s hammer blows would fall almost wholly on the British and the French.”

 

Stevenson’s conclusion incidentally, on the Spring Offensive is that “much of the (German) success had rested on tactical superiority rather than greater resources, once tat superiority was lost the balance would swing massively and the Allies’ underlying advantages come fully into play against an enemy who in many ways had been weakened by triumph”.

 

Ken

 

[Muerrisch]

These "what-ifs" do not seem to bear in mind that, throughout modern history, highly successful breakthroughs peter out as logistics fail to keep pace and flanks become exposed. Although weak in places [Lloyd George] the British army was far from naive and far from exhausted. How else could the 100 Days be such a decisive victory [Sadly un-celebrated these days]?

[EL KAISER]

11 hours ago, AOK4 said:

One has to be realistic: in case the British and French armies were split, would it have led to France stepping out of the war? I doubt so. The British (the allies being in strong control of the seas) would have been able to evacuate and establish a new front line. Besides of this, the Americans, even if not trained, were available in already considerable and increasing numbers, enough to support battered French and British units until ready to take on more active roles.

And even if France was defeated, Germany's allies (Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were basically in a palliative state, only kept alive by support of German units, which would lead to an inevitable German defeat.

 

Anyway, this is all "what if", so basically not leading to anything at all. We all know Germany DID lose the war.

 

Jan

 

 

 

Well i never said it didn't. We all know it did lose the war. That's not what i'm asking. What i'm asking is: "IF" the offensives had been carried out differently (attack here instead of there, attack just 3 days after the last offensive, instead of a whole month later, etc.) could the offensives succeed? And if there is evidence for this, where? Besides, don't take history as an "only possible scenario". The fact that in real ife the offensives did fail "because of this and that", doesn't mean that they were doomed to fail before they began. To think this, is absurd. The "What Ifs" are VERY usefull to understand why things didn't go or couldn't go this or that way.

[EL KAISER]

10 hours ago, MikB said:

 

Exactly so. There is no escaping the facts. Whatever prevented them from 'winning' was what happened, and will have had its own causes and antecedents.

 

I used to imagine what might've been the outcome of the WW2 batlle of Denmark Strait had Holland in Hood received clearer shadowing reports in the night before, or had he turned to port in battle 20 seconds earlier or later - until I realised that it's just futile to try to make historical realities unhappen.

 

Of course there is no escaping the facts. But there is no guarantee that the facts that finally occured would have inevitably happened. History played out in the way it historically did. So what? Does that mean the facts could not have been any different? Obviously no. Things could have turned out very differently. What i believe is that the offensives could have made Germany win the war ("win" as in a negotiated peace). What i lack is evidence. What i ask for is evidence of any kind.

[Muerrisch]

16 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

 

Of course there is no escaping the facts. But there is no guarantee that the facts that finally occured would have inevitably happened. History played out in the way it historically did. So what? Does that mean the facts could not have been any different? Obviously no. Things could have turned out very differently. What i believe is that the offensives could have made Germany win the war ("win" as in a negotiated peace). What i lack is evidence. What i ask for is evidence of any kind.

 

Have you heard of the concept of inherent military probability? IMP for short.

This relies on using the outcomes of previous similar scenarios, whether they be on a micro or macro scale. It can take into account doctrine and training and known idiosyncrasies.

 

Not evidence, but my reading of IMP [also using examples more recent that 1918] is that the attack was probably doomed. To those on the spot it felt differently of course.

Edited 16 March , 2020 by Muerrisch
speeling misstake

[phil andrade]

Lack of cavalry was a crucial reason for the German failure to exploit their success.

 

This is well attested by British soldiers who were retreating in Picardy in March : they dreaded the appearance of enemy cavalry and were hugely relieved that this didn’t happen.

 

No lack of evidence here.

 

As to the reasons for this lack of cavalry, I’ll need help explaining it.

