Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[Guest]

Martin, could you enlighten me on one point? As a result of the 1916 pre-Somme deliberations, did you conclude that Haig reluctantly fought the Somme as directed and against his better judgement or did he largely agree with the strategy laid out?

My perception is that Haig did not want to fight on the Somme and preferred the Flanders option.

I am not sure that this tells us anything other than the fact that coalition campaigns by necessity have to coordinate with the senior/lead partner - in this case the French. Many military commanders do not have the luxury of choosing the time and place or circumstances where they will fight and often have to make compromises. I doubt that Haig went into the battles of the Somme resentful of the fact he had to fight there against his better judgment. It does not absolve him. As a professional, I suspect he had discounted this as soon as the decision was made and got on with the task in hand.

He is most often criticised for the results of the battles of the Somme and later, Passchendaele. My personal view based on what I have read is that I doubt very much anyone could have done things differently at the Somme (i.e. got a better result) as the plan necessitated complying with the French. I can't prove this and I have no interest in trying to convince anyone. I am sure people will make up their own minds based on the available evidence. To do this, I do think it is important to have at least read the primary texts on Haig such as his diaries (all versions) and some of the meticulously researched studies on Haig. Hankey and the OH are also essential reading as is Lloyd George, regardless of whether one believes their content, they all shaped perceptions of Haig. My sense is that some contributors with extremely strong views have not done the necessary hard yards in the archive material. I would put myself in that category with regards to specialist knowledge on Haig. I am not informed enough to have a strong view.

The obsession with using casualties as a yardstick of 'success' or 'failure' is a nonsense as history shows many commanders regarded as successful have on occasion suffered casualty ratios far in excess of the Somme of Passchendaele. There is plenty of well researched published material on this with examples spread across two centuries of continental warfare. If Haig is to be castigated purely on casualty ratios, then he would be in good company with the likes of Marlborough, Wellington and Napoleon who all had worse days when casualties are measured as a per cent of participants. Warfare is full of disasters and most successful generals will have had disastrous days during their tenure. British casualty rates and casualty ratios during the great war were lower than those of all of the major participants.

When Kitchener started enlisting men for '3 years or the duration of the war' In August 1914, it was a very clear signal that he believed it would last at least 3 years and possibly longer. He was not alone and there are many senior officers who predicted similar time-frames. These factors were not only discussed by the cabinet and the war cabinet, but approved in parliament by politicians. Few abstained and fewer still voted against it. When conscription was introduced under the Military Services Act in Jan 1916 (also approved in Parliament) and subsequently expanded, it was because the Govt's ability to produce trained men was being outstripped by casualties. Political sanctioning of these important legislative steps involved an acknowledgement that casualty rates were way beyond pre-war expectations. The Field Service Regulations estimated 44% casualties within the first 6 months and Haldane as we know accurately predicted that the Regular Army would be spent in the same time period. BEF 'first cohort'casualty ratios in 1914 were close to 90% as were second and third and fourth cohort casualty rates (the reinforcements) and again this was repeated in 1915 on the Western Front as well as Gallipoli and with the New Armies. If one was to measure casualties as a percent of participants during 1914 and 1915 spanning similar periods to the Somme, we would see casualty ratios in the same order of magnitude. The Somme gets special attention due to the spike in casualties on the first day of the series of battles and large absolute numbers, however one needs to temper this against the massive numbers involved. When this is done, the Somme is less of an out-lier

When Parliament sanctioned the expansion of the Army and later Conscription, it was acknowledging a commitment (and continuation of that commitment) to a continental war on an industrial scale. To blame the unfortunate generals who had the invidious task of executing the Government's policy seems to rather miss the point that continental wars costs millions of lives. When compared to the major industrialised nations, Britain got off with relatively fewer casualties and lower casualty ratios. The current popular idea that a continental war could be waged against armies of millions without massive casualties and high casualty ratios during intense periods is either incredibly naive or incredibly ill-informed in my view.

