Maj.Gen.Sir G.M.Harper

[Terry]

On my rereading of "Vimy", I noted that the author stated that the commander of the 51st Highland Division, Sir G.M.Harper, was the antithesis of Arthur Currie, was more "hidebound", and didn't place much faith in machine gun support.

Do any of the Pals know much about this officer, and what type of divisional commander was he?

[armourersergeant]

I think that opinions on this chap can be as polarised as they are over Haig. He comes in for some criticism over his work or not with tanks, though wether this is justified i can not say. This is one chap i have not studied yet.

A few of the tankies on this forum may give you one side and i think Bryn Hammond was after some info about him some time back!

He was promoted to corps commander later in the war and thus given that Haig by this time was trying to push through more younger officers, and given his age, this seems he must have had something. His nicknames of 'Daddy and 'Uncle' seem to imply affection from those that bestowed.

If i had to comment i would say that he has probably been given a bad press and that it is not well deserved.

regards

Arm.

[Terry]

Thanks Arm. I wanted to get some insight on the fellow, and was left with the impression in "Vimy" that he was just another stereotypical old-fashioned British regular who had difficulty grasping the new concepts of fighting a war. This might not be fair, so I am hoping some of the Pals can help.

[DrB]

I think "Uncle" was a kindly gentleman with his troops and officers, but a bit of a reactionary with the new-fangled methods of waging war. What I have read makes the man appear to want to excel, but still retaining a bit of the "thin red line" mentality.

DrB

[Jim Gordon]

Terry

Bryn Hammond is certainly the chap to give you a definitive view on George Montague Harper.

However I have some very definite views of my own as BH well knows.

Harper was the victim of character assassination by Brigadier-General Baker-Carr in his book "From Chauffeur to Brigadier" written in the 1920s. While purporting to be a friend of Harper he started the malicious nonsense that has continued to the present day.

Incidentally I had a short correspondence with Pierre Breton the author of "Vimy" in 1988 in which I asked him to identify the source of the material he wrote about Harper. His response was that all his research papers had been sent to the McMaster University Archives and were not easily available. - end of story.

T. Travers also picked up on this calumny and I also had some correspondence with him . It would seem that the myth propagated by Baker-Carr and siezed upon by Liddell-Hart in the 1920s and 1930s lives on being carried forward by such authors as those referred to.

It is a great pity that Harper was killed in a motor accident in the early 1920s and left no papers. memoirs etc. and thus was unable to defend himself against the likes of Baker-Carr and Liddell-Hart's.

Finally may I say that my Father served in Harper's Division for over 3 years being severely wounded at Cambrai and I never heard him say a word against Harper (mind you he didn't say much about any of the gory business)

One of the most serious allegations against Harper concerns his conduct and the conduct of his Division at Cambrai and this has been reappraised by John Hussey in an article he wrote for the The British Army Review No. 117 entitled " 'Uncle' Harper at Cambrai: A Reconsideration". Well worth a read.

Bryn Hammond has given several talks on Harper to the Western Front Association and others. If you approach him gently he may even send you a transcript of one. He and I are not in complete agreement on the subject of Harper but his is the best and fairest assessment I have encountered. I trust he does not consider it presumptuous of me to advise you to follow this course.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Terry]

Jim,

Many thanks for your comments. I really appreciate your remarks. I assumed that a man commanding a fine division such as the 51st would surely have some very good points in his favour!

Cheers,

Terry

[Robert Dunlop]

Gardner provides the following:

'The linchpin connecting Henry Wilson to the operations section [of GHQ in 1914] was its head, or GSO1, Colonel George "Uncle" Harper. A sapper by trade, Harper had served as an instructor at the Staff College at Camberley during Wilson's tenure as commandant. [T]he two became closely acquainted in this period. In 1911, Harper followed his former commandant to the War Office, where he remained until the beginning of the war. As deputy director of Military Operations, Harper served as Wilson's right hand during the formation of plans for the mobilization of the BEF alongside the French. Thus, by the outset of the First World War, Harper was a close associate and friend of the sub-chief of staff. Despite his experience as an instructor at Camberley, Harper was in many ways better suited to a command in the field than to a staff position. Walter Kirke described him as "the beau ideal of a fine fighting soldier", a characterization apparently warranted by the fact he "had a handsome presence and was a great sportsman with a genial and commanding personality".

