Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[tumbi1]

" it comes from first hand experience of peoples lives destroyed by the war."

So if Haig had not been in charge, peoples lives would not have been destroyed by the war?

"Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde" General Mangin.

A thought for the "Lions led by Donkeys" school:

Given that Haig was appointed G O C in C,

WHAT SHOULD HE HAVE DONE rather than WHAT SHOULD HE NOT HAVE DONE?

War is a bloody business, so as soon as the politicians had committed to World War One a lot of people were going to die. However the point here is what could have been done by the British GOC to limit the loss of life. Actually what is being implied is Haig wasn't able to follow any other course other than the one he followed so the total loss was inevitable, which I find an astounding thought.

One example of what he could have done and didn't - stop the Somme offensive after the first day when it was the biggest disaster in British military history, and re-evaluated the tactics. He could have listened when the lower ranks at the front were reporting the machine guns weren't being neutralized by the bombardment, but they weren't due to an atmosphere of optimism he himself fostered that didn't accept any criticism or intelligence that was contrary to what he thought. He could have moved the attack to Messines as he originally considered. There are innumerable options and 'what ifs'. I would have loved to have seen what Currie could have achieved if he was given the chance. What about a massed tank attack utilizing thousands of them to maximize surprise? They were eventually used, but to salvage something from another disastrous offensive when the drums were beating for his head.

It is easy to get caught up in the minutia, but it stands that Haig was responsible for the Somme and Passchendaele, both massive military disasters. I argue he was a donkey just like the others, but he just happened to be the head British donkey. Some people say he did win in the end, but the Germans were outnumbered and always at a disadvantage. That the French and British came so close to losing the war condemns the leadership.

Haig wasn't all bad. Yes he stuck at it until the end, although I am sure a Currie or Monash would have too. Maybe he was popular with the public and ex-servicemen at different times, but that is immaterial as to whether he was a great general or not. In my opinion he doesn't deserve to be mentioned in the same breath as even just the great British captains of history.

[phil andrade]

Remember,tumbi 1, Haig - during the Somme battle of 1916 - was fighting in a coalition war, and was bound to conform with the dictates of Allied strategy as determined by conference and agreement at the end of 1915.

He himself was fully aware of the deficiencies of his army and expressed the view that better results could be attained by delaying the offensive until he had the required heavy guns and the troops were better trained. The prospect you allude to - of abandoning the battle and transferring the axis of attack to sectors to the North - implies that he was a free agent without any obligation to comply with Entente and Allied strategy. Britain was still the junior partner when the plans for 1916 were drawn up, and the exertions of the French at Verdun and the massive contribution of the Russians under Brusilov made it all the more imperative that the BEF should perform the task allowed to it.

I would be a good deal more circumspect about his determination to continue his offensive in Flanders one year later....in that case I do agree that he exhibited a degree of culpability.

He was no Marlborough.....but he had a uniquely awful task to perform ( in terms of British military annals ) and I reckon that on balance he accomplished it well enough.

Phil (PJA)

[tumbi1]

Remember,tumbi 1, Haig - during the Somme battle of 1916 - was fighting in a coalition war, and was bound to conform with the dictates of Allied strategy as determined by conference and agreement at the end of 1915.

He himself was fully aware of the deficiencies of his army and expressed the view that better results could be attained by delaying the offensive until he had the required heavy guns and the troops were better trained. The prospect you allude to - of abandoning the battle and transferring the axis of attack to sectors to the North - implies that he was a free agent without any obligation to comply with Entente and Allied strategy. Britain was still the junior partner when the plans for 1916 were drawn up, and the exertions of the French at Verdun and the massive contribution of the Russians under Brusilov made it all the more imperative that the BEF should perform the task allowed to it.

I would be a good deal more circumspect about his determination to continue his offensive in Flanders one year later....in that case I do agree that he exhibited a degree of culpability.

He was no Marlborough.....but he had a uniquely awful task to perform ( in terms of British military annals ) and I reckon that on balance he accomplished it well enough.

Phil (PJA)

I understand he had to work with the French, but he was always considering moving the offensive north if he struck problems on the Somme. He decided not to for reasons best known to himself, but I suspect his stubborn personality contributed.

[nigelcave]

The reason(s) best known to himself was that he did not have a choice. It was what had been agreed by all the allies.

What was a choice was where to push on after 1st July - and there the argument could become more interesting. Joffre wanted him to keep on at the northern end, whereas Haig reinforced what he saw as success. In this particular case Joffre was right: the key to the German defences on the Somme lay at Thiepval. On the other hand, one could argue from Haig's point of view that one should reinforce success, which came at the southern end. The question that might have arisen was why had that part of the front been successfully assaulted and the northern part not.

