Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[Robert Dunlop]

However it does not really explain why 51 Div were held up.

Sorry Arnie

It is just taking a little while to get the various sources together. I have my books on Cambrai scattered all around the computer . Probably won't get much more posted today but I will take your most recent comments into account.

Robert

[jhill]

Incidentally I had a short correspondence with Pierre Breton the author of "Vimy" in 1988 in which I asked him to identify the source of the material he wrote about Harper. His response was that all his research papers had been sent to the McMaster University Archives and were not easily available. - end of story.

I can only speculate on Berton's sources for his negative remarks about Gen. Harper. However, I note that the War Diaries of some of the units on the right of the Canadian front at Vimy describe considerable frustration in trying to make contact with the Imperial (i.e. British!) units supposedly advancing on their flank. Perhaps this could be a source of the reference to Harper's alleged stand-offishness.

Just a thought.

[Robert Dunlop]

The first phase of the 51st Division's attack went well. The details are not important for this debate but there are some features to highlight. The initial advance is described in the division's history:

'As the artillery barrage opened, the twelve wire-crushing tanks moved off, accompanied by small parties of infantry detailed for the capture of the outpost line.'

The 'Rovers' were specifically dedicated to crushing the barbed wire, the idea being that tanks needed to wander along the wire to ensure that enough of an opening was created for the infantry to get through. The infantry accompanying the Rovers carried red flags to mark the gaps in the wire. The process of opening up the wire was somewhat time-consuming; it was not just a case of drive through it. Not relevant here is the fact that special wire-pulling tanks were created as well. Their job was to use grappling hooks to pull the wire out of the way in preparation for the building of the cavalry pathways.

The 'Fighting' tanks constituted the second wave. There was a third wave who formed up about 90 minutes after zero. They, along with an remnants of the previous waves, were to attack the Flesquieres ridge.

As the arrangements for the tanks were somewhat different for 51st Division, I am not sure if the following quote holds true for the expected behaviours of the tanks (we know that the piece about the close proximity of the infantry was not true):

'Sections of three tanks would follow a prepared drill to deal with a given section of the double trench. In the lead would be the advance tank, slightly nose down under the weight of its fascine. It would drive through the wire and up to the lip of the trench whereupon it would swing to the left and move along its allotted sector. A short distance behind would come the main body tanks, each leading two files of infantry. Passing through the wire in the wake of the advance tank, the left-side tank of this pair would deposit its fascine in the second line trench and pass over; it would then also turn left while its mate when straight on to place its fascine in the second trench. Having cleared their sector the other two tanks would follow across the second trench and form up to await the infantry.' [from 'The British Tanks 1915-1919'].

These behaviours would have very significant consequences on Flesquieres ridge.

The other point of note from the divisional history is the timing of the taking of the first objectives. In close co-operation with the tanks on several occasions, the 'leading battalions had reached their objectives... between 9.15 and 9.40 am.'

Note that by this time, the German reinforcements were already in Flesquieres village

Finally, despite the difference in tank/infantry tactics from other divisions, the initial advance had been very successful. The 5th Gordon Highlanders alone had 'captured a total of 10 machine-guns, 2 trench mortars, and 400 prisoners, including a battalion commander complete with his staff [see previous post in this thread]'.

Now began the attack on the Flesquieres support line and village...

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here's how the divisional history described what awaited:

'The enemy's support system, which was to be overcome in the next bound, consisted of a strong fire-trench known as the Hindenburg Support, protected by two to four belts of heavy wire, and supported by a trench some 100 yards in rear known as Flesquieres Trench - a trench in many places shallow, and protected by little wire. Of these the former lay on the crest of the Flesquieres Ridge [you can see this on the map above, just in front of the village particularly], and the latter just behind it. Both skirted a chateau at the south-west corner of the village, which, with its walls and wooded grounds, offered great possibilities for concealed defences.'

Picture of the chateau below.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The division history picks up the story of the attack on the ridge:

'On the right, the 6th Gordon Highlanders advanced on a two-company front, the leading two companies being detailed for the capture of the Hindenburg support system. These companies were preceded by six tanks. On arriving at the enemy wire the tanks came within view of a field battery some 500 yards distant, which immediately opened on them, and by a succession of direct hits knocked out all six in the space of a few minutes, an admirable exhibition on the part of the German gunners.

Owing to the formation of the enemy's entanglements, which projected in irregular V shapes for over 180 yards from the trench, the infantry did not appreciate, until they were held up by the wire, that the tanks had failed to penetrate it. In this position, they were suddenly swept by close-range machine gun fire, and in a few moments had lost some sixty men killed and wounded.'

Now supposing that the tanks and infantry had been together. How would the outcome have been any different? The field guns would have engaged the tanks as before. Until the tanks were actually through the wire, the infantry could not engage the guns. Meanwhile the infantry are lashed by close-range machine gun fire.

Your photos show quite clearly that they broke through and cleared the crest.

The photograph was taken on the second day, after Flesquieres had been abandoned. No tanks on the right flank of the village, which is where the photogaph was taken, made it beyond the Flesquieres trench.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Nearer the village, where the trenches and wire lay on the forward slope, 'the 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better. Seven tanks on the left and centre of the battalion front passed through the wire and enabled the left company to enter the trench with only three casualties.

On the right of the battalion front the tanks appear to have lost their direction, as no gaps were cut in the wire. "C" Company, however, discovered a gap on their left flank, and having passed through it, pushed on towards the trench. Here they had some severe fighting before they finally established themselves in it, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and capturing many prisoners.

This company then tried to force their way along the Hindenburg support line towards their right to join up with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. By leaving the trench and running along the parapet, shooting and bombing the Germans, they cleared some fifty yards of the trench. The rifle and machine gun fire from Flesquieres, however, became so heavy that they were forced to take to the trench again and establish a bombing block on their flanks between them and the enemy.

While this fighting was in progress the surviving tanks were pushing on towards Flesquieres Trench; but they too came under artillery fire, and were knocked out by direct hits.'

Here we have an example where the tanks opened up an opportunity for the Seaforths to get into the foremost support trench. Note how they became totally absorbed in the local contest to control the trench and then came under suppressing fire from the village. Meanwhile the tanks came under accurate, devastating artillery fire.