By the standards of the time, these traits were more evocative of the aggressive battlefield commander than the staff officer. Ultimately, Harper spent most of the war in the former capacity, at the helm of 51 Highland Division between 1915 and 1918 before assuming command of IV Corps in the final months of the conflict. In 1914, however, Harper's long connection with Henry Wilson apparently resulted in his selection as head of the operations section of GHQ.'

Horsfall writes the following about Harper with respect to the 51st Division:

'This Scottish Territorial Division had experienced a difficult time since its arrival in France in early May 1915. It had fought at Festubert and Givenchy but was considered to be untrained, badly organized and with low morale. It suffered from having four commanders in eighteen months and when Major General Harper arrived in September 1915 they self-deprecatingly called themselves Harper's Duds, from their Divisional sign HD.

[George Harper] immediately set about training his division and restoring morale. By [November 1917] the reputation of the Highlanders was high. Harper was always careful in the use of men and always sought an alternative to a frontal assault, a viewpoint which would influence his actions at Flesquieres. It is true that he distrusted tanks; he appreciated their hitting power, but from unhappy experiences [at High Wood, Arras, and Third Ypres] was aware of their limitations.

Several military historians have insisted that General Harper was opposed to using tanks: this is far from true. Before the battle, he issued an instruction which said, "The tank is the primary weapon of attack", but warned that the wire cutting tanks might not advance regularly or in straight lines. He recognised the protection offered by steel plate but also the likely concentration of hostile fire upon tanks and said infantry should keep clear of that fire. He ordered that his men should not be less than 100 yards away; they should not move in "worms" (single file behind them), as was advocated, but advance in two extended ranks. He devised his own system for the advance of tanks, different from all other divisions at Cambrai. All three tanks in the forward sections were allocated as advanced tanks, which he called "wire crushers", whilst the main body of tanks were "fighters". The "wire crushers", moving four minutes in advance of the remainder, would deal with the enemy's support line and move on to crush the enemy wire as much as possible. If a fascine was not needed they were to cross the Front Line trench, still in advance of the other tanks, and act similarly against the support line. Whilst the infantry advancing in long lines might have difficulty in finding gaps it was thought that great lengths of it would have been crushed by this method. The infantry were also instructed that they must not attempt to cross the wire until the enemy were engaged by the tanks.

On the 19th [November 1917] Major General Harper's division was ready. His affectionate nickname was "Uncle", given to him by the division who now understood him and appreciated his concern for the men. During the day he visited them in Metz, where they had been in virtual hiding inside their billets to avoid being seen by marauding enemy planes.'

I think the issue of Cambrai is an interesting one. Given the prior history of tank warfare, Harper's rationale was very reasonable. Tanks acted as a magnet for every kind of firepower that the Germans possessed. Infantry operating in close support came in for the same treatment. So Harper cannot necessarily be accused of being a stick in the mud. The problems in capturing Flesquieres were related to more than just the difference in infantry/tank co-operation. The undetected German field guns played havoc with the tanks as they crested the rise. The guns were placed either side of but further back from the village. Infantry could help in these situations but they would have to outflank field guns operating in any number or provide suppressing frontal fire while the tanks outflanked the guns.

Meanwhile, from what I can make out, Flesquieres was probably the most heavily defended point in the line, in terms of the concentration of German defenders. It was not going to topple as easily as neighbouring villages. The German field commander appreciated the central significance of Flesquieres and his tactical awareness proved correct. Hold Flesquieres and the rest of the attack would struggle to get much beyond it. This, coupled with the relatively unbroken wire on either flank of the village (partly due to lack of effectiveness of the operning barrage at this point, partly due to Harper's policy with the "wire crushing" tanks being forward and therefore most vulnerable to anti-tank fire), caused major difficulties for infantry trying to support the tanks against the field guns. The infantry (1/6 Gordons on the right and 1/7 Blackwatch on the left) were taken in enfilade from Flesquieres, so a wider turning movement was needed. I think it was a unit from 62nd Division that got round the flank of the field guns on the left of Flesquieres. In the end, Flesquieres fell because the Germans abandoned it overnight, rightly recognising the threat of encirclement next day.

What happened at Flesquieres illustrated what could have happened all along the attack if the line had not been so lightly defended.

Robert

[Jim Gordon]

Robert

Thank you for your very interesting post regarding Cambrai/Flesquieres. Can I just correct one point ? The First Wave of 153rd. Bde. was 1/6th. Black Watch on the left and 1/5th Gordons on the right. The Second Wave consisted of 1/7th Gordons on the left and 1/7th Black Watch on the right.

