Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[Steven Broomfield]

This bit about being over-encumbered always interests me, and I won't let the fact I've said this before stop me from saying it again.

In 1979 I was a platoon radio operator (A40, IIRC - about the size of a small wardrobe on my back plus a spare battery about the size of a bedside cabinet) in a TA infantry battalion. The scale of equipment laid down that I would carry an SMG for personal protection, but I always had, in fact, an SLR. With the SMG, the total all-up weight I was expected to carry was 99lbs (the SLR was heavier, of course). At the time, I weighed about 10 stone, dripping wet. Looking at coverage of guys in Afghanistan in the recent past they look pretty encumbered, too.

Trouble is that fighting a battle needs the poor bloke on the ground to carry stuff - weapons, ammunition, bombs, entrenching tools, sandbags, food, water, steel helmet, bayonet - and stuff that's pretty heavy. And indispensable.

[Bernard_Lewis]

I think John Terraine in 'White Heat'gives an analysis of tank deployment and the 'drop out' rate on Day 1 (which battle eludes me) is amazing let alone whst occurred on subsequent days.

Bernard

[Gareth Davies]

This bit about being over-encumbered always interests me, and I won't let the fact I've said this before stop me from saying it again.

In 1979 I was a platoon radio operator (A40, IIRC - about the size of a small wardrobe on my back plus a spare battery about the size of a bedside cabinet) in a TA infantry battalion. The scale of equipment laid down that I would carry an SMG for personal protection, but I always had, in fact, an SLR. With the SMG, the total all-up weight I was expected to carry was 99lbs (the SLR was heavier, of course). At the time, I weighed about 10 stone, dripping wet. Looking at coverage of guys in Afghanistan in the recent past they look pretty encumbered, too.

Trouble is that fighting a battle needs the poor bloke on the ground to carry stuff - weapons, ammunition, bombs, entrenching tools, sandbags, food, water, steel helmet, bayonet - and stuff that's pretty heavy. And indispensable.

But an infantryman on 1 Jul 16 didn't have to carry anywhere near that weight.

[Steven Broomfield]

Exactly. For some reason 60 lbs rings a bell. I know men were slightly smaller then, but then again at 10 stone I wasn't exactly Charles Atlas.

[squirrel]

60 pounds IIRC was full Field Service Marching order including everything the soldier was wearing - few, if any, would have been carrying a valise, but would be dressed in "battle order" with the small pack carried on the back. Yes, some would have been carrying extra bombs, SAA, shovels, barbed wire, stakes, pigeons, flags, extra rations and water bottles, Lewis Gun magazines etc., but this would have been the support waves not those involved in the initial assault. However, I doubt that they would have had to carry anything like the weight that the current infantry soldier does.

Interestingly perhaps, those who moved in to no-man's land before the British barrage stopped seemed to have suffered fewer casualties than those who advanced after it had done so.

At what level was this decision made I wonder?

[Gareth Davies]

In the 36th Division it was the GOC who made the decision.

[paulgranger]

Wasn't it the Official History that originally quoted the 60lb weight being carried by the assault troops? Or perhaps Liddell Hart?

[MikeMeech]

60 pounds IIRC was full Field Service Marching order including everything the soldier was wearing - few, if any, would have been carrying a valise, but would be dressed in "battle order" with the small pack carried on the back. Yes, some would have been carrying extra bombs, SAA, shovels, barbed wire, stakes, pigeons, flags, extra rations and water bottles, Lewis Gun magazines etc., but this would have been the support waves not those involved in the initial assault. However, I doubt that they would have had to carry anything like the weight that the current infantry soldier does.

Interestingly perhaps, those who moved in to no-man's land before the British barrage stopped seemed to have suffered fewer casualties than those who advanced after it had done so.

At what level was this decision made I wonder?

Hi

Peter Simkins in 'From the Somme to Victory', 2014, has the following information on page 71, reference the "considerable variation in attack formations" and that "a number of divisions, brigades or individual battalions on 1 July - including units of the 21st, 31st, 32nd, 34th and 36th Divisions - sent their troops out into no-man's-land before zero hour," Simkins also mentions that Prior and Wilson calculated that: "for the 80 battalions that went over the top in the first assault on 1 July, as many as 53 crept out into no-man's-land close to the German wire before zero, while 10 others rushed the German front line from their own parapets. This leaves 17 battalions, 12 of which did advance at a steady pace and 5 for which evidence is difficult to find." Further "at least some of the battalions which advanced at a steady pace did so because they were following a creeping barrage. These were some of the most successful units of all on the first day."