Here is a report from a tanker in E Battalion:

'Our second objective was Flesquieres Chateau. Here stif resistance was met... Our alignment and positions had been lost by this time, which to individual attacks on various strongpoints. My particular tank, being a male, plugged the chateau and machine gun emplacements in the vicinity for about ten minutes but, as there was no enemy in sight, I decided to get around the rear of the chateau. Shells were dropping rather too near just now, which hastened our efforts. After crossing a deep sunken road, in which was one of our tank commanders repairing a broken track, we were asked by the infantry to clear a trench that was holding up their advance. The trench in question was on the reverse slope of Flesquieres Ridge, and therefore out of our sight. On gaining the crest of the ridge we seemed to walk right into it. Tanks were all over the place; some with noses up, some afire, but all motionless. At the time we hardly realized what had happened, however we spotted the offending trench, packed with Huns fully exposed, and all their fire seemed concentrated on our tank. The trench was protected by a belt of wire 50 yards deep. My gunners, in spite of the enemy's fire, were getting well on their targets and I could observe six pounder shells bursting on the parapet. About 20 yards into wire we received a direct hit which left a gaping hole in the side of the tank.' from 'Tanks and Trenches'

Features to note are: the inability to detect the defenders in the chateau, the propensity for the tankers to become disoriented, the co-operation with the infantry, the inability to detect where the artillery fire was coming from, and the failure to penetrate the wire before being hit.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

'The second wave of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, in spite of heavy fire directed against them from Flesquieres Trench, made repeated attempts to enter it, in which all officers except one per company became casualties.

The 7th Gordon Highlanders, just as they had done at Beaumont Hamel and again at the chemical works [?Arras], carried their advance to the furthest point reached in the attack. They made short work of the Hindenburg Support, where they picked up 100 prisoners. On approaching Flesquieres Trench their tanks became subjected to close-range field gun fire, and drew most of the fire from the riflemen and machine-gunners. The infantry were thus able to enter the trench and establish themselves in it after some heavy fighting.

The next waves thus passed on to assault the village, unsupported by tanks, and in the face of terrific fire. At one period they were able to sweep the main street of the village with Lewis-gun fire; but subjected to machine gun fire from all sides, they could not maintain their position, and were forced back into Flesquieres Trench.

The Germans then delivered a counter-attack against the right of the Gordon Highlanders, and forced them out of Flesquieres Trench, which in this sector was only a few inches deep.

The 7th Gordon Highlanders were thus left, holding the Hindenburg support line throughout the battalion front, and with three platoons in Flesquieres Trench.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The report from the CO of the Seaforths, as quoted in the Battleground Europe series 'Flesquieres':

'The tanks which crossed in the centre of the battalion front had made excellent progress and done splendid work, when several of them were knocked out by direct hits as they proceeded to Flesquieres Trench and the others, running short of petrol, could not proceed further. Heavy machine gun fire was now encountered from the houses in the village and from the trench in the wood. On the left touch was gained with the 1/7th Gordons but on the right the 1/6th Gordons were held up by wire and the heavy machine gun fire. An attempt was made by our second wave to push forward up to Flesquieres Trench; except at one point this was impossible, in spite of determined efforts by men and great gallantry by the officers.

The enemy fire was intense; the place seemed alive with machine guns. Tanks came up on our left but, as they had no petrol, could not go on. However they opened fire with their Lewis guns and six pounders. I ordered an advance under this covering fire and got the men forward but the tanks had ceased firing and again there was a tremendous fusilade of machine gun fire from the village. After severe fighting we gained a foothold in Flesquieres Trench, with our right resting on the Flesquieres-Ribecourt road and our left three hundred yards round the southeast corner of the village. From this trench we made two determined attempts to attack the village by rushes, covering the attack with heavy rifle and Lewis gun fire. This was unsuccesful, for the enemy machine gun fire poured upon us from behind the high walls and houses in the eastern side of the village.'

The picture below shows the area. I have divided the picture in half - the top half is the left side, showing the direction of the attack; the bottom half shows the wall.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Later, the CO Seaforths:

'ordered two platoons to attack through the wood and two more to enter the village. This attack was supported by Stokes mortars and rifle grenades. The first party was driven back but the second entered the village and pushed through. Unfortunately, the tanks went back, without rendering the required assistance. we did our best to establish a series of posts round the village but, as my left flank was exposed and we were being fired on at front and from all over the village, I was compelled to withdraw my men.'

From the divisional history:

'About 5 pm, seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village. They were not however sufficiently closely supported by the infantry, and the attack failed. The enemy, with great cunning, offered no resistance to the tanks in the streets, either lying motionless in his emplacements or retiring into dug-outs and cellars while the tanks were passing. The tanks, after crusing about the village until the light began to fail, returned after an uneventful voyage.'

The two platoons mentioned above were ordered forward to support the tanks but the second platoon only arrived on the edge of the village as the tanks were leaving. Note that while the tanks were cruising around not detecting anyone, the infantry outside the village were still being subjected to heavy suppressing fire.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Major Hofmeister, the 84th IR commander who called up Krebs' unit was killed by a fatal head shot. Major Krebs was left in sole command, though he was wounded at about the same time. Krebs remained in the village until the night when he ordered and personally supervised the evacuation of the defenders. This additional information was provided courtesy of Mad Zeppelin on the Axishistory forum. Horsfall wrote '[Krebs] knew he had to get out now or his little command would be eliminated. By 10 pm his front was silent. Very quietly, at about midnight and leaving German and British dead where they had fallen amongst the still blazing tanks, he and his gallant band slipped away.'

Krebs was righly decorated for his heroic defence of Flesquieres village. The other 'hero' of the defence was Unteroffizier Theodore Krüger, whose body was identified next to one of the artillery batteries. He was immortalised by Hitler with a statue.

The Germans put up an extraordinary defence of Flesquieres.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

However it does not really explain why 51 Div were held up. Other than by the omissions of Harper ( or his ground breaking plan). The Germans, how ever much they expected the attack were caught on the hop.

