Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[Robert Dunlop]

'What Happened Next on 20 November

"Significant enemy attacks are not expected against this army front in the near future," was how the 2nd Army reported the situation on 16 November to the German High Command. Four days later, in the grey morning of 20 November, almost all their positions from Arras to north of St Quentin were under heavy British artillery fire.

Instead of the usual prolonged preparatory bombardment, the British had used the totally new tactic of a sudden barrage with "gas, smoke and high explosives" that disguised the true objective of the attack*. Instead of the presumed small attack with "the objective of capturing Havrincourt", a seemingly limited goal, the strong forces were being used on a broad front for the offensive. With a crashing blow the so-called "quiet front" was transformed by fierce fighting that raged across the battleground. It was an assault in the fullest sense of the word. It met the German regiments in a state of combat-readiness, but too widely spread out and virtually without any weapons that could take on the most dangerous opponent of the day - the tanks.

Thus the "land battleships” broke through the German frontline in countless places from Havrincourt to just west of Banteux. The sectors of the strong Siegfried Line occupied by the whole of the 54th Infantry Division and the flank regiment of the adjacent 9th Reserve Division were lost. The enemy began to roll up the front trenches of the 20th Landwehr Division, while the British 62nd Division turned from Havrincourt toward Graincourt, and numerous assault columns converged from Ribécourt towards the section of canal south of Cambrai. The tanks were always at the forefront clearing the way. On that day, they were the main weapon of attack , under whose protection operated all the British assault divisions. There was only one place, Flesquières, where the brigades of the British 51st Division were held up, just like a storm tide breaking against a firm rock.

* The British secondary attack against the 183rd Infantry Division was totally defeated in the morning. The enemy did occupy parts of the forward zone in the sector covered by the 240th Infantry Division, south-east of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles and north of Bullecourt. The German counter-attacks failed but, on the other hand, the British could not extend the break-ins over the following days.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'Flesquières

In accordance with previous plans, the commander of the 27th Reserve Infantry Regiment was ordered up from Marcoing to Flesquières. Major Krebs rode with his staff along the canal via Noyelles and through Nine Wood. From the front came the powerful roar of the battle. Heavy hostile fire was falling on the access routes and crossroads. The dense fog made observation impossible.

The ride led past the artillery positions, which were massed east of Flesquieres. British shells of various calibers had been falling on the battery positions since the early morning. Numerous guns had been destroyed by the heavy enemy fire. However, shot after shot flew in rapid sequence from the surviving barrels. The defensive fire had to be repeatedly interrupted. Sections and batteries sent officers and NCOs forward in order to get through the fog and get some idea of the combat situation*.

At 0900 hours Major Krebs arrived at the 84th Infantry Regiment’s command post. As already mentioned, II battalion had already been sent down to occupy the Oetinger Switch Line with the main forces. Flesquières, as well as the rest of the high ground, was under heavy enemy artillery fire. The messages that already had been sent from the front line were extremely unsatisfactory, with only the I/84th Infantry Regiment staff still in telephone contact - the battalion commander had asked for help because the enemy had penetrated into the K 1 line. There was no information from the sector on the left. The noise of the battle was becoming ever louder. A worrying sign! Major Krebs immediately collected all his available forces. Major Stubenrauch did not receive the order to stay in the Support Line, but II Battailon’s Machine Gun Company and part of 8th Company were stopped from going forward. Half-battalion Pfaehler travelled up by truck from Fontaine-Notre-Dame to southwest of Cantaing, where it was ordered by 3/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment to send forward the 4th Company to the left of their position in the forward trench of the Support Line, just east of the depots.

The two regimental commanders waited impatiently for further messages, while they themselves could only provide incomplete information about the situation when requested by the higher command. The terrible din of combat drew closer. Then the first tanks appeared. At first they sought to cover their approach with a smoke screen. Then, however, they sprayed a hellish fire from their cannons and machine guns. Major Hofmeister, a giant of a man, stood up in the trench and was severely wounded in the head**. Major Krebs, even though he was wounded at the same time, took over command. Having just arrived on the high ground at Flesquières, he resolutely and quickly put in place the measures needed to hold the area.

At the same time, the British were well aware that it was extremely important for them to capture Flesquières. They sought to achieve their goal by using strong forces. More and more tanks emerged in front of the Support Line. The 1 and 2/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment, which had stayed overnight in the underground shelters and catacombs of Flesquières, received an order at about 0830 hours from Major Hofmeister to move into the Support Line and then, half an hour later, to begin counter-attacking towards the I/84th Infantry Regiment’s command post. But this last order only reached some of 1st Company, consequently the other half of the battalion continued to defend the high ground. As the advancing tanks and the following British storm troops, which already arrived in front of the western half of the village over the ditches of the Support Line, threatened to envelop Flesquières, 2nd Lieutenant Möhring took command of a force comprising Sergeant Reinsch with his platoon from 1st Company, units from II Battalion and a group from 108th Pioneer Company, who then immediately occupied the southwestern and western entrances to Flesquières***. The 2nd Company dug themselves short trenches in the rubble on the eastern part of Flesquières in order to defend the pioneer park and the ammunition depot. The machine guns of II Battalion, along with the trench mortars of I Battalion, provided effective support to 3 and 4/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment . A small detachment of about 25 men, mainly from 3rd Company, who had not travelled forward on the transport, arrived on the northern edge of the depots. Second Lieutenant Helff secured the second line of the Support Line with the newly arrived men from 3rd Company and with a company formed from stragglers and parts of II/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment. The left flank was protected by a platoon-strength group of men from the 387th Landwehr Infantry Regiment, who were later joined by NCOs and crews of the 1st Trench Mortar Platoon when they ran out of ammunition for the minenwerfers.

The commander of III/84th Infantry Regiment reported to Major Krebs, having collected together all the stragglers in and around the sugar factory, located northeast of Flesquières; Captain Fürsen transfered command of the rest of the 84th, which meant another fifty men approximately.

* There were 14 batteries of artillery reinforcing 54th Infantry Division’s sector between Havrincourt and la Vacquerie, excluding two sections (13 and 14). Colonel Lauer was the commander of 55th Artillery, with Major Voßfeldt commanding the Light Artillery Group and Captain Crell commanding the Heavy Artillery Group.

** Some men tried to bring the heavily wounded regimental commander to the main casualty station at Noyelles. The stretcher party, led by Private Sorensen (12/84th Infantry Regiment), suffered heavy losses from machine gun fire on the way because it had not been realised that the British had got so far, which meant that the dying Hofmeister later fell into the hands of the enemy.

*** Reinsch’s platoon from 1st Company had separately tried to bring help to the hard-pressed 84th and had first advanced along part of the Havrincourt Switch Line. Second Lieutenant Hoefer had not received either order, he alerted 2nd Company when he noticed that 1st Company was moving off. Second Lieutenant Möhring informed 2nd Lieutenant Brockes about the situation. Just as 2nd Company was forming up, it came under fire from the tanks.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Account of the fighting around Flesquieres... contd

'The 27th Infantry Regiment, which formed the staff reserve, became aware of the gaping hole on the eastern side of the defensive front. They had seen that the battalions of the 387th Landwehr Infantry Regiment had been overrun by the British.

When one realises how few defenders there were under the command of Major Krebs who actually opposed the British, with their tanks and superior numbers of infantry, on the high ground around Flesquières, then it seems incomprehensible that the British did not succeed in overwhelming these 600 or so men in the first attack.

