Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[armourersergeant]

So you see that many of these books tell the truth. Edmunds, the official historian, admitted before he died, that he was a personnel friend of all the Generals (including Haig , he was at Sandhurst with him) and tried not to destroy their reputations

I am aware that Haig and Edmonds were at staff college together but i think they were not at Snadhurst as Edmonds would have gone through the 'shop' Woolwich.

Edmonds did not like to slag off his fellow officers atleast not in public, though in private he could be quiet scathing and also to some extent after their deaths. But yes he was careful not to damage the officer corps reputation.

As to whether Haig and Edmonds were friends, it is a muted point. Certainly at Camberley, Edmonds said that Haig was very stand-offish and that he was only really friendly with Blair of the KOSB.

Tim Travers in his book 'The Killing Ground' tries to imply that Haig was shadowed by Edmonds at the request of one of the tutors, thus implying that Haig was lacking!

According to Edmonds he has a slightly different slant to the story in his unpublished memoirs, in that Haig was often to General and he, Edmonds, to specific and that it was hoped that they would help correct each other. It may be fair to say though that Haig benefitted best from the marriage'.

But when Edmonds had his break down at the end of 1914 it was Haig that rescued him and gave him a job!

regards

Arm.

[Arnie]

Arm

I enjoyed your post, you make great efforts to be fair, something Haig and his 'Donkeys' in their writings could ever be accused of

Haig also felt compelled to keep many of his Divisional and Corps commanders as he did not feel he had better to replace them with! Given that presumption then he may have had the ability in theory but was restricted by reality!

I find this little more than an excuse for Haig. The most successful Generals

in the war were not even professional soldiers. Monash and Curry, but they only reached the top because of the intervention by their respective Dominion Governments. Eric Geddes was a political appointment made by Lloyd George. His efforts reorganising the supply system are considered by some as the greatest efforts by one man to victory. Geddes was not even a soldier but he finished the war as both General and an Admiral. Many hostilities only officers knew far more about modern war than the majority of pre war Generals.

I also do not have problem with the man in charge choosing who he wanted to do the job. You just have to make sure that the man in the hot spot is the right man. Which is a different question altogether.

But does this excuse the old pals acts and cronyism that existed through out Haig' Armies. A system that promoted poor regular officers over brilliant hostility only men.

Haig sacked Swinton the brilliant tank commander and replaced by an officer who did not believe in Tanks. Reason for dismissal? The Tank crews were scruffy.

Finally you said that the troops referred to Harper as 'Daddy' or 'Uncle'. I would suggest that may have been a little of 'hail fellow well met'.

I think Sassoon summed up this attitude in his poem;

The General

"Good-morning; good-morning!" the General said

When we met him last week on our way to the line.

Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of ’em dead,

And we’re cursing his staff for incompetent swine.

"He’s a cheery old card," grunted Harry to Jack

As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack.

But he did for them both by his plan of attack.

[Arnie]

Jim

I forgot to add a little rider to the quotes added by you. I should have added

I have a little trouble with these two quotes in that they seem to be in direct contradiction;

Although the two quotes appear to be in direct oposition. they both have one factor in common, they both in their way, provide a white wash for Harper.

Arnie

[Jim Gordon]

Robert

Thank you for your courteous reply.

I look forward to reading your alternative hypothesis on what happened at Flesquieres but would value your opinion on Hussey's contribution. In my opinion he does raise certain matters that are worthy of further consideration.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Jim Gordon]

Arnie

Before I make a restrained attempt to answer your postings re Harper and 51st. Division I think it only fair to make it clear where I am coming from on this issue.

The life span of my Father was severely truncated on account of wounds received at Cambrai. He was the recipient of two field gun shell fragments received while trying to quell the very field gun batteries so often referred to in this thread.

For 50 years now I have been reading comments re 51st. at Cambrai to the effect that a “…single bullet from them would have silenced the German gunner….” which changes to “…. The field gun batteries would have been easily silenced if the troops had been up with the tanks.” when it was established that more than one field gun battery had been present. I would love to have heard my father comment on the latter which, I must admit, still makes me feel up-tight and accounts for any note of acerbity that may creep in as my answer progresses. My interest in Cambrai is two-fold – One because I think it the most interesting battle fought in WW1 but pricipally because I have nurtured a desire, for more years than I care to remember, to find out the truth about what happened to by Father

In this connection it is interesting to note that the C.O. of the 1/7th. Gordons, in which my father was a sergeant, had marksmen specifically stationed right at the rear of each tank to shoot down the enemy if he fled . Note the “if”. Unfortunately at Flesquieres the enemy did not flee. Before you can blame Haig for my father’s misfortune (your usual tactic to account for any mishap in WW1) may I say my father never did.

I will now attempt to answer your posting.

What is your justification for claiming my source John Hussey is unreliable ? He is a member of both the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and of the British Commission for Military History.

I take exception to your emboldened quotation which can only be taken to infer that Robert Dunlop’s and my sources are liars. Or maybe you are referring to me alone. Are you?

Can I also point out that the quotation might also be applicable in reverse.

You accuse me of being “a little ambiguous”. Wrong! I am a lot ambiguous (See Chamber’s Dictionary for meaning of ambiguous).

You keep on hammering that the 51st. was late in starting and say you have found many references to this fault. Name them. I have the War Diary for 1/7th. Gordons and it is quite explicit that the Battalion started the attack on time. Do you include this Battalion in your list of liars ?

Regarding L/Cpl. R. McBeath’s V.C. you are quite correct that I indulged in a slight touch of poetic licence about the time at which he won it. The truth is I have no idea as to the correct time but assumed as 1/6th. Seaforths led the attack on the front of 152nd. Brigade it must have been early on.

