Was the German army defeated before 8th August 1918?

[6th Shropshires]

Thanks Jon S & Arm for your comments on Foch.

Robert you mention Lieut.-Colonel Wetzell, some of his proposals were very similar to the tackics used by Haig in the last hundreds days. He had stress on the fact that the difficulties faced by the Germans in the West were so great that a decisive breakthrough could hardly be attained by a single attack against only one sector. He stated that it must be done by a sequence of consecutive attacks and rapid transference of troops, he wanted a attack against St. Quentin to draw the British reserves away from Flanders, but he stated that this attack should not be pursued pass the fixed line, and then a attack in the direction of Hazebrouck should be carried out , his proposals were not used in the way he had intended, instead Ludendorff fort the first attack to a stand still before he ordered the second, far too late to work, and thank god for that. Wonder if Haig had read Wetzell proposals and dicided to use them himself

Annette

[Robert Dunlop]

Does this extremely high level of prisoners suggest that the German army were already defeated before 8th August, if not in terms of military defeat, certainly by lack of morale? And more importantly that a new critique is required on the extent of the tactical achievement for which Haig, particularly, is credited?

Jon, I just want to check what you meant by the second of your original questions. Are you suggesting that Haig is credited with defeat of the German army in the last 100 days and, perhaps, shouldn't be because the army was self-destructing?

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

... a decisive breakthrough could hardly be attained by a single attack against only one sector. He stated that it must be done by a sequence of consecutive attacks and rapid transference of troops

This is basically what Ludendorff did. In my opinion it was a major error. In hammering away up and down the line the German army was sure to sustain high casualties, which they could not replace. It was a policy of self destruction.

I need to read more widely on this but my current feelings are that the main German offensive had to either be in the north to threaten the Channel ports and I still fear, at this moment, that Haig would have brought the army back at an early stage. The alternative route for the Germans was to move against Paris. I think if Paris fell, then so did France.

The Germans still would not have won the war but it would have been an interesting peace/Armistice negotiation.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, I just want to check what you meant by the second of your original questions. Are you suggesting that Haig is credited with defeat of the German army in the last 100 days and, perhaps, shouldn't be because the army was self-destructing?

Robert

I came across the POW figures, couple that with the implosion of the German home front, the realisation of defeat within the ranks of the German army after the failure of the Michael et al offensives, and I thought does the period August to November need to be re-critiqued ... ah a question for the Forum!

The trouble is the written history that is often accepted as fact is normally far from the truth. Only by critiquing history, IMHO, can we come near to the truth and this has to be a constant process as new material and interpretations come to light. History is the past but the process of understanding is still dynamic.

Regards,

Jon

[David_Blanchard]

The interesting part of German strategy is that it was an attack in Michael and then Georgette to defeat Britain. This wasn't achieved, not necessarily because of the strength of the British Armies on the Lys, but because of the strength of French Reserves. These reserves covering the British Armies in the north had to be pulled away, hence the third offensive Blucher- across the Chemin des Dames- pulling the French armies in towards Paris. Then the final phase of the German Spring offensive would be launched against the British, driving them back to the channel.

The paradox is that the German diversionary offensive was too good on the Chemin des Dames- the greatest breakthrough on the Western Front was made on the 27th May. This changed Ludendorff's plan; Paris was just over the hill 40 miles away. Which Great War General, having attained this degree of success would not have followed up such an impressive breakthrough of the Allied lines?

Of course this is what Ludendorff did, but by the 15th- 18 July the French had developed an antidote to the Bruchmuller barrage and stormtroop tactics, as a result the Germans failed to get to Paris in 1918. It was always going to be a gamble, even if he had stuck to his original strategy of defeating the British Army first, rather than pressing forward towards the French capital.

Regards

David

[Robert Dunlop]

The trouble is the written history that is often accepted as fact is normally far from the truth. Only by critiquing history, IMHO, can we come near to the truth and this has to be a constant process as new material and interpretations come to light. History is the past but the process of understanding is still dynamic.

Forgive me, Jon, but I did have a little chuckle when I read this . In the nicest possible way. I kinda got the feeling in light of your previous comment that it was ok to question conventional 'wisdom' with respect to Haig and the last 100 days, but not with respect to Haig and the Somme . Please, I am just being light-hearted in this. As you know, I do not have a problem with debating issues and I don't take things personally. FWIIW, and this may come as a surprise to some, I am neither pro- nor anti-Haig. I just want to delve more and more deeply into the complexities of command and control, how battles were fought, etc, etc. There is SO much more that we need to understand and bring together. The Forum really helps to facilitate this.

I came across the POW figures, couple that with the implosion of the German home front, the realisation of defeat within the ranks of the German army after the failure of the Michael et al offensives, and I thought does the period August to November need to be re-critiqued ... ah a question for the Forum!