But that opens a debate on the development of the Somme. What I would say, keeping the discussion of the Somme 'general', is that there was really no alternative to keeping the battle going within the context of the allied planning for 1916 and in line with what the allied powers, and indeed the Central powers, were doing.

Haig had perfectly sound strategic reasons for preferring the northern flank; but he/Britain was a junior partner in a coalition war, to repeat what, I am sure, will be regarded by many as a tired old refrain - but it is none the less an accurate reflection of the realities for all that. We have to move on from the idea that Haig could make these sort of political military decisions on his own: he could not.

[Steven Broomfield]

Interesting that we focus on the 1st July, when the Somme also saw such innovation, not least the extremely successful night attack a few days later, and the use of tanks in September. We should also, as pointed out above, remember that we were fighting a coalition war - choosing to ignore what was happening at Verdun through 1916 is rather short-sighted.

[towisuk]

There seems to be a lot of discussion about "tactics", what about the poor bloody Tommies lying in swathes in no mans land? each one of them was every bit as important as any horse riding General but were treated as cannon fodder. And what did their families get as a "reward" following cessations??

regards

Tom

[nigelcave]

Quite; but that is something that was without Haig's control. Ask the politicians and ask the electorate would be more appropriate in that context.

When talking of Haig in particular it is inevitable that it will end up being a discussion of the military conduct of the war; but as I hope it has been established, that was hardly his unique responsibility.

[phil andrade]

There seems to be a lot of discussion about "tactics", what about the poor bloody Tommies lying in swathes in no mans land? each one of them was every bit as important as any horse riding General but were treated as cannon fodder. And what did their families get as a "reward" following cessations??

regards

Tom

Haig himself pondered that very question.

In a striking passage in his diary - here I cite from memory, so forgive me if I'm not spot on - written in early 1917 , he reflects on the awful ordeal of the Somme fighting , and what it had cost in terms of life and blood. He marvels at the enormous determination and courage of the officers and men who faced up to a task that was bound to entail certain death for so many of them. He writes that he hopes that these men will have a government that will do them justice by looking after them after the war.

If need be, I'll find the reference and quote it properly...but, please trust me, you'll find that it bears out what I'm saying above.

As to how far British society post war behaved as Haig would wish, that's a matter we could discuss, too.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

There seems to be some misguided idea in some of the posts that Haig dictated War Policy. He didn't. It was forged out of long and hard debates by the War Cabinet and always subject to aligning and coordinating with French objectives. Policy was also subjected to intense scrutiny and reviewed in detail: In June 1917 the War Policy Committee was formed, which was separate to the War Cabinet. Hankey was Secretary to both. It's purpose was to review the British war policy as a whole and it carried out a detailed investigation, holding sixteen meetings between 8th and 20th June 1917 when, according to Hankey:

'the results of the inquiry were laid before a full meeting of the War Cabinet and the final conclusions were reached. Robertson, Haig, Jellicoe, Webb Gilman, Delme Radcliffe and Guy Granet were heard at witnesses and Robertson was present at many of the discussions .... the immediate object of the inquiry was to decide on the military policy to be adopted or the remainder of 1917..."

The backdrop to this: earlier in May 1917 both the British and French Governments had agreed to continue the offensive on the Western Front and to devote the whole of their forces to this objective. The principles were laid down by Petain, Nivelle, Haig and Robertson and aproved by the respective Governments.:

"It is no longer a question of aiming at breaking through the enemy's front and aiming at distant objectives. It is now a question of wearing down and exhaustig the enemy's resistance and if and when this is achieved to exploit it to the fullest possible extent"

In Hankey's words "The British and French Governments ...had officially adopted the policy of a war of attrition". My underlining.

The military executive was subordinate to the political executive who had the power to hire and fire the military leadership. They had the option of removing Haig after the Somme and didn't. They were quite capable of removing military leaders as the later removal of Robertson clearly shows. Hankey discusses these considerations in minute detail and it becomes very clear that Sir John French and Henry Wilson had the ear of Lloyd George and were key personal advisors. Both were often openly critical of military policy and critical of Haig. Lloyd George's own criticisms of Haig and Robertson are well known, however when they made it clear that they were both prepared to resign in early 1917, Lloyd George backed down and thanks to some quick diplomacy by Hankey an uneasy equilibrium was restored. It is equally important to acknowledge that the Flanders Offensive of 1917 was approved by the War Cabinet. Strategy was subject to approval by the War Cabinet, later the Imperial War Cabinet and later still, the Supreme War Council