The enemy stormed forward again and again against Flesquières. The fog lifted. Wherever one looked, there were tanks standing or wallowing nearby. However, the British only achieved temporary success in the central and the eastern parts of the village. Second Lieutenant Höfer retook the eastern half of the village with the 2/27th Reserve Infantry Regiment after close hand-to-hand fighting. A small detachment of the 84th drove the enemy from the park. The British were forced to fall back from the village center as well. NCO Richter stopped a tank with hand grenades and then destroyed the following British combat patrol with well-directed machine gun fire. By clearing the village, the German defenders saved the valuable ammunition dump in the pioneer park. From just east of Flesquières to the beginning of the Ribécourt Switch Line, the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 27th Reserve fired their machine guns right at the observation slits of the tanks, courageous infantrymen repeatedly jumped out of the trenches and threw cluster grenades, then took the unwounded British tank crews from any destroyed tanks as prisoners.

By 1000 hours Major Krebs had already asked the brigade for reinforcements and at 1230 hours had then repeated this request along with giving a detailed report on the situation. The morale of the defenders of Flesquières was magnificent. They, like their commander, were driven by one thought, holding the position. With determination, anything is possible!

The artillery also shared in the glory of the defence of Flesquières against the British.

The 3/282nd Field Artillery Regiment, which belonged to the 384th Landwehr Infantry Regiment of the 20th Landwehr Division, was subordinated to the 54th Infantry Division’s artillery group in accordance with "Plan Havrincourt". It was located just to the west of Flesquières under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Finndorf; 2 guns had already been destroyed by a direct hit in the morning. The battery then successfully resisted the tanks into the early afternoon, thereby giving valuable flank protection for the soldiers in Kreb’s regiment; Sergeant Reinsch reported that the guns had destroyed five tanks in quick succession. Pioneer Platoon Officer Ulrich (2 Ersatz Company of 24th Pioneers Regiment) and Sergeant Friedrichs (281st Pioneers Trench Mortar Company) came and helped the artillerymen with the defense of their firing positions. The pioneers recovered undamaged machine guns from a shot-up tank and skilfully fired them, until the ammunition was used up. With a huge effort, 2nd Lieutenant Rüppell had the guns of 2/108th Field Artillery Regiment (south the sugar factory) pulled out from their carefully prepared positions*. In this situation there was no protection from shrapnel and they skilfully covered the guns to prevent them being observed by hostile aircraft. To defend against the tanks, the artillery required complete freedom of movement in all directions. The British artillery fire, however, smothered the German batteries but what happened to 3/108th Field Artillery Regiment near Flesquières was a fine examplar: to start with, the battery only had three guns to move into action. Just as the guns were set up, the undercarriage of one cannon was severly damaged by a heavy shell. British shells caused several German ammunition stockpiles to explode . By 0900 hours only one field gun was capable of firing, with NCOs Klose and Greising, as well as Private Ludwig, performing superbly. A direct hit then completely destroyed this last gun and stopped the whole operation; the battery was thus disabled by counter-battery fire. The remaining gunners transfered to the sister battery (2).

The German batteries caused heavy losses, however, where they were able to fire directly at the enemy tanks. The batteries of III/213th Field Artillery Regiment were operating southeast of Flesquières. They faced a particularly severe problem: they didn’t know the area, the conditions of the Western front were unfamiliar, their first job involved them in this huge battle, and there was a lack of ammunition. The situation for the field- and foot-artillery batteries was very unfavourable because they had very little ammunition with which to defend against such an enormous attack. The following gives a clear picture: at the beginning of the British attack, the 2/108th Field-Artillery Regiment had 2010 high explosive shells, 933 gas shells, and 33 canister shot; Major von Uslar reported that his three batteries arrived in their assigned firing positions after several futile attempts to get ammunition, while the transport with the howitzer ammunition stayed in Marcoing until between 0200 and 0300 hours before being made available. Each battery then received 240 shells, with more arriving immediately after. At 0600 hours, however, nine batteries received 260 shells that were useless because the required firing pins were missing.

In his official report, the British Commander-in-Chief often mentioned the performance of the German artillery under these difficult circumstances. He wrote: "A German artillery officer, the only one who stayed with his battery, fired a field gun by himself and hit several of our tanks near Flesquières, until he was killed beside the gun. The bravery of this officer was admired by all ranks."

Efforts were made to find out the name of the officer but even inquiries in England were unsuccessful**.

Investigations into the number of the battery and the regiment were just as futile.

From the wording of the report only one field battery could have been involved. The imprecise description "near Flesquières" means that more firm conclusions cannot be drawn, because tanks advanced toward the village from the south, the west and southeast.

Arguably, the fame of the unknown German artillery officer won’t be diminished when one acknowledges, in the way that the enemy leader acknowledged the single act, all the German batteries near Flesquières. Every one of the officers, NCOs and gunners performed outstandingly.

The few lulls experienced by the defenders of Flesquières were used to re-organize the mixed up units, to replenish precariously low ammunition stocks and to take the small supply of hand grenades from the pioneer depot to the southeast exit of the village for use in counter-attacks. The repeated attempts by the enemy to envelop the right wing were repelled from the northwest edge of the village. The defenders comprised men from the 27th Reserve Regiment, the 87th Regiment and some pioneers, along with gunners from the field- and foot-artillery after their ammunition had run out. At noon the enemy stopped attacking the village. Attacks continued on the second line of the Hindenburg Support Line, east of the first line, on the southern edge of the village***. Nevertheless, Major Krebs waited impatiently for the 54th Infantry Division promised in a brief message sent by signal lamp at 1300 hours. He did not allow the successes of the morning to deceive him about seriousness of the situation.

Early in the afternoon, the British infantry, cavalry and artillery were seen to be being resupplied to the south of Flesquières; the enemy seemed to be getting ready to make another strong attack. They turned their attention, however, toward Marcoing. All attempts by Major Krebs to re-establish contact on the right and the left flanks were futile. Soon afterwards, the returning stretcher bearers reported that Marcoing and even Noyelles were in the hands of the enemy. From Flesquières it was clear that the British infantry and cavalry units were moving forward past Graincourt. There was no doubt that the danger of being completely cut off was growing with every minute.

In the meantime (at 1330 hours) Major Krebs had sent back the Ordinance Officer of the 84th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Lieutenant Bertheau, to report on the situation. There were still no signs of the reinforcements coming up from the division.

* Individual batteries of the 108th Field Artillery Regiment had already fought against tanks in April 1917 (Aisne - Champagne battle).

** The “Historical section, Committee of Imperial Defence“, in London, responded: he was not identified in A C Doyle‘s “The British Campaign in France and Flanders 1917 “, who altered the original report to read "Prussian artillery officer" and indicated that 16 tanks were destroyed by him.

*** Haig said in his report that the 51st Division’s attack against Flesquières had become exhausted, with numerous tanks having taken direct hits from German field batteries in positions on the reverse slope of the ridge. Later on he then said: “Nevertheless, all of our second objectives, with the exception of the village, were taken”. The second objective of the 51st Division, the so-called “Brown Line” - which should have been reached at Zero Hour plus 3 hours 30 minutes - ran, however, north of the sugar factory to the north of Flesquières, as was later demonstrated in the orders and battlemaps. The Highland Division were unable to take “the second objectives in this area” because their combat sector involved the village; "before noon" the brigades were held-up south of Flesquières and, subsequently, east of the German Support Line.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I cannot find any additional material about the fighting in this area during the afternoon. I will keep looking.