I refuse to be drawn into a discussion on the relative merits, or otherwise, of the 62nd. and 51st. Divisions. To me a Divisional number is just that – a number, and I must point out that I meant no disparagement of the 62nd. Division in my claim re Fontaine. It is true the Guards did reach Fontaine but this was to relieve the 51st. They did not fight their way there although they saw plenty action after the relief.

The 51st. Div attack stalled because they lost their tanks and because the defenders remained to fight until evening.

It is not surprising that you find the “Baker-Carr” quotes difficult to take. Here we have the Brigade Commander of 1st. Tank Brigade giving a completely diametrically opposite view in his Battle Report , written a few days after the battle, to that which he gives in his book “From Chauffeur to Brigadier” written in 1930. Can he be lying ?

It must be his Battle Report that is a tissue of misrepresentations as your hero Liddell-Hart preferred the 1930 version.

You are downright insulting to John Hussey in claiming he blames the failure at Flesquieres on the incompetence and stupidity of the tank cews. Neither of these two nouns are mentioned in his text. Have you even read his paper ? No one is claiming all 40 tanks allocated to 51st. “lined up like sheep” but as my original posting made quite clear there is evidence, which requires to be tested, that 6 tanks of E Battalion on the extreme right flank did just that.

Incidentally why do you categorise me as “revisionist”. To me a revisionist is a historian who re-examines the evidence surrounding events and then makes public the conclusions he has drawn. I am not a writer, nor a historian, nor a military type and I have certainly no desire to re-write history. I do admit to a desire to see the evidence supporting opinions tested before they are accepted as “Fact”. It was in this spirit that I submitted Hussey’s paper for comment and for the reason stated in my preamble.

How come the officer Davidson referred to by Liddell-Hart does not qualify as a souvenir-hunter while both E.J.Medley and R.B.Purey-Cust do ? It is rather ironic that you have to turn to Haig’s Director of Military Operations for support. Furthermore, what has the date of of their report (1935) got to do with it ? Liddell-Hart and Elles did not write their books until the 1930s’

To infer that Baker-Carr wrote a doctored version of his Battle Report to satisfy Haig does not warrant a reply.

Lastly (I hope), the 51st. reported that the M.G. fire it met was wildly inaccurate while the C.O. of 1/7th. Gordons reported a significant proportion of wounds caused by sniper fire. In fact the ground, covered in long grass between Flesquieres Trench and the village, was infested with numerous snipers and it was they who inflicted the main damage to the infantry.

Also 51st. did not employ “Scout Tanks” (whatever they were) in advance of the main body of tanks but they did use “Wire-Crushers” whose job was obvious from their title but who were also required to strafe the enemy trenches in enfilade to assist the infantry assault.

I am feeling rather worn out now and will finish as briefly as I can.

In your last post you insinuate that revisionists take advantage of the fact that all the parties involved are now dead and cannot answer for themselves. This charge could equally be placed at the door of Baker-Carr et al regarding their defamation of Harper as they carried that out in 1930 after Harper had already been killed in a car crash in 1922 leaving no papers.

In conclusion, I can see that I have been partly responsible for lowering the tone of this debate to a personal level. I leave it to regular readers to judge where the remainder of the responsibility lies..

To Terry Reeves whose innocent posting started this marathon – now you know what it is like to step over a 1000 foot precipice !

Arnie I find your reply to my posting both arrogant and insulting. You can ignore this reply or answer it. The last word is yours but please don’t patronise me.

On that note I am withdrawing from this debate.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Arnie]

Jim

Please read this: [Broken link removed]

This throws a different light on to the battle. If this report is accurate then It could be that Dad was right and Mc Beith did win is VC before breakfast. However, it only moves the delays to later in the day. Harper did allow the tanks to go forward without support, the result being, the Jocks lost the initiative, the tanks were destroyed piecemeal without their infantry support and the Jocks suffering severe machinegun fire with out the protection of their tanks.

Sorry I upset you; I didn't think you could be so thin skinned! The reason I emboldened that the statement, it is a fact of life in any court or tribunal in the land; I thought you would appreciate that.

I too have an interest in this battle apart from my regiment having 3 later 4 battalions taking part, several members of family were there and I was an apprentice to a man who served in a tank at Cambrai.

Can I deal with your remarks regarding your Father, I doubt if your father was wounded engaging the Artillery. Is that a fact or just a useful assumption? You see it’s a matter of distance. Artillery can engage Infantry, who cannot reply, at a great range and cause casualties. But, when infantry get closer the gun becomes useless and the infantry usually capture it.

Are you sure your Father was a Sergeant and not a General? The reason I ask is that in my experience a Sergeant may know the Z hour for his platoon, even the Battalion but certainly not the rest of the Brigade, Division, Corp or Army. So how would he know the uniform Z hour for the whole of the attack?

A whole division held up by snipers? A sniper should not hold up a well trained section for very long. A sniper in the open and in long grass would soon be dealt with using smoke with fire and movement. A sniper(s) holding up a division?

Now Hussey:

Quote

What is your justification for claiming my source John Hussey is unreliable? He is a member of both the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and of the British Commission for Military History.

Simply this; the revisionist historians only appeared in the late 50s. When very few were alive to challenge their ideas. Also historical, administrative, tactical orders had all been weeded to ensure no embarrassment to the establishment remained. People like Baker Carr, had the advantage over the revisionist in they had been soldiers and had served in the war/battle, and had many live sources with experience, who could confirm or challenge them if they did not get their facts right. Harper died in the twenties but many of his supporters, if he had any, would still be alive to question any untruths. Of course a rabid critic of Haig and Co was Churchill, so much so he ensured that the the conditions that appertained in the Great War between Army and Government never appeared in the Second, by keeping the Army firmly under control.

You ask why I consider Hussey unreliable. Simply because his sources are now contaminated. However you can belittle Liddle- Hart, who was a far more distinguished historian. A soldier in the war, also a staff officer and a confident of the man who wrote the official history, with access to all the documents that will never see the light of day again.

