Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[Robert Dunlop]

according to two accounts of the battle, the artillery was moved into position during this delay.

'Realising that to be effective against tanks, it was more important for field guns to be mobile rather than hidden in fortified positions, Hofmeister ordered the guns of 2nd Company 108 Field Artillery Regiment to be pulled out into the open and pointed towards the top of the ridge, from where the attack would come.

I would like to return briefly to this issue of the moving of the artillery vis-a-vis the delay in 51st Division's attack toward the Brown Line. I believe it is clear that the artillery were in place to the rear of Flesquieres. They would have been located in fortified/hidden gun pits, possibly similar to those encountered by 20th Division though I am not sure what the German artillery posts looked like around Cambrai. If they are similar to other areas of the Hindenburg Line that I have seen photographs of, then the guns were under cover, firing forward with a limited arc of fire, probably not much more than 90 degrees in total. The situation around la Vacquerie suggests that the guns did not need to run out from their positions to attack the tanks advancing to their front, though this is purely supposition on my part. Having detected that tanks were present on at least the right flank after 62nd Division began its advance on the Brown Line, the field guns would need to get into the open to have sufficient field of fire to engage them. I am not sure this means that the guns needed to be 'mobile' in the sense of being able to move them quickly from one place to another. I submit that it would have been possible for the guns behind Flesquieres to attack the tanks supporting 51st Division, even if they had not been moved into the open, but this is not proven.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Its clear other German defensive positions had close artillery support both the 29th and 62nd Divs both reported captures of German 77mm Guns. See the previous post.

Arnie

I just want to check I have understood you correctly. By 'previous post' are you referring to: 'During the day 37 guns and 2,000 prisoners were taken by the 62nd Div.'?

I would agree that significant numbers of 77 mm and other German artillery pieces were captured. This does not necessarily equate with any of these pieces being used in direct fire mode against tanks.

In January 1917, Sulzbach ('With the German Guns' ISBN 1844150194) wrote:

'I do a check inspection of our anti-tank gun, because its just here [near Vaux] that these dreadful tanks have been used as assault weapons by the enemy, and we found out at once how to allow for them: in each sector we have one anti-tank gun, which only fires when tanks are sighted.'

On 5 December 1917, after the Battle of Cambrai, he wrote:

'Meanwhile, in our sector of front, we have dug in what they call a battle-gun, which is only fired in the gravest emergency. The theory and practice of anti-tank training is being taken further all the time. Meanwhile, my battery has a second gun at the extreme front on anti-tank duty, so that I have one section here at Nouvion and one up at the front with the infantry'

This suggests that, if the same principle were followed by the defenders around Cambrai, a small proportion of the guns would have been available in the anti-tank role in the forward and/or outpost zone.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

with constant air recce. The guns could easily have carried out a map shoot onto Flesquires

Arnie

I am not sure if this was possible. Air recce and captive balloons seem to have been widely used to detect artillery and reinforcements forming up in the rear areas. Flesquieres was in the middle-distance to the final objective. Possibly it was obscured by smoke for the early phase of the attack. I think the weather was not particularly good either. Visibility at ground level was pretty good I think but cloud cover may have been a problem. But you have raised a good point and I will keep a look out for reports of aerial reconnaisance on the day. In any event, it still remains a puzzle as to why a significant part of the attack arsenal was missing at the vital moment, not that this situation was unique to this attack.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Brigadier Elles (Later Maj Gen)... complaints of Harpers conduct of 51st Divs advance cannot be ignored. he was after all one of the Tank officers who concieved the Cambrai Tank Raid

Arnie

You are right, the comments cannot be ignored. But they must be put in context. Firstly, Elles had been desparate to find a way of demonstrating his belief in the efficacy of tanks, particularly after the earlier debacles with the likes of Bullecourt and Third Ypres. Cambrai was meant to be that demonstration but it failed in front of Flesquieres. Second, Elles needed Haig to be on his side in promoting the importance of tanks. If Haig fingered a scapegoat to shift blame, perhaps Elles 'mirrored' his boss? Third, Cambrai became a severe political reverse for Haig, the more so after the initial enthusiasm at the breakthrough. Even more reason to agree with the boss. All purely conjecture on my part but presented as a set of arguments that require we take Elles comments with a degree of scepticism as well. I am not suggested we throw them out at all. For me, the real question is whether he carefully analysed why the Germans succeeded at Flesquieres, not why Harper failed? If he didn't, then he missed a very important opportunity. Unfortunately, I have not got Elle's book on the Tank Corps, nor have I come across any of his writings on this subject.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Always up to standard, good post

“This battle is fantastic and unmilitary scheme” – Gen Harper before the battle of Cambrai.

I appreciate your use of the official history; unfortunately it is biased in favour of the ‘Donkeys’. In some of the posts above there is criticism of Edmunds the author of the History in his presentation of the battle. Denis Winter says the following about him;

When war broke out, he was sent to gather documents for the subsequent Official History at GHQ. The position required the supple qualities of a courtier and, for the only time in his outspoken life, Edmonds displayed them. 'I was on terms of friendship with all the British generals from Haig downwards,' he told Bean. 'I never belonged to any party and since I was not competing for promotion, I enjoyed confidences I might not otherwise have had.' The result, as Edmonds later told the Cabinet Office, was that 'Only Hankey knows more about the Great War than I do' — and Edmonds's correspondence bears him out. Only a profoundly knowledgeable man could have produced an Official History so misleading in detail and yet with the ring of plausibility.