At one stage in 1918 Lloyd George was actively trying to remove Haig using the failures of the Flanders Offensives as the prime reason, however he didn't go through with this. for one simple reason: Haig's success in early August 1918. Hankey, Vol II page 867:

"Haig was sometimes in danger but the Prime Minister could not discover a Commander-in-Chief who would be easier for him to work with and at the same time equally reliable"

Hankey believed that "Lloyd George was the man who won the war" (Vol II page 872). Hankey as Secretary to the War Cabinet and its subsequent manifestations was party to every critical meeting during the war and had the confidence of all the key players. He had many personal one-on-one meetings with them all throughout the war. He describes the atmosphere on 9th Oct 1918 at Versailles "The conference was in great spirits on the receipt of news of Haig's great victory and break-through between Cambrai and St Quentin" suggesting that Haig was to 'blame' for the success.

It is worth considering this question: If Haig was such an appalling leader, why was he not removed? MG

[phil andrade]

I understand he had to work with the French, but he was always considering moving the offensive north if he struck problems on the Somme. He decided not to for reasons best known to himself, but I suspect his stubborn personality contributed.

Your last point makes me wonder how far this " Haigophobia" might actually emanate from his personality.

He was, by his own admission, not a " showy" person : perhaps this was a massive understatement ...he was a notoriously reserved - even dour - person who was not known for being a master of sparkling wit and repartee.

More than any other war that comes to my mind, this was a conflict that entailed remoteness of leadership from the led : not because the leaders sought this, but because circumstances dictated. The black powder wars of earlier eras required generalship that involved front line leadership in the literal sense. The Second World War afforded commanders the chance to fly hither and thither and meet the men, supported by media savvy publicity teams. The Haigs, Falkenhayns, Joffres etc. did not have this facility ; and Haig, being a taciturn person, would have been uncomfortable in such a role. Petain might have been more at home in this regard, and Mangin " The Butcher" certainly displayed charismatic battlefield leadership.

Did lacklustre personality condemn Haig to an unjustly hostile perception by posterity ?

Phil (PJA)

[tumbi1]

Your last point makes me wonder how far this " Haigophobia" might actually emanate from his personality.

He was, by his own admission, not a " showy" person : perhaps this was a massive understatement ...he was a notoriously reserved - even dour - person who was not known for being a master of sparkling wit and repartee.

More than any other war that comes to my mind, this was a conflict that entailed remoteness of leadership from the led : not because the leaders sought this, but because circumstances dictated. The black powder wars of earlier eras required generalship that involved front line leadership in the literal sense. The Second World War afforded commanders the chance to fly hither and thither and meet the men, supported by media savvy publicity teams. The Haigs, Falkenhayns, Joffres etc. did not have this facility ; and Haig, being a taciturn person, would have been uncomfortable in such a role. Petain might have been more at home in this regard, and Mangin " The Butcher" certainly displayed charismatic battlefield leadership.

Did lacklustre personality condemn Haig to an unjustly hostile perception by posterity ?

Phil (PJA)

No, not personality, his results. That's what I am basing my opinion on. His stubbornness is just a possible explanation for his decision.

[tumbi1]

There seems to be some misguided idea in some of the posts that Haig dictated War Policy. He didn't. It was forged out of long and hard debates by the War Cabinet and always subject to aligning and coordinating with French objectives. Policy was also subjected to intense scrutiny and reviewed in detail: In June 1917 the War Policy Committee was formed, which was separate to the War Cabinet. Hankey was Secretary to both. It's purpose was to review the British war policy as a whole and it carried out a detailed investigation, holding sixteen meetings between 8th and 20th June 1917 when, according to Hankey:

'the results of the inquiry were laid before a full meeting of the War Cabinet and the final conclusions were reached. Robertson, Haig, Jellicoe, Webb Gilman, Delme Radcliffe and Guy Granet were heard at witnesses and Robertson was present at many of the discussions .... the immediate object of the inquiry was to decide on the military policy to be adopted or the remainder of 1917..."

The backdrop to this: earlier in May 1917 both the British and French Governments had agreed to continue the offensive on the Western Front and to devote the whole of their forces to this objective. The principles were laid down by Petain, Nivelle, Haig and Robertson and aproved by the respective Governments.:

"It is no longer a question of aiming at breaking through the enemy's front and aiming at distant objectives. It is now a question of wearing down and exhaustig the enemy's resistance and if and when this is achieved to exploit it to the fullest possible extent"

In Hankey's words "The British and French Governments ...had officially adopted the policy of a war of attrition". My underlining.