Arnie

In response to the important points that you raised:

i) the Germans were caught on the hop initially. In the Flesquieres sector, they reacted swiftly and decisively, securing the key defensive position of Flesquieres village on the reverse slope. They were fully prepared, with riflemen, machine gunners and highly trained artillery batteries, well before the 51st Division finished attacking the division's first objectives.

ii) Once the German defenders were in place, they were not subjected to significant suppressing artillery fire. The village was targetted by some of the 'heavies' supporting the attack on the initial objectives but at the time of the assault, these guns were engaging targets deeper in the German lines. Although smoke was laid to screen the initial assault, it does appear to have affected visibility in any way later. Had it still been present when the attack on the village went in, it would have counted against the British, highlighting the tanks even further as they came out of the smoke. The alternative would have been to drench the village in gas and smoke directly. This was not considered in the original fire plan. Once the attack got underway, it seems as if it was not possible to call-in fire from the divisional batteries that would have been assigned to SOS calls.

By your admission Harper allowed the tanks to advance on their own. Your photos show quite clearly that they broke through and cleared the crest.

I think I mentioned above that the photograph does not indicate what happened on day one. It was taken after the Germans abandoned Flesquieres village and the British had resumed their advance. When the tanks went forward, the infantry had to stop in any event as the tanks prepared paths through the wire. Given the slow speed of the tanks, they were easily knocked out on the reverse slope. If the wire was on the reverse slope, then the tanks could not get through before the guns knocked them out. If, as in the area where the wire and the support trench lay on the forward slope, then the tanks did get through the wire and open the way sufficiently for the infantry to penetrate. Having done so, the tanks were then knocked out as they crested the rise, while the infantry found themselves pinned down with heavy MG and rifle fire. Under these circumstances, the natural instinct of the infantrymen is to turn to where the fire is coming from. In war, the perspective becomes very narrow. The priority for the infantry was nearby - the source of the heavy small arms fire - not the more distant threat of the artillery. Had the artillery started engaging the British infantry, then the situation might have been different. But there is no evidence of this. So the infantry had to try and slug it out against the withering fire from the German defenders. It was simply not possible to support the tanks. There is no evidence from anything I have read that the tankers or the infantry really discovered where the artillery fire was coming from at the time that the attack reached the ridge.

The distance from the crest to the German Guns is approx between 500 to 700 metres, well within small arms range and certainly within range of the Vickers. 

If the village had not been present, then you are quite right. There were examples of this happening in other areas. One minor point is that the Vickers guns were mostly involved in barrage work. Some were assigned to accompany the initial advances - George Coppard describes this in his book 'With a Machine Gun to Cambrai'. So it is quite possible that Vickers teams accompanied the forward elements of the 51st Division. British machine guns were not typically used to spearhead advances; they were more usually used to consolidate positions once captured. But this does not preclude them from being used in the way you describe, provided the position in which they were set up was not under heavy small arms fire. And they had to acquire the target. Neither of these preconditions seems to have been satisfied.

Hence as I say they could have been engaged by the Infantry, chasing away or killing the crews, as did 62 & 20 Divs. The tanks coming over the ridge without infantry would have been easy targets. All this while the Jocks where pinned down by a few machine guns.

Harper's tactics served well enough for the 51st Division to achieve its first objectives with minimal losses. Even after the attack on the village got underway, it is clear that infantry/tank co-operation did take place. The big difference in what happened around the village, compared to the rest of the battlefield, was the strength and determination of the German defenders. In other attacks, I recall that single German field guns or batteries had their gun crews shot down. The British infantry could attack them directly and were not subjected to significant small arms fire from other positions. Nor do I recall that the batteries were having to be engaged at the same time as trying to cross the wire. As I mentioned once before, Flesquieres was a marker for what might have happened had the attack gone in against several villages defended in this way.

In the German counter attack their infantry captured gun positions and Headquarters. Could not  51 Div have done the same, the others did?

The German counter-attack managed to do this on the British right flank, but not on the left. There were several factors that favoured the success of the attack on the right. Firstly, the Germans had heavy artillery support and their preparatory barrage fell on relatively weak defensive positions, often located on the forward slope, nothing like the pre-prepared defenses of the Hindenburg Line. Secondly, the Germans were able to use Banteux Ravine to get large numbers of stormtroopers deep into British lines. The ravine was poorly defended, lying at the junction between two divisions. Thirdly, the British defenders were relatively weak and were exhausted after the earlier battles. The barrage, combined with the ability of the Germans to get deep into the line, caused many to fall back. The speed of the advance was such that the gun lines were reached quickly.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Don't tell me your problems with books I've got plenty of them, books and problems and a 'trouble and strife' giving me an ear bending.

Langley thanks for the compiment, if we find any Colour Sergeants involved we'll let you know. Although I never knew of any of our 'Colour blokes' being any where near any shooting, 'cept me of course!!!

Robert; I'll try to keep up. Know know 'readin an ritin is not sgood.

he ensured his artillery batteries were well trained in hitting moving targets with direct fire from reverse slope positions.

The reverse slope as you know is the one nearest to the gun position, so as I said before the tanks would initially show their bellies to the gunners and would not be able to engage the artillery positions (should have been the Jocks).

This what John Keegan says about this stage of the battle in his 'The First World War'

"The difference was in the centre. There the 51st Highland Division,

gingerly following the tanks at some hundred yards' distance, entered

the defended zone of the German 54th Reserve. Its gunners, trained by

General von Walter, began to engage the British tanks as they

appeared, unsupported by infantry, over the crest near Flesquieres

village, and knocked them out one by one. Soon eleven were out of

action, five destroyed by a single German sergeant, Kurt Kruger, who

was killed by a Highlander when the 51 st Division's infantry at last got

up with the tanks. By then, however, it was too late for the division to

reach the objective set for it for the day, so that, while on the left and

right of the Cambrai battlefield, the whole German position had been

broken, in the centre a salient bulged towards British lines, denying

General Byng the clear-cut breakthrough espousal of Elles's and

Tudor's revolutionary plan should have brought him.

He also says, words to the effect, that the rest of the advance travelled 4 miles at almost no cost, in the 20th Light Div; 2/DLI had 4 men killed and 14/DLI had only 7 men wounded. We talked of the success of the 62nd West Riding Div previously

[Arnie]

Nearer the village, where the trenches and wire lay on the forward slope, 'the 6th Seaforth Highlanders fared better

Not Robert that we are talking about the forward slope This was when the infantry had finally caught up with tanks and after their had been 11 tanks knocked out. The jocks were fighting well, but, unfortunately considering the attack as a whole it was to late.