Don't go away I've lots more

Arnie

[Arnie]

Robert

A bit more;

Reinforcements - In most accounts I have read the Germans had Divisions that had arrived from the Russian front on the night before the attack and was available to reinforce on the first day - when? The Germans admitted that there was an opening in their defenses on day one that the British did not exploit. Hindenburg said;

At this point a catastrophe (initial assault – Arnie) was averted by German divisions which had arrived from the East, and were more or less worn out by fighting and the long journey.  Moreover, after a murderous defensive action lasting several days we succeeded in quickly bringing up comparatively fresh troops, taking the enemy's salient in flank by a counter-attack, and almost completely restoring the original situation at very heavy cost to the enemy.

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. V, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923Reinforcements

The German Guns - I doubt if the guns were under hard cover when they engaged the tanks. They would not have had the arc and elevation to engage moving targets. The Jocks captured one Gun the other apparently had left or perhaps as you say the Germans might only have had one Gun! You cannot hide the fact that the infantry should have been up with the tanks to give protection in such emergencies. Infantry/ Tank Cooperation as envisaged by Swinton/ Eller was successful in this battle and all future battles of the war and only failed when the ‘Donkeys’ mated the tanks with cavalry in 1918. Swinton/Eller’s wisdom was far seeing as the tactics with modification is in use today.

In regard to Eller being influenced by his boss I assume you mean Swinton, possible but remember Swinton was dismissed by Haig after the Battle so perhaps that doesn’t apply. But then on the other hand Elle may have had convictions. Unusual for a first world war General I agree.

Artillery – I see no reason why the artillery could not have done a map shoot what ever the viewing conditions. I can only think the reason they held their fire was the danger of firing on their own troops who perhaps were in Flesquieres If they had moved off on time perhaps they might have been. But as you say there were problems with artillery elsewhere and at different times. But initially they had prepared well. However the account below Sheds some light on the ability of the artillery to engage targets that could not be seen and with pre registering;

At Cambrai. the British were to use a short but highly accurate barrage however, using a new technique of predicted fire (the Germans had been using this for some time), devised by Brigadier General H. H. Tudor. The artillery guns were specially calibrated before the battle started and registered onto specific targets using a grid system, ranging being based on detailed mathematical calculations. This meant that there was no need for ranging shots to be fired, thus secrecy and surprise was maintained until the very last minute. Further, the previously slow but effective creeping barrage, based on 10-yard lifts was dispensed with. This was ideal for suppressing German fire, but their troops naturally had time to take cover in their underground dugouts until the barrage passed, by which time the British troops were preparing to enter their trenches. Instead, a barrage was used with 100-yard lifts, which moved faster and increased the chance of surprise. It caused less crate ring and damage to wire, trenches and installations - but of course the tanks could keep pace, cut the wire and fall on the Germans before they had time to respond.

Another description of the Battle it says that in the opening bombardment the guns engaged targets behind the Hindenburg line so it seems to be possible to engage targets in Flesquires.

One official excuse for no artillery support in the German counter attack was the infantry did not fire warning signals which as they KOYLI History clearly states they did The German Guns - I doubt if the guns were under hard cover when they engaged the tanks. They would not have had the arc and elevation to engage moving targets. The Jocks captured one Gun the other apparently had left or perhaps as you say the Germans might only have had one Gun!

Infantry/Tank Cooperation - You cannot hide the fact that the infantry should have been up with the tanks to give protection in such emergencies. Infantry/ Tank Cooperation as envisaged by Swinton/ Eller was successful in this battle and all future battles of the war and only failed when the ‘Donkeys’ mated the tanks with cavalry in 1918. Swinton/Eller’s wisdom was far seeing as the tactics with modification is in use today.

In regard to Eller being influenced by his boss I assume you mean Swinton, possibly, but, remember Swinton was dismissed by Haig after the Battle so perhaps that doesn’t apply. But then on the other hand Elle may have had moral convictions. Unusual for a first world war General I agree.

Artillery – I see no reason why the artillery could not have done a map shoot what ever the viewing conditions. I can only think the reason they held their fire was the danger of firing on their own troops who perhaps were in Flesquieres If they had moved off on time perhaps they might have been. But as you say there were problems with artillery elsewhere and at different times. But initially they had prepared well;

At Cambrai. the British were to use a short but highly accurate barrage however, using a new technique of predicted fire (the Germans had been using this for some time), devised by Brigadier General H. H. Tudor. The artillery guns were specially calibrated before the battle started and registered onto specific targets using a grid system, ranging being based on detailed mathematical calculations. This meant that there was no need for ranging shots to be fired, thus secrecy and surprise was maintained until the very last minute. Further, the previously slow but effective creeping barrage, based on 10-yard lifts was dispensed with. This was ideal for suppressing German fire, but their troops naturally had time to take cover in their underground dugouts until the barrage passed, by which time the British troops were preparing to enter their trenches. Instead, a barrage was used with 100-yard lifts, which moved faster and increased the chance of surprise. It caused less crate ring and damage to wire, trenches and installations - but of course the tanks could keep pace, cut the wire and fall on the Germans before they had time to respond.

In one description of the Battle it says that in the opening bombardment the guns engaged targets behind the Hindenburg line so it seems to be possible to engage targets in Flesquires.

One official excuse for no artillery support in the German counter attack was the infantry did not fire warning signals which as they KOYLI History clearly states they did!

Arnie

Standby for Part 3!!!

[Arnie]

Robert

Waken up there!! Part 4.

