Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[nigelcave]

Nigel, here we disagree! Surely the BEF was for, inter alia, a continental commitment? Below is one of the many gems from my battered laptop.

What is the Army For?

On 8^th December 1888 Stanhope the Secretary Of State for War minuted Adjutant-General Viscount Wolseley with what has become known as the Stanhope memorandum. This was in reply to the very reasonable question “what is the army for?” In summary, and in order of priority, it was to:

1. Support the civil power

2. Garrison India

3. Garrison all fortresses and coaling stations at war footing

4. Be able to mobilise three Army Corps for home defence

5. Be able to send abroad two complete Corps (but this was “improbable”).

The underlying assumptions were that the Royal Navy would rule the waves; that the balance of power in Europe would ensure that no grand alliance could be formed to threaten the United Kingdom and that this country would not wish to intervene in European matters. This latter was despite various treaties, notably that of 1839, whereby Great Britain and other European powers guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium and part of Luxembourg.

Much was to change before 1914. The concept of a “striking force” or “expeditionary force” gradually emerged, a force tasked primarily with swift intervention overseas, not necessarily on mainland Europe, but also to defend India against any Russian threat. This force would need many rapidly available reservists unless it were to be maintained permanently and expensively at War Establishment. A reservist cost less than half a serving soldier.

Hansard 25^th February 1907. Viscount Haldane. ... “The Government should have ready this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades and keep it alive through regular machinery for six months, and after that the nation should be prepared to do its part. That aid should come, through channels which should be provided for it beforehand, to the support and the expansion of the professional Army of the country. ... I should define the obligation of the War Office to be to keep this force of six divisions and four cavalry brigades with their military administrative services in an efficient condition for mobilisation, and to maintain them for a period of at least six months. After six months, drafts are found by the ordinary machinery of war. It does not follow that we shall use the whole of that force at once, and therefore we hope to spread out its use for a larger period of time. But with the wastage of war one feels that at the end of six months the resources of the War Office may be at an end with that amount of men, and then an appeal must be made to the nation itself”.

I am sure you are right; but what I seem to recall reading/seeing/being referred to was what was in the ???Army Estimates for 1914. I need to do some delving. But the point is valid, I would suggest, as regards the Continental commitment as the 'expeditionary force' did not have to be despatched there; and the nearest chronological example of the sending of a large force was within the Empire.

Some time ago someone produced the army budgets for a number of years preceding 1914: it would be useful to resurrect these again, perhaps (tho' we may well be drifting off topic ....).

[Muerrisch]

Army estimates 1914. Hansard.

The hon. Baronet (Sir F. Banbury) asked me whether the establishment of 186,000 was not too small. It is very hard to say what should be the precise size of the British Army when we consider our world-wide responsibilities. When we consider how much that is interdependent not only with policy, but with the size of the Navy, it is really an impossible question to answer. All I can say to-day, when it would not be proper to enter into a disquisition upon the general policy of this country, how far its armed force available for instant service should be larger or smaller, is that the necessary garrisons in India and the Colonies are maintained up to full strength, and that the Expeditionary Force can be mobilised at shorter notice than ever before up to its full strength, except perhaps for certain unimportant details, for which arrangements have already been made. More than that I cannot now say. I think the hon. Baronet himself will see that on the Report stage of this Vote I could not be expected to go into the large strategic questions which must be involved in any answer to the questions he has put to me. I would suggest that the proper time and the only time at which this question can really be discussed is when we can consider the whole question of defence—the Army and the Navy together. I have reason to believe that an opportunity will be given, and I hope it may be given.

[nigelcave]

Thanks for that; in the intervening time between posts I have been flicking through the surprisingly readable 'The Development of the British Army 1899 - 1914 by Colonel John Dunlop, published in 1938. Admittedly he had an 'interest' in the TF, but very well put together.