[Arnie]

Robert

'The tanks which crossed in the centre of the battalion front had made excellent progress and done splendid work, when several of them were knocked out by direct hits as they proceeded to Flesquieres Trench and the others, running short of petrol, could not proceed further. Heavy machine gun fire was now encountered from the houses in the village and from the trench in the wood. On the left touch was gained with the 1/7th Gordons but on the right the 1/6th Gordons were held up by wire and the heavy machine gun fire. An attempt was made by our second wave to push forward up to Flesquieres Trench; except at one point this was impossible, in spite of determined efforts by men and great gallantry by the officers

This paragraph has been well crafted to give the reader the impression that the Jocks were with the tanks when knocked out (without actually saying it). Of Course they weren't. The Jocks arrived to late to help the tanks.

[Arnie]

Robert.

'About 5 pm, seven more tanks arrived, of which six entered the village. They were not however sufficiently closely supported by the infantry, and the attack failed.

Two points here; One, the Jocks failed to support the tanks. Second, in a semi urban environment a tank is blind and fairly useless. The Jocks had not learned from the initial attack.

When the tanks went forward, the infantry had to stop in any event as the tanks prepared paths through the wire. Given the slow speed of the tanks, they were easily knocked out on the reverse slope. If the wire was on the reverse slope, then the tanks could not get through before the guns knocked them out.

This problem is pure excuse (not yours) all the other divisions where the infantry and tanks worked in close support had asstounding success. The problems suffered by the Jocks were of Harper's making. The histories written by Swinton and Baker Carr (both reviled by the revistionists) are quite clear as are personel accounts by the Tank crews involved that the problems at Flesquieres were of Harpers making.

In the eyes of GHQ and therefore the the writer of the Official History. Because the 51st Div suffered so many casualties that it must have a successful victory. Where has the 20th & 62nd Divs were a failure through lack of casualties after all that was the mind set of Haigh and co.

[Robert Dunlop]

as I said before the tanks would initially show their bellies to the gunners and would not be able to engage the artillery positions (should have been the Jocks).

Arnie

If I understand correctly, the proper sequence should have been that the infantry came over the ridge first, attacked the enemy artillery, and then the tanks would cross the ridge to breech the wire?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This paragraph has been well crafted to give the reader the impression that the Jocks were with the tanks when knocked out (without actually saying it). Of Course they weren't. The Jocks arrived to late to help the tanks.

Arnie

I agree that one has to be very careful in interpreting the account. However, it is much more significant that a tanker mentions talking with the infantry, and changing course as a result. So there is some evidence of infantry/tank co-operation. This is not quite the same thing as the point that you are making though, namely that the infantry were not with the first tanks that went over the ridge. Of that there is no doubt and Keegan's summary reiterates what others have written.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Two points here; One, the Jocks failed to support the tanks.

Arnie

We do not need to debate this point. I agree that the infantry did not accompany the initial wave of tanks over the ridge.

Second, in a semi urban environment a tank is blind and fairly useless. The Jocks had not learned from the initial attack.

I agree with your second point about the ineffectiveness of tanks in built-up areas. There were several other examples of this in the battle of Cambrai - tank attacks on Bourlon and Fontaine villages spring to mind.

This problem is pure excuse (not yours) all the other divisions where the infantry and tanks worked in close support had asstounding success. The problems suffered by the Jocks were of Harper's making. The histories written by Swinton and Baker Carr (both reviled by the revistionists) are quite clear as are personel accounts by the Tank crews involved that the problems at Flesquieres were of Harpers making.

This is the crucial point. Would other divisions have suceeded against Flesquieres where the 51st Division failed? I respect the comments of the tank crews and their opinion, was quoted by Swinton and Baker Carr, that Harper was to blame for their terrible misfortunes in front of Flesquieres. But, again with respect, I would suggest that for the moment we set aside the interpretations of the tank crews, GHQ, and the writer of the Official History, and continue to focus on what happened, as best we can piece together. The problem is that if we don't set aside these interpretations then we might take them for granted and miss a key aspect of what happened. Sitting in our proverbial arm-chairs, this is not really a big deal. At the time though, failure to learn from a 'mistake' by blaming it as an error of judgement on the part of a colleague may prevent the real cause of the problem from becoming apparent.

You have raised an important issue to be resolved. How did the German defense of Flesquieres compare with the defence of other similar villages in and around the Hindenburg support line elsewhere in the attack? Ribecourt is not quite the same, as it lay in the valley. Perhaps Graincourt and Marcoing are the nearest similar examples?

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

Can I take some random shots, at your recent posts?

Bear with me if I have mentioned any before.

I accept that perhaps it is unlikely that the MMGs would have been up with advance troops. But according to your post the Stokes were. I think the Vickers at the Bn & Brig disposal would have been up with Stokes, to 'shoot ' the Jocks onto to the next objective. Coppard in his book confirms this in his description of the first day of the battle. He says:

The 37th Brigade began to move forward at zero plus one hour, in the following order: 7th East Surreys, 6th Buffs, 6th West Kent’s and 6th Queen's, all in artillery formation. It was a stirring sight, and it was pretty marvelous to know that for one precious hour the tanks had borne the brunt of the attack, and not us. We went forward into enemy country in a manner never possible without the aid of tanks. 'A' Section fell in behind the Queen's, my two guns being on the right flank

.

Your assertion that the signal wires were cut by the tanks is in the wrong time frame. Remember the tanks were well ahead of the troops in the initial assault and therefore the line would not yet have been laid.

The initial breakthrough of the unaccompanied tanks onto the forward slope would indicate a battle between the tanks and the artillery. I have read in some accounts that 31 tanks was lost in this encounter others say 11. Whatever the number it would indicate a battle between the tanks in the open and the concealed artillery (this fact raises another point that I will return to later) I say 'exposing their Bellies' meaning they were vulnerable when crossing the skyline. Supposedly a solitary Gunner remained manning a single gun the air photos suggested that the remainder had with draw. If a Jock Sergeant killed the line Gunner and captured his gun surely this suggests that if the infantry and kept up with tanks they could have been neutralized if not capture them. The other divisions did.

Schwerpunkts were adapted to a greater or lesser degree to all major defensive positions especially those in danger of imminent attack.