The military executive was subordinate to the political executive who had the power to hire and fire the military leadership. They had the option of removing Haig after the Somme and didn't. They were quite capable of removing military leaders as the later removal of Robertson clearly shows. Hankey discusses these considerations in minute detail and it becomes very clear that Sir John French and Henry Wilson had the ear of Lloyd George and were key personal advisors. Both were often openly critical of military policy and critical of Haig. Lloyd George's own criticisms of Haig and Robertson are well known, however when they made it clear that they were both prepared to resign in early 1917, Lloyd George backed down and thanks to some quick diplomacy by Hankey an uneasy equilibrium was restored. It is equally important to acknowledge that the Flanders Offensive of 1917 was approved by the War Cabinet. Strategy was subject to approval by the War Cabinet, later the Imperial War Cabinet and later still, the Supreme War Council

At one stage in 1918 Lloyd George was actively trying to remove Haig using the failures of the Flanders Offensives as the prime reason, however he didn't go through with this. for one simple reason: Haig's success in early August 1918. Hankey, Vol II page 867:

"Haig was sometimes in danger but the Prime Minister could not discover a Commander-in-Chief who would be easier for him to work with and at the same time equally reliable"

Hankey believed that "Lloyd George was the man who won the war" (Vol II page 872). Hankey as Secretary to the War Cabinet and its subsequent manifestations was party to every critical meeting during the war and had the confidence of all the key players. He had many personal one-on-one meetings with them all throughout the war. He describes the atmosphere on 9th Oct 1918 at Versailles "The conference was in great spirits on the receipt of news of Haig's great victory and break-through between Cambrai and St Quentin" suggesting that Haig was to 'blame' for the success.

It is worth considering this question: If Haig was such an appalling leader, why was he not removed? MG

Haig wasn't removed at times for political reasons, and at others because they couldn't see an obvious replacement. As I have said, Haig was just one of the donkeys from both sides of the line. In regards to Haig not having complete control of the direction of the war, the input he did have doesn't paint him as a great general. Haig was a product of the times and those times didn't produce great generals, unfortunately for the soldiers in the trenches.

[stiletto_33853]

Tom(towisuk), I was fortunate to have taken my very first battlefield trips with my grandfather (see signature) when I was a young lad and have to admit that the serving members of my family had much the same opinion as your extended family, i.e my grandfather did not have the time of day for anyone beyond divisional level but was happier at the brigade level. Unfortunately, as I am sure is likely to be the case in many instances, I did not have the passion for WW1 at that time so missed a lot of his discussions with me and his point.

Over time there are still matters that concern me regarding Haig, and still do, however the resources available today give us a far better insight into the man, his role and how he conducted the war. I am not in the revisionists school of thinking totally and am keen to learn more, a lot more. To remain in the donkey school of thought I believe is an understandable error given the wealth of material available.

As Martin has referred to, Hankey's memoirs are an excellent example of the nature of the beast and would urge you to read them as some sort of starting point. They certainly wetted my appetite to learn a little more and I still have a huge way to go to fully grasp this complex matter.

Andy

[geraint]

Andy - like you, I still tend to adhere to family recollections and utterances made during my youth. I had an extreme and unhealthy interest in the war during the early sixties, and I even taped veterans on a Sanyo cassette player during the early and mid 70s, almost preferring their company in my local pubs to those of my own age. Geek. Total geek. I don't recall anyone of them with a good word for the brass hats (Haig, whether named or not, amongst those brass hats).

I've read hundreds of books over the years (though funnily enough I've never read Alan Clark's Donkeys). None has pushed me over the edge into a more pro-Haig way of thinking. Need an example? He (completely unjustly) blamed the Welsh 38th Division for it's "failure" at Mametz Wood, substituting them during the last few hours and allocating the battle victory to the 21st Division.

Tom: The "homes fit for heroes" (and the promised rewards enshrined in those four words), didn't materialise. The industrial and rural misery of the twenties and hungry thirties wiped out any thoughts of victory and social rewards for Tommy Atkins and his family. The workhouses continued until 1947 - stuffed full with Great War veterans, who were then placed in local council social accommodation and health board mental homes until they died.

[Guest]

Haig wasn't removed at times for political reasons, and at others because they couldn't see an obvious replacement. As I have said, Haig was just one of the donkeys from both sides of the line. In regards to Haig not having complete control of the direction of the war, the input he did have doesn't paint him as a great general. Haig was a product of the times and those times didn't produce great generals, unfortunately for the soldiers in the trenches.

