Haig's Post War 'Rewards' ?

[Muerrisch]

This was said of a 17 year-old son of a senior RAF officer:

 

"He is arrogant and ignorant enough to become a Harrier pilot!"

 

I knew many such, and I wouldn't even lend them my old push bike to go down to the Mess.

[phil andrade]

Brian Holden-Reid was very emphatic on this differentiation between command and leadership.

 

It was something I'd never encountered before in my forays into military history, so I thought it worth citing and pitching it into the discussion.

 

Apparently, Bazaine was good at inspiring his men, and they fought well when he led them.

 

This was balanced by a complete failure to handle the responsibility of high command.

 

I know diddly squat about the Franco Prussian War, so I must make no further comment about what happened to the French in 1870.

 

Holden Reid was equally emphatic that Haig exhibited command skills, but will not be remembered as a leader.

 

Phil

[PhilB]

For the benefit of the discussion, could someone define and differentiate leadership skills and command skills?

[phil andrade]

Fair question , Phil...and one which I was frightened might be asked !

 

My interpretation : leadership entails ability ( and, of course, willingness ) to inspire trust and confidence in the soldiers, if need be by direst personal intervention in front of them.

 

Command : the exercise of control at " arm's length".

 

Now I'm looking at my answer, and feel that I have failed to make a decent account of myself !

 

Perhaps any serving or retired military folks might be kind enough to make a more professional response ?

 

Phil

[Gareth Davies]

According to current British doctrine:

 

Leadership is the projection of personality and purpose on to people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding circumstances.  To be a successful leader one needs to be a leader (values & standards, example, responsibility, influence), one needs to know how to be a leader (professional competence, effective intelligence, mental agility), and finally one needs to walk the walk and make things happen (develop oneself and others, build the team, and get results).  

 

Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.  Command has 4 constituent elements: Authority (and with authority comes responsibility and accountability), Decision Making, Leadership, and Control.

[Muerrisch]

Then again there are "Officer qualities" : OQs.

 

These mysterious aspects were much in vogue during my 41 years serving alongside [not in] the RAF.

 

I never dared ask!

[Gareth Davies]

OQs are not mentioned in either the Army's command or its leadership doctrine.

[Muerrisch]

this from an AAC site:

 

The Army Air Corps may be a flying corps however its officers still require essential qualities, as in any other branch of the British Army. 

These essential qualities are:

• Selfless Commitment
• Courage
• Discipline
• Integrity
• Loyalty
• Respect for others
• A sense of responsibility
• Leadership
• Mental agility

An additional characteristic necessary within the AAC is a willingness to learn, along with an eagerness to put skills and training into practice

[Gareth Davies]

The first 6 'essential qualities' listed above are the 6 values of the British Army that are required by all ranks.  A sense of responsibility is part of leadership. I would want mental agility in my soldiers and NCOs.  

 

But we are getting a little off topic.......

[Gareth Davies]

Although slightly pre-Great War, here is one officer's view on OQs:

 

An officer should be comely, spratly and above all else, confident in his own dress and bearing. He should, where possible, eat a small piece of meat each morning with molasses and beans. He should air himself gracefully when under fire and never place himself in a position of difficulty when being shot at. He should eat his meals comfortably and ahead of his soldiers, for it is he whom is more important tactically on the battlefield and therefore he who should be well nourished. His hair should be well groomed and if possible he should adorn a moustache or similar facial adornment. 

When speaking to his soldiers he should appear unnerved and aloof and give direction without in any way involving himself personally in the execution of arduous or un-officer like duties. He should smoke thin panatellas except when in the company of ladies where he should take only a small gin mixed with lemon tea. 

He should be an ardent and erudite gentleman and woo the ladies both in the formal environment and in the bedroom where he should excel himself beyond the ordinary soldier with his virulent love making prowess. 

These I say to you are the qualities of an officer that set him apart from the lay person and the common soldier.

Lieutenant-General Hubert Worthington

Commander In Chief
5th Royal Indian Mountain Division
Bombay

12th December 1907

 

 

[PhilB]

6 hours ago, Gareth Davies said:

According to current British doctrine:

 

Leadership is the projection of personality and purpose on to people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding circumstances.  To be a successful leader one needs to be a leader (values & standards, example, responsibility, influence), one needs to know how to be a leader (professional competence, effective intelligence, mental agility), and finally one needs to walk the walk and make things happen (develop oneself and others, build the team, and get results).  

 

Command is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.  Command has 4 constituent elements: Authority (and with authority comes responsibility and accountability), Decision Making, Leadership, and Control.

I find it somewhat confusing that leadership is listed among those things vested as part of command. Strikes me that leadership is a set of talents you have and command is something you`re given to exercise.

[Gareth Davies]

Yes. But the current view is that you can't exercise command if you don't have the required set of leadership talents.  

[charlie962]

Worth looking at this thesis on Heroic Leader /Heroic Manager distinction?