Returning to the discussion at hand, I don't think you answered my original question? The reason I asked is that another interpretation of your question 'And more importantly that a new critique is required on the extent of the tactical achievement for which Haig, particularly, is credited?' is that Haig should be given more credit for the tactics that finally precipitated the Black Day of 8th August. Is this what you meant?

Robert

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Jon

QUOTE(6th Shropshires @ Mar 3 2007, 06:17 PM)

... a decisive breakthrough could hardly be attained by a single attack against only one sector. He stated that it must be done by a sequence of consecutive attacks and rapid transference of troops

This is basically what Ludendorff did. In my opinion it was a major error. In hammering away up and down the line the German army was sure to sustain high casualties, which they could not replace. It was a policy of self destruction.

Sorry I do not agree, Wetzell's idea was a fast transference, the Germans should have started to make their transference to Flanders soon after 23rd-24th March, once they had won the Somme line. They carried on the attack on this front for at lest five days too long, they should have been striking Lys Valley around the 3rd or 4th April at the latest, they not only wasted time by carrying on with the Somme front but wasted good men & materials for nothing. Ludendorff slowness was the major error.

Annette

[6th Shropshires]

The alternative route for the Germans was to move against Paris. I think if Paris fell, then so did France.

The Germans still would not have won the war but it would have been an interesting peace/Armistice negotiation.

But I do partly agree with this Jon, I think this would have been an interesting peace/Armistice negotiation, the French may have been more willing to sue for peace but would the British ?

Annette

[Robert Dunlop]

I would like to add a little more to the discussion around Foch as Generalissimo. It became apparent after March 21st that an overall commander was needed. The British had extended their line to the Oise River with Fifth Army. This freed up French divisions, which Pètain then held in reserve. Given that the British had fed more troops into the line, their reserves were correspondingly less. The German preparations for Operation Michael were very good. Much is made of the secrecy with which artillery and then infantry were put in place for the attack. But these preparations were not completely unknown to the Entente. A really interesting aspect of the German planning, which Ludendorff drew attention to in his memoirs, was the explicit goal of deceiving the Entente with preparations for attack along much of the rest of the Western Front. Thus, Haig was concerned about an attack near Ypres, whilst Pètain was concerned about an attack to the east of St Quentin. It is interesting to pause and reflect on these perspectives. Essentially, these views portray where the respective C-in-Cs perceived the main strategically important areas were, ie the areas that, if taken by the enemy, would have the greatest adverse effect on the war. Thus, the area around St Quentin was deemed relatively unimportant and was not defended as strongly. The weakness was detected by the Germans and led to this area becoming the target for Operation Michael. It exposes the problem with the German approach of attacking the weakest point - the point is weak for a reason.

St Quentin was only relatively unimportant. Plans were in place to support the defenders. The British had some reserves behind Fifth Army. The agreement to take over the line came with an understanding that Pètain would send some of the French reserves north to help Fifth Army if necessary. In the event, the German attack proved much more powerful and more successful that Haig had expected. Fifth Army had to fall back quickly to prevent it being surrounded. It wasn't just a case of feeding in a few reserves here and there. The further back Fifth Army withdrew, the wider was the potential gap between it and the French army. British cavalry helped plug this gap but the French reinforcements played a magnificent role in stabilizing this side of the German re-entrant. Meanwhile, Haig continued to worry about the north around Ypres, and Nivelle contined to worry about an attack in the Champagne region. Both wanted to retain reserves for these strategically more important areas, but, meanwhile, the German bulge continued to increase.

The British right flank, ie the remnants of Fifth Army, had to bend back, pivoting on the right flank of the British Third Army. This was the standard response to a threat against a flank - the German bulge was a bell-shape but the British would have focused most on that side of the bell that threatened them most directly. As the size of the Fifth Army shrank, and as the length of flank increased, more British reserves had to be sent south. Now, it was getting really serious. Pètain was focusing on the French perspective, doing just enough to protect their left flank but making sure that the possible attack in the Champagne region could be defended. This situation illustrates why the military has a hierarchical command structure with someone at the apex. If Haig's post did not exist, then the British Fifth Army might have only worried about its situation, and Third Army would have concentrated on its situation, with disasterous consequences. Someone had to draw things together.

It is very important to note that, contrary to what some people believed and wrote, Pètain responded quickly to the threat posed by March 21st.

Leaving aside what actually happened for a moment, I would expect that a Supreme Commander would have had:

1. The power to set overall strategy, in co-operation with the respective political authorities, and in consultation with the respective C-in-Cs.

