Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[MikeMeech]

Hi

Here is the conclusion to the 'Tactical Notes' that mentions what they are based on.

 

Mike

 

[towisuk]

On 07/07/2016 at 22:26, phil andrade said:

But he won.

 

Phil

 

But at what cost??? just look at the panorama of cemeteries scattered across the front line of the Somme, and think of the men buried in them (not forgetting the missing) and their families at home. These were real people, who were thrown against a well dug in enemy who's machine guns reaped a harvest of victims never seen before.  

 

The £250,000 award amounts to around 35 pence (in new money) per casualty for the Somme ....

Cannon fodder is certainly an apt expression.... 

 

regards

Tom

[PhilB]

On ‎07‎/‎07‎/‎2016 at 22:26, phil andrade said:

But he won.

 

Phil

Almost deserves a thread of its own - "Haig won, what does it prove?"  (Although, technically it was Foch that won). Winning certainly doesn't prove one is a bad general but does it prove one is a good or great general?

[phil andrade]

42 minutes ago, PhilB said:

Almost deserves a thread of its own - "Haig won, what does it prove?"  (Although, technically it was Foch that won). Winning certainly doesn't prove one is a bad general but does it prove one is a good or great general?

 

It proves that he could have done worse, which, as Wellington might have said, is something.

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

2 hours ago, towisuk said:

 

But at what cost??? just look at the panorama of cemeteries scattered across the front line of the Somme, and think of the men buried in them (not forgetting the missing) and their families at home. These were real people, who were thrown against a well dug in enemy who's machine guns reaped a harvest of victims never seen before.  

 

The £250,000 award amounts to around 35 pence (in new money) per casualty for the Somme ....

Cannon fodder is certainly an apt expression.... 

 

regards

Tom

 

 

Was that awful war ever going to be won without paying an immense price in lives ?  I suppose that  it might have been - for the British people - if, as was to happen a generation later, the population of Russia bore ninety per cent of that price....but that's opening up such a monstrous can of worms that I'll put my head down.

 

Had there been a 1920s or 30s version of the Chilcot Report, I wonder how far the blame might have been focused on politicians rather than soldiers.

 

The allusion to people being thrown against a well dug in enemy needs to be treated with circumspection.  That enemy wasn't just sitting back and waiting to be attacked...it was occupying Franco Belgian soil, as the aggressor, and imposing a harsh ordeal on those subjected to it.  Worse than that, the Germans pursued their advantage by dint of constant harassment ...there was the dreadful prospect of suffering constant lethal fire from those German positions, even if no offensive was undertaken to expel the enemy.

 

I know I'm stating the obvious, but sometimes it needs reiteration.

 

Phil

 

 

[charlie962]

One can criticise individual men and actions and always argue it could have been done differently by someone else in a more efficient way. It is fascinating to read threads like this and previous years and get pulled in all directions. But it always seems to me to come back to the same questions and I find my responses unchanged despite keeping an open mind and learning from all those who are better equipped than I to express the arguments and carry out the research.

 

From a purely miltary viewpoint:

Could the war have been won without killing an awful lot of Germans ?

Could an awful lot of Germans be killed without suffering huge casualties on our side?

Unpalatable as it is, isn't it more a question of 'when' rather then 'if' for these casualties?

The casualties in 1918 were enormous, were they not,  even though by then the allies were in theory near the top of the learning curve?

I appreciate that this is the War of Attrition argument . But isn't that the inevitable consequence of industrialised warfare with armies of millions of men?

 

The war could have been stopped earlier, but surely only by political compromise?

 

It seems to me that overall our military did their job. I'm not so sure of the politicians.

And whilst it is always good to find somebody to blame did we the people, the pawns, the cannonfodder, learn not to make the same mistakes again?

[phil andrade]

Interesting allusion to the enormous casualties in 1918 despite the allies being in theory near the top of the learning curve

 

That learning curve worked for the Germans as well, producing a horrific equilibrium.