62nd Division first day – Even if we accept that it took a little longer for 186 Bde. (2/4 KOYLI, 2/5 KOYLI. 2/4 Y & L and 2/5 Y & L)To clear Havrincourt It was cleared sufficiently early to allow 186 Bde to pass through and capture Graincourt and move into the fringe houses of Anneux (KOYLI History) However ‘The Long Long Trail ’ says;

The 51st Division had a very hard fight for Flesquieres, but its failure to capture it and keep up with the pace of the advance on either side left a dangerous salient which exposed the flanks of the neighbouring Divisions. On the left of Flesquieres, the 62nd Division fought hard through the ruins of Havrincourt, up to and through Graincourt and by nightfall was within sight of Anneux in the lee of the commanding height crowned by Bourlon Wood. The division had covered almost five miles from their start point, and was exhausted. (This was later claimed to be a record advance in the Great War for troops in battle).

Later in the narrative it says this about the 51st Div;

There was good news, however, as the 51st Division crept into Flesquieres, abandoned during the night by the Germans.

6ist Bde, 20 Div, 7/KOYLI – The version of 7/KOYLI action on the first day seems to be fairly accurate. But this is what the Regimental history says;

At 8.10 a.m. the 7/K.O.Y.L.I. passed through the 7/D.C.L.L, who were busy consolidating the line which they had captured, and attacked the Hindenburg support line. Casualties became frequent from machine-gun fire, and the leading officers were killed or wounded; the support line was captured as designed; there was a second objective allotted to the battalion and the barrage, on which it counted for protection, was now 1,000 yards ahead. Some time was necessarily occupied in mopping up pockets of the enemy, and some reorganization of companies had to be effected before advancing to another attack. As soon as possible the line went on under Capt. F. P. Hargreavc. The barrage was too far ahead to afford any protection and the tanks were also away in front, so that the line came in for heavy machine gun fire and suffered many casualties before it reached its goal at 11.30 a.m. Capt. Hargreave was among the killed.

The brigade had gained all its objectives and had made secure all the ground within the limits of its allotted task. At 11.30 a.m. the 29th Div. passed through on its way to the capture of Marcoing and Masnieres, where there were important bridges over the canal

You see here Robert, that 7/ KOYLI suffered lack of tank support, as did the Jocks in front of Flesquires, but unlike Harper’s Jocks it was not of their making!

Note the time again; the KOYLI left their start line at 0620 hrs. You cannot really think that time wasted at the start and the break by 51 Div., during the first phase did not have an effect on the battle?

Arnie

Stand By for Part 5!!!

[Arnie]

Robert

I hope you are keeping up. I shall be asking questions at the end!!!!!

Another Version of the battle – I found this version of the battle. It gives another prospective but never the less it’s still the same message. Harper to blame;

The Germans were in full retreat, as they were elsewhere along the front. Most seized upon this opportunity, but not Harper. He stuck rigidly to the plan and its timetable, thus giving his men and the tank crews an hour's rest before pressing on, time also welcomed by the Germans. This by itself would not have been wholly disastrous but, when Harper renewed the attack, he did so by keeping his infantry well behind the tanks. He ignored the recommended tactics of the Tank Corps and advanced his infantry 200 yards behind the tanks, rather than the prescribed 100.

This led to tragic results on Flesquieres Ridge. Unaware of the infantry's plight, the tanks pressed on towards the crest of the ridge. Here the gunners of the German 108th Field Artillery Regiment (54th Division) had been specially trained to fight tanks. Their commander, Lieutenant-General von Watter, had discussed their strengths and weaknesses with his brother (who had first fought them on the Somme) and they themselves had faced down French tanks in the Nivelles offensive. Manhandling their 77mm cannons into exposed positions, the gunners fired over open sights, directly at the approaching tanks. Deprived of their infantry support, the tanks could not see what hit them. They were easy targets for the German guns. Twenty-eight tanks were destroyed here and it was at Flesquieres that the mythical Sgt. Major Kruger was credited with destroying 16 tanks single-handed (Hitler later erected a statue of Kruger and his gun in Cologne in his honour). D battalion alone lost a further 14 tanks (10 to artillery) - 28 in all now being out of action. Whilst the tanks blundered around unsupported on the ridge, the infantry themselves were unprotected against the hail of machine gun fire from stay-behind German troops who forced them to retreat. Other tanks eventually outflanked and destroyed the German gun batteries, but it was too late. Deprived of the momentum and protection that the tanks had previously provided, the 51st Highland Division lost impetus and a fierce struggle raged around the brave German defenders of Flesquieres village. The attack here ground to a halt and the resulting delays opened up dangerous gaps in a critical area of the British line. The scheduled thrust by the 1st Cavalry Division in this sector never materialized.

In conclusion – I would like to finish this rather long post with a couple of quotes from Winston Churchill's (‘The Great War’) who after all despite all the claims by the revisionist was the true Godfather if not Father of the tank. It is an extract from a memorandum written by Churchill to F.M. French on December 3, 1915 and read by Haig shortly after;

“If artillery is used to cut wire, the direction and imminence of the attack is proclaimed days beforehand. But by this method the assault follows the wire-cutting almost immediately, i.e. before any reinforcements can be brought up by the enemy, or any special defensive measure taken. (My underline)

“The Caterpillars are capable of actu¬ally crossing the enemy's trench and advancing to cut his communication trenches; but into this aspect it is not necessary to go now. One step at a time. It will be easy, when the enemy's front line is in our hands, to find the best places for the Caterpillars to cross by for any further advance which may be required. They can climb any slope.

They are, in short, movable machine-gun cupolas as well as wire-smashers...." Surprise consists in novelty and suddenness. Secrecy is vital, and it would be possible, over a period of three or four weeks, to work routine condi¬tions into such a state that very little extraordinary preparation would be re¬quired. The weak man-power avail¬able in the enemy's front line can easily be overwhelmed by forces which might appear to be assembled in the ordinary course."