The usual counter-argument is that the generals 'were all bad' and/or "Haig was the best of a bad bunch" and by extension things could have been done differently (i.e. better). This presupposes anyone had the ability to fight the Great War without incurring horrendous losses - or that there was the British equivalent of Sun Tzu lurking in the aisles ready to solve all the problems in an artful way. They have also been accused of being unimaginative which again is not supported in facts. The tactical innovations and advancements in technology during the war were simply astonishing. The problem was that innovation by the brightest minds was being largely replicated by the other side or countered with equally innovative ideas and neither achieved a 'knock-out' technology as the Americans did in WWII. The evidence would suggest that massive casualties were (unsurprisingly) a systemic risk of industrialsed warfare on this scale. WWII might also support this view where the major participants (Germany and Russia) saw even higher ratios than during the Great War.

To avoid any confusion, I am not trying to convince anyone. None of the above is new. I am just trying to answer your question based on what little I have read. It is simply what I believe, so not really important. MG

[MelPack]

I have hidden or edited some posts to remove references to a former forum member some of which were inappropriate or not really relevant to this topic. I have also hidden/amended related posts which - whilst fine in themselves - made no sense as a result.

Neil

Oh that's alright then. Perish the thought that anything inappropriate or not really relevant should be introduced.

[phil andrade]

Martin,

British casualty rates and casualty ratios during the Great War were lower than those of all the major participants

Might this be reconsidered if we focus on that period of the war that has been popularly associated with Haig's most controversial battles ?

I refer to the year and a half between the commencement of the Battle of the Somme and the end of 1917.

During that period, the British suffered significantly heavier casualties than the French, and, most significantly , much heavier losses in relation to those of the enemy, despite the Nivelle Offensive. To a degree, this must reflect the fact that for much of this time the British had to do more of the heavy lifting. The comparison, however, is an uncomfortable one for those who wish to argue for a fairer and more favourable assessment of Haig's generalship.

Phil (PJA)

[geraint]

Oh that's alright then. Perish the thought that anything inappropriate or not really relevant should be introduced.

Chortle chortle! Nice one!

[Trev2386]

I've been following this topic/thread from the start. I have little or no knowledge of Haig, or, indeed, his political masters. However, I do find it fascinating reading through it all. From a lay mans terms, ie, mine, the knowledge of the contributors is mind boggling. It's also nice to see some of them accepting that they were incorrect with their initial thoughts.

Keep it up.

Trev

[geraint]

He is most often criticised for the results of the battles of the Somme and later, Passchendaele. My personal view based on what I have read is that I doubt very much anyone could have done things differently at the Somme (i.e. got a better result)

(and Arras in April-June 1917)

Following the Somme catastrophe, and planning for Third Ypres - I believe that Plumer would have done things differently, and MAY have had a better result. (You really don't need a nitpicking list of reasons do you.) In the grand picture, had Haig died of a heart attack in January 1917, I believe that many on the general staff could have led the army into a better conclusion than Haig when alive.

[Guest]

Martin,

British casualty rates and casualty ratios during the Great War were lower than those of all the major participants

Might this be reconsidered if we focus on that period of the war that has been popularly associated with Haig's most contoversial battles ?

I refer to the year and a half between the commencement of the Battle of the Somme and the end of 1917.

During that period, the British suffered significantly heavier casualties than the French, and, most significantly , much heavier losses in relation to those of the enemy, despite the Nivelle Offensive. To a degree, this must reflect the fact that for much of this time the British had to do more of the heavy lifting. The comparison, however, is an uncomfortable one for those who wish to argue for a fairer and more favourable assessment of Haig's generalship.

Phil (PJA)

Phil - I am sure if anyone wanted to, they could carefully select casualty data to support any argument.

Rather than me using some arbitrary dates to make a point, it might be useful to look periods chosen by Maurice Hankey when defending Haig against alleged excessive attrition during offensive operations; the Battles of the Somme 1916 and the German Offensive 1918.

The latter was just 15 days according to the Battle Honours Committee so a fair comparison might be to look at the first 15 days of the Battles of the Somme. It transpires that the daily cost in lives for the first 15 days of the Somme offensive was just 0.9% higher than the daily cost in lives of the 15 days of the German March Offensive (21st March- 5th April) when the BEF was in defensive mode.*

It simply illustrates that the perceived cost of the Battles of the Somme requires context and the impact of the first day distorts perceptions. In this simple example, when the BEF was on the defence, daily attrition was very nearly as high as the first two weeks of the Somme. Even the most ardent critics of Haig conveniently ignore this fact as it does not fit the agenda that his offensive operations were particularly wasteful. The evidence suggests that a defensive strategy did not reduce attrition. MG

* For Officers it was actually worse. In March 1918 more British and Empire officers became battle casualties than in July 1916. I suspect that will surprise many. (Source: SMEBE pages 257 and 267)

[phil andrade]

Martin,

cost in lives...?