Can I partially quote the WW1 History of the KOYLI who had three battalions in the initial attack?

The 36th (Ulster) Div. fought on the left, the 5ist (Highland) Div. on the right, of the 62nd Div.

The attack was carried out according to plan, and the minutest detail had not been overlooked in the orders to the division. It is true that some of the tanks detailed to precede the 2/4th K.O.Y.L.I. were late, but the leading companies went forward without them; the tanks soon, however, came up and took the lead. The 2/5th were entirely without tanks in assaulting the first objective, and it was here that Capt. Lynn's work during the night (He Recce'd the enemy wire and found and marked ways thro') was found to be of such paramount importance. Without tanks the battalion carried all before it, rushing the enemy posts and still keeping the general line. Capt. Lynn and 2/L.t. James gallantly led the way and were conspicuous in the close fighting in the enemy trenches. First the enemy outpost line was overrun. One machine gun post after another fell into the hands of the stormers; Boggart Hole, Snowden and Etna (Pit heaps) were rushed and taken, the last by a com¬bined effort of flank platoons of the 4th and 5th Bns. K.O.Y.L.I.,

Who would not wait for an expected tank to do the crushing part of the work for them? "C" and "D" Companies of the 2/4th Bn. were in the second wave of the battalion; a heavy machine gun fire was enfilading the leading companies from Chateau Wood on the right; the flank company of this second wave went for the wood, fought the garrison, and took seventy prisoners with two machine guns.

Havrincourt was taken without a serious check. Machine guns had been mounted in the village square, the houses were manned and defended, but the suddenness of the offensive had taken the enemy at a disadvantage, and these important points were not too strongly held at the moment. By 8.30 a.m. the K.O.Y.L.I. battalions had captured their objectives in the Blue line and at once set to work on the business of consolidation.

Note the time of the attack Robert

The KOYLI Regimental History goes on to an interesting observation about Bourlon Wood and says something about shortage of reinforcements. In that at such an important early stage and important place, Byng was forced to use Dismounted Cavalry:

On the 23rd the 4Oth Div. went through and attacked Bourlon Ridge, capturing the wood for the time being. There was desperate fighting for the ridge in the next three days. The Germans had received considerable reinforcements. The 4Oth Div. and the cavalry, who were assisting it dismounted, were rapidly thinning. The Guards Div. relieved the 5ist; the 62nd was brought in again to replace the 4Oth.

To late the Germans had reinforced!

Your description of the Jocks action at Flesquires is all well and good, but it was too late. Similar actions were fought elsewhere on the battlefield with similar or better results The KOYLI History says:

During the day 37 guns and 2,000 prisoners were taken by the 62nd Div.

The 2/5th K.O.Y.L.I. had taken 200 prisoners and 8 machine guns,

as well as 2 granatenwerfer and 4 minenwerfer.

During all the battles in the villages the German seemed far batter at learning tactics as they went along it took only hours to find that the tank was vulnerable when fighting in an urban environment especially with infantry support. A German officer saw the battle from the other side.

'Armoured vehicles have entered the village,' he wrote in his report. 'It is found that they are able to conquer ground but not hold it. In the narrow streets and alleyways they have no free field for their fire, and their movements are hemmed in on all sides. The terror they have spread amongst us disappears. We get to know their weak spots. A ferocious passion for hunting them down is growing.' The Germans had discovered that individual hand grenades thrown on the top of the tanks or at their sides were ineffective. 'We tie several grenades together', the officer wrote, 'and make them explode beneath the tanks'. The new weapon had found a new adversary. (Gilbert – The First World War)

Swinton wrote after the battle, words to the effect that he had tried to think of all eventualities but he never though that senior officer would throw tanks into villages alone to fight well defended Germans. Harper of course was the main offender.

Can I let Denis Winter in his ‘Haig’s Command’ finish this post?

When he made his first personal reconnaissance of the battlefield forty-eight hours after zero, it was obvious there had been no breakthrough and that the Germans were reinforcing fast. On the other hand, as Haig wrote in his confidential report a month later,

There were signs of German withdrawal both south of the river Scarpe near Arras and to the north of Bourlon village.18 GHQ's Intelligence branch also passed on the news that the Germans had only one division in reserve. Perhaps Haig was badly informed. More probably he was lying. Either way, he made the decision on 22 November to override his promise to terminate the battle if it failed to break the German position early on.

When Davidson read the watered-down treatment of that crucial episode in one of Edmonds's drafts, he sent a critical letter. ‘You have made little or no reference to the major issue at stake. The main facts and cause of losses at Cambrai. were, I think, quite clear. In my recollection, they were as follows:

(1) The fighting power and morale of the German Army were higher than was supposed. There had been miscalculation in that respect.

(2) We had been fighting the greater part of the German Army for a long period. Our troops were tired and not adequately trained for open warfare. The weather was bad. Some of our divisions, trained for this particular operation,

had been removed to Italy. Under these circumstances we had not the requisite force to persist in the operation after the first serious check.

(3) The delay and hold-up caused by the Flesquieres Ridge on the first and second days was so serious as to warrant the abandonment

of the operation as soon as its effect was realized, i.e. when the

Commander in Chief rode over the battlefield. I was with him and

remember it well. (4) The operation was based on a surprise break

clean through. When that was out of the question, it should have

been called off.'  This from Haig's Operations Director was

Authori¬tative criticism of Haig's decision to fight on, and the events which

followed came straight from Alice in Wonderland.

Robert I hop that gives you something to keep you occupied?

[Robert Dunlop]

I accept that perhaps it is unlikely that the MMGs would have been up with advance troops. But according to your post the Stokes were. I think the Vickers at the Bn & Brig disposal would have been up with Stokes, to 'shoot ' the Jocks onto to the next objective. Coppard in his book confirms this in his description of the first day of the battle.

Arnie

I mentioned Coppard's book because it contains the description you quoted. Note that the Vickers guns were typically used to cover the flanks of an attack or to consolidate strong points when an objective was reached. I have no problem with the idea that a machine gun(s) might have been bought over/forward to engage the artillery, had the location of the artillery been known. I am not clear about the time at which the Stokes mortars would have arrived. As with the Vickers guns, it is quite possible that some accompanied the infantry forward. I have seen examples of this in other attacks.