According to most accounts including the German one, the six tanks were hit crossing the lone Gunners (?) Front. There were still over 30 to 36 tanks in E battalion. If an historian claims that the tanks came over the ridge one at a time when they could have crossed elsewhere would indicate the crews were incompetent or stupid. And I’m sure they weren’t. The lone Gunner is a contentious issue as to whether he actually existed. Although at the inquiry into the failure at Flesquires, Harper blames him. A number of Historians have stated that there is no mention of this Gunner in German Reichswehr archives and doubt whether he existed

You avoided answering why Hussey’s report differed from Baker Carr’s.

Davidson was apparently sent by GHQ to find out what had gone wrong with the 51st attack. What were the two Majors doing if not souvenir hunting after all their batteries were still in action?-See Gavin Roynon’s “Massacre of the Innocents” regarding officers fascination for wandering over recent battlefields (soldiers as well I suppose)

Quote

You accuse me of being “a little ambiguous”. Wrong! I am a lot ambiguous (See Chamber’s Dictionary for meaning of ambiguous).

I don’t have Chamber’s Dictionary, but according to the Oxford Dictionary it means obscure; having a double meaning: of doubtful classification; of uncertain issue. Yes that’s you alright!

Mc Beith - Ah! So your fact is an assumption? But it was a fact earlier and you’re the one who gets up tight over a simple remark (but see above).

Fontaine – Sorry but I thought we were talking about the first day. You see 62nd Division carried out all their tasks, doing what they were asked, in the way they were ordered on the first day. Saying that, 51div took two days to achieve very much the same and did not capture as many guns. Is stretching fact a little far! Oh, by the way 62 Div were relieved after the first day because of exhaustion and casualties. The 51st weren’t, does that not beg the question why?

Quote

The 51st. Div attack stalled because they lost their tanks and because the defenders remained to fight until evening.

I won’t mention a late start. Robert talks about the tanks being 400 to 500 meters in front. So according to Edmunds (speaking after the war), a mile was a good advance under fire in a day. So the infantry supposedly supporting the tanks could have been anything from Half hour to half a day behind the tanks. Harpers held up his Infantry for 90 minutes would this have added to the hold up (then we have the three machine guns- see above)

Davidson’s report is at CAB45/118. I see also that Davidson also accompanied Haig around the area of 51 Div’s battle in an attempt to find out what had gone wrong.

I find it strange through out the period of this debate. There has been no rancor, only honest disagreement. So much so we have been congratulated at the quality of debate.

You put your ‘half pennyworth’ in and that changed. I have noticed when ever any one varies from the official revisionist line they are attacked and an attempt made to belittle them.

You seem to take any criticism of Harper personally because of your father, a Sergeant in 51 Div. I doubt if ever saw Harper more than once or twice and probably never spoke to him.

In conclusion, in another book I read that the Divisions who went through the grinder at Passchendaele never really recovered properly, some where worse than others and had developed a collective opinion that they had done enough in this war. Hence they did not drive home their attacks with the same élan as usual. 51 Div had always been a heavily used Division, over used some would say. So perhaps they had decided consciously or subconsciously to let the tanks get on with it. There are other examples for this in WW2 in Normandy the ex 8th Army divisions (50th, 51st and 7th Armoured) did not perform as well as divisions from the Garrison in England. They had used up their store of courage and were suffering from a collective form of PTSD.

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Jim

I have just got back and read your most recent post. I will try and put up my summary sometime in the next few days.

Artillery can engage Infantry, who cannot reply, at a great range and cause casualties. But, when infantry get closer the gun becomes useless and the infantry usually capture it.

Arnie

This is not always the case. Here are some examples of British artillery being engaged at close quarters, starting with Le Cateau and Becke's book 'The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau':

'The BC (Captain Gillman) observed from a position in the open cornfield on the spur to the west of his Battery [123rd Battery RFA, attached to Fifth Division on the right of Le Cateau defensive line]. It was during this phase that he noticed the German infantry pressing forward on his left front and only about a quarter of a mile away, so he went down into the Battery to warn the section commanders of what was impending and to make the necessary arrangements for meeting the attack.

The left section was run round to receive the infantry with a point-blank burst of fire directly it showed. The German infantry, however, was driven back by an advance made by our infantry and 123 [battery] was not called upon to intervene.'

'It was clear that on the Right Flank and Right Centre of the Fifth Division the enemy had gained sufficient artillery preponderance to warrant him in risking another immediate overwhelming attack with his infantry. To meet it there were on the ground only a comparatively few guns left in action and the ammunition supply in the exposed batteries was almost exhausted. But the Germans remembered only too well the rapid fire of the British Infantry on August 23 and 24 and they made no attempt to rush the position [pure conjecture but this sets the scene for the next quote].'

'The German Infantry, in possession of Le Cateau and the big spur above the railway station, were steadily pouring round the open right flank of XV RFA. The Germans were now determined to assault, and masses of their infantry suddenly appeared out of the sunken road behind the right flank of the line held by the 2/Suffolk Regiment. The occupants of these trenches... and RFA [who may have been fighting as infantry, it is not clear from the text] promptly opened rapid fire on the mass and did so much execution that, instead of rushing the small British force, the German infantry halted and returned the fire...'

'The end of 52 [battery] RFA [, the only surviving battery from XV on the right, the rest having been hitched up and got away] must now be given. As this phase [of the German attack on the right] wore on the fire of the Battery became more and more intermittent, single guns firing at long intervals. The Battery was in its death-throes. Through the devoted gallantry of the wounded the two flank guns were able to maintain a desultory fire. Finally, at 2.45 pm the end came with startling suddeness and the flank was overwhelmed and rolled up from the right and right rear. It was impossible to fire into the surging crowd of friends and foes and the OP of the dying battery was over-run by the Germans 26th Regiment, 7th Division, IV Corps'.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

These are some examples from Farndale's book on 'The History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery' regarding March 1918:

'By noon [21st March], the mist suddenly cleared to reveal German infantry advancing 300 yards from the muzzles [of A Battery 82 Brigade RFA]. The 18-pounders smote them cruelly, inflicting such casualties that every effort to rush the guns was crushed. Quick accurate gun drill took its toll and for nearly four hours the battery held its ground... till 1700 hours, when the gallant A Battery was rushed and captured.'