I doubt it.

In casualties, yes - especially with the best part of a hundred thousand British prisoners going into the German bag in those fifteen days. Maybe that's rhetorical exaggeration, but there were scores of thousands.

It was the cost in German lives that was particularly staggering in that phase...and of their officers, especially.

On the defensive, Haig exacted on an enormous toll in killed from the Germans who attacked him. On the offensive, this was starkly reversed.

This is where I feel that Haig was culpable : he was adamant that his troops were killing Germans in such numbers at the Somme and Passchendaele that relentless attack was justified. Perhaps Charteris was telling him what he wanted to hear.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

(and Arras in April-June 1917)

Following the Somme catastrophe, and planning for Third Ypres - I believe that Plumer would have done things differently, and MAY have had a better result. (You really don't need a nitpicking list of why do you.) In the grand picture, had Haig died of a heart attack in January 1917, I believe that many on the general staff could have led the army into a better conclusion than Haig.

Geraint, it is an interesting theory that one can't of course prove, and one can't disprove. I do respect your views and don't mean to be disparaging, but this is simply part of the never-ending 'should-have-could-have-would-have' speculation of so-called 'counter-factual' debate. There is never any conclusion to these debates and I don't really get it*

I dont doubt that Plumer would have done things differently but I doubt that it would have made a blind bit of difference. Out of mild curiosity I would be genuinely fascinated to understand how many (fewer) casualties Plumer would have incurred in your view (and how you might get to that figure), and how Plumer could have had any impact during the German March Offensive and avoided 173,000 casualties in March 1918 - the second costliest month of the whole war - that to my mind shows that British dead had more to do with the Germans than their own leaders. MG

* It is what I call the 'three lanes' argument. When stuck in a motorway traffic jam every passenger has a theory that one lane will be faster than the other, and regardless of which lane the driver chooses all the passengers 'know' that another lane would have been faster.

[Guest]

It was hellish, but wasn't the truth that in 1916 the pressure had to be taken off Verdun, and in 1917 the French had collapsed and the pressure had to be kept on the Germans?

Mike

[phil andrade]

While we're comparing loss of life on the Somme in July 1916 compared with that of March 1918, let it be suggested that more German soldiers were killed by Haig's men in the first couple of weeks of the Kaiserslacht, than the number of British troops killed by the Germans in the first two weeks of the Somme.

I say " suggested" because I'm not sure ; but if pressed, I would take a bet on it.

It also serves to remind us that Haig was not uniquely profligate in the lives of his men ; and he certainly was not callous.

Phil (PJA)

[geraint]

I wouldn't disagree Martin. I'm not a "what if..." person, and only threw it into the mix as a memento mori. One could also ask what would Sir John French have done in 1916-7 had he retained overall control.

I'm not an academic nor a professional historian, I couldn't differentiate between an ibid and an op cit in a footnote, but I have read widely. Plumer strikes me as an intelligent far thinking general. His attitude and contribution in Third Ypres showed an individuality which could have had a far different outcome to the war's casualty rate.

The casual and profligate use of young men's lives was absolutely horrendous, and it isn't right to say that it reflects the values of the times in 1914. It didn't. Yet two years later humanity had given way to casual bloodletting on an industrial scale. So attrition was a belief held by a handful of politicians and military leaders. it wasn't inevitable, it wasn't preordained, it was coldly promulgated by Haig and Lloyd George. A diplomatic answer could have been reached in 1917.

Also -I never understood why irate posters here demand others to say what would you have done? Or what could have been done differently? Knowing that ANY attempt at an answer would have been laughed off the GWF field.

[Guest]

Phil - I am going to revert to the fatality arguments (prev post deleted):

British & Empire Fatalities (CWGC data) in France (Army)

The Somme first 15 days............................1st Jul - 15th Jul 1916........35,987

The German Offensive (15 days)...............21st Mar - 5th Apr 1918.....35,661

A difference of 0.9%. MG

[Guest]

Also -I never understood why irate posters here demand others to say what would you have done? Or what could have been done differently? Knowing that ANY attempt at an answer would have been laughed off the GWF field.