 

Cavalry is terrifically greedy of space and resources, and every train was needed to transport men and munitions, and rolling stock was in short supply for Germany, as were the metals required to make and sustain it.  Attritional blockade had depleted transport and fodder.  I wonder if the Germans deployed what cavalry they had in the Ukraine, to the detriment of the Western Front.

 

French cavalry, incidentally, was diverted to garrison duties in Paris, because the French government was worried about social unrest.

 

That’s another dimension we might discuss.

 

But, for what it’s worth, I’ll pitch in the cavalry  as something that could have changed the heavy tactical British  reverse of 21 March into something more far reaching.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

Edited 16 March , 2020 by phil andrade

[kenf48]

It was not necessarily cavalry but horses.  Horses brought up supplies, ammunition and most importantly artillery.  They evacuated wounded.  The Germans had poor motor transport and building railways, even light railways was impractical given the speed of the advance.  The weather which had so helped the Germans on March 21st turned to rain and the iron wheels of the few lorries available turned any remaining tracks into the familiar quagmire.

 

The Germans lost 29,000 horses during 'Michael'.  The German planners had recognised horses were critical for movement.   The basic strategy as discussed above was to push forward with no particular objective in mind, the strategy Ludendorff had previously applied with some success..  The infantry were given two days rations and expected to forage for food as they advanced.  The British as they retreated may have left mountains of corned beef but they destroyed the fodder for horses.  Logistics was one of the reasons the offensive failed.

 

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

French cavalry, incidentally, was diverted to garrison duties in Paris, because the French government was worried about social unrest.

 

On the 23rd Petain sent nine infantry and five cavalry Divisions to assist Haig and his army, logistics once again this time on the Allied side. This was all the railway could carry.

 

Ken

 

 

[charlie2]

Further to Ken‘s post the German OH states that the biggest problem they had was the provision of fit horses. 100000 were procured but this was only enough to supplement the 44 so called „Mobil“ divisions establishments by 232 per division the rest were replacements. The horses hard fodder was increased by up to 2kg daily from 1st March but there wasn‘t enough time to restore them to full fitness. The problem with the fodder supply was never solved.

Due to the lack of fit horses MG Coys and LTM Batteries were severely restricted in their use of horse drawn transport, MG Coys only had enough for 6 of their 12 guns and the LTMBs only enough for 2 of their 4 Mortars.

There were 2 dismounted Cavalry Divisions in the west so there were probably not enough horses to equip them even if they had wanted to. 
Charlie

 

 

 

[phil andrade]

So it wasn’t just a question of “ a horseshoe nail” , then, but of a hundred thousand bleeding horses ? 😂

 

Phil

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

49 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

So it wasn’t just a question of “ a horseshoe nail” , then, but of a hundred thousand bleeding horses ? 😂

 

Phil

Yes,

And the manpower shortage.

And the malnutrition.

And the logistics.

And the tactics.

 

So yes, if the Germans had solved these slight oversights, they would without doubt have won the war.

[phil andrade]

They didn’t do badly, considering these disadvantages, did they ?

 

Phil

[GWF1967]

37 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

They didn’t do badly, considering these disadvantages, did they ?

 

Phil

It requires quite a lot of what ifs to see anything like a different outcome.

Re-occupying  land they’d  laid waste to, outrunning lines of supply, and loosing irreplaceable men in huge numbers.

 It could have worked out differently If they’d had Fergie Time. 

[kenf48]

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

They didn’t do badly, considering these disadvantages, did they ?

 

Phil

 

They made the biggest advance of any army on the Western Front since 1914, unfortunately that was proven to be a pyrrhic victory.

 

 

Ken

 

 

[Muerrisch]

17 minutes ago, kenf48 said:

 

They made the biggest advance of any army on the Western Front since 1914, unfortunately that was proven to be a pyrrhic victory.

 

 

Ken

 

 

 

I rather think the glorious 100 days ended up beyond the Rhine. 

[James A Pratt III]

On youtube there is a video "Total War Comes to the Fatherland the German home front in WW I

 

As for horses they were in short supply there is a film clip of a German artillery piece being towed by cattle!? since there were not enough horses. Oxen were also used. I also understand fodder was in short supply in Germany in 1918.