'Meanwhile, C Battery of 83 Brigade had its sections dispersed. At 1115 hours, German infantry rushed through the mist [towards the advanced section]. Seizing rifles and their breech blocks, the section fought its way back to the next section only to find German infantry closing in. Again, Captain Haybittel and his men grabbed a machine gun and withdrew to a nearbly sunken road. Here they made a stand fighting as infantry and, when a line was established to the rear section, the combined small arms fire stopped every German rush, inflicting heavy casualties and knocking out each enemy machine gun. This must be a unique and rare case of a battery acting as its own infantry and then conducting a withdrawal through an encircling enemy.'

'D Battery of 83 Brigade had two sections well forward and one near Brigade Headquarters. The men of Brigade Headquarters formed a protective screen round the guns with rifles. By noon, German infantry appeared through mist 500 yds away; they were engaged down to 200 yds, the Gunners having to duck to avoid splinters from their own shells. Throughout the afternoon the little force held out. By 1800 hours the last round was fired. The position was by now under

close machine gun fire but the Germans, roughly handled all day, shrank from closing before dark.'

'D Battery of 177 Brigade was firing in the mist in the early morning on SOS tasks when German infantry suddenly appeared through the mist on the right flank of the battery. The guns were in pits and could not be switched around, nor was there time to run them out in the open. The guns of right section were disabled, the gunners gave covering fire with small arms while the left section was run out into the open and swung on the enemy at point blank range. Lieutenant Trorey seized a Lewis gun and he himself killed many Germans. The battery had held up the advance for the vital hours to coordinate

some kind of line to the rear.'

'Records report a single 18-pounder on 21st Division's front (its battery unknown) which fired 1,000 rounds holding up an entire German brigade and then, with all ammunition gone, the subaltern in charge held off the Germans with a machine gun as a team galloped up, limbered up and thundered off into the dusk of the evening.'

'At one point [in the Hirondelle Valley], a mixed line of field guns and three 9.2" howitzers fired point blank [ouch] at the closing enemy. Ranges got shorter and shorter and the gunners seized Lewis guns and rifles and held until the next line could be prepared.'

'In 34th Division's area, 160 Brigade RFA greatly distinguished itself near Croissile firing over open sights at 5,000 advancing infantry and defeated three assaults in succession by the terrible accuracy and speed of its fire. Two more German divisions came up, advancing in mass, and forged forward. When only 200 yards away, the gunners fell back and fought on with the infantry until dark.'

Weber, in 'A Field Artillery Group in Battle', also mentions the 2nd Brigade RFA HQ staff coming forward to support a battery of guns. They used Lewis guns against Germans debouching from a nearby town, on the flanks but not close assaulting the battery.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

These quotes are from 'Pushed and the Return Push' by Quex (a pseudonym). Quex was a liaison officer with the 82nd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. He has written a detailed account of the Brigade from March 1918 through till the end of October.

In March, the Brigade was in support of an infantry division in the St Quentin area, part of Gough's Fifth Army.

'Gunners had the rare experience of circling their battery positions with barbed wire, and siting machine-guns for hand-to-hand protection of the 18 pdrs and 4.5" hows; and special instructions in musketry and Lewis-gun manipulation was given by infantry instructors'

'"An officer told me that an advanced party of the enemy came over the crest about 12.30. They fired Very lights in response to a Hun contact plane that flew towards the switch-trench leading NE towards the battery. By 2 o'clock more enemy infantry were coming from the south, apparently to join up with the advanced party who had sat tight. Both A and B Batteries (18 pdrs) fired on this new body and they seemed to me to be dispersed. But by half-past three, while I

was there, Germans in small parties were crawling through the wire in front of A Battery, and getting into our trenches."

"Was the battery still firing when you came away?" demanded the colonel.

"Yes, sir, firing well, but mostly on fresh parties of Boche eight hundred yards away."

A knock at the door, and the entrance of a quick-eyed dapper bombardier from the very battery talked of prevented Dumble from continuing.

"From Major Harville, sir," he said, saluting.

The message ran -

"I have fired 2200 rounds and have only 200 rounds left. My SAA for Lewis guns and rifles is also running short. Can more ammunition be sent up immediately, please? The enemy has got through the wire in front of the battery and is now

on two sides of us. If the infantry can assist we can hold out until dark, when I shall retire to rear position."

"[Later] We finished all our ammunition, sir" [the sergeant] began addressing the colonel, "and took our rifles. Major Harville was shot by a machine-gun while he was detailing us to defend the two gun-pits farthest from the place where the enemy had got past our wire. Mr Dawes, who took command, said we would keep with the rifles, and Bombardier Clidstone was doing fine work with his Lewis gun. The Huns didn't seem inclined to come close. The battery fired several fine volleys; I heard them for a long time. Then I noticed no firing came from the battery. There was no sound at all for over ten minutes. Then about a hundred Germans rushed forward and started bombing the gun-pits, and some of our men came up. I saw about a dozen of them marched off as prisoners."

"[The sergeant of D Battery - not the same sergeant nor the same battery as above - ] returned again, and discovering Germans close to the 18 pdr and the 4.5 howitzer, ordered the [gunner] detachments to open fire on them with rifles. The enemy were dispersed after ten minutes's shooting."