What seems clear is that:

i) The Germans had a pre-prepared plan for the defence of this part of the Hindenburg Line. The exact details of the plan and the extent to which it was modified in the light of the limited intelligence about an impending attack is not clear to me yet but I will keep working on this.

ii) There were units already stationed in the Forward Line on the morning of the attack. Far from falling back in an organised way (as opposed to the rout of some units in other parts of the line), the supporting German defenders actually made their way forward in two waves. Not surprisingly, they came up against their disorganised colleagues as they got further forward.

iii) There were catacombs, augmented by pre-prepared bunkers, under Flesquieres, which is typical of the German defensive strategy for villages incorporated into their fixed lines of defence. Some troops were stationed in Flesquieres overnight.

iv) The German commanders and NCOs acted with typical initiative, and paid a high price thereby. Flesquieres became a focus for the defence, having been set up with a pioneer park and ammunition dump. There was a very substantial force in Flesquieres. Despite being a mish-mash of units, it fought with great cohesion and determination, and served as a rallying point for many. The defenders were well supported by machine guns and did engage in local counter-attacks to ensure that the village remained solely in German hands.

v) There were mutiple artillery guns involved in fighting off the tanks. Some guns were protected by machine guns for part of the time. Some of the gunners joined the infantry in the village when they finally ran out of ammunition.

I am even more impressed by the quality of the German defence of Flesquieres, which is a fine example of the ability of German commanders, NCOs and soldiers/gunners under extreme adversity. This is in sharp contrast with Ludendorff's high-level overview, which suggests that his comments were being driven by another agenda.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

On the evolution of tank tactics after Cambrai, this from Haig's diary:

'Wednesday 31 July [1918]

Remarkable progress has been made since Cambrai, not only in the pattern of the tank but also in the methods of using them. Tanks now go in first, covered by shrapnel barrage, and break down all opposition. Enemy in strong points and machine gun nests are then flattened out by the tanks. The latter then signal the infantry to "come on", and these then advance in open order and mop up the remaining defenders, and collect the prisoners. During consolidation tanks zig-zag in front to cover the operation. Australian infantry were used to demonstrate first of all, and then the onlookers from another battalion were put through similar exercises on the same course.

The result of these methodical exercises is to render the tank attack more effective and much less costly to us. Sir Henry Rawlinson, General Hugh Elles and Staff of Tanks met me at the tank ground.'

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Back from the burning sands of the Sahara. The item below will not had much to our debate, but I thought you might be intrested, especially in the photo. The are both taken from John Laffin's bokk 'Jackboot' a history of the German soldier.

On 20 November 1917 came the revolutionary battle of Cambrai, in which the British Army used 381 tanks during the first great tank battle of history. The Germans were tem­porarily demoralized by the psychological effect of the great lumbering monsters. They travelled at only three miles an hour but were so huge and deliberate and apparently invulnerable that many Germans despaired. It was a great victory for the British, although the success was nullified because the British General Staff had not expected such a success and had not made plans to follow up. At the end of the day's fighting British casualties were about 4,000, but by the time the Germans had stabilized the front, 45,000.

Much of the initial fighting took place around Flesqui­eres, where Germans fought with great gallantry. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, reported: 'Many of the hits on tanks at Flesquieres were obtained by a German artillery officer, who remained alone at his bat­tery, and served his gun single-handedly until killed. The great bravery of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks.

On this day batteries of Field Regiments 282 and 108 fought at Flesquieres. The Germans do not know to which regiment the unknown hero belonged. But British and German soldiers all spoke of a battery stationed to the west of Flesquieres which continued to shoot in the midst of murderous fire. It hit tank after tank, and took heavy punishment in return. One by one the crew went down until only one man remained at his post, drenched in blood and blackened by smoke. He load

and fired. Then he, too, was killed. The Germans claimed that the battery wrecked forty-nine British tanks.

To many a German officer it had become more and more clear as the war progressed that all success sprang from the sort of individual action provided by the officer at Flesquieres, while the mass of troops gave weight and impetus of fire. These officers, soldiers by inclination as well as by conscription, devoted much time to the training of shock troops—trying to build on what the assault parties of 1915 had begun. Their attitude was that it was better to command a resolute section than a wavering company, but if they could get a resolute company so much the better. Unfortunately, shock troops needed to be handpicked and by 1918 Germany had too many formations for which to find a hard core to be able to pick them out and put them into select companies.

I've added the bit in italics just as a matter of intrest

\it's the Artillery memorial in Cologne, depicting the gallant German Officer (NCO) who served and defended his gun against the British Tanks at Cambrai.

[Robert Dunlop]

Hi Arnie

Welcome back. Sounds like an interesting break.

Thanks for the photo.

Robert

[Arnie]

Hi Robert

Back from the sun baked Sahara and ready to resume the fray. I must say your latest effort is very impressive, but do not expect me to praise your translation, it could have been translated from the Berlin telephone directory :- ).

Can I start with the hangover from my previous but one message?

I am not sure there is a problem with the sequence.

The reason I questioned the sequence was regarding the prisoners coming back. It would seem to me they would have been captured by infantry and sent or escorted back across the battlefield. If our tank Commander had been in the first wave at this time, he would not have an infantry escort, and therefore no one to capture/escort the prisoners. Don’t you think it would be unlikely that the POWs would be strolling back, more like a dose of ‘hot foot’ to get away from the shot and shell of both sides?

Perhaps he was desperately trying to play-down the significance of tanks, having let German tank development languish.

I cannot let this comment go with out comment. Ludendorf was a soldier of the same ilk as Haig and both had the same attitude towards tanks. The difference was simply that the British Government, which had the common sense to over rule the War Office decision on Kiggle’s suggestion, to cancel the order for the 1000 up rated tank, supported the British Tanks. Ludendorf had no such controlling Government to second-guess him. Without the intervention of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill our discussion would be purely academic, there would have been no tanks and therefore no Cambrai battle

I thought the Divisional HQ was very far back!

This is the second report of the divisional Commander being far back from the fighting. The Cavalry Division Commander was to far back and it affected the flow of the battle, preventing the cavalry to take advantage of the opportunity to breakthrough. Could this have been the reason why 51 Div did not take advantage of the initial shock of the attack and later provide artillery support?

Of course, both examples give proof to the criticisms of the Generals for this very thing

It seems that the tanks topped the ridge and began to descend the ridge into the village then came under direct artillery fire

The score of this gunner is different with each version you read. The Germans thought five or six. Nevertheless, if we accept the eight or nine of Haig’s version, it is far off the numbers that Hussey claims was the reason for of 51 Div’s failure at Flesquires. This was later in the day and E battalion had gone into action with over 40 tanks, and the battalion were still in good shape when the second line passed through the first around the Grand Ravine area,

Could I go on to the German report of the action at Flesquires find this document most interesting The tone would suggest that it was written at the time of the rightwing ‘stab in the back ‘campaign in Germany and around the time of the erection of the solitary gunner statue shown in my previous post.

Battle around Flesquires

The Defence; The Germans admit this was a quite area and although at first sight it would seem that Flesquires was well defended But, I realised that initially the German report covered the defence area that stretched from Havrincourt to east of Marcoing. Its head quarters were in the area of Havrincourt, under Maj Krebbs and he did not move on the high ground around Flesquires until after the loss of Havrincourt.

According to the German report even the artillery defence plan was called ‘’Plan Havrincourt’. It would seem to be strange that the Germans would site an Engineer Park and an Ammunition dump in the middle of its main defence zone, where an accident or shellfire could cause an explosion that would have destroyed a sizeable section of the village together with its German defenders.

The size of the garrison is rather small, if your claim that Flesquires was such an important defensive position. Twice in the narrative it mentions that the garrison was 600 men, not even a battalion and although reinforcements of Regiments is mentioned, it would seem that thee were very few reached Flesquires.600 men would seem a small garrison to cover a defensive perimeter of nearly 4 kilometres.

The preparations before the battle do not present a sense of urgency, gunners arriving without ammunition, shells with out fuses. In addition, in cases no preparation of an artillery defence plan with no positioning of a FOO (Forward Observation Officer) strange for a pre planned defence scheme.