I would dearly like to discuss with you (or anyone else for that matter) the Flesquieres incident but in deference to what the originator of this thread wants, i.e. an assessment of Harper, maybe it would be better to postpone this to some later date.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks very much for the correction Jim. I had grabbed the information from the Battleground Europe Series and had not checked any other sources.

I look forward to a new topic on Cambrai/Flesquieres.

Robert

[Bryn_Hammond]

One of the most serious allegations against Harper concerns his conduct and the conduct of his Division at Cambrai and this has been reappraised by John Hussey in an article he wrote for the The British Army Review No. 117 entitled  " 'Uncle' Harper at Cambrai: A Reconsideration". Well worth a read.

Bryn Hammond has given several talks on Harper to the Western Front Association and others. If you approach him gently he may even send you a transcript of one. He and I are not in complete agreement on the subject of Harper but his is the best and fairest  assessment I have encountered.  I trust he does not consider it presumptuous of me to advise you to follow this course.

Regards

Jim Gordon

Re: Jim's remarks:

a) Ta, Jim!

Jim and I don't differ THAT much in our views,

c) Jim has generously shared his knowledge of 51HD with me and I have been educated and

d) Yes, anyone who wants to know my views on 'Uncle' doesn't have to approach me THAT gently! Happy to share (that implies a two way process - Jim gave good info back!)

Robert Dunlop's post containing Walter Kirke's description is interesting as I've always felt the opposite of the view that "Despite his experience as an instructor at Camberley, Harper was in many ways better suited to a command in the field than to a staff position" - I live to be educated.

I disagree with Horsfall's view of the "unhappy experiences" of 51HD at Third Ypres especially re: 31 July when they and 39th Div worked well with tanks.

I agree with much of the analysis of the events at Flesquieres but would add two points. Not enough is made of the failure of 6th Div and H Bn, Tank Corps' failure to assist on the right flank against the rear of the Flesquieres Ridge and, secondly, a lot of the failure to take the village was due to poor co-ordination of tank and infantry attacks on the village - something the BEF lacked practice in during Third Ypres.

Oh, and Hussey's article is worth reading (it was in Stand To!) and he wrote his after I had written on Harper and in different circumstances. I have (and still am) revising and revisiting my opinions on this and lots of other aspects of the war. Aren't most of us, if not all?

Bryn

[Robert Dunlop]

I agree with much of the analysis of the events at Flesquieres but would add two points. Not enough is made of the failure of 6th Div and H Bn, Tank Corps' failure to assist on the right flank against the rear of the Flesquieres Ridge and, secondly, a lot of the failure to take the village was due to poor co-ordination of tank and infantry attacks on the village.

I think the attack on Flesquieres illustrates an important difference between British and German tactics. Typically, the Germans would have attempted to only pin Flesquieres with the frontal attack, while the flanks (both) would have been the real focus. The aim would have been to get right around behind the town and cut off the defenders.

There was at least one important reason why the town had to be neutralised by capture. Surrounding Flesquieres would not necessarily have neutralised the defenders immediately. At least one cavalry division had to get forward in the vicinity of Flesquieres. As it was, machine gun fire from that area effectively stopped a significant advance. As the Germans found to their cost in the Spring offensive, all-round defensive locations could make a real mess of any horses/horse-drawn vehicles that attempted to get forward.

The co-operation of tanks and infantry in towns was problematic throughout Cambrai. Especially once the Germans found their confidence again. Close-quarters fighting, even now, is difficult in built-up areas. Tanks were extremely vulnerable to infantry in villages and towns. So long as the town was not subdued, the machine gunners on the outskirts could take infantry in enfilade as they tried to cross unbroken wire and outflank the town. The next few days saw these same problems multiplied several times, at Bourlon and le Fontaine for example. It is notable that the next big tank/infantry successes - le Hamel and Amiens - did not really involve much in the way of fighting to capture large villages on reverse slopes and the like. Again, in these cases the German front lines were relatively thinly held - a situation somewhat akin to day one of Cambrai.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Just bring ing this back up. When i was at the IWM last tuesday i came across a diary entry from Major-General Loch who was at the time a staff officer co-ordinating between II corps and GHQ.

23rd August 1914.(summary my words)

he makes a comment that a fighting HQ has been established at Bavai and that he had that day been forced to write up some orders for Murray (COS) which was not his job, but that GSO1 Harper had let personnel feelings get in the way and refused to write them up for Murray.