"[Next day] one gunner did extraordinarily stout work. Unaided, and with a rifle, he held up a Boche machine-gun party that had worked round on a battery's left flank, and later, with three others captured the machine-gun. One Boche, who broke through, he chased over half the country apparently, and shot him down. The amusing thing is that when he had killed the Boche he searched his pockets and found a cake, addressed to a bombardier in another battery. The Huns had scuppered this battery and ransacked their dugouts. The bombardier was somewhat surprised last night when the gunner handed him his lost cake.'

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Your examples are good but apart from one incident It would seem that the

gunners were defending their Guns fighting as infantry apart from the one incident.

The 18-pounders smote them cruelly, inflicting such casualties that every effort to rush the guns was crushed. Quick accurate gun drill took its toll and for nearly four hours the battery held its ground... till 1700 hours, when the gallant A Battery was rushed and captured.'

- note the Guns were captured - Arnie

1918 the German 'Sturm Truppen' had fir and movement down to a fine art. To get to the gun line they must have broken all the infantry defence lines in doing they must have gone through the artillery's killing ground. The actual blowing the German infantry away is possible if you are using anti personnel canister ammunition. Other wise to get the round to explode on contact at 300 metres doesn't seem right, the elevation would have to be depressed very low I would rather think that well trained infantry would have been well spread out and engaging the guns with Machine Guns and rifle grenades.

But For Jims dad to be wounded with shrapnel would indicate exploding shell indicating a longer range well out of small arm range. In a defence of the guns like the one you produced, why do we see no evidence of it and why in all thse relative quick advances made by both sides, where so many guns captured

Over to you

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

The close-quarters anti-infantry capability of German artillery batteries had also been increased prior to Cambrai. Sulzbach ('With the German Guns') reported in October 1917 that:

'At this point orders arrived that several of our officers are ordered away to attend a machine-gun course, one lieutenant from each battery. Here we are with the Divisional Machine-Gun Training Company. The idea of providing us gunners with machine-gun training is that each German battery is now being issued with two machine-guns for defence in hand-to-hand fighting.'

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Yes, It would seem that the Germans were wise to the threat to artillery by the then new Infantry tactics.

But we must look at the results; the British captured over 50 German guns. The Germans reciprocated by capturing almost has many.

When you read any regimental history it is very rare that they report the normal, only the abnormal makes good reading. In consequence the British defence of the Guns were abnormal when you consider through out the war so many were captured.

But we are transgressing.

Can I show you What John Keegan says about this period of the battle:

Cambrai sector were unprepared for the hurricane bombardment that descended upon them at 6.20 on the morning of 20 November and the appearance of dense columns of tanks, 324 in all, rolling forward with infantry following. Within four hours the attackers had advanced in many places to a depth of four miles, at almost no cost in casualties: in the 20th Light Division, the 2nd Durham Light Infantry lost four men killed, the 14th Durham Light Infantry only seven men wounded.

The difference was in the centre. There the 51st Highland Division, gingerly following the tanks at some hundreds of yards' distance, entered the defended zone of the German 54th Reserve. Its gunners, trained by General von Walter, began to engage the British tanks as they appeared, unsupported by infantry, over the crest near Flesquieres village, and knocked them out one by one. Soon eleven were out of action, five destroyed by a single German sergeant, Kurt Kruger, who was killed by a Highlander when the 51st Division's infantry at last got up with the tanks. By then, however, it was too late for the division to reach the objective set for it for the day, so that, while on the left and right of the Cambria battlefield, the whole German position had been broken, in the centre a salient bulged towards British lines, denying

General Byng the clear-cut breakthrough espousal of Elles's and Tudor's revolutionary plan should have brought him.

Back to you Robert

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Robert talks about the tanks being 400 to 500 meters in front.

Arnie

This is not quite correct. I mentioned that 'the tanks advanced over the ridge unaccompanied by the infantry, who were variously listed as 200 - 400 yards behind the tanks.' There is no consistent figure on this, though the tanks were definitely separated from the infantry.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

1. Substantial numbers of German defenders also got into Flesquieres well before any British infantry reached the vicinity, indeed before they had consolidated the Blue Line.  The German artillery were already in place.

2. The resumption of the advance by 51st Division was delayed compared with 62nd Division - 0930 hrs vs 0845 hrs for the advance from the Blue Line.

3. The tanks advanced over the ridge unaccompanied by the infantry, who were variously listed as 200 - 400 yards behind the tanks.

My hypothesis is that even if the infantry had accompanied the tanks over the ridge, Flesquieres would still not have been captured on the first day.

This hypothesis can never be proven. There is some supporting evidence:

i) The tanks had to cross the wire first before the infantry could get through. The wire was up to 50 yards wide. Thus the tanks would still have been most vulnerable to the numerous anti-tank guns because they still had to cross the ridge ahead of the infantry.

ii) The co-ordination of tanks was difficult. While the ideal would have been for all of the tanks to cross the ridge at the same time, this would have been highly unlikely.

iii) The views from inside a tank were extremely limited. I have already quoted from one tanker who was present in the attack on Flesquiere village and whose tank was hit by the artillery. It would have been difficult for the tankers to pick up the artillery when their focus was on preparing the way for the infantry by crushing paths through the wire then knocking out the trenches and associated strong points.

iv) The infantry came under heavy and sustained rifle and machine-gun fire from Flesquieres village. This diverted their attention towards the sources of the fire. If the infantry had crossed with the tanks and then focused on the artillery, they would have been cut down by German defenders in the village and in the Hindenburg Support Line and/or would not have been able to continue attacking the artillery.

v) While it is possible that infantry can suppress artillery, combined infantry/tank operations were still in their infancy and tanks were used to support infantry, rarely vice versa.

I would like to quote some additional examples pertaining to these issues.

31 July 1917

'At this time I saw G11 blown up by a direct hit and about five minutes later G2 was blown up by a direct hit and my own tank was very heavily shelled. We seemed to be under direct observation of a German battery but I was unable to locate its position.'