 

It seems to me that overall our military did their job

 

Who's going to argue with that ?

 

I certainly won't.

 

Phil

 

 

[Robert Dunlop]

On 8 July 2016 at 11:56, MikeMeech said:

Here is the conclusion to the 'Tactical Notes' that mentions what they are based on.

Mike, thanks for posing the extra details.

 

Here is more context from British X Corps conference notes (G.S. 187). The meeting was held on 6th April, 1916. It included representatives from 32nd, 36th, and 49th Divisions:

 

"Discipline - It has been noticed that there is considerable difference between Divisions and between battalions and brigades of the same division in matters of cleanliness, smartness and saluting. Officers must pay continual [NB: 'considerable' was used in the typed original but this was scored out in pencil and overwritten with 'continual'] attention to this question, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. Officers must be made to stop men who fail to salute them and report the men to their units."

 

I will start a separate thread on the issue of British command and intolerance or otherwise of 'criticism'.  

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

Could  an awful lot of Germans be killed without suffering huge casualties on our side ?

 

This is a very fair question/comment ; I feel that Haig was terribly mistaken in his belief that the Germans were suffering more heavily than the British in the Somme and Passchendaele fighting.

 

The fact that Churchill challenged this belief in his August 1916 Memorandum strengthens the case against Haig in this respect.

 

This was not a case of arguing with the advantage of hindsight.  Churchill made estimates of the casualty exchange rates in the Somme fighting of July 1916 - at the time - that subsequent revelations from German archives vindicated.  The analysis was very unfavourable to the British claims regarding the attrition of the German army.

 

Haig, far from expressing disquiet about the claims that Churchill was making, wrote that Winston's head is gone from taking drugs !

 

Optimism in a commander is an essential attribute - and Haig had it in spades. But here we have something bordering on the delusional, with catastrophic consequences in terms of British loss of life.

 

As you will see from most of my responses, I'm very inclined to challenge or refute many of the anti Haig arguments....but on this matter of his interpretation of the casualty exchange rate, I feel uncomfortable about supporting him.

 

Maybe it was a case of him being told what he wanted to hear : Charteris was notorious for this syndrome.  Perhaps we're dealing with this refusal to countenance criticism that we've been discussing....a cultural aspect that was excessively developed in the British army ?

 

Phil

[squirrel]

Circumstances in 1914 were such that the small BEF was sent overseas in 1914 with little in the way of organised back up for replacements and re-equipping. Territorial battalions were employed on Home Defence and sent overseas to relieve Regular troops to be sent to France and Belgium. Territorials also were also sent to France and Belgium and joined there by the Indian Army in late 1914 and the Canadians in early 1915. By this time there was little of the Regular Army remaining. Those who had Volunteered for the Regular Army, Kitchener's Armies and the Territorials  also began to be sent in early to mid1915.

There was no organised industrial plan to resupply or arm and equip these men until the latter part of 1915 and shortages continued until the latter part of 1916. The quality of some of what was supplied to the troops abroad was appalling, particularly artillery shells.

Essentially, our Forces spent the first two and half years of the War fighting with one hand tied behind their backs and learning as they went along.

By this time it was evident that the German Armies on the Western Front were not about to go home any time soon and that the only way to defeat their industrial strength was to outmatch them in that area and to employ greater numbers of men to do so. Was there another way? I have yet to find or see it anywhere it if there was. 

Having agreed to assist the French, if attacked, and complying with our treaty with Belgium, we were committed to fight a war for which we had insufficient men, arms and              equipment. The victory that was eventually gained, at an appalling cost, was achieved by those Senior Officers and Commanders, most of whom had years of experience in a         totally different kind of warfare and could not  have foreseen what a European War would bring, did what they could with what they had until well trained and equipped Armies were capable of taking on the Germans and beating them.

