Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[phil andrade]

PJA post # 218

with respect I think that your argument is flawed with regard to the number of casualties increasing as the War progressed.

The size of the Army also increased with more men engaged - might this not be a factor in the increasing number of casualties year on year?

Nearly 5.4 million men served on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. The Army, deployed in various parts of the world and in the UK in 1914 was 733,514.

Ratio is one thing ; absolute numbers another.

Martin G is to be praised for his analysis of the dreadful mortality rates suffered by the first cohorts : I, for one, owe him much...I would never have realised how lethal the ordeal was for all ranks -officers especially - who disembarked in August 1914 and faced the ordeal of the early campaigns.

If a small professional army numbering one hundred thousand suffers ninety per cent casualties the impact is bound to be different from that of a mass citizen army of several millions suffering fifty per cent casualties.

I am pleased that Martin's tabulation endorses my suggestion that four fifths of British deaths can be attributed to the 1916-18 period.

One tenth of the manhood of the nation....here, of course, I meant one tenth of the men of military age. Rule of thumb is that this military manpower equates to roughly one fifth of total population. Haig was not far from the mark, was he ?

I have just finished browsing through Andrew Roberts's THE STORM OF WAR, and the chapter on the Bomber Offensive and " Butch" Harris makes comparisons with Haig, and carries an uncanny resonance with the statements made by Grumpy above.

You're not Roberts's ghost writer by any chance, are you, Grumpy ?

This has been a big thread, and I run the risk of mentioning something that's already been thrashed out, but I would be interested in finding out what Haig's wife, Doris, had to say about the treatment of her husband in regard to rewards and reputation.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

For anyone wanting a reality check on how Haig was regarded when he died in 1928, it is worth reading Dan Todman's "The Great War, Myth and Memory". The chapter 'Donkeys' (an ironic reference) attempts to displace much of the modern mythology with some facts. He draws comparisons between the level of public mourning at Haig's funeral with that of the Princess of Wales in more recent times.

Todman gives Max Hastings a good dressing down for an appallingly error-ridden article in the Evening Standard on the 80th anniversary of the end of the War. Hastings in his clumsy character assassination of Haig doesn't even get his name correct, calling him "Sir John Haig".

The chapter is illuminating and provides a rather balanced argument on Haig. All the usual donkey jockeys are tackled and there is an interesting timeline of how perceptions of Haig evolved over the subsequent 80 years since his death. A good read. MG

[Muerrisch]

I have just finished browsing through Andrew Roberts's THE STORM OF WAR, and the chapter on the Bomber Offensive and " Butch" Harris makes comparisons with Haig, and carries an uncanny resonance with the statements made by Grumpy above.

You're not Roberts's ghost writer by any chance, are you, Grumpy ?

Phil (PJA)

Phil,

Mr Roberts has never heard of me. If what you say is true, then he agrees with me!

[Muerrisch]

So post war Haig got his rewards, and the men who fought in, and survived the trenches got what???

regards

Tom

If you want the details of post-war gratuities, pensions and widows pensions, please let me know, but first tell us all what War Gratuity you would think a fair sum [bearing in mind that a private soldier was on a little more than a shilling a day].

Or is there no sum that you consider adequate?

[phil andrade]

A half century before, US Grant - a general who resembled Haig in his determination to fight relentlessly, and who was similarly criticised on account of the appalling cost in casualties - assumed the Presidency of his nation.

Haig had no such political aspiration.

I wonder how far the awards of grants and titles to successful British generals was seen as a means of placating ambition and, perhaps, as an inducement to divert their attention away from activity in the political sphere.

In the event, Grant proved to be a failure as President - at least, his reputation as such has been traduced.

He was also notoriously poor at managing finance - both in the private and public domain.

How did Haig fare in matters of money ? Was he competent at handling finance, or, at least, at appointing the right people to deal with it ?

Earlier in his military career he had baled out French , who had incurred serious debts ; I infer from this that Haig had been pretty responsible in his monetary affairs.

He clearly enjoyed the advantage of family wealth from the whiskey.

