I need evidence that Germany could still win in March 1918

[brianmorris547]

12 hours ago, phil andrade said:

EL KAISER,

 

Please don’t rely on John Mosier : the very thought of that gets me agitated !

 

Phil

 

So it's not just me then.

Brian

[phil andrade]

The late Richard Holmes - I am sure - opined that the Germans had come quite close to winning the war in the spring of 1918.

 

Whether he said this in one of his many screen appearances, or whether he wrote it in one of his books, or both, I cannot remember .

 

But I certainly remember taking note of his statement , because I felt rather reassured that he endorsed my sense of the history.

 

This is the second time that I’ve alluded to something that I can’t identify  specifically, so please bear with me....there’s a chance that I might find the book on my shelves.

 

Phil

 

 

[David Filsell]

Close, but no cigar

[MikB]

19 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

Close, but no cigar

Yes, I've always felt that investigating counterfactual scenarios is a bit of magical thinking. Whatever happened, happened for reasons that were good and sufficient at the time and events drove matters to the actual conclusion. Sometimes you find that matters have turned on quite a small event, but the ramifications of predicting a more distant outcome where such an event occurred differently are beyond reasonable calculation. Had Germany 'won' in spring '18, would there even be an internet to debate it on, never mind which of the individuals would or wouldn't be there to do so?

[EL KAISER]

5 hours ago, phil andrade said:

The late Richard Holmes - I am sure - opined that the Germans had come quite close to winning the war in the spring of 1918.

 

Whether he said this in one of his many screen appearances, or whether he wrote it in one of his books, or both, I cannot remember .

 

But I certainly remember taking note of his statement , because I felt rather reassured that he endorsed my sense of the history.

 

This is the second time that I’ve alluded to something that I can’t identify  specifically, so please bear with me....there’s a chance that I might find the book on my shelves.

 

Phil

 

 

Thank you! Never heard of him. If you find it, please tell me what he thinks happened that made the offensives fail.

[tom bowler]

You need evidence ?  I understand that there have been very books even written about his issue/ time period. I have a couple of books by Chris Baker pertaining to this episode. My Grandfather was shot,gassed and take POW on 11th April 1918 near Armentieres.. Now ordinarlly, I would have just accepted this.    These days I do not. There is evidence that people/politicians  like Lloyd George, were more interested in Palestine than in protecting the UK. LG was himself central to the Balfour Declaration.Too many of our politicians, Lloyd George included, since have been beholden to zionist pressure/money.

 

In late 1917, Ludendorf allowed the infamous sealed including Lenin's  train, to go to St Petersburg. Ludendorf admitted afterwards that this was a massive gamble.

 

Anyway back to March 1918. The Russians getting themselves extricated from WW1 in late 1917 allowed many German Divisions to join the Western Front . This literally allowed us to be almost 'washed away',  Operation Georgette, for example.

 

Our Armies had been 'watered down' and numbers of troops had too. We actually had a General who was 'fired' by bums like LG, who complained that the 'side show', for us, of places like Palestine was just that. Sir William Robertson was against 'watering down' the front line in France to build up troops in such as Palestine. Sir William knew the politicians game .

Edited 15 March , 2020 by tom bowler

[EL KAISER]

3 minutes ago, tom bowler said:

You need evidence ?  I understand that there have been very books even written about his issue/ time period. I have a couple of books by Chris Baker pertaining to this episode. My Grandfather was shot,gassed and take POW on 11th April 1918 near Armentieres.. Now ordinarlly, I would have just accepted this.    These days I do not. There is evidence that people/politicians  like Lloyd George were more interested in Palestine than in protecting the UK. LG was himself central to the Balfour Declaration.Too many of our politicians since have been beholden to zionist pressure/money.

 

In late 1917, Ludendorf allowed the infamous sealed including Lenin's  train to go to St Petersburg. Ludendorf admitted afterwards that this was a massive gamble.

 

Anyway back to March 1918. The Russians getting themselves extricated from WW1 in late 1917 allowed many German Divisions to join the Western Front . This literally allowed us to be almost 'washed away' a Operation Georgette, for example.