He states that Murray had been anxious all day and could be petulant and thus made it hard for some to work with him.

This does not reflect on Harper very well, almost as if he had thrown his toys out the pram. Hardly a professional attitude to take.

regards

Arm.

[Jim Gordon]

Arm

Possibly this is an instance of Harper being best suited to Field Command rather than Staff.

Anyway, maybe if his toys were well directed towards the advancing hordes they may have done some damage.

Regards

Jim Gordon

[Arnie]

The whole idea of the Cambrai attack was suprise however this was lost in essence because Harper did not conform.Although it cannot be said that he lost the battle that honour lies with haigh and his lack of reserves

At 6.20 am on November 20th the tanks and infantry moved forward to the attack on roughly a six-mile front, and gained a demoralizing initial success at all points save in the left centre in front of Flesquieres. The main cause of this one serious check was that the commander of the 5lst Division, Harper, preferred a method of his own instead of conforming to the formations devised by the Tank Corps, and adopted in all the other divisions. His advance tanks were called 'rovers', and went much farther ahead, and the infantry formations were not as well fitted for close cooperation with tanks as those laid down.

.

The separa­tion seems to have been inspired by his expressed feeling that the whole Cambrai plan was 'a fantastic and most unmilitary scheme' - when on the staff of General Headquarters he had resisted the development of machine guns, and now was equally sceptical of tanks. The result was that the infantry were too far behind the tanks, lost the gaps in the wire, and were stopped by machine-gun fire. An officer who examined the battlefield afterwards could only find three small heaps of machine-gun cartridge cases, from which it would appear that a handful of machine guns held up a whole division - a fact which sheds a striking light on the future of infantry action in open country.

The loss of touch between the infantry and tanks lay also at the root of the losses which befell the tanks when they came over the ridge and under the close fire of several German batteries, for infantry accompanying them could have picked off the gunners. Here occurred the famous incident of the solitary German artillery officer who was reputed to have 'knocked out' sixteen tanks single-handed. It must go into the catalogue of historic legends, for only five derelict tanks were to be seen at this point after the attack had moved on, and an intelligence officer who examined the ground found marks which showed clearly that three batteries had been in position there to engage the tanks. It is possible that all save one gun, and one. gunner, had been silenced, as was claimed, but impressions in the heat of battle are sometimes misleading. The feat has, however, an ironical significance in the fact that it was blazoned to the world by the British General Headquarters. The in­centive of a mention in dispatches was not accorded to enemy feats performed at the expense of the infantry or cavalry.

[Robert Dunlop]

The whole idea of the Cambrai attack was suprise however this was lost in essence because Harper did not conform.

Arnie

I must respectfully disagree. Not with your comment about surprise being the whole idea. It was achieved, to the extent that the Germans had received some warnings which they chose to largely ignore (though not totally). The Germans could not detect any increase in artillery activity, which they regarded as the hallmark of British attacks.

You could argue that the fullest extent of the Cambrai breakthrough was not achieved because of Harper's part in the failure to take Flesquieres quickly. This has no bearing on whether surprise was achieved.

Although it cannot be said that he lost the battle that honour lies with haigh and his lack of reserves

It cannot be said that the British lost the Battle of Cambrai. The breakthrough was not achieved and there was no exploitation. But the British retained Flesquieres ridge, though they lost a chunk on their right wing. It must be remembered that even if the Germans had not counter-attacked, the British were preparing to fall back to the Flesquieres ridge. Without control of Bourlon Wood, Fontaine and area on the right of the canal, the forward slope of the ridge was a death trap. So if you regard the final extent of British gains as being dictated by the line of the ridge, then the Germans did not gain all that much by force of attack.

The battle was lost as soon as the British stopped short of Bourlon Wood on the left and failed to cross the canal in force on the right. Once the Germans began to consolidate, no amount of infantry reserves would have made a difference in my opinion. The artillery support was too weak after day one, whereas the German artillery got stronger and stronger. Haig should have stuck with the initial plan - stop at 48 hours if Bourlon Wood is not controlled.

At 6.20 am on November 20th the tanks and infantry moved forward to the attack on roughly a six-mile front, and gained a demoralizing initial success at all points save in the left centre in front of Flesquieres. The main cause of this one serious check was that the commander of the 5lst Division, Harper, preferred a method of his own instead of conforming to the formations devised by the Tank Corps, and adopted in all the other divisions.