 

As Chris states: " You can argue all you like about how efficiently or effectively the command carried out its instructions, and whether that contributed to more deaths that might otherwise have been incurred, but in a war of continental scale it was 100% inevitable that there would be many deaths regardless of what the military command did if it was to carry out its instructions. That seems to me an irreducible minimum that can only be placed at the feet of politicians. And then we must ask: which politicians?"

[Muerrisch]

Well said Squirrel. I have never heard of the concept of the " irreducible minimum", but, although unquantifiable, it is a concept that has a grain of new truth. The French General Mangin said something like "whatever you do, you lose a lot men". [in a French accent, no doubt].

 

This minimum is NOT a military construct, but a political one.

 

Regarding "criticism" ............. in my professional life there were two ways of voicing it. The useful one was one on one, private. The useless one was public. This is not rocket science, and can surely have been no different 100 years ago?

[phil andrade]

We are still left with Churchill's unpalatable argument - which I think he made with uncanny prescience - that Haig was deluded, or, more worryingly, allowed himself to be deluded, into a certainty that the horrific Somme fighting was working to the British advantage in terms of casualties.

 

There is an exquisite sequel to Churchill's rendition about his Memorandum, which I must cite because it so clearly demonstrates the kind of syndrome that I alluded to earlier , and which other forumites are discussing in a different thread :

 

 The temptation to tell a Chief in a great position the things he most likes to hear is one of the commonest explanations of mistaken policy. An Emperor, a Commander-in-Chief, even a Prime Minister in time of war, is in the main surrounded by smiling and respectful faces.  Most people who come into contact with him in times of strain feel honoured by contact with so much power or in sympathy with the bearer of such heavy burdens.  They are often prompted to use smooth processes , to mention some favourable item, to leave unsaid some ugly misgiving or some awkward contradiction.  Thus the outlook of the leader on whose decision fearful events depend is usually far more sanguine than the brutal facts admit.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

20 hours ago, phil andrade said:

I feel that Haig was terribly mistaken in his belief that the Germans were suffering more heavily than the British in the Somme and Passchendaele fighting.

 

The fact that Churchill challenged this belief in his August 1916 Memorandum strengthens the case against Haig in this respect.

It cannot have been the case that Churchill challenged Haig's belief about the Germans suffering more casualties in the Somme and Passchendaele fighting in August 1916. The Somme had only just started and Passchendaele was still a year away. I understand the general point that you are making though. As to Haig being 'deluded', here are the notes of his comments to his army commanders in a meeting on 27th May, 1916:

 

"1. The Commander-in-Chief, in a brief review of the situation, pointed out that, however confident of success, it would not be sound to base our plans on the expectation of definitely destroying the enemy's power in one campaign before the winter. It was necessary to look ahead.

 

Our object must be -

 

a. To train our divisions, to continue to build up a large reserve of ammunition and other military resources, and to wear out the enemy as much as possible.

 

b. We must be prepared to support the French (who are losing severely at VERDUN) by a resolute attack. While, however, we attack and make preparations to exploit any success gained, we must nevertheless clearly keep in view the necessity for putting our troops in favourable positions for commencing a spring campaign in 1917 so as to make certain of success next year."

 

Haig had the ability to keep different perspectives in view at the same time, something that is referred to as scenario planning. It is possible for us to concentrate on one such scenario without recognising or realising that the other/s were being planned for simultaneously.

 

I will look out the quotes that I published in another thread on Passchendaele.

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert, 

 

You are of course right - Churchill could not have been challenging Haig's claims about Passchedaele one year before the battle was fought.

 

You will surely acknowledge, though, that his August Memorandum was a clear and contemporary refutation of the statistical claims being made at the very time that the Battle of the Somme was being fought.

 

As such, I find it a remarkable document, and I would love to hear what you and other forumites have to say about its content.

 

Were I to be a big anti Haig man, I would hang my hat on this.