I note that he states that the Army vote for 1914-15 £28,845,000, up 5% since 1907 [but up almost £2 million from the previous year; the RN had gone from £32,911,046 (1907/08) to £46,309,300 (1913/14). Amazing what you could get for your pound in those days.

At the end of the day the government has to make decisions on where to spend defence funds and how much is politically appropriate/practicable. Everyone in the army/navy etc would have loved to have plenty of money to spend on all sorts of useful things; but that was never going to happen until war broke out - or if it did.

[Guest]

I thought Sir Edward Grey had been the prime mover behind the idea of committing the British Army to help the French in 1905 and the francophile Sir Henry Wilson had aggressively promoted the plan as Director of Military Operations from 1910.. The idea was debated in the House as early as 1904 if Arnold Forster is to be believed and certainly he was writing about it in 1906. To my mind this commitment was the root of all the problems. Blaming Haig against the backdrop of a strategic blunder of this magnitude, made 5 years (arguably 10 years) before he took control of the Army seems rather unfair. A late arrival in 1916 by the BEF (still a year ahead of the Americans!) would at least have enabled the BEF to fight on equal terms with the requisite men and materiel..... So much for hypothesy.

The shouting match debate over Haig seems to be intractable. The Donkey school's arguments seem to hinge on the theory that it could have been done differently (i.e. better). This can't be proven. Similarly the Revisionist school's arguments rely on the idea it couldn't have been done any differently. This cant be proven. While it is a mildly interesting 'counter-factual' debate, I am not sure either side can prove their own theory or indeed disprove the others'.... For the record I have no idea if Haig could have done things better or whether anyone else in that position could have.

Mission Impossible: Command of the BEF 1914-16. We should be mindful though that Haig and his predecessor French were forced by the politicians to act in support of the French allies when the politicians had not provided the means to do the task. In modern business parlance they were 'set up for failure'. Most battles in 1915 would largely fit this bill and it was an invidious position for the men with the very heavy responsibility of carrying out some rather mad decisions by the cabinet . The political executive had singularly failed to provide the men and materiel (guns and ammunition) to prosecute a continental war and indeed the folly of the Dardanelles, despite the fact that Haldane had pointed out in 1908 that the existing resources would be exhausted within 6 months. He was on the money. By Feb 1915 the Army had been largely destroyed. By March 1915 British Infantry regiments were running out of trained reserves and partially trained Kitchener men and TF were plugging the rather large gaps. It is no wonder that the Army was annihilated again in 1915. None of this is new, I think Tacitus (98 AD) was the originator of JFK's plagiarised Bay of Pigs apology that 'Victory has a hundred fathers, Defeat is an orphan'. President Carter discovered the wrong end of this in 1981 and Margaret Thatcher the right end in 1982. Either episodes could so easily have worked out differently. JFK's more erudite (mis) quote improvement onTacitus' rather clumsy original would have been rather apt for the commanders for large parts of the Great War.

So I would ask the obvious question: which part of Haldane's rather accurate predictions did the Cabinet fail to understand? By extension, if French and Haig were being asked to do the impossible, who really was to blame? All the evidence is in the rather long and sorry tale of 1915. It is not hard to find and anyone interested in exploring the disconnect between the Cabinet (Political Executive) and the executive of the Army need look no further than Maurice Hankey's memoirs. He had a ringside seat and left a very impartial assessment of how the war was managed.

Separately- Part of the Donkey school argument seems to focus on the class aspects, and the idea that a 'ruling class' sent the 'lower classes' to their deaths or 'murdered' them. This aspect always seems to ignore the fact the higher one was in the Edwardian social pecking order the greater the general chances were of dying for one's country. The First day of the Battles of the Somme - the event most readily used to 'prove' that Haig was a mass 'murderer' - was fought by volunteers, not conscripts. It is a small but rather important point as it rather undermines the idea that these men were unwilling participants. Close to 50% of all men who served in the British Army were volunteers.

[charlesmessenger]

Martin

An excellent post. There were no Great Captains on either side on the Western Front and the generalship was imperfect on both sides. What can be said of Haig is that he stuck it out better than most and his BEF played the lead role in the final 100 Days..

