Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[tumbi1]

4 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Rawlinson wanted a long preparatory bombardment over many days. Haig recommended a hurricane bombardment. Rawlinson reviewed the recommendation and still wanted a long preparatory bombardment. We know what type of bombardment was actually used, showing that Haig did not overrule Rawlinson nor did Haig disallow 'criticism'.

Robert

Of course Haig discussed things with his higher commanders, and there was some give or take, but from the Fourth Army Tactical Notes; " it must be remembered that all criticism by subordinates of their superiors, and of orders received from superior authority, will in the end recoil on the heads of the critics".  From what I have read this was the the vibe from the top down.

 

 At the end of the day Haig was in command of the Somme battle and he carries a lot of the responsibility for the disaster.

[phil andrade]

Responsibility is one thing , culpability another.

 

Editing here : I suppose that's the nub of it...I wasn't just making a pedantic point : Haig bore an immense responsibility, and that in itself makes him worthy of recognition and - dare I say it ? - reward.  If, in the course of carrying that burden, he exhibited culpability that cost hundreds of thousands of lives that might otherwise have been spared, then, of course, we have good reason to be dismayed.

 

Phil 

[phil andrade]

10 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

We need to be cautious about applying such a comparison. Neuve Chapelle was fought on a much narrower front. This enabled the Germans to contain the break-in, not least because of the reach of flanking artillery. I illustrated the point in this post here and in subsequent posts in the same thread. The issue about weight of shells per yard is also addressed too.

 

It should be recalled that, although Neuve Chapelle's short preparatory bombardment proved a great success (at least on most of the front attacked), the attempts to repeat this in the next battle failed because the Germans made significant improvements to their trenches in French Flanders, as well as the wire defences. These improvements were hastened by the lessons learned from Neuve Chapelle.

 

Robert

 

The point about being circumspect in making comparisons was fully acknowledged by me in post number 466, Robert.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

The point about being circumspect in making comparisons was fully acknowledged by me in post number 466, Robert.

Apologies, Phil. I was writing in agreement with this point. The purpose of my post was to raise some additional considerations. The problem with electronic messaging is that the tone doesn't transfer with the text. I wasn't criticising the original note.

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

Thank you, Robert.

 

How right you are about electronic messages failing to match tone and text !

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

On 25 June 2016 at 02:06, tumbi1 said:

... from the Fourth Army Tactical Notes; " it must be remembered that all criticism by subordinates of their superiors, and of orders received from superior authority, will in the end recoil on the heads of the critics".  From what I have read this was the the vibe from the top down.

tumbi1, what was the date when this note was issued?

 

Robert

[tumbi1]

On 6/26/2016 at 15:18, Robert Dunlop said:

tumbi1, what was the date when this note was issued?

 

Robert

May 1916.  In this booklet the quote is actually highlighted for emphasis.  I first saw reference to this booklet in "Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918" by Dr Martin Samuels, which is an excellent read.

 

I can't find a downloadable copy of the booklet, but you can see the cover and excerpt here; https://www.dur.ac.uk/palace.green/whatshere/iotm/

[Robert Dunlop]

On 27 June 2016 at 07:46, tumbi1 said:

I first saw reference to this booklet in "Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918" by Dr Martin Samuels, which is an excellent read.

Thank you very much for posting the link, tumbi1. I thought that was the booklet you referred to, so thank you for the confirmation.

 

I have Samuels' book but it has been many years since I read it. I remember being struck at the time by the distinction that Samuels drew between British and German command styles. A lot of information has emerged since then but, if I understand correctly, there is the sense that Haig pursued a top down, no questions asked or tolerated command style, that this approach resulted in the 'failure' of July 1st, and therefore he did not warrant receiving a 'reward' post war. Have I interpreted your point correctly?

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

Doesn't the summary of the book state that while individual battalions were given a degree of lattitude, in the event this was to be of no avail against unsupressed artillery and machine gun fire ?

 

The Germans kept on alluding to the rigidity of the British, even as late as the end of 1917, when there had been several British and Dominion successes at Arras/Vimy, Messines, Broodseinde and Cambrai.

 

Phil  

[Old Tom]

I hesitate to add to this interesting and well informed debate, but would like to suggest that the solution of the question about the effectiveness of artillery- which is the most important consideration - lies with the different views of Haig and Rawlinson. In other words 'bite and hold' or 'breakthrough'. The dilution of artillery fire as a result of Haig's decision to attack two German lines rather than one at a time as intended by Rawlinson has been discussed in detail. My somewhat superficial appreciation of the conduct of the war as a whole is that, as time would tell,  Rawlinson was correct and that Haig was wrong.  The relationship between the two generals has been discussed elsewhere as has the 'top down' nature of command at that stage of the war.  Haig was the boss!