I include this quote simply because even at this early stage surprise was thought to be a major component of a tank attack. A factor that any General worth is salt would recognize and not throw it away because of a personal phobia. At least Harper should have obeyed his orders, he allowed his Jocks to be ‘shot at dawn for much less’

Finally this quotation by Churchill which sums up the difference of thinking between an advanced thinker and a ‘Donkey’ like Harper:

It has been necessary to the whole argument of this account to dwell insistently upon these aspects of the Battle of Cambrai. Accusing as I do without exception all the great ally offen¬sives of 1915, 1916 and 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question, what else could be done? And I answer it, pointing to the Battle of Cambrai. “This could have been done." This in many variants, this in larger and better forms ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the Generals had not been content to fight machine-gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that that was waging war.

I hope I have not gone on too long perhaps it will make good (?)Bedtime reading!

Best wishes

Arnie

[Arnie]

Sorry Robert but I shall have to add a post script after finding something last night so here we have Part 6

I have a set of six massive volumes called ‘The Great War the Illustrated History of the first World War’ originally published in 1919 – 1920. The material used seems to be Newspaper articles from the period. so the contents are written in rather a ‘jingoistic newspaper style of the period. There are some interesting pictures though but the printing is poor quality.

Because of the A/M problems I hesitate to use it in our debates. However I looked to find any unusually interesting pictures. I found one of the gun captured by the Jocks at Flesquires. The gun is concealed in a ruined farm building; at least I think we know they were not in hardened positions but, were concealed. I shall try to print the picture but I have not had much luck a lately.

Some other interesting points were;

The assaul divisions on the first day captured 'exhausted German Troops that had just arrived from Russia'. Can we assume that Flesquires had also been reinforced in this way, with 51Divs delays, I think they must have?

The articles description of the first days battle, spends a lot of time talking about 36 & 6 Div’s battles, 62 Div also gets a good write up but 51 Div’s gets a rather shorter and unenthusiastic report. Harper is not even mentioned!

Best Wishes

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

I note your comments about the British Official History. All sources must be treated with care. The BOH volume on Cambrai is regarded as one of the best, but that does not mean that information contained therein should not be subjected to scrutiny. It was written by Captain Wilfred Miles, no doubt under the watchful eye of Edmonds, who wrote the Preface.

Reinforcements - In most accounts I have read the Germans had Divisions that had arrived from the Russian front on the night before the attack and was available to reinforce on the first day - when?

The 107th Division had arrived from the Russian Front and 'hurried forward through the mist by battalions and smaller groups. The units had no knowledge of the ground or the German defensive system. They did not know where they would make contact with the British' (from the BOH). I am not aware of any evidence that this division got any units into Flesquieres. The 52nd Reserve Regiment of this division was ordered 'to counter-attack and recapture Flesquieres with two battalions' in the afternoon but I do not think either battalion got through. The other two regiments came into action around Noyelles and Cantaing, and the Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line respectively.

Other reinforcements came in on the flanks very late in the day, notably from 20th Division and a battalion from the 183rd Division. Several other regiments were hurried to the front via road and rail, though none arrived on the 20th November.

The Germans admitted that there was an opening in their defenses on day one that the British did not exploit.

Yes, the German higher command levels perceived a big hole. With the 107th Division on its way forward, I am not sure how true this was on the ground. In particular, I doubt that cavalry would have been able to sweep forward to encircle Cambrai had Flesquieres fallen quickly. But it was a possibility.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The German Guns - I doubt if the guns were under hard cover when they engaged the tanks. They would not have had the arc and elevation to engage moving targets. The Jocks captured one Gun the other apparently had left or perhaps as you say the Germans might only have had one Gun!

Arnie

Attached is a photograph of a covered gun pit.

It is from a book on Cambrai and I have seen the same thing from the front view as well. I have not been able to find that picture. I do recall, however, that the guns would have had no problem traversing either at least 45 degrees either side of the mid-line and elevating sufficiently to catch tanks as they crested the rise, as behind La Vacquerie. The primary reason for the gun pits was to protect the guns from observation while enabling them to fire counter-preparatory barrages. So elevation had to be possible.

I apologise if I gave the impression there was only one gun. There were several batteries of guns around Flesquieres.

You cannot hide the fact that the infantry should have been up with the tanks to give protection in such emergencies. Infantry/ Tank Cooperation as envisaged by Swinton/ Eller was successful in this battle and all future battles of the war and only failed when the ‘Donkeys’ mated the tanks with cavalry in 1918. Swinton/Eller’s wisdom was far seeing as the tactics with modification is in use today.

Far from hide from the fact, I have tried to address what would have happened had the infantry accompanied the tanks. Infantry/tank co-operation was not uniformly successful after this time. I reported on the problems that occurred during the Battle of Amiens. I have just came across the following account while reading the regimental history of the 4th (Queen's Own) Hussars, dated 24th August:

'The attack was carried out in the afternoon by the 99th Infantry Brigade with the assistance of tanks against Mory Copse. A splendid view was got of the artillery barrage, and one could easily see the Germans "legging it" as the tanks advanced and our infantry advanced behind. At the top of the hill where the copse was a battery of 77s was in action, and as the tanks reached the crest they were knocked out one by one; but our infantry reached and occupied the copse, which was a very important tactical feature.'

The first point to note is the separation of infantry and tanks, sufficient that the tanks could be picked off before the infantry occupied the copse. The second point is that the infantry were able to knock out the guns. However, they would have been in similar trouble to the 51st Division had there been an additional major strong point nearby the copse to give mutual support to the guns.