Did his efforts to procure money for ex servicemen benefit from his own financial know how ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Film of the crowds at Haig's funeral in 1928

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[clk]

Hi,

How sad it is, after this forum has been in existence for some 20 years, that the same old arguments are being recycled here.

That's me out.

After his February 2015 comment of "Elvis left the building", his + one year silence, then recently posting (including the above), I really hope that Chris hasn't given up on the Forum all together. I don't know about high level strategies, and the such. I do think though that the forum will never be "perfect", but I guess that there are numerous posts that he finds frustrating. However, I would also like to say how appreciative I am to him for sharing his knowledge (I'm sure that I'm not alone), that has enabled me to research individual soldiers in greater detail

Regards

Chris

[geraint]

Why were they Haig's fault? They may well have been (probably were) victims of the war which Haig certainly didn't start.

I feel that sometimes we see Haig as the sole focus of blame, but surely the people who - for want of a better word - "created" the war should be held guilty too? As Cowper said, War's a game which, were their subjects wise, kings would not play at.

Is it me, or am I completely wrong regarding Haig's status and position? He was Commander in Chief? He was a Field Marshal? He did command the British army did he not? He was the ultimate buck stopper on 1 July 1916 and the following two month battle? He was still in supreme command a year later for his second act at Third Ypres? He did carry a little bit of clout didn't he? Silly me! There was I thinking that he was just a harmless colonel blimp who told a merry jest in the mess...

[nigelcave]

Is it me, or am I completely wrong regarding Haig's status and position? He was Commander in Chief? He was a Field Marshal? He did command the British army did he not? He was the ultimate buck stopper on 1 July 1916 and the following two month battle? He was still in supreme command a year later for his second act at Third Ypres? He did carry a little bit of clout didn't he? Silly me! There was I thinking that he was just a harmless colonel blimp who told a merry jest in the mess...

In order: From December 1915; from January 1917; in 'France and Flanders', from December 1915; yes, but four and a half months; no - supreme command implies total control and that he did not have; however, he was C-in-C; he did carry clout, the question would be the extent compared to, say, Joffre, Nivelle, Falkenhayn and the duumvirate of H and L.

I'm not sure what he saw of the 'mess' during the war; and merry jests weren't really in his make-up, tho' not entirely bereft, so I am told, of a sense of humour.

[David Filsell]

Once again Martin brings a welcome analytical approach to discussion on the forum and shines a valuable and considered factual posting We are retreading old ground in which sheer emotion is allways allowed to influence and blind responses. None of debate, sadly, is very new - apart a few erudite and studied responses based on fact rather than emotion. Those with fixed opinions remain with them - class warriors or not. The more open minded learn something. Then the the thread closes only, as Chris Baker notes, to re-emerge in slightly revised form stumbling over the realities of that other place. Doncha just love the forum?

[phil andrade]

How could any British person indulge an interest in the Great War without participating in a discussion about Haig ?

And if the same old things recur, that's testimony to the enduring fascination....it's not a function of sterile fixations ; it reflects a very understandable need to engage the intellect and the emotions.

GWF without a Haig debate ?

Might as well try and stage Hamlet without The Prince.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

There's a Prince in Hamlet?

[David Filsell]

Don't mind the debate, sweet prince, hate the closed minds.

[phil andrade]

There's a Prince in Hamlet?

....That is the question....

Phil (PJA)

[tumbi1]

Coming back to the cavalry thing, merely to point out that the 11th Hussars converted to armoured cars in 1928 (along with the 12th Lancers), whereas the 10th Royal Hussars did not mechanise until 1936 - on a mixture of old lorries and worn-ot Light Tanks (the report in the regimental gazette of a recruiting trip to the West Country had me alternately wiping tears of mirth from my eyes and tears of frustration). I believe the Greys did not lose their horses until about 1940.

Whatever Haig wrote in the inter-war years, his record in France and Flanders was for continuous improvement - tanks, armoured cars, aeroplanes ... what we would now call the "all arms" battle came to fruition under Haig.

(I declare an interest: I have recently become a member of the Haig Foundation, and a damned fine Journal they produce, too!).