[MikeMeech]

2 hours ago, Old Tom said:

I hesitate to add to this interesting and well informed debate, but would like to suggest that the solution of the question about the effectiveness of artillery- which is the most important consideration - lies with the different views of Haig and Rawlinson. In other words 'bite and hold' or 'breakthrough'. The dilution of artillery fire as a result of Haig's decision to attack two German lines rather than one at a time as intended by Rawlinson has been discussed in detail. My somewhat superficial appreciation of the conduct of the war as a whole is that, as time would tell,  Rawlinson was correct and that Haig was wrong.  The relationship between the two generals has been discussed elsewhere as has the 'top down' nature of command at that stage of the war.  Haig was the boss!

Hi

 

Then again, just to confuse matters, there is the refusal by Rawlinson to allow XIII Corps to advance after taking the first line despite requests from its commander, there was little resistance in front of them.  This is regarded as a missed opportunity, Gary Sheffield's article in the July 1916 History Today covers this fairly fully. Also he comments that:

 

"While Haig has often been accused of blindly adhering to a doctrine of breakthrough, on July 1st, 1916 it was Rawlinson's rigid refusal to countenance anything  but a limited 'bite and hold' approach that was disastrous." 

 

Mike

[Old Tom]

Mike,  A sound point which is in addition to my attempt to highlight the artillery question. I am just re-reading Gary Shefield's 'The Somme' written in 2003 which seems  less definitive as to the lack of exploitation of XIII Corps success. I think this is worth discussion and I will start another thread. 

[Robert Dunlop]

There is a lot of information about the artillery planning for the Somme and about the concept of 'breakthrough' starting here. The latter concept has been incorrectly applied after the battle. It was Haig's intention that the British were prepared to exploit a collapse of the German army defending the Somme. This was quite a different concept. The issue of the artillery attacks on the German second line needs to be appraised carefully. The problem with the German machine guns was that the artillery fire lifted off the German lines as the British began to leave their trenches. This was a problem of the moment, not related to the preparatory artillery fire in preceding days irrespective of which lines were bombarded during that earlier phase.

 

Robert

[tumbi1]

20 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Thank you very much for posting the link, tumbi1. I thought that was the booklet you referred to, so thank you for the confirmation.

 

I have Samuels' book but it has been many years since I read it. I remember being struck at the time by the distinction that Samuels drew between British and German command styles. A lot of information has emerged since then but, if I understand correctly, there is the sense that Haig pursued a top down, no questions asked or tolerated command style, that this approach resulted in the 'failure' of July 1st, and therefore he did not warrant receiving a 'reward' post war. Have I interpreted your point correctly?

 

Robert

No worries Robert,

 

from what I have read the whole British command generally didn't tolerate criticism, but they weren't the only ones.  The French seemed to be experts at silencing critics as an example.  I think this 'command style' contributed significantly to the disaster on the 1st of July, and is just one example as to why Haig was not a great general in my view.  As such though he was just one of a generation of poor generals on both sides, and he most certainly didn't warrant a reward post war.  None of them did.  

[phil andrade]

Perhaps Haig was just out of his depth....and never more so than he was in the opening of the Somme offensive.

 

And, to be fair, who wasn't ?

 

Phil

[Guest]

What would you have done differently tumbi1?

 

Mike

[MikeMeech]

On ‎27‎/‎06‎/‎2016 at 07:46, tumbi1 said:

May 1916.  In this booklet the quote is actually highlighted for emphasis.  I first saw reference to this booklet in "Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918" by Dr Martin Samuels, which is an excellent read.

 

I can't find a downloadable copy of the booklet, but you can see the cover and excerpt here; https://www.dur.ac.uk/palace.green/whatshere/iotm/

Hi

I am not sure if this does show a 'command style'.  It appears clear to me, in the context of the paragraph it is in is that Officers should not criticise their superiors in front of their own subordinates.  This would "recoil on the heads of the critics and undermine their authority with those below them." because if the officer criticises his superiors then the subordinates can obviously criticise that officer.  I believe that applies today in the military.  Could officers in the German Army in WW1 criticise their superiors in front of their men?