There are many examples of tanks supporting infantry, both during and after Cambrai. But as noted in another thread in 'Western Front', it is much harder, though not impossible, to find examples of the opposite occurring. I will dig out some of the quotes I have from tankers in the Battle of Amiens about this problem.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Another Version of the battle – I found this version of the battle. It gives another prospective but never the less it’s still the same message. Harper to blame;

The Germans were in full retreat, as they were elsewhere along the front. Most seized upon this opportunity, but not Harper. <snip>... a fierce struggle raged around the brave German defenders of Flesquieres village.

Arnie

The only comment I would make here is that, with due respect to the author, there is a major inconsistency in his or her account. I have snipped the middle part of the text to highlight the initial mention of the Germans 'in full retreat' versus the statement about 'the brave defenders of Flesquieres village'. I had not read this article before but it was just this inconsistency, not explicitly pointed out in this way, that got me thinking about this whole issue when I first read about Cambrai. This is what made me start looking into it in far more detail.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I found one of the gun captured by the Jocks at Flesquires. The gun is concealed in a ruined farm building; at least I think we know they were not in hardened positions but, were concealed.

Arnie

Great picture! Thanks for sharing it. Several things stand out. First, the gun is not a field gun. It looks very like a picture of a howitzer that Ralph Whitehead once posted on the forum. I don't think it will have been from one of the field gun batteries. The Germans did use minenwerfer to fire directly at tanks but I am not sure about the use of high trajectory guns in direct fire mode.

The other thing is that the building is not consistent with pictures I have seen of the buildings around Flesquieres. This building looks to have been all wood, or certainly not stone-walled. This is no way precludes it from being in the vicinity - its just different.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The assaul divisions on the first day captured 'exhausted German Troops that had just arrived from Russia'. Can we assume that Flesquires had also been reinforced in this way, with 51Divs delays

Arnie

As per my earlier posting, I believe the short answer is currently 'no', unless further evidence turns up. From my reading, the reinforcements who had arrived from Russia, ie the 107th Division, fought at the limit of the British advance on the first day and there is no evidence that I have found that any made it through to Flesquieres. There were plenty of reinforcements got into Flesquieres, as planned, well before the 51st Division, or any of the neighbouring divisions, had got through to the first objective.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

I feel you arguments are getting a little weaker

Here are my replies to the questioned and answered raised excuse me if they are slightly (?) mixed up.

Gun Positions – You pictures shows a well dug in Gun with overhead cover but very little camouflage. Perhaps they took it away? In previous threads we have both said that the guns were pulled out of their gun positions to engage the tanks. That is simply to be able to fire over open sights to get the flatter trajectory (special designed anti tank guns had a very flat trajectory) to engage a moving tank. Indirect Fire is rather ‘hit and miss’ for anything other than battery fire. The guns at Flesquires were not within the confines of the village. If they were brought up into position on the 20th as it is reported, I doubt if they would be in dug in positions as elaborate as the one shown. It takes hours to dig a gun pit, I know that from experience. Rather they would be in a coppice or a ruined building similar to the one shown in my picture.

Infantry Tank Cooperation – The example of supposed infantry tank cooperation failing is a little ambiguous. There are at least three scenarios to cover that incident;

One; the incident is similar to the Jocks at Flesquires. But is this case the Infantry was sufficiently near, to close with and capture the Guns. That never happened at Flesquires. All the guns bar one were allowed to escape and if they were dug in as you suggest, then the Jocks were slower than we thought.

Two; I mentioned earlier about the ‘Donkeys’ having tanks operating with cavalry and it being a disaster. As this incident was witnessed by a cavalryman could this have been one of those ill-fated incidents. This would have meant that they would have to wait for the infantry to come up and save the day.

Three; perhaps the tanks were leading and the leading tanks were hit crossing the skyline? The supporting infantry deployed and attacked and captured the guns. I say this because you the tanks were hit one by one and don’t indicate how many, certainly not 31, I think.

Robert I suppose their are a lot of incidents were infantry/cooperation may have failed for any numbers of reasons. But I will take bet that all tank attacks with out infantry support are doomed to failure sooner or later. Thats why Swinton, Fuller and Eller's tactics were adopted by every army in the world worth its salt and the tactics survive today.

107th Division Reinforcements – Robert we have moved from a position of no reinforcements to one were they perhaps never used in Flesquires. So we have a choice of two probabilities. You contend that there is no evidence to support the argument that they could have reinforced during the delays had by the Jocks (delays you originally said hadn’t happened). But there is no evidence that they did not. There is circumstantial evidence that says there is a probability they could have. In the early afternoon the 62 Div captured troops from the 107th Div not much more than a mile away from Flesquires. Would you not then concede in the time wasted by the Jocks the Germans could have reinforced, if only with the ‘cooks and bottle washers’ from the 107th?

The Fighting at Flesquires

I have snipped the middle part of the text to highlight the initial mention of the Germans 'in full retreat' versus the statement about 'the brave defenders of Flesquieres village'.

There is no ambiguity with these two positions; the other assault divisions attacked early and took advantage of the Germans supprise with greater or lesser degrees of intensity. They advanced up to 5 miles and captured many prisoners and guns, some had very few casualties. On the other hand the Jocks attacked late and lost the value of supprise and shock of the tank attack. Because of fighting that had been going on all around, the Jocks were fighting an aware and prepared enemy. This and the late hour, again caused by delays, although ordered, the order could have been discarded and the assault go in with tank support. Thereby, as the other divisions did, take advantage of the Germans original disarray. Because of these delays the Jocks decided call off for the night the attackon Flesquires and go in again at dawn. Only to find the Germans had left. Why leave, if the position was as well defended as you say say? Simply the fear of being cut off, by the success of the other assault Divisions, that were well to their rear.