[kenf48]

10 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

 

I rather think the glorious 100 days ended up beyond the Rhine. 

 

True, but that came a few weeks after the German Offensive as I recall

 

Ken

[Muerrisch]

33 minutes ago, kenf48 said:

 

True, but that came a few weeks after the German Offensive as I recall

 

Ken

I was gently making the point that "They made the biggest advance of any army on the Western Front since 1914" was untrue.

If you had added "hitherto" there would be no dispute.

Anyway, no big deal!

[Muerrisch]

41 minutes ago, James A Pratt III said:

On youtube there is a video "Total War Comes to the Fatherland the German home front in WW I

 

As for horses they were in short supply there is a film clip of a German artillery piece being towed by cattle!? since there were not enough horses. Oxen were also used. I also understand fodder was in short supply in Germany in 1918.

 

perhaps the malnourished Germans were turning a few into frikadelle. Very nice with die Fritten

[David Filsell]

A few thoughts

John Terrain always stood firm in his judgement that in the '100' days, the British Army took more guns, more prisoners and more territory than the French and Americans combined.

He also iargued that Wilson's decision to go to war was a key factor in final allied victory - possibly more so than the untried American troops achieved in combat - by triggering the Germans to decide it was necessary to win the war before US troops arrived in Europe and go for victory in a spring attacks. Attacks tactically highly effective - strategy poor.  It was the last throw of the German dice.

Germany' industry and its supplies of materiel needed to sustain war were in a parlous  condition by 1918.

German logistics, notleast through shortage of motor vehicles and horses, were ineffective 

I have been looking through my collection of German novels and personal accounts of the war. War weariness and low morale figure highly in 1918. Reasons? Simplistically -

Shortage of sound junior officers and experienced senior non commissioned officers

The deployment on the Western Front of troops from the east - one account reports many in their ranks were the dregs of units sent because their unit simply wanted to get rid of them.

Some soldiers transferred from the Eastern Front had developed Bolshevik sympathies.

There is one account of officers being fragged. 

Soldiers' Councils were created because of high command's concern about the state of morale.

There are accounts reporting breakdowns in commanding troops during the Spring Battles. Those in the ranks living on short rations were, as they advanced, amazed by the plenitude of food supplies, weaponry, boots, clothing and the alcohol they found as they reached position taken from the British. In one company the men simply took to the bottle and the bully - as did their battalion commander - and simply refused orders.

 

 

 

Edited 17 March , 2020 by David Filsell

[phil andrade]

Five days from defeat : How Britain nearly lost the First World War

 

Walter Reid

 

This recently published book is a remarkable foray into the very topic we’re discussing : not least because the author has been very gracious in his candour and has admitted that he’s changed his mind.

 

His earlier book Haig, Architect of Victory lavished praise on Haig as a commander.

 

Now the presentation is very different, and Haig is rendered culpable for a crisis of extreme gravity, and focuses on the five days from March 21st to 25th 1918.

 

Such a treatise , of necessity, implies that the Germans did indeed stand a chance of winning, and came pretty damned close to achieving that result .

 

I haven’t yet read the book, but thought it should be cited as evidence of sorts.

 

Phil

[ejwalshe]

Was a good debate until I read John Mosier's name a couple pages back and unfortunately had to give up.

 

John should stick to poetry.

[phil andrade]

9 hours ago, ejwalshe said:

Was a good debate until I read John Mosier's name a couple pages back and unfortunately had to give up.

 

John should stick to poetry.

 

 

Ted,

 

Please don’t give up : your opinion would mean a lot.

 

Phil

[squirrel]

Interesting and absorbing thread. One point comes to mind. Haig placed Gough's Army, the weakest, in the area where he could most afford to lose ground.

A sensible decision or did he just close his eyes, stick a pin in a map and tell Goughie, "That's where you deploy"?

 

 

Head down for incoming...

Edited 18 March , 2020 by squirrel