 

Another thing strikes me as remarkable : the cordiality and, indeed, collaboration, that existed between Haig and Churchill in the post war years.  Churchill never relinquished his visceral criticism of Haig's perception of the Somme and Passchendaele battles.

Despite this, he was gracious in giving Haig a lot of credit and actually declared that his regard for Haig was such that he repudiated Beaverbrook's criticism that he had been " hedging" too much in his condemnation of Haig's strategy espoused in the WORLD CRISIS.

 

Haig was stung by some of Churchill's arguments, but still endorsed much of what Winston had written, and the friendship between the two men makes a very edifying historiographical counter point to the vile manner of Lloyd George's polemics against Haig.

 

Churchill , I am sure, would not only have accepted the legitimacy of Haig's post war rewards, but heartily endorsed them.

 

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, I think it is appropriate to suggest Haig was, perhaps, misinformed but I respectfully suggest he was not 'deluded'. As to the wider discussion of German casualties, this long thread is a good starting point - see here.

 

Robert

[PhilB]

On ‎09‎/‎07‎/‎2016 at 10:51, phil andrade said:

2 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

 

Churchill , I am sure, would not only have accepted the legitimacy of Haig's post war rewards, but heartily endorsed them.

 

Phil

 He very probably would, having been born in Blenheim Palace, a previous post war reward! A very impressive place to visit, by the way.

[Robert Dunlop]

3 hours ago, phil andrade said:

Churchill never relinquished his visceral criticism of Haig's perception of the Somme and Passchendaele battles.

Perhaps fuelled by Churchill's failure to impress when given a relatively low level command prior to the Somme .

 

Robert

[phil andrade]

52 minutes ago, PhilB said:

 He very probably would, having been born in Blenheim Palace, a previous post war reward! A very impressive place to visit, by the way.

 

Ah, good !

 

I was expecting that one !

 

One pampered toff protecting another one....the thought had occurred to me.

 

But I would ask any forumite  - who has time or inclination - to browse through that August Memorandum and reflect on its implications.

 

It looks like " back of a fag packet " stuff....yet how accurate he is : right on the button.

 

What does this tell us ?

 

Is it an indication of keeping the show on the  road by suppressing discordant comments ?

 

Very much a confluence of " issues" (  that dreadful word again) ...the Easterner versus the Westerner, the culture of keeping criticism at bay and telling the boss what he wants to hear, and, of course, the hard data about the casualty figures....perhaps I ought to make this a special study and open a thread to mark the Centennial.

 

It also has a topical ring to it, in view of Chilcot.

 

I like the denouement , with a gracious acknowledgement of Haig's abilities and achievements....an object lesson in how the High and Mighty can disagree and yet be buddies.

 

Phil

[Steven Broomfield]

1 hour ago, PhilB said:

 He very probably would, having been born in Blenheim Palace, a previous post war reward! A very impressive place to visit, by the way.

Which proves the point that Haig receiving a reward after winning a war for his country was by no means unusual - indeed, it was pretty common. Wellington didn't do too shabbily out of the slaughterhouse which was Waterloo and some pretty massive blood-letting in the Peninsula.

 

Montgomery, on the other hand, was made President of Portsmouth Football Club.

[David Filsell]

He was of course as, a soldier, a great admirer of Pompey

[phil andrade]

Viscount Montgomery of Alamein PPFC.

 

Any suggestions as to what PPFC might stand for ?

 

My dear old dad, who fought at Alamein, would have been very quick to suggest the answer, and it would NOT have been President of Portsmouth Football Club.

 

Some more quotation from Churchill's reflections on his Memorandum in THE WORLD CRISIS, if I may :

 

The statements in this memorandum were resented and repudiated both in the Cabinet and at General Headquarters, to which a copy found its way.  There is no doubt that I did not make sufficient allowance for the compulsion to an offensive excercised by the blind movement of events.  The facts were however only too true.