2. Control over a small number of reserves that might be needed to support either the French or the British at the point of overlap (I don't just mean geographic overlap here). By 'control', I mean the ability to decide where the reserves should be allocated. Once the decision was made, the reserves would then fall under the direct control of the military commander to whom they were assigned.

3. The responsibility for ensuring that both C-in-Cs understood what was needed to achieve the broader strategic goals

4. The capacity to represent the needs of the C-in-Cs, particularly for the resources needed to fulfill the broad strategic goals

I would not expect the Supreme Commander to dictate precisely how the C-in-Cs then went about their jobs.

These views are based on my current limited understanding of how the chain of command worked, in general (if you pardon the pun), at that time. Please add to or amend the list.

So what actually happened? The post of Supreme Commander was ratified at the Doullens Conference. This took place on March 26 1918, only 5 days after the launch of Operation Michael. General Foch was appointed to the post. There are many different accounts of how the decision was made. These are interesting but not relevant to this discussion IMHO. It is important to note, however, that Foch had provided a memorandum to Clemenceau before the meeting. Doughty picks up the story:

'a memorandum in which [Foch] emphasized the importance of common Franco-British action and called for the appointment of an "agent" to give orders to allied forces and ensure that they were executed. In this memorandum he described the area south of Péronne, where Pétain and Fayolle had struggled to shore up the British Fifth Army..., as "easy to defend" and the area to its north as requiring substantial reinforcements by the French and British [he was a wiley fox ]. Though Clemenceau bristled when he read Foch's self-serving memorandum, Foch's optimism proved far more attractive to the grizzled politician than Pétain's pessimism.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to review what Doughty wrote about Pètain in his excellent book 'Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operataions in the Great War.' This relates to the decision about a replacement for Joffre. Note the reference to another facet of Pètain's character, which is labelled as 'obstinacy'. I have included the preceding paragraph as it gives a nice feel for who the other potential players were. The last paragraph is just for interest and for the sake of completeness. Nivelle was out of the equation:

"When France's political leaders chose a new commander of French forces in north and northeastern France, they had about a dozen officers from whom to choose, including the chief of staff (Castelnau), army group commanders (Foch, Pétain, Franchet d'Espèrey), and army commanders (Gérard, Nivelle, Humbert, Gouraud, Mazel, Fayolle, Villaret, and Micheler). Though one would expect the chief of staff and army-group commanders to be amongst the finalists, all had faults of one type or another that led to their not being chosen. Castelnau and Foch suffered from their long association with Joffre, as well as from their being devout Catholics. Briand had especially strong doubts about Castelnau's abilities. Since Foch had recently been injured in an automobile accident, questions also arose about his health. Franchet d'Espèrey, though hugely successful in the early part of the war and a confidant of Brian on strategy in the Balkans, had done nothing extraordinarily special since becoming an army group commander and was not highly regarded by his peers.

Of France's most senior army leaders, only Pétain seemed a viable candidate to replace Joffre. While Pétain was a Catholic, he did not attend mass regularly and thus encountered few objections from the radical elements in French political circles. Yet he had not curried favour with people such as Briand and Poincaré and had surprised some with his comments about French politics. At one point he had told Poincaré that he did not 'give a damn' about the French constitution. At the moment Briand chose Nivelle, he wanted to appoint a general officer with whom the new technical advisor could work smoothly. Neither he nor Joffre found Pétain's pessimism appealing, and neither relished the prospect of contending with his obstinacy.

Of the army commanders only Nivelle had the reputation and political support to merit serious consideration. While treating visiting politicians courteously and warmly, he had caused a sensation throughout France with his successful capture of Forts Douaumont and Vaux. Among his supporters, for example, was André Maginot... The most important supporter of Nivelle, however, was Joffre. Joffre had long been impressed with Nivelle's optimism and his 'can do' spirit."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

According to the British Official History, Clemenceau drafted the first job description for the post of Supreme Commander. It was brief:

'General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments with the co-ordination of the action of the British and French Armies in front of Amiens. He will arrange to this effect with the two Generals-in-Chief, who are invited to furnish him with the necessary information'

Haig quickly recognised that this meant Supreme Commander of the area in front of Amiens - not very Supreme really. He 'pointed out the difficulty of the task unless Foch had full authority over all operations "on the Western Front". This this, General Pétain at once agreed, and, in revising the draft first the words "front occidental" and then "front ouest" were substituted for "devant Amiens", and then [without asking the Americans or Italians] "Armées Alliées" for "Armées anglaises et francaises".'

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

I kinda got the feeling in light of your previous comment that it was ok to question conventional 'wisdom' with respect to Haig and the last 100 days, but not with respect to Haig and the Somme .