[Guest]

One of the challenges here is that the soldiers in the trenches were a number of degrees of separation from Haig. A private soldier in July 1916 would certainly know who his Platoon Commander, Company Commander and CO were (on occasion it could be the same man), but beyond that it is anyone's guess the level of tangible knowledge/awareness of Brigade, Division, Corps, Army, BEF commanders they would have. I suspect the 5 million who served would have very little awareness other than them being a list of remote names.

 

Decisions made by Haig as a result of diktats from the French objectives,  endorsed/approved by the War Cabinet would cascade down a number of tiers. How his 'leadership' or 'command' impacted the man on the ground could be a very large debate. His orders would be interpreted by a number of individuals and subjected to at least five separate layers of operational orders (and their subjective interpretations of how to achieve the objectives or 'mission' in more modern military parlance). I would argue that 'leadership' and 'command' really only impacted two levels down and for the soldier on the ground his deterministic* fate was largely determined by decisions made at Brigade and Battalion level.

 

* Deterministic: impacted by decisions rather than the random risks of death from non-deterministic sources such as long-range shellfire.

 

I am up to my eyes in the Guards Div Op Orders (pretty poor by modern standards but good by the standards of the Great War) and the three Guards Brigade Op Orders (ditto) and it is pretty clear that despite some rather intense and detailed planning and months of training, decisions made on the ground by local commanders at least 4 or 5  layers of command down from Haig on the day prior to some attacks resulted in some rather unfortunate and fatal consequences. On occasion they also had some rather positive consequences. The days that trench systems were taken with less than 1% casualties unfortunately don't make tabloid headlines. It is important to note that these days also existed, although no-one appears to be 'blamed' for these rather sublime successes that resulted from the lessons learned from prior experiences. One only has to look at the many thousands of pages of operational reports to understand that these men were very focused on learning from prior mistakes and it is this process that ultimately worked. Mny of the reports include lists of recommended changes in tactics and what would now be called battle procedure (to use a modern term) 

 

The core of this debate is about perceptions of Haig and how his decisions impacted the man on the ground. The more I read and study the battles the less I believe his decisions were the cause of such randomly chaotic and fatal outcomes. To understand how and why so many men died I think it would require a few lifetimes' worth of research. It is pretty clear (to me at least) from the sliver I have studied in sufficient detail that the cascade of orders from 'leader' to the ultimately 'led' involved a myriad of inputs from subordinate leaders/commanders: at Army, Corps, Division, Brigade and Battalion level (and their respective Staffs) which added to the complexity of the 'chaotic' system they were working in. I use 'chaotic' in the mathematical sense of Chaos Theory where there is an underlying order in a seemingly random system.

 

It would be interesting to hear from his critics quite how his decisions impacted the men on the ground without involving at least five layers of subordinate commanders and their hundreds of staff. It was a very large team. That none of their rivals managed to do any better suggest to me that it was a systemic problem that was beyond the technology of the time. 

 

While I am open to the idea that Pte T Atkin's death can be attributed to decisions made by Haig, I think it is a fairly simplistic approach that ignores a much more complex set of deliberate inputs down the long chain of command and rather a lot of random factors too. - some as simple but as chaotic as predicting the weather in the case of gas attacks. 

 

MG

Edited 22 June , 2016 by Guest
some additional thoughts

[tumbi1]

18 hours ago, QGE said:

It would be interesting to hear from his critics quite how his decisions impacted the men on the ground without involving at least five layers of subordinate commanders and their hundreds of staff. It was a very large team. That none of their rivals managed to do any better suggest to me that it was a systemic problem that was beyond the technology of the time. 

 

While I am open to the idea that Pte T Atkin's death can be attributed to decisions made by Haig, I think it is a fairly simplistic approach that ignores a much more complex set of deliberate inputs down the long chain of command and rather a lot of random factors too. - some as simple but as chaotic as predicting the weather in the case of gas attacks. 

 

MG

This is a great way of looking at things MG, as it is always a lot more complex than 'it was all Haig's fault'.

 

One example of Haig's 'decisions', or more accurately 'outlook', that had a major impact on the men he led was when planning the Battle of the Somme.  He was over confident in regards to the artillery preparation, and this over confidence was reflected down the chain of command, to the point where no criticism was allowed.  It wasn't only Haig of course, as most of the high command were in on it, but he was their leader.  He at times had doubts, but then his subordinates reinforced his confidence again. 

 

von Falkenhayn's planning for Verdun seems to have been equally over confident, and when his hoped for break through didn't eventuate he too reverted to attrition, with equally disastrous results.  von Falkenhayn's subordinates also reinforced his confidence when he was questioning the outcome at times, and their men paid for it.

[phil andrade]

When we consider the British artillery deployment for the Somme, we might do well to compare it with that of Neuve Chapelle.

 

The number of guns per yard of front attacked had been much higher at NC than  it was to be on the Somme.

 

I don't have the stats to hand, but I'm sure the figures will bear me out.

 

The action of March 1915 was far more localised, and on a much smaller scale, so it might be unfair to draw the comparison, but I cannot help but wonder whether Haig was anxious about the relatively thinly stretched array of guns in June 1916.