2nd Lt Popplewell, Tank G3

'On proceeding to cross Steenbeek engaged with six pounder, enemy batteries firing from left and right of Winnipeg. These batteries were silenced.'

Tank G4, Lt Gardner

31st May 1918

'At the head of the ravine, at what appeared to be about 600 yards range, an anti-tank gun unmasked. We saw the flash of the discharge. It was evidently firing at us. Without halting the crew commander (of the Renault RT17) opened fire against the gun, which replied vigorously. With a quick tack the tank dodged behind some bushes and from this cover a few well directed rounds quickly silenced the enemy's fire. Little groups of our own riflemen now appeared, mostly Colonial troops. Rifles in hand they regarded us with curiosity. It would appear that they might have engaged the anti-tank gun.'

23 July 1918

'On 23 July, the anniversary of the battalion's arrival in France, the tanks went into battle in three phases at slightly different times, the idea being for one company to take over and push on when the preceding one had reached its objective. In this way poor old C Company took over from A just as Mr Hun recovered from his surprise, which was complete as usual. Attaining their objective the tanks began to patrol in front of their infantry to enable them to consolidate the newly gained ground as much as possible. Of the eleven [tanks that reached the objective] six were knocked out, chiefly by direct hits over open sights.'

RQMS H. G. Mackenzie, 9th Battalion

8 August 1918

'Further north the other companies of the 13th were meanwhile advancing over undulating ground; the method of attack had been adapted to suit the conditions. Leaving the infantry established on a crest, tanks would go forward across the valley, maintaining fire on isolated machine-gun posts, and gain positions on the forward crest. In all cases this induced the enemy to give themselves up and enabled the infantry to advance to the next crest.

A [German] field gun placed on the high ground across the river near Chipilly was in a position to enfilade the advance and knocked out three tanks soon after they passed the first infantry objective.'

'Major Pape's eleven tanks left their assembly point shortly after 8 am, deployed in front of the infantry, and at 8.20 am, followed at a distance of about 200 yards by their Australians, started on their attack. The ground in this sector beyond Warfusee was level, rising at a slight slope towards a crossroads lined with trees. Behind this screen three German batteries were established and their guns commanded the approach over open sights. Six tanks of the company were knocked out almost in one line in front of this position. The casualties were severe, but nothing daunted, the survivors of the crews left their tanks and with their Hotchkiss guns attacked the artillery. 2/Lt Plews continued to move forward against these guns in spite of two direct hits on his tank, while that of 2/Lt Challis received three hits without being brought to a standstill. These officers were thus able to approach nearer than the rest to the hostile guns and, when finally knocked out, attacked the gunners on foot at the head of their crews. In this gallant fashion the batteries were were captured and the advance enabled to continue.'

10 August 1918

'The infantry were of the opinion that the tanks were too fast and kept too far ahead of them. What was lacking was the mutual understanding gained by previous practice [with the Australians].

Coming under fire from a battery of guns, [2nd Lt Gray] received a direct hit on his tank, but being able still to move he made for the flank of this battery in the hope of enfilading it. A second hit killed one of the crew and wounded two others, but he continued to advance until a third hit brought his tank to a standstill.'

29 September 1918

'The leading tanks, after crossing the crest, came under heavy machine-gun fire which they attempted to crush; they were, however, directly afterwards knocked out by enemy artillery. The tanks which had gone over the ridge were B25 Curmudgeon III, B26 Cynic III, B27 Crusty III and B28 Crab V. These were all knocked out by direct hits, burnt out, and the crews became casualties. About 6 pm Lt Ridley went forward with four men to the abandoned tanks to report the possibility of salvage and to leave guards on them. He was only able to reach two, and in doing so lost two of his men. He therefore withdrew the whole party, as further attempts at salvage were impossible owing to heavy machine-gun and artillery fire.

[in a separate action] on crossing the high ground immediately east of the canal all five Mark Vs were knocked out by direct hits.'

Notice that:

i) I could only find two examples where anti-tank guns were knocked out:- one example was only suggestive (Colonial troops in support of Renaults), and the other was achieved by dismounted tank crews because the infantry were some distance behind. In neither case was there a large concentration of German riflemen and machine-gunners nearby in heavy cover. Had this been present, the tankers would not have been able to achieve their success in attacking the anti-tank guns, IMHO.

ii) It was occasionally possible for tanks to enagage and knock out anti-tank guns. Not quoted is one other example of tanks knocking out an isolated gun.

iii) Even after Cambrai, it was not uncommon for tanks to operate well in advance of infantry. 51st Division's follow-up was not unusual. Note that on the 8th August 1918, the Australians, who were most experienced and best-trained at infantry/tank co-operation were some 200 yards (ie the minimum quoted distance that 51st Division were behind the tanks) back.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

In summary, the capture of Flesquieres was essential to the successful advance of the British Army on the first day of the Battle of Cambrai. The failure to take the village has long been blamed on poor tactical decision-making by Maj-Gen Harper, GOC 51st Highland Division. Specifically, the delay in starting the second phase of the attack and the separation of infantry from tanks have been cited as the key causes of the failure.

This view adopts the scapegoat approach. It is suggests that the British tactics applied elsewhere on the Cambrai battlefield were appropriate because they worked elsewhere on that battlefield. The further assumption is that German defensive capabilities were uniformly distributed across the breadth and depth of the battlefield. Therefore the failure at Flesquieres had to be a failure of the British tactics at that point. The tactical differences applied by Harper are very evident, therefore these must have been the cause of the failure. Thus, Harper was to blame.

In support of the scapegoat view, the 'myth' of the single German gunner responsible for knocking out the British tanks has been widely propagated.