 

I have thought it right to thrash this controversy out in detail, to vindicate the claim which I make that I pass no important criticisms on the conduct of commanders in the light of after knowledge unless there exists documentary proof that substantially the same criticisms were put on record before or during the event, and while every point was disputed and unknowable.

 

Heavens ....that sounds familiar...things don't change, do they ?

 

He continues :

 

Sir Douglas Haig was not at this time well served by his advisers in the Intelligence Department of General Headquarters

 

Look at this allusion to the aversion to criticism :

 

The whole habit of mind of a military staff is based upon subordination of opinion.  It is not every councillor who, like the Bastard in " King John," will say to his sovereign :

 

" But if you be afeared to hear the worst,

Then let the worst unheard fall on your head "

 

And now look at this :

 

Yet when events are surveyed in retrospect, it does not seem just to throw the reproach of this battle upon Sir Douglas Haig.

 

You will see, I hope, why I find this writing so persuasive, and why I reckon we can incorporate it into discussions about Haig, his rewards and the way we view him today.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[phil andrade]

6 hours ago, Robert Dunlop said:

Phil, I think it is appropriate to suggest Haig was, perhaps, misinformed but I respectfully suggest he was not 'deluded'. As to the wider discussion of German casualties, this long thread is a good starting point - see here.

 

Robert

 

Yes, Robert, that was a massive thread, in the course of which I nearly became a casualty myself !

 

I know that I contributed a lot to it, and I hope that I cited Churchill's memorandum.

 

If Haig was convinced that his troops had inflicted more casualties on the Germans than they themselves had suffered on the Somme in 1916, then I would be confident in stating that he was deluded.

 

Perhaps I'd better check definitions.

 

As a caveat, I would suggest that the greater the extent of his "delusion" in the summer of 1916, the more he is to be admired for his performance in the same area of France two years later.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

[Guest]

For anyone interested in the information available to Haig when making his decisions, the book "Haig's Intelligence: the German Army 1916 - 1918" by Jim Beach might be a useful starting point. It is now available on Kindle for £21, a significant drop from its original price. I am in the middle of reading it and it is extremely well researched. There are masses of meticulous footnotes in each chapter with indicate the author has done some considerable research. It's basis was the author's PhD on the same subject. 

 

One of the key debating points is whether the intelligence Chief was selective in the intelligence briefs that he passed on to Haig. One school of thought is that Charteris, in a misguided attempt to maintain Haig's morale fed him overly optimistic reports on German casualties. The inference is that Haig's subsequent decisions may have been based on false or misleading information.

 

A counter-view is that Haig's over-optimism was independent of the intelligence reports.  I have not yet read the author's conclusions but the mass of detail on the British intelligence gathering operations is a real eye opener. Anyone reading the book would probably be much better informed on Haig's decision making process. MG

 

The thorny issue of calculating or at least estimating German casualties remains a contentious issue if the long thread on GWF is any indication. MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, thank you. However, calculating German casualties has never seemed a core consideration to my mind.

Battle is not a football game, whereby a side 3-2 up can be said to be winning. To know [or believe] that "we are killing them faster than they are killing us" might be good for morale but is without much significance except considered in the longest of attritional terms.

 

Surely of much greater significance is determining the strength and battleworthiness of the enemy at the front and in immediate reserve. At the Somme and at Passchendaele the assessments of these factors was apparently woefully optimistic. 

[phil andrade]

Winston's head is gone from taking drugs !  

 

Those words, or words very like them, were used by Haig as a riposte to Churchill's memorandum.

 

What better proof could we have of the disdain that those in GHQ felt for the views of a maverick politician who had been discredited, even if his  estimates of the statistical reality were to prove so uncomfortably accurate ?

 

Truly a demonstration of that syndrome recently dubbed " Tunnel vision and Tribalism" that stifled criticism and sustained excessive optimism.

 

The casualty exchange rate was an immensely important predicator of the success or failure of the Somme offensive.

 

Phil