Back to you friend

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

Before addressing the points that you have raised, I think it might help to consolidate some of the information that we have pulled together. Firstly, I would like to focus on the advances made by the British infantry on the morning of 20th November. I will correlate these, as best I can, at hourly intervals and with the movements of the German infantry and artillery around Flesquieres. To do this, I have created the following basic map. It uses a German relief map of the Cambrai area, which is useful because you can visualise the ridges and gulleys quite nicely. I have superimposed the approximate British and German lines, with the British objectives of the Blue Line, Brown Line and Red Line.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

The next version of the map is timed around 0800 hours, very approximately. I have just focused on some of the British divisions for the sake of convenience. Note that the German batteries behind Flesquieres were already in place inside covered positions. I have drawn the direction of advance of the 2 battalions of the German 27th Reserve Infantry Regiment who moved forward into Flesquieres. The 51st Highland Division had reached the edge of the Grand Ravine.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

This map is timed for approximately 0900 hours. It shows the 27th RIR in Flesquieres. Elements of 62nd Division had begun their advance on the Brown line. 6th Division were in the process of mopping up Ribecourt, aided by the right flank of 51st Division, and moving to the Blue Line. 20th Division was consolidating La Vacquerie.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

Moving forward to 1000 hours, 62nd Division is well on the way to the Brown Line, 51st and 6th Divisions have just reached the Hindenburg Support Line, and 20th Division the Blue Line. Around 0930 hours, the German artillery batteries came out into the open.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Arnie

By 1100 hours, 62nd, 6th and 20th Divisions have reached the Blue Line. 51st Division remains stalled in front of Flesquieres.

Robert

[Jim Gordon]

I have been prevented from taking part in the above debate due to circumstances beyond my control not allowing me to follow it as closely as I would have liked.

I wonder if the two main protagonists would care to comment on the following extracts from John Hussey’s article in the British Army Review No.117 entitled ‘Uncle’ Harper at Cambrai: A Reconsideration’

Extract 1 “On the right a section of six tanks of E Battn went ahead in a formation prescribed neither by Fuller nor Harper. For reasons never explained it went up in line ahead. As it breasted the curve of the slope each tank was silhouetted against the sky. The German field battery to the east of the village destroyed them one by one at 500 yards range before they could enter the wire. In no way could the infantry have averted this disaster although the tanks themselves might – for had they been in line abreast some of their 6-pounder guns might have destroyed the battery at such short range------“

Ref. for Extract 1

Not only do Infantry war diaries insist on the ‘successive’ destruction , but several officers , including two artillery majors from 29th and 6th Divisions, who walked over the ground to inspect the wrecks on 21 Nov 1917 confirmed ‘that we all remarked how the tanks had come on the rise one by one when they must have been caught almost stationary’ and were put out of action one by one because they followed –my-leader over the crest… on the south side of Flesquieres ‘

(E. J. Medley and R. B. Purey-Cust to A. F. Becke, 10 August and 14 September 1935. WO.95/367)

For those who agree that Baker-Carr was the source of the calumny heaped on Harper and his Division the following will be of special interest.

Extract 2 “If you ask what was Baker-Carr’s verdict, it was that on both 62nd and 51st fronts it was a great success. For instance:

“The principle of co-operation between Tanks and Infantry as adopted in this battle was so satisfactory that it rather suggests the desirability of always training the same tank formations with the same infantry formations.

[On the special Wire-Crushing Tanks ahead of the Main Body] this system worked excellently and I consider that this formation might be adopted.

In the recent operations on the first day, I am of the opinion that an excessive number of Tanks was used, but probably the Infantry for this reason suffered fewer casualties. As a general rule, one Tank per 100 yards of front should be sufficient on each objective:

The cases of assistance rendered to the Infantry are too numerous to mention. The Tanks invariably operated in front of the Infantry, virtually leading the whole way, enabling them to seize and consolidate positions with comparatively little loss and destroying numerous enemy Machine Guns.

Infantry Formations: The formations adopted by the Infantry of the 2 divisions with which this Brigade was operating differed slightly , but in principle were the same. Both were highly successful”

Extract 2 is taken from Baker-Carr’s Battle Report to Tank Corps HQ, December 1917, WO.95/98, paras 19d. 21 (A.1) and 22.

Regarding Robert’s point as to whether any other formation could have done better than the 51st I fear this is a question that will never be answered. This is a question which is wholey subjective and can only be addressed by voicing opinions. I submit that history consists of facts not opinions.

Four facts regarding the conduct of 51st :

1. L/Cpl R. MacBeath had won the VC before breakfast.

2. In reaching Fontaine the 51st had made the furthest advance of all participating formations.

3. It is a fact that the advance of the 51st stalled in front of Flesquieres.

4. The 51st did not start late but was bang on Z hour.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you, Jim.

An interesting addition to the debate. As you note, it is clear that the 51st Division got away right on time.

In addition:

1. Substantial numbers of German defenders also got into Flesquieres well before any British infantry reached the vicinity, indeed before they had consolidated the Blue Line. The German artillery were already in place.

2. The resumption of the advance by 51st Division was delayed compared with 62nd Division - 0930 hrs vs 0845 hrs for the advance from the Blue Line.

3. The tanks advanced over the ridge unaccompanied by the infantry, who were variously listed as 200 - 400 yards behind the tanks.

I understand your point about history comprising facts, not opinions. As many of your quotes illustrate, the recording of 'facts' close to an event is actually heavily influenced by 'opinions', either directly or indirectly. The key is to understand the strengths and limitations of all sources of historical 'fact'.