The Assault Troops

The whole story seems to be one of the Artillery versus tanks with the German Infantry having a supporting role and the British Infantry little more than spectators. The story highlights the fear of the tanks and the damage the tanks could do. On the other hand, the Infantry supporting the tanks seems only to have been in patrol strength. In the three occasions, where the Jocks broke into Flesquires they were driven out with the minimum of force ie. A company, a section, and one Officer/NCO with a light machine gun. In one case it would seem that the Jocks had captured half the village and to be driven out by a one company counter attack would suggest the Jocks were not there in strength or that the attack was not driven home with enough vigour.

All these incidents indicating that the Infantry support was too weak and unable to take advantage of opportunities that arose. I find it difficult to understand that a full divisional attack with tanks, aircraft and a superiority in artillery could not force the issue against 600 men especially when the first German defence line had broken and run.

The Germans could not believe that the Jocks could not take Flesquires would seem to indicate the position was ripe for capture. The attacks were then interrupted for the planned 90 minute break. Thus allowing the Germans to replenish, reinforce, and reorganise. After this break of course time and daylight was against the Jocks, it would get dark in the late afternoon. Could it have been that the full weight of 51 Div was not brought to bear soon enough?

The Headquarters were too far behind to take advantage of the German weakness’, by the modification of the plan, cancelling the 90 minute break and subduing the German artillery and positions with shellfire.

Regarding, Haig’s diary for 1918 It seems to be telling us that the tank assault at Cambrai was a failure, after declaring it a great victory and causing the church bells to be rung. It failed at Flesquires because of Harper not following the plan and failing to react swiftly to the shock of the tank attack. Flesquires was not a central point in the German defence and all though the Germans fought well even they could not understand why the village failed to be captured.

Perhaps was being very clever knowing that if Haig’s plan was successful it would mean that the British would be left with another salient to defend needing possible two divisions to defend it, with all the attending casualties.

Arnie

PS: Sorru it as taken so long to reply. But, you know I'm not to good with reedin and ritin!

.

[Robert Dunlop]

I must say your latest effort is very impressive, but do not expect me to praise your translation, it could have been translated from the Berlin telephone directory :- ).

Arnie, coming from you I think I will take that as a compliment

I don't propose discussing your points about the time sequence or Ludendorff. You have raised valid issues. The latter could be debated but the debate would not really be of any consequence.

This is the second report of the divisional Commander being far back from the fighting.  The Cavalry Division Commander was to far back and it affected the flow of the battle, preventing the cavalry to take advantage of the opportunity to breakthrough.  Could this have been the reason why 51 Div did not take advantage of the initial shock of the attack and later provide artillery support?

This is possible. But it is not necessarily the case. Battlefield command and control was difficult at the best of times. I must say that the artillery issue remains a real mystery to me. I must try and track down some of the unit histories, if such exist.

The score of this gunner is different with each version you read.  The Germans thought five or six. 

I wouldn't get hung up on the lone gunner thing. The German history casts doubt on the story. There were several guns in the area

The size of the garrison is rather small, if your claim that Flesquires was such an important defensive position.  Twice in the narrative it mentions that the garrison was 600 men, not even a battalion and although reinforcements of Regiments is mentioned, it would seem that thee were very few reached Flesquires.600 men would seem a small garrison to cover a  defensive perimeter of nearly 4 kilometres.

Certainly more than a couple of machine guns and a few snipers. The size of the garrison should not be taken as an indication of the importance, or otherwise, of Flesquieres. The primary objective of the German defence appears to have been to stop the attack as early as possible. Once the British overran the forward positions, Flesquieres then became the natural choice for a defensive stand - a Schwerpunkt if you will. The 600 men includes a significant arsenal of support weapons, especially machine guns (each MG represents the equivalent of an extra 60 rifles). It would not be sensible, nor would it fit the German concept of concentrating effort, for the garrison to be cover the defensive perimeter of 4 kilometres. The description of the rock in the midst of a storm surge is more apt.

The preparations before the battle do not present a sense of urgency, gunners arriving without ammunition, shells with out fuses.  In addition, in cases no preparation of an artillery defence plan with no positioning of a FOO (Forward Observation Officer) strange for a pre planned defence scheme.

I think the muddle does imply a sense of urgency for those artillery units that were being rushed up in expectation of the British attack. The attack was not expected the next day though. So no surprise that the co-ordination of the reinforcements was inadequate. There was a pre-planned defence scheme. As I mentioned, I have not had a chance to translate this. No doubt this will cast light on the arrangements for the units that were already in place in this sector.

The whole story seems to be one of the Artillery versus tanks with the German Infantry having a supporting role and the British Infantry little more than spectators.  The story highlights the fear of the tanks and the damage the tanks could do.  On the other hand, the Infantry supporting the tanks seems only to have been in patrol strength.  In the three occasions, where the Jocks broke into Flesquires they were driven out with the minimum of force ie.  A company, a section, and one Officer/NCO with a light machine gun.  In one case it would seem that the Jocks had captured half the village and to be driven out by a one company counter attack would suggest the Jocks were not there in strength or that the attack was not driven home with enough vigour.

All these incidents indicating that the Infantry support was too weak and unable to take advantage of opportunities that arose.  I find it difficult to understand that a full divisional attack with tanks, aircraft and a superiority in artillery could not force the issue against 600 men especially when the first German defence line had broken and run.

You would make a tough commander, Arnie - 'not enough vigour' for the Jock's attacks?? Hmm, sounds like some WW1 commander's comment? Remember though, it was not a full division that attacked Flesquieres. Second, the tanks were mostly knocked out or, as you have rightly pointed out before, were ineffective once they got into built-up areas. Third, there was no artillery support forthcoming. I don't know of any situation where aircraft made a significant contribution to clearing a built-up area. So we are left with infantry attacking a defended village. Going back to the various anecdotal accounts from the 51st Division's attack, the assault troops came under heavy fire, found it difficult to maintain cohesion & get into Flesquieres, and lost heavily in attempting to do so. Little surprise then that the Germans could push the each attack out.

The Germans could not believe that the Jocks could not take Flesquires would seem to indicate the position was ripe for capture.

Or perhaps it was just the writer's way of making a point. You may argue that a more vigorous infantry attack might have carried the position. I would humbly suggest that you would have been reinforcing failure. Far better to have got the artillery involved, sealed off the village, and then dumped plenty of gas on it - perhaps. Anything but throw more infantry in.

It failed at Flesquires because of Harper not following the plan and failing to react swiftly to the shock of the tank attack.  Flesquires was not a central point in the German defence and all though the Germans fought well even they could not understand why the village failed to be captured.

Arnie, you are perfectly entitled to this view. For one thing, it has forced a whole lot of extra information to the surface. Prior to this, I had an instinct that something important happened at Flesquieres that could not be explained by Harper's plan. It just did not make sense that German defences would crumble everywhere else but that Flesquieres would hold up a good division supported by large numbers of tanks because Harper delayed the infantry. I have read too many other accounts of attempts to capture villages to believe that the Harper story was the whole reason. Nor did it make sense that one gunner stopped all the tanks both sides of village. By pushing the debate, you have given me the impetus I needed to read about Flesquieres in even more detail. So thanks. Time to try and chase down the issue of the artillery support, or lack of. Even now there is the basis for an interesting paper.

Robert

[Arnie]

Hi Robert

You make some valid points but I must take issue with one or two of them..

I wouldn't get hung up on the lone gunner thing.  The German history casts doubt on the story.