It appears there was a bit of a variation and tactics also appear to be left to the commanders on the ground, which is what was laid down in FSR's I believe. All a rather more complicated story.

Mike

[Muerrisch]

Re. weight. My son was an airman of the Volunteer RAF Regiment ."Rockapes" at Scampton c 1980.

He was a skinny 10 stone. He was also a crack shot, having represented RAF Rheindahlen at .22 meets. He was thus expected to do well with the GPMG. This he did, winning the shoot and beating the Adjt. into 2nd place.

Once my son realised that he had to CARRY THE BL**DY Gimpy, his shooting declined rapidly.

So they gave him the radio to carry instead.

If you can't take a joke, you shouldn't have joined.

Quite

[michaeldr]

Some statistics from the RBL's Somme 100 Field Manual

see https://www.britishlegion.org.uk/media/4113/somme100fieldmanual.pdf pages 16 & 17

19,240 British soldiers had been killed by the end of the first day.

First Day of Battle

British Casualties

57,470

Casualties including the 19,240 soldiers killed, was and remains the highest suffered by the British Army in a single day.

In comparison, the French Army had around 1,600 casualties

and the German had 10,000–12,000 casualties.

30KG

The average British infantryman carried 30kg of equipment as he went over the top during the first phase of the battle.

TOTAL CASUALTIES

GERMAN CASUALTIES 500,000

BRITISH CASUALTIES 419,654

FRENCH CASUALTIES 204,253

5 MILES

was the furthest advance of any allied force during the whole battle.

[geraint]

Not 1st July, but 4th RWF Battalion History states that their "sacks and greatcoats were left in billets, and all other superfluous kit left in pioneer camp" when they took up firing trench and attack positions at Aveluy Wood. Kit and coats were in Senlis. Following the battle on April 7, they crawled from Martinsart to Senlis, picked up their coats and kit, and marched 11 miles to Puchevilliers. This after having lost 10 officers and 146 ORs. Unfortunately the coats and kitbags had been left in the open and were impregnated by mustard gas oil, which when being worn by the men in the 11 mile march through heavy rain coated their skins with mustard, leading to the loss of 10 officers and 130 Other Ranks. Why kit was stowed in the open in heavy rain; why were the noted arrival of mustard shells in the vicinity not passed on to the battalion are questions beyond this thread. But it does show that probably all battalions had similar arrangements regarding kits and coats which were deemed superfluous to the battalion's immediate situation.

[charlesmessenger]

Geraint

That sounds to me like a case of very poor staff work. This is not surprising at this stage in the war, given the rapid expansion of the Army and a diminishing number of qualified staff officers.

Charles M

[paulgranger]

Geraint

What year did the events you mention take place? Mustard gas was first used at Ypres in mid 1917, but the April dating suggests the Battle of Arras

[geraint]

Paul - April 1917. Aveluy Wood. "worse day of the war for the battalion" according to Ellis. The 4th RWF were divisional pioneers for 47th London Div, but that week were used as front line infantry.

[Guest]

Hi Geraint is that Welsh or Welch, excuse my ignorance. The 4th R Welsh Fusiliers were in the Salient in April 1917 4 RWF Diary

Apologies if I'm getting confused.

Mike

[stiletto_33853]

Personally I would like to learn a lot more about Haig. There are questions, a lot, I have about him and his role as C-in-C, some good, some bad.

Love him or hate him Liddell Hart's views on the British conduct of The Battle of The Somme seem to have completed a circle between 1916 and when he published a revised edition of "The Real War as History of the World War 1914-1918." Taking a few of Brian Bond's examples in the Aftermath chapter of "Liddell Hart's Western Front"

Haig's initial plan lacked realism, and the week long bombardment sacrificed surprise.

Haig aimed at breakthrough (when did his attacks ever not) but did not resolve his differences with Rawlinson, who initially preferred to plan for only limited advances.

Haig's carelessness about the inadequate effect our our guns on the first day "would have been culpable in a Company Commander"; it was an "object lesson in supreme negation." Why was the offensive allowed to continue? Because of Haig's 'bulldog attitude' and his deluded belief in the enemy's weakness.

After the costly offensives in July, "Nearly two months of bitter fighting followed, during which the British made little progress at great cost, and the infantry of both sides served as compressed cannon fodder for artillery consumption.

no, this is not having a go but a thirst for knowledge.

Andy

[phil andrade]

Geraint,

Could this be April 1918 ?

Allusion to mustard gas suggests so .

An awful lot of British soldiers suffered gas poisoning in the April 1918 fighting .

Sorry if I'm getting things wrong here.