Your assertion that the signal wires were cut by the tanks is in the wrong time frame. Remember the tanks were well ahead of the troops in the initial assault and therefore the line would not yet have been laid.

Just a minor point of clarification. The comment about signal wires was made by Farndale, who was reflecting on possible reasons why the artillery were not called in to support the attack on the village. Some tanks were ahead of the troops but not all. Loss of telephone contact seems to have occurred on other parts of the battlefield, again attributed to tanks.

Supposedly a solitary Gunner remained manning a single gun the air photos suggested that the remainder had with draw. If a Jock Sergeant killed the line Gunner and captured his gun surely this suggests that if the infantry and kept up with tanks they could have been neutralized if not capture them. The other divisions did.

I would agree with you whole-heartedly, if there was only one gunner. But I think this is incorrect. Several sources have noted that this story is probably mythical. The Official History for example says:

'Written not long after the event, a few lines in the Commander-in-Chief's despatch gave rise to the legend the one gun, served by a German officer, alone in the battery position, was responsible for the destruction of most of the tanks before Flesquieres, and that this officer was killed at this gun. It seems certain, however, that the losses suffered could never have been inflicted by one gun or even by one battery.

The only reliable evidence from either side is that of Zindler. He states that the guns of a number of batteries of the 108th F.A. Regt (54th Division) on the slopes N and NE of Flesquieres were pulled out of their pits and opened direct fire on the tanks: an under-officer named Kruger served one gun single-handed, hitting a number of tanks as they crossed his line of fire.' The reference to Zindler is an article in "Wissen und Wehr', May 1937.

My observation, for what it is worth, is that tanks were hit on both sides of the village. One man could not have been responsible for this.

Arnie, you have not addressed the fundamental problem with the infantry leading the way or accompanying the tanks over the ridge. Once the infantry were seen, they were hit with heavy fire, both from the village and from the support line. There is no question, as indicated by the account from the tanker, that some of that fire would have been diverted onto the tanks, which was a key reason why Harper thought the men should not follow the tanks closely. But the attention of the infantry would have been drawn to the small arms fire, not the artillery firing on the tanks. You imply that the infantry commanders would be able to ignore the enfilade fire, take time to notice that the tanks were being hit, spot the guns (so far my reading has not suggested that anyone, other than the airmen who spotted them in the early morning, were able to do this), arrange for support weapons to be targeted onto the guns, along with the Lewis guns and rifles of the infantry companies. All this while under heavy fire; indeed the small arms fire was so great that heavy casualties were sustained almost immediately and the men had to seek shelter.

Infantry and tanks worked very well together if MGs alone had a go at the infantry, in which case tanks would often trundle over and squash them, or if isolated field guns had a go at tanks, in which case infantry could suppress the artillerymen. But not both together in this way, particularly when the tanks had to come over a ridge one-by-one in the manner that you described. The one other example that I have read about of the effect of batteries of field guns at relatively close range was on the extreme right flank of the Canadians advance at Amiens. Mitchell, in his book 'Tank Warfare', describes how he waited in vain for tanks to return from this direction. When they did not, he went forward and he describes the terrible state of the Mk V* tanks that were hit in enfilade by German batteries that had not been reached by the French assault troops operating on the right flank of the Canadians. Only one tank seemed to have seen the guns and turned towards them, getting within 200 yards before it too was knocked out.

I know that many French tanks suffered a similar fate in the terrible assault on the Chemin des Dames earlier in 1917. This was where the artillery of the German 54th Division learned its trade. The following is a quote from the brother of Major Bossut, a French tank commander who was killed on 30th June:

'The tank column was built up again and set forth, this time on the road as day was about to break. It was hardly dawn yet when we drove through Pontavert and on to the road to Guignicourt which, up to the crossing of the Miette, had us run parallel to the front for three kilometres, close to and in sight of the enemy. Numerous batteries fired at us; it is an extraordinary thing that we suffered so little up to the Miette. When we got there, I could see that my brother's fears were only too well founded. The first tanks had to cross in a column under heavy fire, then proceed along the river for a few hundred yards of chaotic terrain before they could find a place where they could deploy for battle.' He goes on to describe looking for and finding his brother in a burned out tank, hit by artillery fire. What is not clear is whether any of the German artillery in this account were firing directly at the tanks. I suspect not, but so far it is the only account I have found of German artillery and French tanks at this time.

Schwerpunkts were adapted to a greater or lesser degree to all major defensive positions especially those in danger of imminent attack.

The definition of Schwerpunkt is much more than just the physical locality of a strongpoint(s). It seems to have more to do with the notion of the point of maximum effort and impact, point of maximum leverage if you will. In this regard, Flesquieres was the key to the battlefield.

Your description of the Jocks action at Flesquires is all well and good, but it was too late. Similar actions were fought elsewhere on the battlefield with similar or better results

Thank you for the postings on the KOYLI. There is no question that the advance elsewhere went well. The 51st Division did well initially too. They even contributed to the fall of Ribecourt. But Havrincourt and Ribecourt were not like Flesquieres. Neither village, to my knowledge, was covered by batteries of artillery in close support.

Robert

[Malcolm]

May I say that this is a very civilised discussion and an example to all FORUM users.

I regret I have not got sufficient information to enter the discussion but I find it fascinating.

Aye

Malcolm

[Arnie]

Robert

Very good, but as always but!

The 51st Div problems at Flesquieres were mainly caused by Harper’s phobia about tanks and his insistence that his Jocks should operate well clear of them. However that was not the total source of their problems Time was their biggest enemy. Harper delayed 51 Divs 'kick off' until 0930 hrs this must have given Germans in Flesquieres more than adequate warning and time to reinforce. And according to two accounts of the battle, the artillery was moved into position during this delay. This is in some way confirmed by the extensive air race failing to find the artillery batteries around Flesquieres.

You will note that 62 Div had captured Havrincourt by 0830 hrs; part of this attack was carried out at night before the main attack. The defenses at Flesquieres could only have been made stronger by these delays.