 

The earlier action had made a convincing demonstration of what a high concentration of guns could achieve in an intense barrage, albeit on a narrow frontage.

 

Maybe Haig was all too aware, but felt pressured into compliance with something that he would have preferred to delay until his artillery was up to the job.

 

Joffre was very insistent, citing the toll of Verdun.  He was not so worried about Verdun when he dealt with Petain....an intriguing contrast.

 

I wonder if you're right about Falkenhayn and Verdun, tumbi 1 .....he was insistent on restraint and economy, limiting the attack to the right bank of the Meuse, while his subordinates wanted to go for it on both banks.

 

But then Falkenhayn was an enigmatic commander, and Verdun  - in my opinion - was the most enigmatic of all battles.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Chris_Baker]

6 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

When we consider the British artillery deployment for the Somme, we might do well to compare it with that of Neuve Chapelle.

 

The number of guns per yard of front attacked had been much higher at NC than  it was to be on the Somme.

 

I don't have the stats to hand, but I'm sure the figures will bear me out.

 

The action of March 1915 was far more localised, and on a much smaller scale, so it might be unfair to draw the comparison, but I cannot help but wonder whether Haig was anxious about the relatively thinly stretched array of guns in June 1916.

 

The earlier action had made a convincing demonstration of what a high concentration of guns could achieve in an intense barrage, albeit on a narrow frontage.

 

Maybe Haig was all too aware, but felt pressured into compliance with something that he would have preferred to delay until his artillery was up to the job.

 

...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

That's quite right, Phil. It makes it even more curious as to why Haig thought it best to spread his artillery firepower over the first two German defensive systems rather than concentrate on one. Details at http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/battles-of-the-western-front-in-france-and-flanders/the-battles-of-the-somme-1916/british-artillery-bombardment-before-the-infantry-attack-on-the-somme/

[Guest]

Just a thought that the percentage of shells that actually exploded and did their job would be higher in July 1916 than at Neuve Chapelle. (If it makes any odds?)

 

Mike

[phil andrade]

A good point, Mike...truth to tell, that had not occurred to me.

 

I suggest that the weight of fire per square yard was so much greater at Neuve Chapelle, that the effect of duds was less pernicious than it was to be in the Somme bombardment.

 

Another thing....had the exponential increase in the supply of shells by 1916 compromised their  quality in favour of their quantity ... ?

 

Then, too, the German defences were much stronger in that chalk soil of Picardy by summer 1916 than they were in the primitive defences of Artois in early 1915.

 

These are not things that I know, so much as an attempt to deal with your very valid comment.

 

Phil

 

 

[Chris_Baker]

From memory, Robin Prior gives the artillery statistics for Neuve Chapelle and the Somme in his "Command on the Western Fron".

 

I think that is where I go my " [NC] bombardment, for weight of shell fired per yard of enemy front, was the heaviest that would be fired until 1917"

 

http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/battles-of-the-western-front-in-france-and-flanders/the-battle-of-neuve-chapelle/

[phil andrade]

Thank you, Chris.

 

One more thing I should have remembered : the NC artillery delivered a surprise hurricane barrage, and the Germans were not prepared.  Another striking contrast with the Somme, where surprise in this respect was minimal.

 

Phil

[Guest]

Another bonus with the new Forum is that a link to a page of search results works now, so, for example, a search for "haig + somme + bombardment" yields these results

 

Click

 

Before the upgrade this would not have worked as a link.

 

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

On 22 June 2016 at 16:52, phil andrade said:

When we consider the British artillery deployment for the Somme, we might do well to compare it with that of Neuve Chapelle.

 

The number of guns per yard of front attacked had been much higher at NC than  it was to be on the Somme.

We need to be cautious about applying such a comparison. Neuve Chapelle was fought on a much narrower front. This enabled the Germans to contain the break-in, not least because of the reach of flanking artillery. I illustrated the point in this post here and in subsequent posts in the same thread. The issue about weight of shells per yard is also addressed too.

 

It should be recalled that, although Neuve Chapelle's short preparatory bombardment proved a great success (at least on most of the front attacked), the attempts to repeat this in the next battle failed because the Germans made significant improvements to their trenches in French Flanders, as well as the wire defences. These improvements were hastened by the lessons learned from Neuve Chapelle.

 

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

On the issue of firing more and heavier shells (had more barrels been available), see the post here.

[Robert Dunlop]

On 22 June 2016 at 14:10, tumbi1 said:

One example of Haig's 'decisions', or more accurately 'outlook', that had a major impact on the men he led was when planning the Battle of the Somme.  He was over confident in regards to the artillery preparation, and this over confidence was reflected down the chain of command, to the point where no criticism was allowed. 

Rawlinson wanted a long preparatory bombardment over many days. Haig recommended a hurricane bombardment. Rawlinson reviewed the recommendation and still wanted a long preparatory bombardment. We know what type of bombardment was actually used, showing that Haig did not overrule Rawlinson nor did Haig disallow 'criticism'.

Robert