I slightly disagree - The 'what if' school does have value at a certain level. The British Army uses this technique at Sandhurst and Staff College when re-appraising battles to train its officers - usually on small scale set pieces from history.. However in the case of a 'what if Haig had an heart attack' and was replaced by Plumer, personally I think the factors are so manifold that the system is chaotic. It is simply too complex. Slightly different if we are discussing 'what if the reserve demolition had failed'.

Edit Demolition for demotion. Doh.

[phil andrade]

Phil - I am going to revert to the fatality arguments (prev post deleted):

British & Empire Fatalities (CWGC data) in France (Army)

The Somme first 15 days............................1st Jul - 15th Jul 1916........35,987

The German Offensive (15 days)...............21st Mar - 5th Apr 1918.....35,661

A difference of 0.9%. MG

Thanks for that, Martin.

A revelation : I must admit that I'm taken back.

What I would keep pitching at, though, is the huge disparity in the exchange rate vis a vis the enemy in those two samples.

I doubt that more than ten thousand German soldiers were killed by the British in the first fifteen days of the Somme, a ratio heavily skewed by a ten to one ratio against the British on the first day.

In the 1918 sample, I expect that the Germans would have lost at least fifty thousand killed ; allowing, of course, for the fact that the huge loss of British prisoners made the overall impact very different.

What I'm driving at here is the dreadful price in human life that the offensive entailed ; I wonder if Haig fully appreciated this. He appears to have assumed that Germans were being killed at an even greater rate than his own soldiers throughout much of the fighting in 1916 and 1917 ; a notion that Churchill refuted at the time with remarkable prescience.

Phil (PJA)

[squirrel]

This is a fascinating thread with some very erudite and well researched posts.

There are mentions of Plumer perhaps doing things differently from Haig had he been C in C at the time of 3rd Ypres. Plumer was in command of the Army that fought the battle of Messines in June and again it was his Army that fought the battle from mid August to it's conclusion. Surely if he could have "done things better" then he would have done so?

[Guest]

Phil - I don't disagree with your point.

The data was simply shown to illustrate Hankey's point. It surprised me too. A lot. I suspect it would surprise most with an interest in this debate. The context of his comments suggests that this was discussed and acknowledged, and certainly we know that Hankey, a big supporter of Lloyd George, was happy to put it on record. MG

[phil andrade]

This is a fascinating thread with some very erudite and well researched posts.

There are mentions of Plumer perhaps doing things differently from Haig had he been C in C at the time of 3rd Ypres. Plumer was in command of the Army that fought the battle of Messines in June and again it was his Army that fought the battle from mid August to it's conclusion. Surely if he could have "done things better" then he would have done so?

Plumer was nearly sacked by Haig for neglecting the upkeep of defences in his sector ...if memory serves me, this had been in earlier 1916.

Plumer was very well served by his staff officer, Harington.

Harington had been sent by Haig.

Anecdote has it that Haig displayed an uncharacteristic outburst, because he was fed up with hearing constant praise about Plumer...

You would never have heard of him if I hadn't sent him Harington !

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

Phil - I don't disagree with your point.

The data was simply shown to illustrate Hankey's point. It surprised me too. A lot. I suspect it would surprise most with an interest in this debate. MG

Middlebrook provides a tabulation of deaths on the Somme battlefields throughout different periods of the war, based on study of CWGC registers.

He attributes 24,701 British Empire deaths to the forty one days from 21st March to 30th April 1918, of whom 11,001 were given identified burial.

This alludes only to the Picardy battlefield ...but it's a figure so at odds with the the figure you cite for just fifteen days ( albeit on all sectors of the Western Front ) that I still feel rather bewildered.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Middlebrook provides a tabulation of deaths on the Somme battlefields throughout different periods of the war, based on study of CWGC registers.

He attributes 24,701 British Empire deaths to the forty one days from 21st March to 30th April 1918, of whom 11,001 were given identified burial.

This alludes only to the Picardy battlefield ...but it's a figure so at odds with the the figure you cite for just fifteen days ( albeit on all sectors of the Western Front ) that I still feel rather bewildered.

Phil (PJA)

Mine are simply date bracketed and 'France' which excludes men who DOW in the UK, so possibly a bit understated. Middlebrook was working from paper in the pre-internet age and his casualty data on a battalion level leaves much to be desired. I know you know how to use the CWGC website, so it shouldn't really be any debate.