All the continuous improvement wasn't led by Haig, and from his post war comments he hadn't learnt much from the improvement. As it was quite obvious he hadn't learnt how could he possibly be considered one of the great military leaders of history? That is my point. There has been some revision of him over the years, and yes he wasn't all bad, but I fail to see how he can escape being labelled one of the donkeys from both sides of the lines. Falkenhayn apparently had trouble sleeping after the war and for good reason, and I sometimes wonder whether a lot of Haig's work with returned solders was a guilty conscience.

I agree with one poster who said Haig was all about the breakthrough and not attrition, but when Haig's breakthrough failed on the Somme he started referring to attrition being the plan all along, and that change can only have been to cover his backside.

What were the alternatives to the tactics Haig used? The tank advocates were pushing for a massed first use of tanks to get maximum value out of surprise, but instead the first use of tanks seems to have been to salvage something out of another failed offensive and again to save his reputation.

I am only singling Haig out as he has been put on a pedestal recently by a number of historians, and for the life of me I can't understand it. He was just one of a bad bunch.

[tumbi1]

Hi

First Monash was a 'Corps' Commander who had an Army Commander above him and then it was Haig, who commanded five Armies, so a different command role entirely (the higher you go the more 'political' problems you face whether with your home government or your allies), success at one level does not mean success at another. All had their staff officers to do their battle planning (see 'The Men who planned the War' by Paul Harris, Ashgate, 2016). All Corps contributed to and benefitted from the BEF training system for new tactics and weapons, the 'BEF' was changing (as were other army's) throughout the war trying to keep up with the changes in warfare and the limitations of technology, particularly communications.

The British Cavalry (the most modern and flexible in Europe before and during the war), like the infantry, had to adapt to the conditions of the Western Front battlefield (see 'Horsemen in No Man's Land' by David Kenyon. Pen & Sword, 2011) and from fairly early on they operated with armoured cars, cyclists and aeroplanes, then alongside tanks. Tanks did not replace cavalry in WW1, or between the wars for many years, the Soviet Union used cavalry throughout the Great Patriotic War 1941-45. Also motor transport did not replace horsed transport and the technology of the day could not operate very well over rough terrain. Tanks were unreliable and short ranged (aeroplanes could not operate in bad weather/visibility and had other technical problems as well), also vulnerable to artillery (which is why tank units had aeroplanes attached to support them including attacking guns used in the anti-tank role), tank unit commanders had sometimes to resort to riding horses to keep in contact with their tank sections. I believe that Kenyon thinks that the problem for British Cavalry during the 100 Days was there were not enough of them to undertake the tasks required.

High casualties on the Western Front during WW1 were a result of the large scale constant fighting. Haig was not around on the Eastern front during WW2 but the Germans and Soviets managed to fill even larger graveyards without him, again due to the large scale of the fighting, tanks and the aeroplane on that front did not reduce casualties.

Mike

The difference between Corps and Army group commander doesn't come into it when considering tactics in a battle, with the first day of the Somme a great example. From a tactics point of view Monash and Haig were chalk and cheese, as was Currie and Haig. I know the type of general I would want to be led by.

The battle of the Somme was a disaster, as was Passchendaele, with massive loss of life in both cases. But apparently Haig was a great general?

[towisuk]

The battle of the Somme was a disaster, as was Passchendaele, with massive loss of life in both cases. But apparently Haig was a great general?

Obviously!!... the Establishment gave him rewards beyond any Tommies dream and erected statues to him...!!

regards

Tom

[SiegeGunner]

The battle of the Somme was a disaster, as was Passchendaele, with massive loss of life in both cases. But apparently Haig was a great general?

Perhaps I am just contrary, but I always seem to notice the things that people don't say as much as the things they do. The shrouds of the Somme and Passchendaele are routinely waved, but how often does anyone mention Arras? And regarding Haig, while many talk about him needing a replacement, how often does anyone suggest that what he really needed was a Ludendorff?

[geraint]

I'm not sure whether Arras is a good example of Haig's prowess Mick.