The class factor is sadly used by those who will insist on regarding 1914-18 through 21st century eyes. It was a very different world 100 years ago.

Charles M.

[henryww1]

I am not a supporter or disclaimer of Haig. I feel that like most of that generation and experience there were many demands and demons playing with the choices made and their direction.

This is yet another example of a question which is great to raise from time to time, but will not be answered with any outstanding final conclusion.

Christian belief that you have done your best and yet possible guilt motives driving you to raise and support charities does not balance or equate.

Asking for reward and recognition and being given a reward are two different things.

Fighting against political pressure from home to pursue futile pre-emptive campaigns before being ready has incredible merit. Continuing on a course of actions that do not result in the required conclusion, time and time again, can be considered stubborn and short sighted, hence the criticism of butchery.

In a world still beset by a belief in the order of things it is not surprising that the man who commanded for most of the war will be honoured at the end. It should also be considered that publicity around the persona of the man who lead us to victory would be treated as an honoured veteran.

Now consider the many heroes that you have personally admired up until the point when restricted documentation has been released.

Haig is and will always be many things to many people.

Edited 23 May , 2016 by 16thlancers

[squirrel]

Martin G post #254:

"...anyone interested in exploring the disconnect between the Cabinet (Political Executive) and the executive of the Army need look no further than Maurice Hankey's memoirs. He had a ringside seat and left a very impartial assessment of how the war was managed".

Couldn't agree more.

[PhilB]

Are the two sides seen to be equally culpable for the disconnect?

[Guest]

Are the two sides seen to be equally culpable for the disconnect?

Since one side had the ultimate responsibility (read legal empowerment) and can be shown on a number of occasions to be instructing the other to do things that they were not simply equipped to do, would in my mind suggest that there was some considerable asymmetry in the 'culpability'. Had French or Haig refused 'Mission Impossible' they would have been replaced by men who were equally ill-equipped (materially) to carry out the task and who would have failed in equal measure.

At the root of this is the idea that the Military Executive were being asked to do things by the Political Executive that they were simply not equipped to do. The Donkey school seems to ignore this central fact. Take Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, Aubers Ridge, Givenchy, Bellewaarde, Hooge, Loos and the 10 month nightmare of Gallipoli as stark examples of the failure of the executive to provide the means to persecute the war in 1915. Gallipoli (Aug 15) and Loos (Sep 15) largely destroyied a whole New Army that simply did not have the required ammunition and guns. It really is that simple. The idea that either was Haig's fault (he wasn't even in command at the time) is simply ludicrous in my view.

MG

[PhilB]

I assumed the "disconnect" to mean failures in communication. Rather, it is a failure to be realistic about aims and capabilities?

[Guest]

I assumed the "disconnect" to mean failures in communication. Rather, it is a failure to be realistic about aims and capabilities?

It is a disconnect on a number of levels. I would strongly recommend reading Hankey's memoirs. MG

[geraint]

The class factor is sadly used by those who will insist on regarding 1914-18 through 21st century eyes. It was a very different world 100 years ago.

Charles M.

That is a very 21st century statement in itself.

As a young lad during the late fifties and early sixties I was bought up amongst my extended family. A great aunt who served as a VAD and married a RWF Lewis gunner awarded an MM, with two maiden aunts who had lost fiances during the war and never married, with a two widows who lost spouses (great uncle and a cousin) and one who re-married a "nuts" and continuously drunk second husband who had served in the black and tans.

these are the people who populated my life at that time. Very loyal to the liberal party and to Lloyd George, very loyal to the RBL and to the Queen when she visited Pwllheli in 1968 (?). But to a person hated with a vengeance all brass hat generals and Haig specifically. during my youth, between five and 17 years old, these people were YOUNGER than I am now. I recall and remember them. I attended funerals and sick beds. I can recall what they said regarding that period. Nothing any revisionist can publish will convince me otherwise. When my second daughter was born in 1983, Lewis Gunner MM said- "thank God you've only got daughters. They won't have to go through what we did."