I would agree, but the thing that troubles me is that Harper and many revisionist historians have used the myth (?) as the reason for Harper failure, why? Was it some sort of red herring, or some clever ploy to divert attention from his failure? It as certainly distracted historians away from the truth.

It would not be sensible, nor would it fit the German concept of concentrating effort, for the garrison to be covering the defensive perimeter of 4 kilometres.  The description of the rock in the midst of a storm surge is more apt.

In a way, Robert this remark reinforces the points I am trying to make (and not making such a good job of it)

Throughout our discussion different areas of Flesquires defensive perimeter as been mentioned in regard to the assault, in three cases it had been pierced by the Jocks. We have had;

The British tank Commander approaching the walls to the front of the German Position.

Then we have the mention of the Jocks break in at the Ammo dump.

The Jocks capturing the eastern half of the village.

We have reports of tanks being seen attacking the rear of the village.

This would mean either a very mobile defence, which is possible, but would mean men having to break cover to move from position to position. If not that, then the defence would be stretched to their limit and be quite weak in places. I accept that the Germans may have had strong points manned by a garrison of platoon strength, in fact one is mentioned. But this would mean areas that would have been easy to break in and in fact the attackers seem to been able to do this, but not in enough strength to hold what they had gained and has a result were driven out by relatively light forces, at the point of the bayonet no less!

In the German account, I see that parts of the defence had to be ‘dug in’ among the rubble, indicating that the village was in parts in ruins making it even more difficult to move around

I think the muddle does imply a sense of urgency for those artillery units that were being rushed up in expectation of the British attack.

Robert, troops of any description moving into a an expected battle zone without ready to use ammunition, would on arrival be as much use as a ‘chocolate teapot’, by not having the means to go into action immediately if necessary. Your ready to use ammo is SOP.

I don't know of any situation where aircraft made a significant contribution to clearing a built-up area. So we are left with infantry attacking a defended village. Going back to the various anecdotal accounts from the 51st Division's attack, the assault troops came under heavy fire, found it difficult to maintain cohesion & get into Flesquieres, and lost heavily in attempting to do so. Little surprise then that the Germans could push the each attack out.

Robert only infantry can take and hold ground and FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) is an Infantryman’s work. The Infantry got into the village in insufficient number to capture or even hold and after all Flesquires was the main objective, the whole battle of Cambrai revolved around its capture. Therefore, Harper should have used the majority of his division to break in. The tanks got to Flesquires and engaged its Garrison; however it’s supporting infantry was either too far behind or insufficient in strength to fight through. Aircraft do not capture anything Robert, but they can give support by ground attack, reconnaissance and target acquisition for the artillery. Harper had this capability and failed to utilise it properly. I agree about the artillery but the infantry should if organised and trained properly in the use of tanks been able to get in and stay in. I keep saying they did in other areas. The British casualties for the first day of the battle was between 3 & 4000 according to which account you read. What were 51Div’s casualties for first day? After all Robert we are talking about Generals who throughout the war had thought that 3 to 4000 casualties from a single division were acceptable to capture a prize like Flesquires. In fact, we have Generals, Harper being one who thought that casualties were a prerequisite for success. A measure of gallantry by the troops taking part

I give you a thought! D you think that perhaps Harper attacked with small patrols accompanying the tanks with the main body set to follow. The tank reached the area of the Village and small numbers of Jocks found there way in. However, unfortunately because of the distance between the tank group and the main body of infantry the Germans were able to put a curtain of machine gun and artillery fire between the two attacking groups.

I would humbly suggest that you would have been reinforcing failure. Far better to have got the artillery involved, sealed off the village, and then dumped plenty of gas on it - perhaps. Anything but throw more infantry in.

Under normal circumstances, I would agree about reinforcing failure. In this case, the failure was in the plan and its execution. The Germans fought well, no doubt, but If Harper had of obeyed instructions and trained his troops in Infantry/Tank cooperation better, his attack would have stood a better chance of success. Even the lack of artillery was a command failure and the excuse of cut lines does not hold up. In this war cut lines were virtually inevitable, but the linesmen seemed to able to repair them. Harper’s HQ being to far back would not have helped!

Robert if you do decide to write a paper it would be a pleasure to give a hand that is if I could help in any way.

Can I just add a story: I mentioned that the chap I worked with when I first started work as an engineer apprentice was in the Royal Tank Regiment (Has it became later) at Cambrai. We talked endlessly about the two wars, but especially WW1 . I remember him telling me that the RTR always thought that Haig with the compliance of Harper tried to discredit tanks believing a meddlesome Government had forced them upon the army. The ploy used in retaliation for Lloyd George over ruling Haig’s Chief of Staff when he cancelled the order for a thousand extra tanks.

I offer this as a subject to think about.

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

the thing that troubles me is that Harper and many revisionist historians have used the myth (?) as the reason for Harper failure, why?  Was it some sort of red herring, or some clever ploy to divert attention from his failure?  It as certainly distracted historians away from the truth.

Arnie, this is a really important question. It has been a red herring. But was it a clever ploy? It sounds like it started as a straightforward eye-witness account. Haig seems to have picked it up very early on. The story is very 'heroic' - the 'superhuman' gunner. It wouldn't surprise me if Haig mentioned it to Harper at some later point.

In a way, Robert this remark reinforces the points I am trying to make (and not making such a good job of it)

Throughout our discussion different areas of Flesquires defensive perimeter as been mentioned in regard to the assault, in three cases it had been pierced by the Jocks. <snip>

This would mean either a very mobile defence, which is possible, but would mean men having to break cover to move from position to position.  If not that, then the defence would be stretched to their limit and be quite weak in places. <snip>

There is one example of Germans breaking cover - remember the commander with the stick. They suffered accordingly. Otherwise, it sounds like a mobile defence. Bear in mind that Flesquieres is not a big village. Furthermore, it was had underground catacombs and bunkers. There are numerous examples, Longueval springs immediately to mind, where the Germans used these features to provide rapid mobility underground. I have seen a photograph of a trapdoor into the bunkers (see below). This one was near the Chateau I bet there were several.

<snip> in fact the attackers seem to been able to do this, but not in enough strength to hold what they had gained and has a result were driven out by relatively light forces, at the point of the bayonet no less!

At times the machine gun fire was so heavy that none of the attackers made it. The attack against the wall was just such an example. So maybe attacks were started with significant numbers but only the remnants arrived in the village. This was not an uncommon scenario. The remnants would have been very vulnerable to a determined counter-attack.

only infantry can take and hold ground and FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) is an Infantryman’s work.<snip> I keep saying they did in other areas.

I don't disagree with any of this. My hypothesis is that there were significant differences in the way the Germans defended the other BUAs. I will check this out in the German sources but it will take a while.

The British casualties for the  first day of the battle was between 3 & 4000 according to which account you read. What were 51Div’s casualties for first day?

Around 800. We need to compare this with the numbers who attacked the village.

I give you a thought!  D you think that perhaps Harper attacked with small patrols accompanying the tanks with the main body set to follow.  The tank reached the area of the Village and small numbers of Jocks found there way in.  However, unfortunately because of the distance between the tank group and the main body of infantry the Germans were able to put a curtain of machine gun and artillery fire between the two attacking groups.

It is possible. Thinking back to earlier postings, specifically quotes from soldiers in the 51st Division, the infantry were able to cross into the trenches where these lay on the forward slope. This was because the tanks could get through the first line of barbed wire. But the troops could not made much headway and it sounds like they got split up into smaller groups. The curtain of machine gun and rifle fire was certainly a feature.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Photograph of the trapdoor by the Chateau.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Can I just add a story: I mentioned that the chap I worked with when I first started work as an engineer apprentice was in the Royal Tank Regiment (Has it became later) at Cambrai.  We talked endlessly about the two wars, but especially WW1 . I remember him telling me that the RTR always thought that Haig with the compliance of Harper tried to discredit tanks believing a meddlesome Government had forced them upon the army. The ploy used in retaliation for Lloyd George over ruling Haig’s Chief of Staff when he cancelled the order for a thousand extra tanks.