 

Our Armies had been 'watered down' and numbers of troops had too. We actually had a General who was 'fired' by bums like LG, who complained that the 'side show', for us, of places like Palestine was just that. I shall have a look at that General's name soonest asap.

Wow! Quite a story! Must be really interesting to have an ancestor who fought in the Great War. And those Chris Baker books, what do they say abou the topic? Could the offensives succeed? If they could, why they didn't?

[tom bowler]

Chris Baker writes, and is a member on here mate.There are some incredibly 'clued up' folk on this forum.

[Sargent Silky Draws]

In my hobby-level interest in military history, I've always looked at the question from the other side. "How did Germany not win the war in 1918?". On the Entente side, leadership elements were planning the great Allied offensive of 1920, on the eve of the launch of Operation Michael. So, they didn't perceive Germany was on the ropes at all, and expecting the war to last two more years, minimum. 
The spring offensive was another victory in a long line of German victories. The French government was making plans to flee Paris and Brit's, making plans to carry on the war from Britain after the expected French surrender.
And then, without suffering a horrible defeat and the front lines still almost at the high watermark of Germany farthest advances into France. Germany says, "screw it, we quit." Like a barroom brawler exhausted from repeatedly punching the face of his out match, bloodied opponent. Germany throws up his hands and goes back to his beer, with the knock out punch just one swing away.
I can understand the German army's opinion that they had the rug pulled out from under them by their government.

[EL KAISER]

30 minutes ago, Sargent Silky Draws said:

In my hobby-level interest in military history, I've always looked at the question from the other side. "How did Germany not win the war in 1918?". On the Entente side, leadership elements were planning the great Allied offensive of 1920, on the eve of the launch of Operation Michael. So, they didn't perceive Germany was on the ropes at all, and expecting the war to last two more years, minimum. 
The spring offensive was another victory in a long line of German victories. The French government was making plans to flee Paris and Brit's, making plans to carry on the war from Britain after the expected French surrender.
And then, without suffering a horrible defeat and the front lines still almost at the high watermark of Germany farthest advances into France. Germany says, "screw it, we quit." Like a barroom brawler exhausted from repeatedly punching the face of his out match, bloodied opponent. Germany throws up his hands and goes back to his beer, with the knock out punch just one swing away.
I can understand the German army's opinion that they had the rug pulled out from under them by their government.

So according to you, the Germans could clearly win, but being really exhausted because of all the fighting, they just lost faith, and so quitted, right?

[tom bowler]

Germany did a similar tactic in WW2 - Battle of the Bulge.

 

In WW1, they certainly had overwhelming numbers.

Edited 15 March , 2020 by tom bowler

[MikeMeech]

6 hours ago, EL KAISER said:

Thank you! Never heard of him. If you find it, please tell me what he thinks happened that made the offensives fail.

Hi

 

There is a full analysis of the offensives in David T. Zabecki's 'The German 1918 Offensives - A case study in the operational level of war', Routledge 2006.  A less detailed book is 'The German Offensives of 1918 - The Last Desperate Gamble' by Ian Passingham.

 

Mike

[phil andrade]

If we seek evidence, let the numbers speak.

 

There were three and a half million German soldiers on the Western Front in March 1918.

 

On the frontage of the Michael attack, 6,500 guns and 3,500 heavy mortars were deployed, along with 63 divisions.

 

This attack was the mightiest ever delivered anywhere in the world, and remained so until Operation Barbarossa .

 

To state that this was anything but a moment of peril for the Entente would be ludicrous.

 

I’ll offer interpretation and opinion later on, and pitch some quotes from Holmes and others.

 

Phil

 

 

[EL KAISER]

3 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

If we seek evidence, let the numbers speak.

 

There were three and a half million German soldiers on the Western Front in March 1918.

 

On the frontage of the Michael attack, 6,500 guns and 3,500 heavy mortars were deployed, along with 63 divisions.