The Tanks easily broke through the forward defenses with out the Jocks support and moved on to attempt the capture Flesquieres. Meanwhile the Jocks were held up by a hand full of MGs. This delay had a knock on effect at the next stage of the advance

The tanks movement down the forward slope was would have been led by the scout tanks, with the mass following behind. The tanks are most vulnerable when the cross the sky line (Accepted tank philosophy) But did the Germans at this time know or understand the philosophy? The evidence seems to point to the fact that although the Germans opened fire as the tanks crossed the skyline, thereby exposing their position and losing supprise. Some tanks at least got someway towards Flesquires, indicating that if the Jocks had have been up with the tanks they could have engaged the Guns when they opened up on the Scout Tanks and at least suppressing their fire allowing the bulk of the tanks to get across the forward slope.

According to reports the Jocks took a one and half hour break in the battle for food and rest. This also had a knock on effect. But one cannot just blame the Jocks, the blame must go higher. The 29th Div. was taken out of the line at Passchendaele moved south to Cambrai. Had a ten mile march to the start line and was thrown straight into another battle. Cavalry Officers who saw the 29th move in were witnesses to their exhaustion

Its clear other German defensive positions had close artillery support both the 29th and 62nd Divs both reported captures of German 77mm Guns. See the previous post.

I will admit that the tanks may have cut the cables, but surely with constant air recce. The guns could easily have carried out a map shoot onto Flesquires

Finally can I let John Laffin have the last word from ‘British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One’?

“Uncle' Harper escaped censure for his mishandling of the 51st Highland Division on 20 November in an ingenious way. He claimed that a German gunner officer had, single-handedly, destroyed all the tanks on the ridge in front of him. There was nothing that Harper could have done to save them. Members of his division went along with this falsehood, possibly out of shame for not being up with the tanks to deal with the German guns, at the moment when they were vulnerable to infantry attack. In fact, at the point that Harper could have intervened, only five tanks had been hit.

Byng resolved his embarrassment by sacking two of his Corps commanders. Such a decisive action had the psychological effect of convincing the critics that Byng himself was 'obviously' not at fault.

Haig, Byng, Kiggell, Harper, the cavalry commanders, the various Staffs, all must share the blame for final failure of Cambrai.

'Stupidity does not explain the behaviour of these generals,' says Norman Dixon. 'So great was their fear of loss of self-esteem, and so imperative their need for social approval-, that they could resort to tactics beyond the reach of any self-respecting "donkey". From their shameless self-interest, lack of loyalty to their subordinates and apparent indifference to the verdict of posterity, a picture emerges of personalities deficient in something other than intellectual acumen.'

Principles, perhaps?

It would seem that Harper condemns himself; He says the damage to the tanks had been done before the Jocks got there. They would have been after starting out almost two hours after they had. If as you say they were up with the tanks why did they not help?

Robert I have some more points for you but I cannot in the life of me remember them.

Cheers

Arnie

[Arnie]

Robert

I'd forgotten this little snippet regarding Harper. It refers to an incident during the German Offensive, around the March 27th 1918.

It was during this period that General ('Uncle') Harper, with the bad memories of Cambrai behind him, came back into battle. He had recently been appointed GOC IV Corps, part of which was his old division, the 51st. The 51st did not try to make a stand against the German thrust but each day pulled back, in what Tim Travers(in 'The Killing Ground) calls a 'dour, deliberate and selfish retreat.' Harper appeared unable to impose his own will on the 51st. At a divisional commanders' crisis conference on 25 March the 5lst's general refused to put his division in the line. Harper should at once have removed this general and replaced him but failed to. IV Corps HQ was under great pressure and reports were con­fused but Harper could have been much more decisive. John Laffin 'British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One'

I think this must have been pay back time for the Divisional Staff Officers support of Harper at the Cambrai Inquiry.

[Arnie]

Robert

Just another point Brigadier Elles (Later Maj Gen) the overall Commander of the British Tanks, went into action with the tanks in the Flesquieres sector of the battle.

His complaints of Harpers conduct of 51st Divs advance cannot be ignored. he was after all one of the Tank officers who concieved the Cambrai Tank Raid, even though the plan was hi jacked first By Byng who turned it into a Breakthrough Battle, and then by Haig who involved the cavalry

Arnie

[Robert Dunlop]

The 51st Div problems at Flesquieres were mainly caused by Harper’s phobia about tanks and his insistence that his Jocks should operate well clear of them. However that was not the total source of their problems Time was their biggest enemy. Harper delayed 51 Divs 'kick off' until 0930 hrs this must have given Germans in Flesquieres more than adequate warning and time to reinforce. And according to two accounts of the battle, the artillery was moved into position during this delay. This is in some way confirmed by the extensive air race failing to find the artillery batteries around Flesquieres.

The German planning for the defense of Flesquieres began well before 0930 hrs - 'shortly after 8.00 am'. There were very few reinforcements available to the Germans across the whole of this thinly defended sector of the Hindenburg Line and it is significant that a large proportion of these headed straight for Flesquieres, arriving around the time indicated above.

The artillery was not detected initially as the guns were located in fortified positions. 'Realising that to be effective against tanks, it was more important for field guns to be mobile rather than hidden in fortified positions, Hofmeister ordered the guns of 2nd Company 108 Field Artillery Regiment to be pulled out into the open and pointed towards the top of the ridge, from where the attack would come. Four batteries were positioned in this way by Lieutenant Ruppell, while the remainder of that regiment and also 282 Field Artillery Regiment continued what fire they could in the general direction of the British advance.' With respect to your point on timing, Cooper noted that 'the guns were moved between 9.30 and 10.00, while the British 51st Division was taking an hour's rest, and at a time when, to the relief of the defenders, the British artillery barrage had lifted to attack targets further behind.

The four 77 mm gun batteries, now able to swivel round to either side, were ideally placed to cover the slopes down from the ridge where, to the right and left, tanks were advancing towards Graincourt and Marcoing. The guns had not been spotted by RFC air reconnaisance earlier, when they had been hidden in their original positions, and so, for the first time that morning, the tanks found themselves in the position they most feared - slow-moving targets in open country, vulnerable to accurate gun-fire. Shells burst around them, and of the 56 tanks of G Battalion and the one company of E Battalion which had left Havrincourt and were heading towards Graincourt, eleven were put out of action.'

At this point in Cooper's account, he contradicts his earlier statement about the timing of the second attack by the 51st Division:

'It was 9.30 when the 51st Division commenced their attack again uphill towards Flesquieres.'