Arnie, I don't really know enough about the relationship between Haig and Harper, nor about any reaction to Lloyd George's overruling Haig on tanks. Going by Haig's diary, I doubt there is anything to this story. Haig suffered a lot worse from LG, which he does talk about. Haig allowed the Cambrai attack to go ahead with the very large tank force. My recent quote about Haig's review of tanks suggests that he had picked up on the change in infantry/tank tactics - with the infantry following the tanks into battle after Cambrai. He was not negative about this. Maybe Haig got defensive about the threat to the cavalry after the war. Don't know.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I mentioned the barrage map for IV Corps but forgot to upload it. See below. The barrage ended just past Flesquieres at 210 minutes after Z Hour. There are no other barrage lines on the map. The hatched areas are where smoke barrages were laid down.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie said:

I give you a thought!  D you think that perhaps Harper attacked with small patrols accompanying the tanks with the main body set to follow.  The tank reached the area of the Village and small numbers of Jocks found there way in.  However, unfortunately because of the distance between the tank group and the main body of infantry the Germans were able to put a curtain of machine gun and artillery fire between the two attacking groups.

Arnie, I have just gone back and re-read the following posts:

 

 

 

 

 

Looks like the attacks were company-size. The German fire prevented large numbers of attackers getting into the village. Note too the mentions of the German defenders disappearing quickly.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert I have read your reply and the previous posts

I will answer in detail shoertly I have only one thing to say that the attacks made by the Seaforths seem to have been late in the days at which time the initiative had been lost.

I will try to get sorted toworrow

Arnie

PS Your bloody quick aren't ypu!!!!!

[Robert Dunlop]

PS Your bloody quick aren't ypu!!!!!

[Arnie]

Hi Robert

Sorry about the time it as taken for me to reply you know I’m s slow reader and your such a fast writer 

Let me get the minor things out of the way before I attack you again. Great photo, it looks very much like our coalhole though!

.

Battlefield command and control was difficult at the best of times

Surely if communications are bad it would be essential for him to be nearer the Brigade HOs. The reason why is that the they did not seem to be a reaction to change of circumstances or situation. In addition, he must have been way back for Haig to mention it. Regarding the Artillery I suspect that the lack of support fire was ordered by Tudor and was part of his original fire plan.. If the Infantry had have been up with the tanks as in Swinton and Elles original plan. They could not have fired because of the Danger of hitting their own troops.

especially machine guns (each MG represents the equivalent of an extra 60 rifles).

The machine gun against a tank would only be another small arm. Its danger to the infantry would be less if the tanks with their firepower were ‘brassing’ up the area

I would humbly suggest that you would have been reinforcing failure. Far better to have the artillery involved, sealed off the village, and then dumped plenty of gas on it –

I refer you to my previous comment about friendly fire. But I shall return to this point later

I had an instinct that something important happened at Flesquieres that could not be explained by Harper's plan. It just did not make sense that German defences would crumble everywhere else but that Flesquieres would hold up a good division supported by large numbers of tanks because Harper delayed the infantry

I think you are being a little generous with Harper. I don’t doubt the Garrison fought well and the Jocks did what they were told and failed. But making an excuse or putting a different meaning to statements does not provide conclusive proof, after all, it just might be that what the German Commander said is what he ment.

There is one example of Germans breaking cover - remember the commander with the stick.

Robert there you go, again our friend with the swagger stick thought he was approaching a knocked out tank. I’m sure he would not a have broke cover to in front of his position if the tank had have had a Jock patrol accompanying it as it was the tank commander scattered them with a LMG.

So maybe attacks were started with significant numbers but only the remnants arrived in the village.

I does not say that, only they broke in, again we have this not accepting what is written when it supports the idea that idea that the Jocks were in insufficient strength to force the issue. More of this later.

Around 800. We need to compare this with the numbers who attacked the village

Can we break down the casualties to AM and PM and how many were tank crews? It is important in deciding when they main effort was made

Arnie, I do not really know enough about the relationship between Haig and Harper,

Haig and Harper were long time friends. Harper was promoted from Haig’s staff to command 51 Div and of course, there would be the normal Masonic links between the two.

'About 5 pm, seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village. They were not however sufficiently closely supported by the infantry, and the attack failed. The enemy, with great cunning, offered no resistance to the tanks in the streets, either lying motionless in his emplacements or retiring into dug-outs and cellars while the tanks were passing. The tanks, after cruising about the village until the light began to fail, returned after an uneventful voyage.'

These companies (Gordons)were preceded by six tanks. On arriving at the enemy wire the tanks came within view of a field battery some 500 yards distant

While this fighting was in progress the surviving tanks were pushing on towards Flesquieres Trench; but they too came under artillery fire, and were knocked out by direct hits.'

'the 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better. Seven tanks on the left and centre of the battalion front passed through the wire

Now Robert I would like to refer you to the links that you kindly asked me to read and the quotes above. I have studied them closely and I must admit that more I read, I thought I misjudged Harper and would have to eat humble pie. Then I spotted an item in the Divisional account of the battle and every thing became clear. The accounts by the Seaforth’s and Gordon’s took place in the late afternoon. 5 Pm is mentioned in the divisional account

I note that far from the tanks being knocked out in the morning we have mention of numerous tanks supporting the Infantry. Nevertheless, we find that in one case the Infantry could not find a gap in the wire even though Tanks had bee cruising the battlefield all day,

Six tanks went through the wire and cruised around Flesquires until twilight. At what time, quite rightly, being without Infantry support and very vulnerable. The tank commander quite rightly pulledout. The Divisional account says the Germans lay ‘doggo’. But did they? I don’t think so, The tanks had found a gap in the defence. You did suggest that the Germans did not have a complete defence around the perimeter

The Jocks sent a platoon in to give the tanks protection, totally in adequate to protect six tank at night. The Platoon is perhaps the one mentioned in the German account. The Platoon got into the Village why not a company or two?

Even the report from the Jocks of the tanks leaving Flesquires at last light would seem to indicate criticism of the tanks, showing a total misunderstanding of the tanks difficulties at night and in a BUA

This attack was carried out by four companies on the main objective that is probably less than 600 men. So where is the scale of 4 to 1 in favour of the attacker?

Imagine Robert if the Jocks had attacked with the tanks in the early morning covered by artillery, smoke and gas, the outcome would probably have been the same as that of the other assault divisions

I believe that the troops did not understand the nature of the operation. And were inadequately trained in infantry tank cooperation. Harper did not have his heart in this attack and it is reflected in his approach to the battle

If the troops had have attacked in close support of the tanks undercover of smoke

The excuse of tanks cutting the cables does not hold up as their would have been few cables laid in the initial assault by the tanks and surely they would have repaired. I have mentioned that the Artillery plan may have excluded further fire.

The original artillery plan would have been sufficient if the full weight of the division had have been applied in the early morning

The seperation of the tanks from the infantry in Harper’s plan for most of the day, would seem to have led to a curtain of defensive fire cutting off the tanks from the assault Infantry

The break in the attacks of 90 minutes was of more service to the Germans than 51 Div, it allowed them to reorganise etc.

Tanks having poor vision when moving closed up and would expect the infantry to keep up and guide them when they are getting to far in front, difficult I know but the Jocks seemed to be able to communicate when they wanted assistance

You may seek some new formula used by the Germans in Defence but you cannot ignore the evidence that the separation of the Infantry from the tanks led to the failure of 51 Div to take maximum advantage of the shock of the artillery barrage and the cover that Gas and Smoke provided and the tank assault.