As you say, the specific question about whether infantry accompanying tanks would have altered the situation around Flesquieres cannot be answered. I have posed an alternative hypothesis to the prevailing opinion voiced by most historians, but it can never be proven. I have tried to present a supporting case, comprising facts related to other historical incidents, both within the Battle of Cambrai and from other battles. I will try and summarise the supporting case in another post once I get back from my travels.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert/ Jim'

One mans facts are another mans lies

Robert Good work, but you are using only one source?

Jim

I cannot accept your stream I think you are being a little ambiguous. Your source is not necessarily reliable. It and others other relies on information that in the past is dubious, like the Official History!

Can I point out the weaknesses in your thread I will try to deal with chronologically?

The 51st did not start late but was bang on Z hour.

Z Hours. All the tanks had a uniform Z hour however the Div Commanders had a certain amount of latitude as to when the infantry crossed the start line. 62 Div attacked in the dark (remember in November its dark until fairly late.) I can find many references to 51 Div starting late in fact this were the main criticism at the time of Harper who had set the start time.

L/Cpl R. McBeath had won the VC before breakfast.

They must have had their Breakfast late, In the Seaforth's (Queen Own Highlanders) Museum there is a description of him winning the VC It doesn't mention breakfast, a little poetic license I suspect, but it does say he was assisted by a tank. Now considering, on Harpers orders the Infantry left their start line after the tanks and were held up at the at the forward German Defenses, after the tanks had passed through, by a handful of machine guns. It would indicate that the incident happened later when the infantry caught up with the tanks.

In reaching Fontaine the 51st had made the furthest advance of all participating formations

This farthest advance was made on the second day after the Germans had ‘snook’ out of Flesquires, leaving the Jocks holding an empty bag; The Guards Div also reached Fontaine. Nevertheless without argument the 62nd West Riding Div (A second line territorial Division) made the farthest advance on the first day

It is a fact that the advance of the 51st stalled in front of Flesquieres.

Of course 51 Div were held up and the reasons were simply they had lost the element of surprise, because of the lateness of their crossing the start line, failing to support the tanks, and stopping for a hour and a half during the first phase.

Jim in regard to the two quotes

John Hussey’s article in the British Army Review No.117 entitled ‘Uncle’ Harper at Cambrai.: A Reconsideration’

“If you ask what Baker-Carr’s verdict was, it was that on both 62nd and 51st fronts it was a great success. For instance:

I have a little trouble with these two quotes in that they seem to be in direct contradiction; Hussey says that the tank attack at Flesquires was a disaster because of the incompetence of the tank crews, no not incompetence but down right stupidity. Baker- Carr says every thing in the tank attack was tickety boo!

You revisionist cannot have it both ways.

In no way could the infantry have averted this disaster although the tanks themselves might – for had they been in line abreast some of their 6-pounder guns might have destroyed the battery at such short range------“

Harper ordered the tanks to go with two ‘scout tanks’ leading. Unless the tanks queued up like sheep all 40 odd of them to cross the ridge. I t would be doubt full whether they could have knocked out 31 or 21 depending what account you read. On what evidence does Hussey come to this conclusion? The infantry should have been 100yds behind the tanks and should have been able to engage the guns with machine gun fire. The other divisions did and were successful in killing the crews and capturing the guns. And that is a Historical fact!

Not only do Infantry war diaries insist on the ‘successive’ destruction , but several officers , including two artillery majors from 29th and 6th Divisions, who walked over the ground to inspect the wrecks on 21 Nov 1917 confirmed ‘that we all remarked how the tanks had come on the rise one by one when they must have been caught almost stationary’

I suppose I should ask what two artillery officers were doing ‘creeping around the battlefield while their Divisions were still in action. That doesn’t matter. They reported this in 1935. However more distinguished officers walked around Flesquires. These were on duty finding out what went wrong and not souvenir hunting. Maj Gen John Davidson, Haig’s Director of Operations, was their trying to find out what went wrong. His report is in a previous thread and he never mentions the issue of tanks crossing the skyline as a problem. (Davidson – CAB45/118) Certainly with the infantry 4 to 500 yds behind they were unable to intervene and support the tanks

Of course the Germans had thinned out their front line positions as they had ahead of Messines and Passchendaele. Brig Burns (CA B45/118) also reporting on the delays in a letter to Edmunds the official Historian recalling his surprise at the scarcity of enemy wounded and dead.’ 'Walking the line that first evening he had only been able to find thirty German corpses on the Divisional front'.

“If you ask what was Baker-Carr’s verdict, it was that on both 62nd and 51st fronts it was a great success.

According to Hussey part of the tank attack was a disaster Baker Carr doesn’t agree. However Robert touched on a point that Eller might be frightened of his job. But then all regular officers were Haig controlled all officer promotions including those at battalion level. Denis Winter in his ‘Haig’s Command’

Getting the best men into the chief jobs was always the best way of increasing efficiency, and in this area Haig had a free hand. The fact is not easily demonstrated from British records today, but the Americans unearthed it during the war when Washington asked John Quekermeyer, a liaison officer, to research and report on Haig's appointments system.(28.9.17 inR6165 US NATIONAL ARCHIVES) The analysis he sent back explained the mech¬anics at length and drew particular attention to the fact that all promotions above battalion level were controlled by GHQ. At three-month intervals, commanding officers at all levels drew up lists of men suitable for promotion and passed them to GHQ for final selection. In theory, the job was done by Haig's Military Secretary, but since he had deliberately chosen a nonentity of low rank there was no check to his will. In theory, too, all appointments were subject to the Army Council's approval in London, but again, although it examined Haig's choice for army command (his personal choice for 1st Army command was once rejected and he was given three names from which to make his selection), its supervision went no further down the hierarchy. As Quekermeyer put it, 'The home authorities never refused the Commander in Chief's recommenda¬tions.' This meant that Haig could sack any man who failed to match up to his requirements and replace him with any man he chose.