If Haig was such a terrible commander yet was left in place for 'political reasons' does this mean the politicians should share some of the blame?

His 'input' ran against Lloyd George's obsession with the Italian front. Lloyd George was trying to remove Haig during the beginning of the 100 days which suggests to me that he was rather hampering Haig at the most critical point in the whole of the war. Had Haig not delivered his 'input' so forcefully in 1917, he would not have been in the position to achieve a rather brilliant and crushing defeat of the German Army during this period. The stats are reasonably well known, but if you don't have them they are worth looking up;The British Army's achievements during this period compares to the other allies' achievements were quite astonishing. The strategic and tactical successes were achieved as a direct result of Haig's 'input' and despite Lloyd George's meddling.

MG

[Jack Sheldon]

One of the prominent men who disliked Haig the most and did as much as possible to destroy his reputation posthumously - namely Lloyd George - had a great deal to say about him in his memoirs. His index contains two and half densely printed pages of entries relating to Haig and it makes interesting reading: 'His limited vision', 'Unequal to his task', 'Industrious but uninspired', 'His inability to judge men', 'His ingenuity in shifting blame to other shoulders than his own' etc. etc. but culminating in, 'No conspicuous officer better qualified for highest command than.' - and he would know; he did everything in his power to find one.

As an aside, I love the 'shifting the blame one'. Again, he would know. Had there been a championship for blame shifting, he would have won at a canter.

Jack

[geraint]

Jack. I would agree with you to a large extent. Lloyd George was not a role model of a politician. A fornicating bribe and patronage politician. But he was elected according to democracy, and in his early days was a serious social politician - the 1909 budget and his old age pensions making him a firm favourite amongst the working classes. Silver tongued orator perhaps; but a tin god with feet of clay.

[charlesmessenger]

First, I thoroughly agree with Chris Baker that Pete Hart's postings are missed. Perhaps he was over passionate, but his postings were always worth reading.

Second, If you read Haig's diaries you will see that as an army commander he spent much time visiting his troops. When he was promoted CinC of the BEF, his time for this became very limited. The reason, much increased other responsiblities.

Charles M

[Guest]

For those missing GAC's informed views on Haig, this is an interesting and entertaining read Click which covers some of the same ground. There are also links within this thread to other related and informed views. A few hours' worth of reading with some valuable references for anyone interested in pursuing knowledge of the debate on Haig. MG

[tumbi1]

If Haig was such a terrible commander yet was left in place for 'political reasons' does this mean the politicians should share some of the blame?

His 'input' ran against Lloyd George's obsession with the Italian front. Lloyd George was trying to remove Haig during the beginning of the 100 days which suggests to me that he was rather hampering Haig at the most critical point in the whole of the war. Had Haig not delivered his 'input' so forcefully in 1917, he would not have been in the position to achieve a rather brilliant and crushing defeat of the German Army during this period. The stats are reasonably well known, but if you don't have them they are worth looking up;The British Army's achievements during this period compares to the other allies' achievements were quite astonishing. The strategic and tactical successes were achieved as a direct result of Haig's 'input' and despite Lloyd George's meddling.

MG

Yes they should.

[PhilB]

There seems to be some misguided idea in some of the posts that Haig dictated War Policy. He didn't. It was forged out of long and hard debates by the War Cabinet and always subject to aligning and coordinating with French objectives. Policy was also subjected to intense scrutiny and reviewed in detail: In June 1917 the War Policy Committee was formed, which was separate to the War Cabinet. Hankey was Secretary to both. It's purpose was to review the British war policy as a whole and it carried out a detailed investigation, holding sixteen meetings between 8th and 20th June 1917 when, according to Hankey:

'the results of the inquiry were laid before a full meeting of the War Cabinet and the final conclusions were reached. Robertson, Haig, Jellicoe, Webb Gilman, Delme Radcliffe and Guy Granet were heard at witnesses and Robertson was present at many of the discussions .... the immediate object of the inquiry was to decide on the military policy to be adopted or the remainder of 1917..."

Martin, could you enlighten me on one point? As a result of the 1916 pre-Somme deliberations, did you conclude that Haig reluctantly fought the Somme as directed and against his better judgement or did he largely agree with the strategy laid out?

[MelPack]

Has this thread contracted?

[Neil Mackenzie]

I have hidden or edited some posts to remove references to a former forum member some of which were inappropriate or not really relevant to this topic. I have also hidden/amended related posts which - whilst fine in themselves - made no sense as a result.

Neil

[Muerrisch]

Make or made?

Makes or made a difference!

[Neil Mackenzie]

Thanks Grumpy! I have edited my post.