It would seem that the supporters of Harper have been a little ingenuous yet again. The Single gunner story was the product of some ones imagination used to deflect criticism of Harper. The stories and accounts of the Infantry attacks presented in such away that suggests the attacks were carried out in the morning but happened in the evening

The gas/ smoke would seem to be effective according to the Germans it certainly seems to have caused a lot of damage, demoralised the defence and covered the approach of the tanks

I repeat that the 90 minute pause in the attack aided no one other than the Germans and gave their artillery to maintain the curtain and separation between the infabtry and the initial assault by the tanks by increasing their isolation and allowing to pick them off at their leisure.

The full weight of a divisional attack does not seem to have fallen Flesquires. The ratio of attacker to defender is any thing from 4 to 1 to 6 to 1 in favour of the attacker. The Germans admit to a garrison of approximately 600 so the minimum assault force would have been 2400 to 3600 a complete Brigade, But we have the suggestion that the Jocks attacked with 4 companies probably around 500 men. I make no wonder why the jocks wre knocked back by the weight of German machine Gun fire.

The total destruction of all the tanks in the initial assault again is proven to be a myth it would seem from 51 Divs and unit reports there were enough left to get in and ‘swan around Flesquires certainly at 1700 hours.

Back to you old friend, for decyphering and comment

Arnie

[Arnie]

Robert

I have given the battle a little more thought and I have some points I would like you to consider

First; the Germans going to ground when the six tanks got into the village perhaps as the Jock historian states they had gone to ground. So doing do you not think they would have been vulnerable if the tanks had have been well supported by Infantry, would they not have been caught like rats in a trap.

Or maybe the Germans knew from previous experience in the battle that the Jocks were not supporting their tanks and therefore believed it was safe to go to ground.

Alternatively that pert of the village was undefended for what ever reason. But, that reason could have been the Germans had started to withdraw from Flesquires. We only know that on the morning of the 18th Nov the Jocks found they had gone.

You see Robert we have a few reports inc a German one, that the German defenders were dealing with the tanks by bundling grenades together and hitting the tanks with this improvised anti tank Grenade.

My second point covers the whole conduct of the battle by Harper and his staff.

The battle seems to, using football clique , 'a game of two halves':

The first was the disastrous unsupported attack by the tanks in the morning indicating the failure of Harpers tactics of separating the Infantry from the Tanks .

Harper called half time and used the 90 minutes break in the to decide the next step. Perhaps he had realised, has did Gen Davidson, Haig's Chief of Staff. That the failure at Flequires probably meant the failure of the whole operation.

The attacks in the late afternoon proved to be futile. If Harper or more likely his staff were aware of this it would explain what seemed to be the use on minimum force and the Jocks not seeming to push their attacks home with their usual vigour.

Capturing the village at last light would only have put 51 Div in the same position at first light, when they found the German garrison had withdrawn for fear of being surrounded and not the fear of 51 Div attacks.

This game of two halves and the aid of the mythical Gunner, allowed Harper to give the impression that it was the defence and not the failure of his plan that had ruined the overall strategy for the Cambria battle. The revisionist have distorted history by their selective use of different phases of the battle.

Just my theory

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Now Robert I would like to refer you to the links that you kindly asked me to read and the quotes above. I have studied them closely and I must admit that more I read,  I thought I misjudged Harper and would have to eat humble pie. Then I spotted an item in the Divisional account of the battle and every thing became clear. The accounts by the Seaforth’s and Gordon’s  took place in the late afternoon. 5 Pm is mentioned in the divisional account

Arnie, I don't think you can use the mention of '5 pm' in this way. The Divisional history matches up with the German history. In the morning, heavy fighting was characterised by repeated attempts of the 51st Division to enter and hold the village. The equally determined German defenders mostly knocked the assault infantry down with machine gun and rifle fire. They were able to eject the few attackers who got into the village. The German history mentions the infantry attacks quietening down for a short while at circa 1.30 pm. Eventually, after the several attempts by the infantry, 'about 5 pm seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village.' Remember that on the next page (249) it mentions that 'in support of the tanks two platoons of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders were ordered to advance through the wood, and two to enter the village from the north. The first party was held up in the wood by machine guns, and second entered the village only to meet the tanks withdrawing. They [the infantry] therefore attempted to establish a chain of posts round the village; but fired at from front and flanks, were compelled to withdraw.' The German defenders were quiet near the tanks in the village but other defenders were still capable of stopping the infantry from trying to support the tanks, even late on the afternoon.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

You may seek some new formula used by the Germans in Defence

Arnie, I have not sought a new formula for the German defence. The result of the attack (failure to capture a heavily defended village) did not seem unusual to me, knowing how the Germans defended other similar villages in other battles. The more unusual thing was the fall of the other villages in proximity to Flesquieres. But then they were not defended by the numbers of artillery as well as the infantry and support weapons. This last sentence is supposition though. I have yet to finish the translation of the rest of the first day's events from the German perspective.

I am off for the next two weeks. We are going to cover the route followed by the German First and Second Armies in the first weeks of the war, as well as visit Belleau Wood and the battlefield of Mangin's counter-attack (Second Marne). We will also visit Flesquieres village again.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I managed to get further with the translations than I thought. It is difficult to piece everything together but here goes.

Cambrai was a quiet sector. This 'Stille Front' was known as 'Sanatorium für Flandern' because the shattered remnants of German divisions were sent there to recover from the fighting in Third Ypres.

After the Battles of Arras and Third Ypres, the German commanders in the area thought that an attack would be unlikely. However, after Caporetto the Supreme Command of the German Second Army felt that the British might try something. They ordered all divisions in the line to take British prisoners for interrogation. The German 184th Regiment captured 40 prisoners from the 55th Division. In a combined infantry and artillery raid on 18th November, 84th Regiment captured a sergeant and 5 men from the 1/Royal Irish Fusiliers (36th Division). Under interrogation, they revealed that at least three tanks had been observed and that an attack was being prepared on Havrincourt. The 51st Division was implicated.

The report about the interrogation was cautious. Some weight was added by the detection of new batteries in Havrincourt Wood. Another prisoner, however, seems to have denied a large attack. The German High Command moved to deal with the perceived threat to Havrincourt. The German 54th Division was responsible for this sector. One regiment (384th Landwehr) and the artillery of 20th Landwehr Division were subordinated to 54th Division. The infantry were bought up to the vicinity of Havrincourt. Other reserves were bought up, including the artillery of the 107th Infantry Division newly arrived from Russia. These were the guns that arrived without ammunition, which then had to be scraped together on the night of 19/20 November.

During the night, the German artillery fired a short barrage but there was no retaliation from the British. This was prompted in part by the detection of the British cutting their own wire in preparation for the attack. All fell quiet again until the British barrage. Immediately the German command was inundated with reports for help. 90th Reserve Regiment (54th Division) was responsible for the area around la Vacquerie. Its I and II Battalions were hit very quickly by the British infantry and tanks because this part of the line was very close. The Germans had no artillery in close support. The British tanks protected the infantry. The Regimental commander immediately phoned for support. Reinforcements were promised but then cancelled as the higher command became aware of what was happening in Havrincourt. III/90th Reserve Regiment was thrust forward to help but the entire Regiment was overwhelmed - the headquarters was surrounded and fell around 12 noon.

As the fog lifted, two batteries of Landwehr artillery were able to engage the tanks from their position near Marcoing. Fourteen tanks were set on fire but the batteries were then overwhelmed by tanks.