[towisuk]

" Very loyal to the liberal party and to Lloyd George, very loyal to the RBL and to the Queen when she visited Pwllheli in 1968 (?). But to a person hated with a vengeance all brass hat generals and Haig specifically. "

​A far more meaningful contribution to the topic Geraint, because it comes from first hand experience of peoples lives destroyed by the war. Too often we get the "well things were different then" or "you're using the class war excuse" ...did that mean there were no morals..?? To my mind there is no excuse for lack of moral leadership that used the ultimate.... "obey OUR rules or you may be tried and shot" threat to even VOLUNTEERS who enlisted.

Nelson on the deck of Victory amongst his men in the heat of battle.. a leader.

Haig and his staff in a Chateau well behind the lines at the start of the Battle of the Somme, so far back that communications about the failure of the advance in most of the front line, couldn't get back to him to enable him to change his tactics and approach to the unfolding disaster. And the pre-planned wave after wave of men going "over the top" fell to the machine guns of the well defended German lines.

regards

Tom

[nigelcave]

Nelson on the deck of Victory amongst his men in the heat of battle.. a leader.

Haig and his staff in a Chateau well behind the lines at the start of the Battle of the Somme, so far back that communications about the failure of the advance in most of the front line, couldn't get back to him to enable him to change his tactics and approach to the unfolding disaster. And the pre-planned wave after wave of men going "over the top" fell to the machine guns of the well defended German lines.

regards

Tom

Well, very difficult for Nelson to be anywhere else in early nineteenth century naval warfare; rather like Wellington, I suppose, at Waterloo. He did OK, of course. from his military activities - a dukedom, a stately home vastly bigger than Haig's, titles and pension from the Spanish government - the latter of which, in part at least, I think is still paid to the current Duke). I wonder what the pension provisions were for those 'Tommies' (to use an anachronsim) and their dependents who fought at Waterloo and were crippled or killed?

Haig, of course, was not commanding at the Somme in a sense that would be recognised by, eg Wellington - he was the C-in-C of the whole BEF, not of the Fourth nor the Reserve armies.

As to comms problems, method of attack, etc etc: all matters that will have been dealt with in great detail at some stage or the other in the Forum's history.

[Muerrisch]

" it comes from first hand experience of peoples lives destroyed by the war."

So if Haig had not been in charge, peoples lives would not have been destroyed by the war?

"Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde" General Mangin.

A thought for the "Lions led by Donkeys" school:

Given that Haig was appointed G O C in C,

WHAT SHOULD HE HAVE DONE rather than WHAT SHOULD HE NOT HAVE DONE?

[Guest]

For an earlier and far more entertaining read on the Haig debate this is worth reading. Click . It includes contributions from a number of informed members of the GWF, past and present. MG

[Gareth Davies]

Thank you for that link Martin. It got quite heated/nasty, didn't it?

[Steven Broomfield]

For an earlier and far more entertaining read on the Haig debate this is worth reading. Click . It includes contributions from a number of informed members of the GWF, past and present. MG

And, dare one say, one or two uninformed members.

[Guest]

Thank you for that link Martin. It got quite heated/nasty, didn't it?

Peter Hart nearly at his very best: sharp, precise and informed. I particularly liked the way the moniker 'Butcher' was dismantled and shown to be a modern construct. Nice. Rather odd that the NAM has such an unbalanced view. I particularly liked the way the debate ground to a crashing halt when the young 14 year old 'Courtney Loveflowers' described him as a 'bit of an idiot', swiftly followed by 'Diane' whose grandfather and Great War veteran actually named his son Douglas Haig. Deuce.

I suspect there will always be 'heat' when Haig is being debated. I am amazed that no-one has promoted the label 'Haigiography' for the Revisionist school.