Another point is that more senior officers are not meant to criticise more junior officers or NCOs in front of their subordinates, the principle is the same, it is about undermining authority.  It does happen though, I was present when my Flight Sergeant was 'told off' by the squadron commander.  I was not in a position to 'remove myself' and I found it a very uncomfortable situation (worse for the Flt Sgt) although it was not something I mentioned to anyone else on the squadron.  Another incident was when a senior officer 'told off' a junior officer when we were in the same office, again I couldn't leave, again it was very uncomfortable.  If incidents like that happened in front of larger groups it would undermine authority in the individual, as would 'public' criticism of more senior officers by juniors in front of their men.

 

Mike 

[MikeMeech]

5 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

I am not sure if this does show a 'command style'.  It appears clear to me, in the context of the paragraph it is in is that Officers should not criticise their superiors in front of their own subordinates.  This would "recoil on the heads of the critics and undermine their authority with those below them." because if the officer criticises his superiors then the subordinates can obviously criticise that officer.  I believe that applies today in the military.  Could officers in the German Army in WW1 criticise their superiors in front of their men?

Another point is that more senior officers are not meant to criticise more junior officers or NCOs in front of their subordinates, the principle is the same, it is about undermining authority.  It does happen though, I was present when my Flight Sergeant was 'told off' by the squadron commander.  I was not in a position to 'remove myself' and I found it a very uncomfortable situation (worse for the Flt Sgt) although it was not something I mentioned to anyone else on the squadron.  Another incident was when a senior officer 'told off' a junior officer when we were in the same office, again I couldn't leave, again it was very uncomfortable.  If incidents like that happened in front of larger groups it would undermine authority in the individual, as would 'public' criticism of more senior officers by juniors in front of their men.

 

Mike 

Hi

Just so everyone can compare the use of the quote from the 'Fourth Army Tactical Notes' original and its use in Samuels.

 

 

 

Mike

 

[charlie962]

Well done Mike in making this proper comparison in context. This now reads like a perfectly normal statement about criticism.

As I understand it Haig allowed Rawlinson, an infantryman, considerable latitude in terms of tactics and objectives and did not impose his views on length of bombardment nor objective of two lines all along the front. Rawlinson in turn allowed considerable latitude to the Divisional Commanders as to when their infantry followed their particular types of barrage. Perhaps 'too much' would be a fair criticism?

Charlie962

[Robert Dunlop]

17 hours ago, tumbi1 said:

...from what I have read the whole British command generally didn't tolerate criticism...

Have you had a chance to read the actual records of the British planning meetings?

 

Robert

[David Filsell]

Everybody was out of their depth. A new style of war, the need to build a 'new'. army capable of beating an efficient foe, the bones of the old army -  officers at all levels, particularly trained staff officers in 14 and 15 lost. Then the  creation of a massive military corporation - from logistics to tactical and strategical developments, development of leaders  et al.  The facts and realities of the Great War ensured everyone was out of their depth.

[tumbi1]

On 7/1/2016 at 03:45, charlie962 said:

Well done Mike in making this proper comparison in context. This now reads like a perfectly normal statement about criticism.

As I understand it Haig allowed Rawlinson, an infantryman, considerable latitude in terms of tactics and objectives and did not impose his views on length of bombardment nor objective of two lines all along the front. Rawlinson in turn allowed considerable latitude to the Divisional Commanders as to when their infantry followed their particular types of barrage. Perhaps 'too much' would be a fair criticism?

Charlie962

I wouldn't call it a perfectly normal statement about criticism, as it meant exactly what it says - any criticism will not be tolerated, so if you voice your concerns you are in trouble.  Samuels also uses that quote on P59 under 'The cult of rank', with another quote from that section; "the authority of the commander-in-chief is impaired by permitting subordinates to advance their own ideas".  Samuels gives a good example of a junior officer at a conference in 1912 having strips torn off him after he offered a possible solution to a problem.  Also during the battle of the Somme, when the Fourth Army asked their divisional commanders for comments, "there was a considerable reluctance actually to point out mistakes, and when Brigadier General Kentish did so, he was in turn criticised for being a critic!".

 

My point is that generally speaking this is the way the British high command operated, and from what I have read this certainly includes Haig.  This is just one of his character traits that made him a poor General, but as I have said a few times he was just one of a generation of them.  They didn't deserve to be rewarded.

[squirrel]

If that was the case then surely the SS series of pamphlets would never have been formulated, printed, distributed with no learning process and nothing would have changed?

[phil andrade]

But he won.

 

Phil

[MikeMeech]

Hi

I have attached the first two pages of the 'Fourth Army Tactical Notes', the whole document is available as Appendix 18 of the Official History 1916 Appendices 1 Volume.

 

Mike