It is true that Harper insisted on a different approach. But might it not be the case that his division's attack might have failed even if they had adopted the same strategy as everyone else? Might the German defenders have had something to do with failure? The German accounts of the defense of Flesquieres suggest a quantum difference compared with other parts of the line that were penetrated more easily. The mere presence of so many artillery pieces that were undetected and unsuppressed was very significant. The German commanders in the area were very good - the rapid assessment of the attack by the forward regimental commander meant that reinforcements were quick to get into Flesquieres. They were skillfully handled once there.

I do not think it is correct to say that had the infantry kept up they would have been able to suppress the field guns. Flesquieres was very strongly held. Any attempt by infantry to pass either flank was doomed to failure so long as this was the case. As you point out, it only took a few machine guns...

Harper's thinking was not too way off. He was concerned about the tendency for tanks to attract heavy machine gun and artillery fire. His precious men, and he was very concerned about the welfare of his men, at least according to their impressions, would have sustained heavy casualties as a result of being too close to the tanks. The same approach was adopted by some infantry during later attacks with massed tanks. Had Harper's men crested the ridge with the tanks, they too would have come under heavy shell fire and machine gun fire directed at the tanks.

I am less inclined to think Harper was solely to blame.

Robert

[Arnie]

Robert

the Germans had received some warnings which they chose to largely ignore (though not totally). The Germans could not detect any increase in artillery activity, which they regarded as the hallmark of British attacks.

The attack was supposed to be a surprise attack by Tanks, The British didn't know that the Germans had been warned by a 'mythical Irish soldier' (It was reported to the subsequent inquiry that the attack was being openly discussed in the 'salons & restaurants in London). Nevertheless because as you say the Germans not believing their own intelligence. allowed the British to surprise them except at Flesquires!!!!

By not conforming the tanks broke through the German wire but because of the lack of mutual support from the infantry the German machine gunners were quickly able to close the gap by fire. There is no doubt that infantry could have dealt with the guns that knocked out 51st Div's tanks. Thus allowing the Jocks to continue their advance.

Divisions did move round the flanks eg.

On their flanks was 62nd West Riding Division conforming to the Tank Corps plan broke through capturing enemy guns (5th KOYLI captured two themselves). The 20th Division passed through and captured Masnieres and Marcoing, securing the passage of the canal at both and even the bridge intact at the latter. On the left of the 5lst the 62nd Division made a brilliant advance, advanc­ing by nightfall as far as Anneux, over two miles in the rear of Fles­quieres. The Flesquieres resistance was thus only an islet, cut off and overlapped by the waves which swept round its flanks and on to Marcoing, Anneux and even to the edge of Bourlon Wood. A penetra­tion of five miles had been made - the equivalent of months of heavy fighting and heavier losses on the Somme and at the Third Battle of Ypres. Decisive success was within the grasp of the British forces, the enemy's three main lines of defences had been overrun, only a half-finished line and the open country lay beyond. But the tank crews were exhausted, the infantry showed little capacity to make progress on their own, and apart from one squadron of the Canadian Fort Garry Horse the two cavalry divisions could contribute nothing towards fulfilling their role of exploitation.

The German official monograph emphasizes the fact that a wide gap remained open for 'many hours, completely unoccupied, between Masnieres and Crevecoeur: 'It was great luck, as no reinforcements could be expected to reach there before evening.' The Germans also had luck in that a relief division from Russia had just arrived when the attack came; by midday on the 20th part of it was in position to cover the direct path to Cambrai. With notable promptness the German Command began moving five reserve divisions to the scene from other parts of the front, and six more were warned to follow. It was thus a race with time; and to the joy of the anxious Germans, their assailants seemed astoundingly dilatory. "The British failed to utilize the after­noon and evening; they might at least have surrounded the German forces still holding out in Flesquieres. The defence ... seems to have deprived the 5lst Division of all initiative.' As for the British cavalry, it is remarked mat they appeared late .and were easily stopped by enfilade fire.

On November 21st local reserves made some further progress. Fles­quieres Fles­quieres was evacuated by its surviving defenders in the early hours, and after dawn the 5lst and 62nd Divisions pressed on, clearing the Ger­man salient formed by this resistance on the first day and carrying the tide of the British advance as far as Fontaine-Notre Dame, one and a half miles beyond the high-water mark of November 20th.