 

This attack was the mightiest ever delivered anywhere in the world, and remained so until Operation Barbarossa .

 

To state that this was anything but a moment of peril for the Entente would be ludicrous.

 

I’ll offer interpretation and opinion later on, and pitch some quotes from Holmes and others.

 

Phil

 

 

 

Well i'm glad you and me see things on the same light. That the offensives weren't doomed to failure. They did fail, obviously. But they could have succeed. Or am i mistaken and you do not share this point of view?

[phil andrade]

47 minutes ago, EL KAISER said:

 

Well i'm glad you and me see things on the same light. That the offensives weren't doomed to failure. They did fail, obviously. But they could have succeed. Or am i mistaken and you do not share this point of view?

 

Very much in agreement with you !

 

Phil

[charlie2]

According to Der Weltkrieg Vol 14 the German army on the western front on 21st March, including those in transit, had a strength of about 4 million men in 200 divisions, 14000 artillery pieces, 10 tanks, approx 3670 aircraft and 23000 vehicles available for troop transport and resupply. They were opposed by nearly 5 million men in 176 divisions, 18500 artillery pieces, 800 tanks, 4500 aircraft and approx 100000 vehicles fror troop transport etc. So they had clearly no numerical superiority in either men or equipment.

Charlie

 

[Chris_Baker]

While those totals are interesting they hide the very significant fact that a very large proportion of the German force was concentrated against the British during March and April.

 

Some members of this forum may recall my talk "Six miles from victory". I think the last time I gave it was at a WFA conference in Surrey. 

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

I think there is a danger here of conflating two separate issues:

1) Did the Germans and the Allies seriously think in early 1918 that the Germans could win the war?

2) Could the Germans have won the war in 1918.

 

The answer to 1)  is Yes.

The answer to 2) depends on when you asked the question and what qualifiers you add.

 

[phil andrade]

Charlie,

 

Did the nearly 5 million Allied manpower include a large number of US personnel who were not battle ready ?

 

My interpretation of the numbers persuades me that the Germans were in a  strong position when they began their offensive.

 

By the end of 1917, they had suffered about three and a half million battle casualties on the Western Front : when they started their 1918 attacks they were able to marshall a similar or greater number than their cumulative casualties in that theatre.

 

The Allies, by the end of 1917, had suffered fifty per cent more casualties than the Germans  on the Western Front - in the order of five and a quarter million - but were unable to deploy that many in March 1918, even allowing for the available US troops.

 

So much for the attritional successes claimed by Haig.

 

The Germans had shown tactical prowess at Riga and Caporetto , and had made this painfully apparent at Cambrai when they demonstrated reflexive skill in a hastily organised and highly effective counter attack.

 

To have such skill , combined with a literally phenomenal deployment of power, launched against a weakened and fatigued ( not to say demoralised ) British army, with a still fragile French ally, can only have been a very dangerous moment for the Entente.

 

While I have made a disparaging comment about Haig , I want to balance that with giving him credit for withstanding such an awful test as befel him and his army.

 

To aver that the Germans could not have won is to diminish the achievement of the Allies in surviving the onslaught, and making such a superb riposte.

 

Phil

 

 

Edited 15 March , 2020 by phil andrade

[phil andrade]

From Richard Holmes, in his book THE WESTERN FRONT, pages 199- 201 :

 

all that week 5th Army slid back in defeat......And  there were even more worrying signs.  Some soldiers now doubted whether there was any point in the war : ‘ The Boche can have this country as far as I’m concerned.’ .......Haig had already faced the possibility that ‘ the British will be rounded up and driven into the sea,’ ...... United, the Allies might just stand : divided, they would certainly fall.

 

I’ve racked my brains trying to remember where I picked up on Richard Holmes’s assertions about how close a call this thing was - as if the implication isn’t clear enough in the citations above - and I think it was when he delivered a lecture that I attended at RUSI in the year or so before he died. If memory serves me, he said : This was a very dangerous and terribly frightening situation, and, yes, the Germans did come quite close to winning.