More detailed analysis reveals that Flesquieres village served as the Schwerpunkt, the focal point, of the German defensive efforts. The village was ideally suited for this purpose, lying on the reverse slope and protected by the Hindenburg Support line. The village was heavily reinforced with the single largest concentration of German troops on the battlefield. This concentration occurred well before any British infantry even reached the first objective. The village was also flanked on both sides by several artillery batteries, the crews being trained and experienced in anti-tank operations. I suspect, but cannot prove, that this was the largest concentration of artillery batteries on the battlefield.

The Mk IV tanks were extremely vulnerable to anti-tank fire, particularly as they crossed the skyline. The British infantry were extremely vulnerable to the concentration of machine guns and riflemen located in and around Flesquieres. Neither defensive features were suppressed with British artillery at the time the attack went in on the village. The failure to capture Flesquieres represents an example of the highly successful application of German defensive principles and skills, rather than the failure of the British tactics. I believe the same problems would have occurred even if the infantry/tank tactics had been different.

Flesquieres posed a unique tactical problem on day one of the battle of Cambrai. The concentration of German infantry and artillery, unsuppressed by artillery fire at the time of the infantry/tank attacks, was quite unlike any other area on the battlefield. British infantry and tanks were highly unlikely to quickly overcome this defensive position, no matter how they were used. At the very least, additional artillery support was required to ensure that village was vulnerable.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

You obviously spent a lot of time finding incidents of tanks fighting with and without Infantry support, with or without a measure of success. Sorry but I find some of it irrelevant, especially as we hope some of the lessons of Cambrai should have been absorbed.

The tanks had to cross the wire first before the infantry could get through. The wire was up to 50 yards wide. Thus the tanks would still have been most vulnerable to the numerous anti-tank guns because they still had to cross the ridge ahead of the infantry.

I don’t quite understand this perhaps my geography is wrong. It would appear from the quote above that 51 Div were advancing up a forward slope with the crest of the ridge ahead. If so they would have been in dead ground as far as the German Gunners were concerned so they would have been unable to engage the tanks with direct fire. I therefore assume that this was the point when Harper called a halt and allowed the tanks to go on alone.

The co-ordination of tanks was difficult. While the ideal would have been for all of the tanks to cross the ridge at the same time, this would have been highly unlikely

Yes I agree, but never the less it does not explain all the tanks crossing in the same place, one section perhaps but the whole battalion of 45 tanks would take even more organizing considering they were spread over the divisional front.

It would have been difficult for the tankers to pick up the artillery when their focus was on preparing the way for the infantry by crushing paths through the wire then knocking out the trenches and associated strong points.

Only a limited number of tanks were detailed for wire crushing the rest were to give support, especially in view they lacked infantry support. The mentioned heavy machine gun fire would seem to have been caused by three machine guns. And all the tanks had not been knocked out.

I find it strange that this position was so strong in isolation. I assume that the area attacked by the British was selected because it was a weak and lightly defended rest area for troops from Passchendaele. If not why did they attack it? According to many sources including the Germans they had thinned out their defenses, prior to an expected attack, as was tactics at this stage of the war.

While it is possible that infantry can suppress artillery, combined infantry/tank operations were still in their infancy and tanks were used to support infantry, rarely vice versa

Yes Robert, Infantry/Tank cooperation was in its infancy, at Cambrai. Those divisions that had practiced it and then used it were successful. 51 Div had neither trained or used it and were therefore unsuccessful.

Regarding post #89 Yes it gives a selection of actions that were fought later in the war when both sides were more aware of the capabilities of the tank. All except Haigh who insisted that the Tanks operate with Cavalry which meant that the Tanks suffered from lack of support of infantry. But why go to 1918 to show good tank infantry cooperation that led to less Tank/Infantry casualties and more guns silenced and captured. Cambrai showed some brilliant and successful actions by the other Divisions involved.

In summary, the capture of Flesquieres was essential to the successful advance of the British Army on the first day of the Battle of Cambrai. The failure to take the village has long been blamed on poor tactical decision-making by Maj-Gen Harper, GOC 51st Highland Division. Specifically, the delay in starting the second phase of the attack and the separation of infantry from tanks has been cited as the key causes of the failure.

Why this should be a scapegoat when there is enough evidence to support that above is a fair description of what happened. Why should the Germans evacuate Flesquires if it was such an important ‘Schwerpunkts’ position and so strongly held? The tanks fought on their own whilst the Jocks rested for 90 minutes in the middle of an assault surely this must have had a bearing on 51 Divs failure to capture their objective.

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

You obviously spent a lot of time finding incidents of tanks fighting with and without Infantry support, with or without a measure of success. Sorry but I find some of it irrelevant, especially as we hope some of the lessons of Cambrai should have been absorbed.

Arnie

As you say, one way to approach the post-Cambrai quotes is to suggest that any failures of infantry/tank co-operation were failures to learn the lessons of Cambrai. An alternative view would be that Harper had already learned the lesson. Tanks and infantry operating closely together was a nice ideal but the propensity of tanks to attract large volumes of both HE and small-arms fire made them dangerous accomplices. So even the Australians, who finally developed an appreciation for tanks, lagged a respectable distance behind them.

I posted some of the other quotes in the hope that others may find them interesting. I agree that information about how vulnerable tanks were to artillery is not directly pertinent to this debate - we agree that tanks alone were unlikely to clear the artillery either side of Flesquieres.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie said:

I don’t quite understand this perhaps my geography is wrong. It would appear from the quote above that 51 Div were advancing up a forward slope with the crest of the ridge ahead. If so they would have been in dead ground as far as the German Gunners were concerned so they would have been unable to engage the tanks with direct fire. I therefore assume that this was the point when Harper called a halt and allowed the tanks to go on alone.