He was concerned about the tendency for tanks to attract heavy machine gun and artillery fire. His precious men, and he was very concerned about the welfare of his men,

The existing experienceshowed and still does for that matter that a tank without infantry support is very vulnerable. But, more t the point if the infantry must be close at hand to take advantage of the initial tank breakthrough, before the enemy can seal that break with fire as is the case of Flesquieres

no amount of infantry reserves would have made a difference in my opinion.

Robert, the whole story of this battle was lack of reserves ie.

The fundamental weakness of the general plan, however, was not topographical, but the complete lack of reserves, unless the four cavalry divisions can be considered such - and the futility of so regarding them was amply shown in their fresh inability, in face of modern weapons, to influence the action. The six divisions employed in the initial attack were all that the Third Army commander had at his disposal - for a plan that visualized a penetration beyond Cambrai to Valenciennes! It is extremely difficult to understand what was in mind as to the future, for without reserves complete success could only mean the creation of an excessively deep and narrow salient, requiring scores of divisions to hold it. It is true that the Guards and one or two other divisions could be made available, and were ultimately brought to the scene, but they were too far away for a prompt intervention. The situation, indeed, had some reminder of Loos. The French also moved a corps to the Senlis-Peronne area just before the attack, but after the first day were told that they were no longer required!

The best comment on this lack of reserves is contained in a story of General Franchet d'Esperey, which one has on the authority of the officer to whom the words were spoken. A long motor ride, in search of information, brought him to a British headquarters at Albert. Entering, he interrogated a senior General Staff officer, flinging at him a string of crisp questions as to the progress of the attack, its frontage, depth. Then came the final, the vital question: 'And where were your re­serves?' 'Mon General, we had none.' The French commander ex-claimed 'Mon Dieu' turned on his heel and fled.

It cannot be said that the British lost the Battle of Cambrai.

You can only call the battle a win if you seperate the initial British attack from the subsequent counter attack;

The gathering enemy themselves were surprised that 'nothing was done to disturb the German preparations'.

And next morning they repaid the tank surprise by one which was similar in principle if different in method. Unheralded by any long artillery preparation, a short, hurricane bombardment with gas and smoke shell paved the way for the infiltrating advance of the German infantry - the prototype of the German offensive method of spring, 1918, as the British attack had been the prototype of the Allied offen­sive method of summer and autumn, 1918. Emerging from the sheltered assembly position of Banteux and Twenty-two Ravines at the very moment when the unfulfilled counter-preparation would have opened, the German stream trickled through the weak points in the British line; then, expanding into a broad torrent which submerged the villages of Gonnelieu and Villers Guislain, swept over gun positions and headquarters, and surged forward to Gouzeaucourt.

The menace of disaster was immeasurable, but, fortunately, the complementary attacks on the north of the salient, round Bourlon Wood, were brought to a standstill, and the emergency declined with the recapture of Gouzeau­court by the superb counter-attack of the Guards' Division and a later effort of the 2nd Tank Brigade. For a time, indeed, there was a chance to 'redouble' and score heavily off the Germans, disordered by this success and hampered by their narrow penetration. But rejecting Snow's plea for a flank riposte by the cavalry, the army commander directed his cavalry head-on against the Germans, and they were soon held up.

Thus the invaders were able to consolidate their hold and even to resume their erosion of the British position. During the next few days continued German progress, especially towards Villers Plouich, and British lack of reserves rendered the British position in the Mas-nieres-Bourlon salient so precarious that the greater part of the original gains had to be evacuated. A sombre sunset after a brilliant sunrise.

One shadow which still lingers is that undeservedly thrown on the regimental officers and men by superior officers anxious to exculpate themselves. The official court of inquiry pinned the blame on the troops, ascribing the surprise to their negligence and also asserting, contrary to facts, that they had failed to send up 'SOS' flares. Even Byng declared -1 attribute the reason for the local success on the pan of the enemy to one cause and one alone, namely - lack of training on the part of junior officers and NCOs and men.' Haig, however, who had been kept in the dark as to the warnings, was an exception to the 'general' rule. In sending his report home, he generously assumed the whole responsibility - although he also sent home several of the sub­ordinate commanders.

I never new they had inquiries when you won!!!!

Robert, poor Generals always blame their soldiers. By the lack of reserves Haigh snatched defeat from the jaws of victory

[Robert Dunlop]

Nevertheless because as you say the Germans not believing their own intelligence. allowed the British to surprise them except at Flesquires!!!!

Arnie

You raise a number of important points. Where appropriate, I will respond to some points in separate postings.