You will note that 62 Div had captured Havrincourt by 0830 hrs; part of this attack was carried out at night before the main attack. The defenses at Flesquieres could only have been made stronger by these delays.

You mention that Havrincourt was captured by 0830 hrs. Other sources suggest that it was a further two hours before all resistance in Havrincourt, including the Chateau, was overcome. Horsfall and Cave noted that 'the two rear battalions of each of the attacking brigades, the 2/4th and 2/5th York and Lancs, and the 2/5th and 2/7th West Yorks, were ready to move. They were to start off from the Blue Line at 8.35 am'. In the event, 'Havrincourt village was still not yet empty of the enemy. Two battalions of the West Yorks would deal with those [Germans still in the village] and then move through the village to the Blue Line, ready to advance at 10 am on [the second objective] the Brown Line.' Other units in the second assault wave were timed as setting off for the Brown Line at 08.45 am, accompanied by tanks. These units came under fire from Flesquieres ridge, presumably because the German defenders around Flesquieres were not seriously engaged yet and because the smoke screen was laid down on the forward not the lateral slope of the ridge. Zero plus 2 1/4 hours (ie 08.45 am) was the time specified for the second advance in 62nd Division Order No 78, issued at 11.55 am on 16th November 1917.

On the right of the 51st Division, the timings of the advance seem to have been as follows:

12th Division [furthest right] - had 'by about 8 am secured its first objective. After a prescribed pause of 48 minutes the 37th Brigade took up the advance on the right. In Lateau Wood sharp fighting occurred, but all resistance was overcome before 11 am. Meanwhile the 36th Brigade on the left had also reached the second objective'

20th Division - 'before 10 am the 61st Brigade had secured its first objective. When the advance to the second objective began progress proved more difficult... nevertheless they arrived on the second objective about 11.30 am. The first objective [of 60th Brigade] was captured to time. No great difficulties were encountered elsewhere and the brigade was in complete possession of its objectives soon after 11 am.'

6th Division [next to and assisted by 51st Division] - '16th Brigade encountered little resistance in the outpost zone and soon the first wave was in possession of the Hindenburg front system. By 11 am the 16th Brigade was in possession of its second objective.' The 71st Brigade also made speedy progress through the outpost zone, Ribecourt was a tougher nut to crack 'although this was accomplished by 9 am'. The third wave of the attack 'experienced some delay in getting through Ribecourt [mopping up was still proceeding, though it is not clear to me if this was the cause] and lost the barrage; but the Germans were surrendering freely and by 11 am the second objective [the Brown Line] was captured together with some 300 more prisoners.'

Havrincourt and Ribecourt, which lay in the forward zone ahead of Flesquieres, both took some time to capture. However, the defenders in the outpost and forward zones were most affected by the barrage and therefore the assaulting troops had a significant chance of capturing the villages. In neither case were there significant artillery batteries supporting the villages to my knowledge. Several tanks supporting the attack on Havrincourt were knocked out but the best I can make out is that the fire came from Flesquieres ridge. If this is so, then this fire was directed on the tanks at a time when the 51st Division would not be expected to be suppressing the artillery there. Most of the stout but short-lived defence, especially of Havrincourt was conducted by machine guns, snipers and riflemen.

La Vacquerie is interesting. It was in a similar tactical location to Havrincourt and Ribecourt. By contrast, the German defenders broke early, with minimal resistance, although, as mentioned above, it was near 10 am when the 61st Brigade secured the objective, ie after the 51st Division commenced its advance on the Brown Line that lay behind Flesquieres village. The 20th Division history records that the village had been mopped up by 9 am. Eighty prisoners, 6 machine guns and 2 trench mortars were captured. It should be noted that this number is significantly less than the number of defenders in Flesquieres village, though it is not noted how many German dead were present nor how many fled the village. After la Vacquerie was captured, 'the enemy offered a certain amount of opposition in the Hindenburg Line [to the 61st Brigade] and the King's on the right suffered heavily, but before 10 am this line was taken.' With the 60th Brigade, 'the first objective was occupied at 9.25 am'. Only one company, the reserve company of 12th KRRC, lost heavily in capturing a strong point.

As the tanks broke forward from la Vacquerie, 'fire from batteries close in rear caught the tanks and knocked out eleven of A Battalion so that the 7/KOYLI and two companies of the 12/Kings had to depend for the most part on their own resources' (British Official History) The 20th Division history records that 61st Brigade 'encountered a good deal of resistance in the Hindenburg Support Line, a good natural position [as with the area around Flesquieres] well fortified and strongly held. Behind the line were many gun pits, some of which the enemy defended to the last. The KOYLI on the left fought with great dash and in spite of severe losses carried all before them. Second-Lieutenant Joffe, Sgt Roberts and about a dozen men of this battalion distinguished themselves by rushing a 77 mm gun which continued to fire point-blank till they were within fifty yards of it. The Kings also forced their way forward by hard fighting and took a number of prisoners.

The 60th Brigade attacked the second objective with the 6th KSLI and 12th RB. The enemy gave little trouble except on the right of the RB, where "A" Company found him defending his positions throughout with determination.

In summary, the villages in the front lines provided some resistance to the assault, with Havrincourt providing the most prolonged resistance. In both Havrincourt and Ribecourt, tanks played a significant role in engaging German resistance with direct fire. In la Vacquerie, it is suggested that the mere presence of tanks was enough to cause defenders to bolt. Though infantry were needed to mop up the village, the task was completed more quickly that for the other two front line villages. None of the villages appear to have been supported by artillery in direct fire mode.

Behind la Vacquerie, the Hindenburg Support Line proved a difficult problem. There were field guns present, dug into gun pits. These appear to have deprived the infantry of their tank support. However, as you suggested, the infantry were able to suppress and even destroy some or all of the guns but only after the tanks had been destroyed. All this happened at around the same time as the 51st Division attack on Flesquieres. The key difference was Flesquieres village, plus there were more artillery behind Flesquieres. Flesquieres village provided better defensive support than the front line villages because of its location on the reverse slope, the artillery barrage had passed off, the quality of the defenders, and the fact that it was embedded in the stronger support line. Take any of these factors in relative isolation and the assaulting troops were able to overcome. Flesquieres bought them all together, and then some.

Robert