Arnie

You are right to pick up on this. Unfortunately, the map that I edited, which was posted at:

 

is not available to review at the moment. It showed, however, that most of the thick belts of wire in front of the Hindenburg Line lay on the reverse slope. There was a short length of wire lying on the forward slope, just forward of the highest point of the ridge. So tanks crossing this wire were protected from the artillery fire.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

This is the post that describes the experience of a tanker while on the forward slope, contrasting with what happened when he cleared the crest in pursuit of targets in a trench on the reverse slope:

 

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie said:

I find it strange that this position was so strong in isolation. I assume that the area attacked by the British was selected because it was a weak and lightly defended rest area for troops from Passchendaele. If not why did they attack it? According to many sources including the Germans they had thinned out their defenses, prior to an expected attack, as was tactics at this stage of the war.

Arnie

I am not sure what you saying here. Are you saying that Flesquieres village was strongly held in isolation? Or are you saying that the British attacked the line because it was thinly held, therefore Flesquieres was only thinly held? Therefore you doubt that Flesquieres was strongly held as I have suggested?

The thinning out of defences prior to an attack was only a part of the strategy used by the Germans. The concept of Schwerpunkt was just as important, providing locales where the attacker could be stalled in order to allow reinforcements to get into the area. German defenders would take on these roles in the knowledge that counter-attack was part of the doctrine, therefore they would not be left to die.

To my knowledge, Cambrai was not thinned out prior to the surprise assault. In fact, we have discussed how the Germans came to be vaguely aware that there might be an attack in the near future and reinforcements were made more available.

Arnie said:

Why should the Germans evacuate Flesquires if it was such an important ‘Schwerpunkts’ position and so strongly held?

Arnie, I think the alternate question is more important. Why did they hold on there as long as they did? The decision to abandon the village is reviewed here:

 

Note that this quote is not from the British Official History. I am not sure that the village was completely cut-off from divisional or higher command. There was a sophisticated visual signalling system installed on the edge of the wall of the chateau. Thus even if telephonic communication was cut-off, there was still the possibility of signalling. I have no evidence, however, that the defenders were in communication with higher command. I presume that Krebs took the [wise] decision to fall back while there was still a chance to get out. The defenders had more than done their job. Having resisted multiple attacks all day, including tanks, the Flesquieres re-entrant had effectively stopped the flanks of the British attack extending their full extent and had largely stopped the cavalry from getting forward. By the time the defenders left the village, the gaps in the German line had been plugged and more reinforcements were on their way.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Could I just try and recap by asking you a few questions

The Cambrai operation was originally planned as a tank raid on St Quinton. Taken over by Byng and then Haig as a breakthrough to capture Cambrai, any success was doomed to failure. Because of the massive salient produced, taking perhaps 25,000 men to defend, with all the casualties a salient inevitably produces. What do you think was the theory behind this attack?

1. This discussion has produced a number of reasons why the Jocks original attack failed e.g. Snipers, 3x Machineguns, a single German Gunner or a combination of all three. I cannot believe that a full Infantry Division supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. Would be held up for long if the will, drive and initiative to accept the opportunity when they arose had been taken.

2. Your reason for their not being artillery support, was tanks cutting lines, is reasonable, until you realise that the lines would have or should have been repaired. The Infantry paused for 90 minutes during the battle more than enough time for parties from the forward command posts and from the Gun line to trace and repair the lines. After all it could not have been more than a few hundred metres long.

3. During the battle after the infantry had broken into the forward German position, could they have not gone to ground into the abandoned enemy bunkers? There are some suggestions that this did happen.

4. It is alleged that the infantry were in no position to assist the tanks because of enemy fire. The Jocks had Mortars and Machine Guns on hand to suppress this enemy fire. Smoke would have covered their movement. Why were the tanks allowed to go forward without any assistance?

5. Gen Davidson said that one reason for failure was lack of training in Infantry/tank cooperation would that not have been Harpers fault for not providing that training. Coupled to this lack of training would not Harpers well know antipathy to the battle and tanks in general have peculated down through the ranks of the Division?

6. The investigation into the action failures by Field Marshal Smuts, concluded that it was caused by lack of training of the junior ranks, failure by a junior officer to fire a success signal and a solitary German Gunner. Who were the scapegoats here then?

Over to you Robert

[Arnie]

Robert I cannot accept that Hrpaer devised new tactics The germans developed their tank attacks to include Panzer Grenadiers who were carried in vehicles to keep up with the tanks. Modern Armoured have armoured infantry the idea is to take immediate advantage of any gaps forced by the tanks before the enemy have time to react.

During the WW2 the Rommel's vaunted armoured divisions were thrown at a British battalion position with out its supporting Panzer Grenadiers.

The reult was the battle of 'Snipe where 2 Rifle Brigade antitank guns and an artillery battery destroyed 50 German and Italian tanks.

[Arnie]

Robert

I have problems with post #31 Its the time when this happend I believe it happend later in the day after 51 Divs 90 minute break and would therefore add little weight to the debate other than good back ground

Arnie

[Arnie]

Robert

I keep having difficulty why the artillery did not use smoke. cut lines is an insufficient reason. I keep having this nagging feeling that 51 Div left the Tanks to get on with it.

Its seems every one is to blame but the people who should have made things happen and that the staff. Surley all the Brigades would have been in touch with Div HQ?

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Are you saying that Flesquieres village was strongly held in isolation?  Or are you saying that the British attacked the line because it was thinly held, therefore Flesquieres was only thinly held?  Therefore you doubt that Flesquieres was strongly held as I have suggested?

Arnie

I think you have answered this question indirectly. If I understand correctly, you believe that Flesquieres village was held by:

...Snipers, 3x Machineguns, a single German Gunner or a combination of all three

This is not what has been suggested in the evidence that I have provided. There is clearly a major discrepany between our points-of-view. Until this is resolved, further debate around any other points is of limited value, IMHO. Therefore, I will undertake to provide material from the original German sources. It will take a little while to translate it.

Meanwhile, it would be helpful if you could provide the source and the full quotation for the discovery of three piles of machine gun cartridge cases. Thanks.

Robert