As the Battle of the Somme came to an end, (British casualties??) Haig and the newly appointed Nivelle met on 16th November at Chantilly and they jointly decided strategy for 1917, which included combined action to breach the German lines at Arras salient. A British attack would draw German reserves and allow the French to break through at Chemin des Dames. It was scheduled for early April allowing only five and a bit months between the Somme and Arras. To avoid heavy casualties during the build up to the battle, as occurred at the Somme, it was decided that the men gathering for the big push would be hidden underground in caverns, dug secretly by the New Zealanders and others, and that the troops could come up silently in front of the German front line, and avoid German machineguns and bombardments as happened at the Somme.

9 April, and Z Day. Three-pronged British attack under Horne, Allenby and Gough. Very successful first two days succeeded in driving the Germans back to their second line. German reinforcement arrived, and the British advance became a standstill following vigorous German counter-attacks as of 14 April. The Battle of Arras deteriorated into a couple of local battles for the next month, coming to a desultory end on 14 May. At the same time, the French were again beaten at the unfolding disaster at the Chemin Des Dames.

Any possibility of a decisive victory had gone.

Haig, however, well into June, still continued to send men to their deaths at the Arras sector in a desultory attempt to establish a new front.

The cost.

Haig pushed the combat zone back by 10 km. A large quantity of ammunition captured. Arras was relieved.

100,000 British casualties.

Approx 100,000 German casualties on which 20,000 were prisoners.

Yves Le Maner

Director History and Remembrance Centre Northern France

Then, of course, a month or so later came Third Ypres. Neither Arras nor Ypres were really battle honours to be proud of.

[Kathie]

I had started off in my reading as anti-Haig. I have somewhat changed my views as I have learnt.

But I think this post raises two very different issues - worth debating.

First, is that when the politicians decide to go to war, those who claim to be professionals and capable of prosecuting a war at the politicans behest, ought to be competent, up to date with modern technology, innovative etc. It does seems to have taken a long time for the British Army to become so - everyone excuses the "steep learning curve". Why so? Surely they should have learnt before. So I think that debate is - should politicians ensure the capabilities their armies before they go into any war and should the army commanders make it clear when they are incapable of carrying out this political task?

Second, on the South African records, we have the details of the pensions paid out to families and to returned servicemen. For the parents etc it was always for a limited period of time - in months not years. For the servicemen, it was very little compared to employment earnings of the time. It odes seem strange that the grateful nation rewards financially the commanders and not the actual players. In the present case, I can understand that Haig and other commanders would have valuable insights to offer in a number of areas (not least political) post war and that it was appropriate for them to sit in the Lords (or a Senate or any upper house). I can also appreciate that, at that time, one needed to be able to have a home in London and spend money on trains etc to go off to do good deeds. But Haig was not poor - think of the whiskey nor was his wife. I think that is the problem - those who seemed to have had so much wanted more whilst those who had nothing got very little.

Kathie

[nigelcave]

I would not get too excited about whisky money, if I were you Tho' his father was a very significant player in developing the whisk(e)y market. I think the family interest had been all sold out by 1919. Haig was chairman of DLC (the new owners) for a year in 1924 - no idea what remuneration that involved. The late Earl once mentioned that the 'benefits' had come down to a crate (six bottles) a year decades ago.

Just think about the navy and the issue of the distribution of prize money. OK, the system had changed, but ...

Were the British any more behind than other continental powers (as regards modern technology etc), who were focussed on the use of mass armies, compared to the, generally, gendarmerie role of the British army? Worth bearing in mind (though I cannot recall where I read this) that the idea of a continental commitment did not even enter into official thinking (i.e. the Army estimates) as regards the objectives for the army pre war.

The army could only spend what the government gave them; for understandable reasons, the focus of government defence expenditure for a good number of the pre war years had been on the Royal Navy.

What new technology did they not have in 1914 and which they could realistically be expected to have? Aircraft, yes (albeit few in number - but then flying itself was new); use of wireless - yes - but the technology was very much in its infancy and was anything but portable; mgs, yes, but budget for these limited.

Of course, sitting in the Lords brought no direct financial return - in fact it cost, as there were no allowances of any type for peers at the time. On the other hand, there were other advantages apart from direct financial remuneration. Even MPs were not paid until the turn of the century.

Not much point, really, focussing on Haig - fine as an example, but everyone else at very senior level was in the same, relatively comfortable, boat.