On the issue of 'surprise', the fog had made it difficult for the Germans to conduct thorough air reconnaisance missions from about 10 November onwards. In the British Official History, it is recorded that:

'on the 16th [November] the Army commander reported to Crown Prince Rupprecht's headquarters that "hostile attacks on a large scale are not to be expected in the near future", but by this time some suspicion had been aroused. No information was obtained by the prisoners captured in the raids on the 55th and 20th Divisions, but from the interrogation of those taken from the 36th Division in the early morning of the 18th November it had seemed clear that an attack in the Havrincourt sector was in preparation; but that it would take place on the 20th was not so certain.

Many British aeroplanes flew low over the German lines on 19th November, and infantry and artillery observers detected unusual activity on the British side. The fragment of a telephone message "Tuesday Flanders..." was picked up by a listening station at Riencourt. The Caudry Group [part of which was involved in the defence of the Cambrai sector] was accordingly reinforced by one regiment and some batteries from Army reserve.

In the 54th Division the Havrincourt sector had assumed a state of readiness from noon of the 18th. Its own 27th Reserve Regiment, which had been drawn into corps reserve was restored to it; and two battalions were moved forward to Marcoing.

On the night of the 19th/20th November the [Arras] Group [also involved in the defense of this sector] issued a warning order regarding an expected British attack next day on Havrincourt in which tanks might take part: the four to five hours preliminary bombardment would probably begin between 2 and 3 am (German time).

The Caudry Group issued an order at midnight to warn the troops that, in an anticipated attack on the Havrincourt sector, tanks might be used.'

The timing of the artillery bombardment was wrong. So when '2 or 3 am' passed without incident, one can imagine that people in the know felt a little more relaxed. I have no evidence for this.

Elements of the 84th Regiment, led by Major Hofmeister, were located in the Flesquieres sector. Hofmeister's headquarters were located east of Flesquieres, in a blockhouse on the the Support Line. He sent forward I Battalion, under the command of Captain Willie, to 'hold the line'. Willie realised immediately there was a major problem as the tanks were now crossing the barbed wire unhindered. He urgently requested reinforcements. Then news arrived that Captain Soltau's II Battalion had been overrun. Willie telephoned the regimental HQ:

'The battalion has been cut off. No trace of counter-attack can be seen. But we hear clearly the shouting and orders being given by the British... All documents are being destroyed. Now a tank is rolling over the top of the day common room of battalion headquarters, which is separated from our dugout by a wooden wall... British infantry are attacking the trenches to our right, passing barely twenty yards away... Our position is desparate...'

Willie's unit was located forward of the Flesquieres position. His command post was surrounded and he, along with his men, were captured.

Meanwhile, I (Hauptman Pfaehler) & II (Major Stubenrauch ) Battalions of the 27th Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the command of Major Krebs, were stationed in Flesquieres area and moved up, reaching Hofmeister at 8.00 am. Together, Krebs and Hofmeister planned the defence of Flesquieres. Hofmeister ordered the guns of 2nd Company 108 Field Artillery Regiment 'to be pulled out into the open and pointed towards the top of the ridge, from where the attack would come.' This move took place 'between 9.30 and 10.00, while the British 51st Division was taking an hour's rest, and at a time when, to the relief of the defenders, the British artillery barrage had lifted to attack targets further behind.' It should be noted that this barrage was not the standard creeping barrage but a lifting barrage that targetted specific German defenses. The batteries behind Flesquieres had not been detected and were not targetted with counter-battery fire. Major Krebs took his men forward into Flesquieres itself.

The scene was now set for the British assault on Flesquieres. The initial surprise for the defenders in the Flesquieres sector was complete. This resulted in the rapid capture of the defenders in the forward positions, despite early reinforcement. The artillery in the vicinity of Flesquiere were essentially untouched by the bombardment. German reinforcements did get into Flesquieres in strength, in part due to the halt in the advance of Harper's 51st Division. In this area, the element of surprise was lost.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Before looking at the specifics of the initial battle for Flesquieres, I want to just consider some of the tactical issues imposed by the terrain. Flesquieres and the associated Support Line were an excellent example of German defensive positions. I have attached a map of Flesquieres, dated from November 1917. The Hindenburg Support Line is clearly marked in red. What I have done is enhance the 5 metre contour lines with the blue dots. Then I ran a dashed purple line along the apex of the ridge. This is just an estimate as I used the midway points between the parallel contour lines as the definition of the apex - a rough approximation. The positions of the German batteries are marked, according to the map in the Battleground Europe series 'Flesquieres'.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The British were coming up the ridge from the bottom of the map. Attached is a the view they would have had, minus the 'modern' trees. This was taken a few months back and shows that you can just make out the tops of some building in the village from below the crest.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