Checking Haig's criteria for those selections proves a surprisingly easy business, since all his corps and army commanders were pre-war professionals. It was a remarkably narrow circle, and even Borden, Canada's stolid Prime Minister, was startled by the fact when he first came to Britain. 'Attended a conference with overseas Ministers,' he wrote. 'Discussed conditions in the British Army and the amazing influence of the Old Army.'

Now Baker Carr’s statement appears to have been taken out of context; I take your word that he is talking about the 51 Div. but they were the only division that did not capture their objective on the first day and were criticized for not conforming in fact in a previous thread it said ‘they avoided tanks because of them attracting artillery fire’.

The cases of assistance rendered to the Infantry are too numerous to mention. The Tanks invariably operated in front of the Infantry, virtually leading the whole way, enabling them to seize and consolidate positions with comparatively little loss and destroying numerous enemy Machine Guns.

I cannot under stand this because in the first phase the infantry was so far behind the tanks that they were held up by a hand full of machine guns.

In conclusion I would like to submit this extract from Liddel Hart’s ‘The Real War 1914 -1918’ In my opinion this is probably the best all-round history of the war. Liddel Hart was a soldier in the trenches, a staff officer, wounded and gassed. The author of the modern infantry’s Battle drills. The Foremost military historian with University departments devoted to his works. His work is used and quoted by most of the modern Military Historians inc Holmes, Laffin, Winter Sheffield, Middlebrook, and even his sacred John Terraine

.

At 6.20 am on November 20th the tanks and infantry moved forward to the attack on roughly a six-mile front, and gained a demoralizing initial success at all points save in the left centre in front of Flesquieres. The main cause of this one serious check was that the commander of the 5lst Division, Harper, preferred a method of his own instead of conforming to the formations devised by the Tank Corps, and adopted in all the other divisions. His advance tanks were called 'rovers', and went much farther ahead, and the infantry formations were not as well fitted for close cooperation with tanks as those laid down. The separation seems to have been inspired by his expressed feeling that the whole Cambrai plan was 'a fantastic and most unmilitary scheme' - when on the staff of General Headquarters he had resisted the development of machine guns, and now was equally skeptical of tanks. The result was that the infantry were too far behind the tanks, lost the gaps in the wire, and were stopped by machine-gun fire. An officer (Davidson) who examined the battlefield afterwards could only find three small heaps of machine-gun cartridge cases, from which it would appear that a handful of machine guns held up a whole division - a fact which sheds a striking light on the future of infantry action in open country. The loss of touch between the infantry and tanks lay also at the root of the losses which befell the tanks when they came over the ridge and under the close fire of several German batteries, for infantry accompanying them could have picked off the gunners. Here occurred the famous incident of the solitary German artillery officer who was reputed to have 'knocked out' sixteen tanks single-handed. It must go into the catalogue of historic legends, for only five derelict tanks were to be seen at this point after the attack had moved on, and an intelligence officer who examined the ground found marks which showed clearly that three batteries had been in position there to engage the tanks. It is possible that all save one gun, and one. gunner, had been silenced, as was claimed, but impressions in the heat of battle are sometimes misleading. The feat has, however, an ironical significance in the fact that it was blazoned to the world by the British General Headquarters. The incentive of a mention in dispatches was not accorded to enemy feats performed at the expense of the infantry or cavalry.

[Arnie]

Robert/Chris

I'm sorry but I forgot to mention a point regarding Baker-Carr apparent change of opinion from his report of the battle and his later Book.

When he wrote the book he was no longer under control of Haig and his acolytes and felt able to tell the truth. I think though there is another reason. The first two, supposedly histories of the war, were published in the very early 20s One by Haigh and another by two of his Staff Officers. Both were very badly received mainly because of the 'Donkeys' habit of blaming the dead, the soldiers and junior officers for (people who previously could not answer back) for any set back and defeat.

On this occasion they were not able to get away with it and the books met with a storm of disapproval and a welter of books by by officers and other ranks that told an entirely different story, Baker - Carr's was in this category. Your right in saying that his book, but also many other piled ordure onto Harper and the other 'Donkeys' You see 'the hostility only' officer did not have the same Masonic loyalty to one another has the pre war regulars.

Philip Gibb the famous war correspondent is accused by Sheffield in his book 'Command and Control on the Western Front' of changing his mind and position after the war. Once again we have a case of once free of Haig's control of the news from the front, Gibb felt able to tell the truth., as did many others, all destroying the reputation of Haig and his Generals so carefully prepared through out the war.

So you see that many of these books tell the truth. Edmunds, the official historian, admitted before he died, that he was a personnel friend of all the Generals (including Haig , he was at Sandhurst with him) and tried not to destroy their reputations

Best wishes

Arnie

PS I'm of on holiday so I will not be able to reply for a week or more.

[armourersergeant]

In theory, too, all appointments were subject to the Army Council's approval in London, but again, although it examined Haig's choice for army command (his personal choice for 1st Army command was once rejected and he was given three names from which to make his selection), its supervision went no further down the hierarchy.

Was this the time he tried to get Haking promoted and was vetoed by London?

Haig also felt compeled to keep many of his Divisional and Corps commanders as he did not feel he had better to replace them with! Given that presumption then he may have had the ability in theory but was restricted by reality!

I also do not have aproblem with the man in charge choosing who he wanted to do the job. You just have to make sure that the man in the hot spot is the right man. Which is a different question altogether.

regards

Arm.