Phil (PJA)

[Chris_Baker]

Why was the offensive allowed to continue? Because of Haig's 'bulldog attitude' and his deluded belief in the enemy's weakness.

Not really. It was not a decision that was possible. This was coalition warfare, undertaking a plan agreed with the French and Russians.

[MikeMeech]

Not 1st July, but 4th RWF Battalion History states that their "sacks and greatcoats were left in billets, and all other superfluous kit left in pioneer camp" when they took up firing trench and attack positions at Aveluy Wood. Kit and coats were in Senlis. Following the battle on April 7, they crawled from Martinsart to Senlis, picked up their coats and kit, and marched 11 miles to Puchevilliers. This after having lost 10 officers and 146 ORs. Unfortunately the coats and kitbags had been left in the open and were impregnated by mustard gas oil, which when being worn by the men in the 11 mile march through heavy rain coated their skins with mustard, leading to the loss of 10 officers and 130 Other Ranks. Why kit was stowed in the open in heavy rain; why were the noted arrival of mustard shells in the vicinity not passed on to the battalion are questions beyond this thread. But it does show that probably all battalions had similar arrangements regarding kits and coats which were deemed superfluous to the battalion's immediate situation.

Hi

It appears that 4th RWF had failed to follow standing instructions as laid down by 'Staff Officers' in SS135 of Dec 1916, which in Section XXXI para 3, page 59 states: "Disposal of surplus clothing and equipment of each man will be tied up in the pack which will be stowed under cover at the units transport lines or in some suitable building if available."

This would be the same location that the officers and men who were removed from the battle order would also be located, so they could have actually also looked after the unit's kit. It appears less the failure of 'staff officers' more a failure of officers and NCOs of the unit to carry out SOPs, therefore their 'mates' appear to have suffered because of it.

Mike

[phil andrade]

Reverting to the RUSI talk that I attended today, Professor Holden - Reid made an interesting observation : leadership and command need to be differentiated.

One can be an excellent leader and a poor commander, and vice versa.

The speaker alluded to Haig at some length, emphasising that he was a good commander, but will not be remembered as a great leader....the lack of charismatic personality being cited.

Lee, on the other hand, was a rare combination of first rate command and leadership qualities.

Such an assessment is bound to be rather subjective ; but I found it compelling.

Phil (PJA)

[geraint]

Phil and Paul

The Official History (published 1926 ) states categorically "They were relieving part of the 142nd Infantry Brigade on the left sub-sector of the divisional front at Martinsart running southwards from Aveluy Wood. They arrived there at midnight on the night 4-5th April 1917." Pages 105 - 110 Chapter XI "The Attack Upon Aveluy Wood April 1917". The chapter heading printed on every page. References in the text also refer to 1917.

BUT

I think the book has been published with erroneous editing. The preceding chapter X The Great Retreat March 1918. The following chapter X11 is Reorganisation The Summer of 1918. The chapter should have been edited into a chronologically earlier portion of the book.

I think that you are all correct in placing this at April 1918. I apologise profusely on behalf of myself and Adjutant Captain C Ellis who published this in 1926.

Royal Welsh Fusiliers Mike - sometimes seen as Royal Welch Fusiliers. Nothing to do with The Welch Regiment sometimes seen as The Welsh Regiment

MikeMeech - excellent response!

Lesson to all. Always proof read and triple check your continuity!

[David Ridgus]

Reverting to the RUSI talk that I attended today, Professor Holden - Reid made an interesting observation : leadership and command need to be differentiated.

One can be an excellent leader and a poor commander, and vice versa.

eg Churchill? (I'm pretty sure that was Alanbrook's view)

[phil andrade]

The example cited by Holden - Reid was Marshal Bazaine, who surrendered his forces in the Franco Prussian War.

 

Abysmal commander, but a wonderful leader.

 

Phil (PJA)

[Jack Sheldon]

I was not at the lecture so I really should not comment, but I am interested that Bazaine was cited as a 'wonderful leader', given that he had an uncanny knack of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory and leading his men into disaster.

 

Jack

[Steven Broomfield]

Far it be from me to cast nasturtiums, but my employers are very keen on developing 'leaders', A cynic might observe that the only reason one might follow some of these people is sheer idle curiosity (or sheer blind optimism). Nice people, but not necessarily breeding stock.

 

The point being, of course, that a 'leader' need not actually be much cop. Jack, you probably has subalterns who would cheerfully lead anyone anywhere but whom you would not entrust with the Mess Funds. I've worked for 'wonderful leaders' whose aim appears to be self-destruction.

 

Fun, though.