What was not so easy to see from the ground were the German defences and wire of the support line. Attached is an aerial photograph taken the day after. Flesquieres village is just off to the top right, so this section of the line was behind the crest. You can clearly see the tank tracks through the thick belts of wire that show up as heavy black lines. The photograph is taken from 'Tanks and Trenches' (ISBN 1840152052).

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The German defenses of Flesquieres ridge illustrate a couple of principles of defensive doctrine:

i) Schwerpunkt - this was a key concept. It was the idea that a battle would often hinge around a focal point. Rather than occupy the whole line with equally distributed forces, it was better to concentrate effort in one or two key areas. In German tactical doctrine:

'Every attack must have its Schwerpunkt. It is according to this that the grouping of forces, the width of the combat strip, the concentration of artillery, mortars and other combat equipment, and the preparation and insertion of reserves must be measured.' (Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg: 1918. Emphasis in original) - quoted from Samuels, M: Doctrine and Dogma.

So was it an unfortunate coincidence that the German batteries were in position around Flesquieres? Did the German commanders make a lucky guess when sending the reinforcements straight into the village once the alarm was sounded? Personally, in the absence of any other evidence, I think not. These arrangements have all the hallmarks of the concept of Schwerpunkt; a concept that was successfully implemented on day one - but more on that later. Ralph has produced evidence from German accounts of the battles on the Somme that well illustrate this concept in other locations and other time periods.

ii) Die Leere des Gefechtfeldes - which has been translated as 'the empty battlefield'. This concept emphasized, amongst other things, the importance of keeping the defences hidden from the attacker until the last minute. Crucial to Flesquieres ridge was the notion that defenses should be located on reverse slopes. This is well illustrated on the map. So for the advancing tanks and infantry, whether together or separate, much of the support line and its myriad of MG nests, were hidden until they came over the ridge line. In the village itself, MG positions could easily be set up above or below the eye-line of crest of the ridge.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

One other point that I neglected to mention about the German artillery batteries. The commander of 54th Division, Lt-General Freiherr von Watter, was an artilleryman. He had become interested in tackling tanks. Having tested his theories against French tanks in the Chemin des Dames offensive, he ensured his artillery batteries were well trained in hitting moving targets with direct fire from reverse slope positions.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

From the British perspective, I will start with a quick overview of the British artillery supporting 51st Division. One should not consider infantry and/or tank attacks in the absence of the artillery. They were crucial to most successful operations. I don't have a lot of information. The Highland Division were supported by 255 and 256 Highland Field Brigades RFA, augmented by 70 and 306 Army Brigades RFA, and 4 and 5 Brigades RHA. At least some of the 4.5" howitzers were involved in laying the smoke screen above Grand Ravine, in front of the Flesquieres ridge line. What is significant is that Farndale records that 'strangely, no artillery fire was called for [in support of the attack on Flesquieres village] and the reasons are not clear. The tanks had, it is known, cut most of the artillery telephone lines, so perhaps it was not possible.'

Robert

[Muerrisch]

I have read this thread with great interest. I have no concept of tactics at this big level [Flesquieres, that is] but I do want to say that, in my opinion, this debate is exactly what the site is all about. Polite debate, cut and thrust, disagreement, authoritative quotations, the lot.

Thank you all, I might have learned something.

Test me tomorrow.

[Arnie]

Robert

Excellent post! However it does not really explain why 51 Div were held up. Other than by the omissions of Harper ( or his ground breaking plan). The Germans, how ever much they expected the attack were caught on the hop. By your admission Harper allowed the tanks to advance on their own. Your photos show quite clearly that they broke through and cleared the crest. The distance from the crest to the German Guns is approx between 500 to 700 metres, well within small arms range and certainly within range of the Vickers. Hence as I say they could have been engaged by the Infantry, chasing away or killing the crews, as did 62 & 20 Divs. The tanks coming over the ridge without infantry would have been easy targets. All this while the Jocks where pinned down by a few machine guns. Robert in the German counter attack their infantry captured gun positions and Headquarters. Could not 51 Div have done the same, the others did?

Arnie