Havrincourt was also attacked very quickly. There was no artillery in Havrincourt. Contact with the German defenders was lost early. Virtually all of the German reinforcements and reserves were sent towards Havrincourt (1 battalion of the 107th Division was ordered forward to support 90th Reserve Regt). The Germans were aware that the attack was much more significant and on a much wider front than originally suspected. Their attention remained on Havrincourt though. The reserves either originated in Flesquieres or were channelled through the village. When they met the British coming around Havrincourt and up the slope towards Flesquieres, the German counter-thrust was completely stymied. The story then picks up with the previous quotes that I produced - Major Krebs recognised the danger "having just arrived on the high ground at Flesquières, [and] resolutely and quickly put in place the measures needed to hold the area."

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert a brilliant piece of work. Your to bloosdy clever by half :-)

I think yo have proven a number of my points.

I see fog mentioned in previous posts and again here I have seen no mention of Fog in British reports can we assume that the fog was a November morning mist suplemented by smoke.

I'm in the process of formulating a reply to your previos post I too am going to France at the weekebd visiting Caen and later St Nazier and finishing at verdun.

I dont want you cheating by moving Flequires or any thing under handed as that.

Have a good trip

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I promise, as long as you don't move Verdun

As to the fog/smoke, it was misty on the morning of 20th November. Smoke would have made this worse in some places. The heavy barrages would have reduced visibility further.

Have a great trip. Catch you again soon.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Art the outset of this discussion Karl Hammond described Harpers tactics of separating the infantry as one that was designed to save lives as tanks attracted artillery fire. I seem to remember that you agreed with Karl’s version and there were suggestions that Harpers tactics were innovative and before their time. Now it would seem that the argument is that the Infantry did go into the attack with the tanks. Surely, you cannot have it both ways.

Can we both agree in the light, of the Berlin Yellow pages you’ve just translated, that Flesquires was not a centre of defence but became so at the loss Havrincourt. The KOYLI history says that both the Infantry and the tanks knocked out some German batteries in the early stages of the battle could they have been firing from a point some where between the two but tasked to support Flesquires

To move on, the British artillery barrage was timed to last for 3 hours and a half. and addition, consisted of high explosive with smoke and gas mixed in. Have you thought why this mix. The High explosive was primarily to destroy the German defences with a secondary objective of demoralising and disorganising the garrison. The smoke would effectively blind the defenders and give cover to the attackers. The Gas was included to try to get into the bunkers etc. where the high explosive could not reach and increase the demoralisation factor. However, it has another use, in that wearing the gas mask obscures vision. Ask any soldier who has had to wear a gas mask in action and he will tell you that you can see ‘****** all’. Therefore, a combination of gas and smoke would effectively blind the demoralised Germans. Moreover, what they could not see they could not hit. Even weapons on fixed lines cannot work efficiently.

We have reports that the tanks took advantage of the cover given by the smoke, but none of the infantry doing likewise. Of course, the separation of the infantry from the tanks, laid down by Harper would have had this effect. If the Infantry the followed close to the barrage with the tanks they would have been on to the demoralised garrison before they could recover? In addition, once into the defended area of the village in numbers, that would have effectively neuteralized the machine guns and perhaps the artillery.

I see no reply to the remark suggesting the ratio of attackers was wrong.

Can I mention the first phase of the attack and try to highlight the different approaches to towards it. I first refer you to the attack by the 62 Div’s, 187 Brigade and its two KOYLI battalions. 2 / 4 KOYLI, their tanks were late in arriving at the start line. Nevertheless, the battalion eager to take advantage of the Barrage set off without the tanks, which caught up later and the two attacked together and captured the demoralised German forward position, moving on immediately into Havrincourt. Whilst at the same time, the 1 / 5 KOYLI not having tank support sent out a night Recce patrol that found and marked a way through the wire. The battalion crossed the start line before first light and were able under cover of the barrage, break through the German first line defence and again get into Havrincourt.

The start times of the two KOYLI battalions were just after 0600 hrs. at the same time approximately as the barrage opened up.

In comparison the 51 Div started behind the tanks who managed to break through the first line with ease. However, for whatever reason the Highlanders were not able to take advantage of this break through and were delayed. We have not had, yet any information as to why they were this hold up. There are three historical narratives, one stating they were held up by 3 machine guns, an other, that the Jocks were reluctant to leave the comfort of the German position once captured, the third, one of few German casualties. The answer may lie elsewhere, or a combination of them all. What is certain they did not advance with the tanks to the main objective?

In the second phase of the battle, the Germans are quite clear that the tanks were the main source of attack and that the they were taking advantage of the barrage especially the Fog/smoke but no mention of infantry support until later. There was artillery fire still enveloping Flesquires. Whatever support the infantry gave the tanks (if any) were certainly insufficient.

In Walter Bions talks about the second wave of tanks taking over the lead from the first wave, who were waiting, in the Grand ravine. The hatched area on the artillery fire map would suggest that this was a ‘no fire zone’. The Grand Ravine’s physical features protecting the tanks from German fire and the no fire zone protecting them from friendly fire, allowing the change over to go unmolested by artillery. Bion had no infantry support, leading to him having to fight off our friend with the stick with a Lewis Gun.

The Infantry were way back and taking cover in a trench.

The 20th Div had their problems with delays they seemed just to get on with it and we have no record the opposition was any less the an at Flesquires following is an account 7 KOYLI’s attack at La Vacquerie, they were is the second wave which I think is the one at Flesquires that may have been questionable.;

All went well; La Vacquerie was taken in the first bound. At 8.10 a.m. the 7/K.O.Y.L.I. passed through the 7/D.C.L.L, who were busy consolidating the line which they had captured, and attacked the Hindenburg support line.  Casualties became frequent from machine-gun fire, and the leading officers were killed or wounded; the support line was captured as designed; there was a second objective allotted to the battalion and the barrage, on which it counted for protection, was now 1,000 yards ahead. Some time was necessarily occupied in mopping up pockets of the enemy, and some reorganisation of companies had to be effected before advancing to another attack.  As soon as possible the line went on under Capt. F. P. Hargreave. The barrage was too far ahead to afford any protection and the tanks were also away in front, so that the line came in for heavy machine gun fire and suffered many casualties before it reached its goal at 11.30 a.m. Capt. Hargreave was among the killed.

The brigade had gained all its objectives and had made secure all the ground within the limits of its allotted task.  At 11.30 a.m., the 29th Div. passed through on its way to the capture of Marcoing and Masnieres, where there were important bridges over the canal.

Maj. Storr did fine work in personally directing the companies on their objectives and dealing with the situations rapidly as they arose, and was awarded the D.S.O. later.

2/Lt. W. Joffe, with Sgt. Roberts and about a dozen men, dis¬tinguished themselves by rushing an enemy 77 mm. gun, which continued firing point blank until they were within fifty yards of it. 2/Lt. Joffe was wounded.  The battalion also captured a second gun of the same calibre.

The companies consolidated their position and spent the night on the line of their final objective.

Can I take you back to #7 you indicated that the following quote by Harper before the battle, indicated his support for the Tanks;

"The tank is the primary weapon of attack

I would suggest that perhaps the quote was taken out of context by Haig’s supporters and later by the revisionists I would furthr suggest that he meant it was the main weapon of attack in the Flesquires operation. This would coincide with description given by the Germans and the Infantry’s lack of drive, in comparison to the other divisions.

Finally, I still think that the descriptions of attacks from the regimental histories of the Jocks indicate attacks late in the day and are in some respects describing the same incidents but from a different perspective.

I think the statement that begins ‘At 5pm’ is describing actions carried out at 1700 hrs.

Arnie

PS of to France with a clear conscience !!!!