 

I can only hope that I’m not guilty of wishful thinking here.

 

Here’s another quote from an eminent Great War veteran and scholar, Cyril Falls, whose one volume history the Great War is still my default point of reference. It’s all the more significant because it alludes  to the situation in May, 1918, after the main attacks against the British had been contained....here’s the opening of Chapter 11 :

 

The Germans still entertained hopes of final victory. The Anglo-French allies realised that they still lay in danger of final defeat..

 

There it is, then.

 

Phil

Edited 15 March , 2020 by phil andrade

[AOK4]

One has to be realistic: in case the British and French armies were split, would it have led to France stepping out of the war? I doubt so. The British (the allies being in strong control of the seas) would have been able to evacuate and establish a new front line. Besides of this, the Americans, even if not trained, were available in already considerable and increasing numbers, enough to support battered French and British units until ready to take on more active roles.

And even if France was defeated, Germany's allies (Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were basically in a palliative state, only kept alive by support of German units, which would lead to an inevitable German defeat.

 

Anyway, this is all "what if", so basically not leading to anything at all. We all know Germany DID lose the war.

 

Jan

 

 

[phil andrade]

Jan,

 

 Forgive me for making such a  condescendingly obvious point, but what  we know now is one thing ; how things looked to the participants at the time is another.  That’s what I’m trying to imagine. 

 

Phil

[MikB]

1 hour ago, AOK4 said:

One has to be realistic: in case the British and French armies were split, would it have led to France stepping out of the war? I doubt so. The British (the allies being in strong control of the seas) would have been able to evacuate and establish a new front line. Besides of this, the Americans, even if not trained, were available in already considerable and increasing numbers, enough to support battered French and British units until ready to take on more active roles.

And even if France was defeated, Germany's allies (Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were basically in a palliative state, only kept alive by support of German units, which would lead to an inevitable German defeat.

 

Anyway, this is all "what if", so basically not leading to anything at all. We all know Germany DID lose the war.

 

Jan

 

 

Exactly so. There is no escaping the facts. Whatever prevented them from 'winning' was what happened, and will have had its own causes and antecedents.

 

I used to imagine what might've been the outcome of the WW2 batlle of Denmark Strait had Holland in Hood received clearer shadowing reports in the night before, or had he turned to port in battle 20 seconds earlier or later - until I realised that it's just futile to try to make historical realities unhappen.

[MikeMeech]

Hi

 

Zabecki, as part of his 'Conclusion' chapter, mentions the following on page 314

The Germans used overwhelming artillery and infantry at their point of attack, the fog aided that attack against the BEF's weakest position (some sources indicate that the Germans still had 40,000 casualties on the first day).  The original and some of the following attacks took large 'bites' out of the 'allied' lines but there were always 'allied' troops in front of them, they did not have the ability to move much faster (maybe a large cavalry formation would have managed it?).  If they could not achieve a total break through when they had the advantages  they had at the start then I am not sure there were any other methods available without too far into inventing what was not available in the time period.  Would a change of leadership leadership make a major difference?  I suspect unlikely.  Would concentration of forces in one attack push further, maybe, but that would mean 'allied' troops from the now unthreatened areas be available to attack the German flanks?  Yes, it did give the 'allied' leadership major worries, however, what the Germans achieved was, as I mentioned, major 'bites' in the 'allied' lines but 'bites' that were difficult to 'hold' due to the losses that they suffered in achieving it.  

If the German leadership did want a 'better' peace deal they would have been better staying behind their defences that they had put a lot of resources in building, and putting further defence lines in all the way back to Germany to indicate to the 'allies' that any attack would be very costly.  However, that would mean the Germans would have to admit they could not win and there might have been political consequences for the leadership in Germany with their population, especially when the resources from the east were discovered not actually to be available.

 

Mike

 

 

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

Good synopsis Mike.

Worthless ground gained at the cost of massive irreplaceable elite troops lost.

By the time Michael had run out of steam in April due to exhaustion, poor logistics and of course gallant Allied defensive fighting, the Germans must have realised the game was up.