[Bernard_Lewis]

Over the years I have bought Great War books written by numerous Forumites. If Martin G writes a book you can put me down for a copy.

I would also like to ask if Mr G assists Forumites in their book purchase costs as he's bl**dy well sold me on Hankey's memoirs as well! Just saying...

Some very impressive contributions to this thread- thanks to all.

Bernard

[Guest]

Martin, could you enlighten me on one point? As a result of the 1916 pre-Somme deliberations, did you conclude that Haig reluctantly fought the Somme as directed and against his better judgement or did he largely agree with the strategy laid out?

Second response. If you read Gary Sheffield's "The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army" he covers the decision making process in detail. He leaves little doubt that Haig preferred the Flanders Option to the Somme. He also shows how the Somme offensive started as a small scale concept to support the French and how the plans morphed into the large scale operations after the German unleashed Armageddon at Verdun.

Ref Pages 159- 169: "Preparing for the Somme" and "The Plans for the Somme".

The genesis of the plans were in the Chantilly Conference of 6th Dec 1915 which Haig did not attend as Sir John French was of course still in situ.. This essentially committed the Allies to synchronsied attacks on the Western Front. The detail of when and where these attacks would be thrashed out by Haig when he took over. Plumer was involved at this stage. The British Army was looking at a number of options, although they were ultimately anchored by the fact that France was the prime mover - however the German assault on Verdun changed everything and ultimately left the British as the lead player on the Somme having originally been in a supporting role. Circumstances on the ground and the binding agreement of the Second Chantilly Conference largely dictated why Haig was forced to commit to the Somme rather than Flanders (his alleged preferred choice).

The above is a rather simplistic summary. It was more complex with the French appealing to the British to take over a substantial part of its line. Haig was very resistant to this idea but partially acquiesced. One of the alleged reasons being that he did not think his newest troops were sufficiently trained (Hankey if memory serves). This is rather interesting as by this stage the flow of volunteers had reduced significantly and Conscription had started. The implications also being that the New Armies were not up to scratch. It is worth noting that the failure of parts of the first and second New Armies at Loos were only four months prior to Haig's discussions with Joffre in Dec 1915 and Jan 1916. When the Germans attacked Verdun in Feb 1916 everything changed.

It would be interesting to see if other authors who have written about this period concur with Prof Sheffield's assessment. The OH is rather short on the machinations behind the scenes.

[nigelcave]

I think it was not a matter simply of the troops - in fact the troops per se were not the problem: tremendous potential. The problem, surely, was the inexperience up the rank structure, which impacted on everything else. Insufficient quality NCOs - in the sense of battle experience; insufficient quality platoon and company commanders, with battlefield experience; insufficient quality battalion commanders, ibid; insufficient quality brigade commanders, brigade majors and staff captains, ibid; insufficient experienced divisional commanders (one of Haig's bugbears), ibid; insufficient quality Corps commanders and, very importantly, their staffs ibid; there was a chronic lack of major battlefield experience at all levels and in all arms (notably important, of course, the gunners, with the added issue of problems of numbers of suitable guns and suitable fuses). I think this is what he meant. Take for example the 37th Division, which had been in France for almost a year by the opening of the battle but had really minuscule battle experience (trench holding, yes, of course - before Monchy au Bois for months). My grandfather, in the 7th Leicesters, sat near a tree and watching as best he could the battle unfold before Gommecourt on 1 July.

Contrast how effective, for example and in many ways, were divisions in the Advance to Victory in 1918, filled with young conscripts - but then with a core of experience in all ranks and vastly improved at the direction level.

There were all sorts of sound reasons why Haig (indeed the British) would not be enamoured by the Somme as a location for the major offensive of the year and by far the biggest in which the British army would be involved.

[PhilB]

Thanks for the responses, Martin. May I make a point about the casualty figures above? The figures, which are essentially deaths per day of battle, seem a bit misleading though I appreciate they are "ball park figures" in bracketed dates. There seems to have been more continuous action after March 21st than July 1st and a rough count of British battalions seeing days in action gives 349 for 1-15/7/16 and 602 for 21/3 - 5/4/18. That would indicate a much lower casualty rate for the latter period in terms of deaths per battalion per action day.

[Chris_Baker]

Considering only the death statistics is rather meaningless, isn't it? What does the total loss of human resource, in killed, wounded and captured, tell us?