[phil andrade]

Kathie,

Your post commands my respect : your admission that you've changed your views somewhat suggests that you have that essential humility that so many of us lack.

I hope Martin G won't mind me mentioning him in dispatches here....he's made some very illuminating research into the impact of the first phase of the war on the old professional BEF, particularly the officer contingent.

This, I think, might have considerable impact on the question you pose : why did it take so long for the British to benefit from that " learning curve" we keep reading about ?

If I understand his research properly, he reveals that the losses sustained in the first campaigns were so catastrophic that the loss of experience was to have fatal consequences for the cohorts that followed.

These British losses in 1914 were, of course, only a fraction of those suffered by the French and other continental armies - literally only about one tenth those sustained by France in the first four months of fighting .

It was the very small size of the BEF that rendered this early attrition so disastrous....Britain lacked the depth of the professional cadre, and the effective destruction of the 1914 contingent was to make the ensuing experiences so difficult and costly.

I suspect that Haig was aware of this ; it might be worth browsing through his diary and seeing if and when he alludes to it.

If we are to believe David Lloyd George, Britain won the Great War despite Haig, not because of him.

Would you trust a Welsh Wizard ?

I would rather take the word of a Donkey....in my reckoning, Haig was worthy of his hire ; he did what he was paid to do : he won.

Phil (PJA)

[Steven Broomfield]

Would you trust a Welsh Wizard ?

Ryan Giggs was pretty good.

[Muerrisch]

that the idea of a continental commitment did not even enter into official thinking (i.e. the Army estimates) as regards the objectives for the army pre war.

Nigel, here we disagree! Surely the BEF was for, inter alia, a continental commitment? Below is one of the many gems from my battered laptop.

What is the Army For?

On 8^th December 1888 Stanhope the Secretary Of State for War minuted Adjutant-General Viscount Wolseley with what has become known as the Stanhope memorandum. This was in reply to the very reasonable question “what is the army for?” In summary, and in order of priority, it was to:

1. Support the civil power

2. Garrison India

3. Garrison all fortresses and coaling stations at war footing

4. Be able to mobilise three Army Corps for home defence

5. Be able to send abroad two complete Corps (but this was “improbable”).

The underlying assumptions were that the Royal Navy would rule the waves; that the balance of power in Europe would ensure that no grand alliance could be formed to threaten the United Kingdom and that this country would not wish to intervene in European matters. This latter was despite various treaties, notably that of 1839, whereby Great Britain and other European powers guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium and part of Luxembourg.

Much was to change before 1914. The concept of a “striking force” or “expeditionary force” gradually emerged, a force tasked primarily with swift intervention overseas, not necessarily on mainland Europe, but also to defend India against any Russian threat. This force would need many rapidly available reservists unless it were to be maintained permanently and expensively at War Establishment. A reservist cost less than half a serving soldier.

Hansard 25^th February 1907. Viscount Haldane. ... “The Government should have ready this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades and keep it alive through regular machinery for six months, and after that the nation should be prepared to do its part. That aid should come, through channels which should be provided for it beforehand, to the support and the expansion of the professional Army of the country. ... I should define the obligation of the War Office to be to keep this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades with their military administrative services in an efficient condition for mobilisation, and to maintain them for a period of at least six months. After six months, drafts are found by the ordinary machinery of war. It does not follow that we shall use the whole of that force at once, and therefore we hope to spread out its use for a larger period of time. But with the wastage of war one feels that at the end of six months the resources of the War Office may be at an end with that amount of men, and then an appeal must be made to the nation itself”.

[Steven Broomfield]

The relevant point, I'd suggest, is the comment from Haldane in the last paragraph: "The Government should have ready this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades and keep it alive through regular machinery for six months, and after that the nation should be prepared to do its part." Interesting, too, that he specified that we should not necessarily "use the whole force at once" and that we should have the correct administrative services to support and maintain this force.

Whether the BEF was 'official' or not (and I always had the impression it was a little ad hoc), surely that comment of Haldane's is the key - a small force, intended to last six months or so, and then replaced/supplemented by 'the nation'.

Oh, and "not necessarily on mainland Europe".