I don't have a dog in this fight but there is some astonishing conjecture in the place of hard facts. Never let facts get in the way of a good story. Keep it coming. Possibly the most entertaining debate of the year to date. Maybe it should be an annual event.

MG

And, dare one say, one or two uninformed members.

I thought that would be crashingly obvious. To my knowledge the 'uninformed' were not GWF members viz '2 million killed'. I may be wrong. My error.... MG

[Steven Broomfield]

Odd that Haig's detractors don't mention the Menin Road in 1914 as commander of I Corps. Leading from the front there.

I thought that would be crashingly obvious. To my knowledge the 'uninformed' were not GWF members. I may be wrong. My error.... MG

One at least had been in the dim and distant. Banned after launching a rather unpleasant personal attack on me (ME!! Of all people) in a matter completely unrelated to the GW. I actually ended up threatening legal action.

[Gareth Davies]

Peter Hart nearly at his very best: sharp, precise and informed. I particularly liked the way the moniker 'Butcher' was dismantled and shown to be a modern construct. Nice. Rather odd that the NAM has such an unbalanced view. I particularly liked the way the debate ground to a crashing halt when the young 14 year old 'Courtney Loveflowers' described him as a 'bit of an idiot', swiftly followed by 'Diane' whose grandfather and Great War veteran actually named his son Douglas Haig. Deuce.

I suspect there will always be 'heat' when Haig is being debated. I am amazed that no-one has promoted the label 'Haigiography' for the Revisionist school.

I don't have a dog in this fight but there is some astonishing conjecture in the place of hard facts. Never let facts get in the way of a good story. Keep it coming. Possibly the most entertaining debate of the year to date. Maybe it should be an annual event.

MG

I thought that would be crashingly obvious. To my knowledge the 'uninformed' were not GWF members viz '2 million killed'. I may be wrong. My error.... MG

This is of course the same NAM that closed in Apr 2014 for a 2 yr refurb.

" it comes from first hand experience of peoples lives destroyed by the war."

So if Haig had not been in charge, peoples lives would not have been destroyed by the war?

"Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde" General Mangin.

A thought for the "Lions led by Donkeys" school:

Given that Haig was appointed G O C in C,

WHAT SHOULD HE HAVE DONE rather than WHAT SHOULD HE NOT HAVE DONE?

I think Grumpy has asked a very good question. I look forward to the answers.

[phil andrade]

Odd people, we British.

Find a soldier who wins a war, and opprobrium is heaped upon him.

The Germans marked Hindenburg - a loser - for high office.

They must be odd people, too.

Better to be odd on the winning side, I suppose.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Odd that Haig's detractors don't mention the Menin Road in 1914 as commander of I Corps. Leading from the front there.

One at least had been in the dim and distant. Banned after launching a rather unpleasant personal attack on me (ME!! Of all people) in a matter completely unrelated to the GW. I actually ended up threatening legal action.

Pray tell. I hope you kept the original screen shots.

On topic. does anyone know:

1. How many ex-servicemen were in the British Legion after the Great War (or the Haig Fund/Foundation or whatever it was called). Presumably those who despised Haig would not be members...

2. How many people attended his multiple funerals? I assume they were not there to throw stones.

3. Was there a book of condolence or a memorial book? If so how many signed it.

4. What did Lloyd George have to say about him when he died rather than when he wrote his War Memoirs?

Simply curious to establish how many had positive views of him as late as 1928. MG

[Steven Broomfield]

Pray tell. I hope you kept the original screen shots.

I'll e-mail you, and no, I didn't.

[nigelcave]

Odd that Haig's detractors don't mention the Menin Road in 1914 as commander of I Corps. Leading from the front there.

One at least had been in the dim and distant. Banned after launching a rather unpleasant personal attack on me (ME!! Of all people) in a matter completely unrelated to the GW. I actually ended up threatening legal action.

The thought that anyone could be so unpleasant to someone so distinguished as yourself has come as such a shock to my system that I had to dig around for some fig rolls and am now searching for the brandy bottle.