Robert ... I am pleased this thread has brought a smile to someone's face! And no I think we need to continue questioning what Haig did on the Somme and elsewhere ... Dr Nick Lloyd has recently done that with Haig at Loos for example and put forward a compelling argument in relation to the placement of the reserves.

As previously stated, from my position I think you have a very good point with regard to the first day Somme objectives and I have urged you more than once to put your thoughts in front of historians who are familiar with the original sources. So the irony of your comment "but not with respect to Haig and the Somme" gave me a rather large chuckle too. To be honest I dont think I have ever considered what side of the fence you sat with Haig ... you can never exclude Haig from the conversation but I dont think in our exchanges you have blatantly gone down the pro-Haig/anti-Haig line but have been more to do with interpretation of strategy and tactics.

Returning to the discussion at hand, I don't think you answered my original question? The reason I asked is that another interpretation of your question 'And more importantly that a new critique is required on the extent of the tactical achievement for which Haig, particularly, is credited?' is that Haig should be given more credit for the tactics that finally precipitated the Black Day of 8th August. Is this what you meant?

To steal your phrase I would say "There is SO much more that we need to understand and bring together. The Forum really helps to facilitate this." A new critique could find in favour or against - the importance is too question and not accept, obviously in line with the those facts and evidence at hand that can be corroborated.

Earlier in post 79 I said "I am also not clear to what extent Haig involved himself in the planning of Amiens or the push forward as he had [involved himself] on the Somme and at Third Ypres for example" and if not too much trouble, I would appreciate your considered thoughts on the extent to which Haig was formulating strategy and involving himself in the tactical achievement for the Battle of Amiens and beyond.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Why was Amiens so important? General Fox, who was a General Staff Officer at British GHQ in Montreuil noted two key reasons. Firstly, the rail network. There were two lateral lines running north-south. One lay near Amiens and 'was brought at several points under the fire of the enemy's artillery. Use of this front lateral line had thus become precarious. The results of this were felt in every part of the railway system. Good circulation is the essence of railway working; and a block at any point has an effect similar to that of an aneurism on ['blood clot within' would be a better analogy] a human artery. Because of the loss of engine depots, and the hindrances to circulation on the front lateral line, the back lateral line along the coast became seriously congested [reducing] the capacity of every engine by an average of 15 per cent.

Further, our rear lateral line had two particularly vulnerable points, [one] near Abbeville, where it crossed the Somme.'

The railways were transferring British, French and American troops as well as all the supplies. 'The extent of this accumulated difficulty from a transport point of view can by gauged from the fact that a British Army [such as Fifth Army, not the whole army] needs on a day of intense fighting 1,934 tons of supplies of all kinds per mile of front [emphasis in the original]'.

Fox raised another serious issue:

'On one of the worst nights of the German advance, when we went up to the situation-map without any enthusiasm, half afraid of what we should see, young [staff] Captain [nicknamed] Hannibal Napoleon deepened our gloom by declaring oracularly:

"If we hold on to Amiens we shall be alright. If Amiens falls to the Germans it is goodbye to Montreuil, and no more Paris leave for a few years".' Got to get your priorities right I suppose.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon

Sorry I do not agree, Wetzell's idea was a fast transference, the Germans should have started to make their transference to Flanders soon after 23rd-24th March, once they had won the Somme line. They carried on the attack on this front for at lest five days too long, they should have been striking Lys Valley around the 3rd or 4th April at the latest, they not only wasted time by carrying on with the Somme front but wasted good men & materials for nothing. Ludendorff slowness was the major error.

Annette

Annette,

This is a fair point but I am not clear how practical it was. The 4th and 6th armies were not strong enough and would require reinforcement from the Michael front once it had been shut down. There are enormous logistical problems associated with transferring large numbers of men and equipment that quickly. There is also the problem of manpower and the exhaustion of those troops that had participated in the Michael offensive and then the adequacy of numbers and quality of replacements needed to bring those Armies back up to strength. There is also the control of the skies by the RFC to report troops movements.

But there was also a bigger problem facing the Germans and that is that the Ypres, Armentieres, La Bassee line had not been weakened as Ludendorff anticipated. Ludendorff couldnt launch the attack in the north until British units had been moved to reinforce the south (and I am now thinking Haig got this part right with the proviso I need to look again at what pressures the French were under). Add this to Ludendorff's previous statement and state of mind "I'm going to punch a hole in the lines and then see what happens?" and in view of the earlier successes with Michael, Ludendorff decided to continue the attack on the Somme expecting sooner or later the British army would conform with his intention that it would bring forces south.

I think also in the previous 3 years of fighting there had been nothing like the success the German's experienced in late March 1918 and it was easy to be sucked in by that success. As an example the Kasier was bestowing awards left, right and centre and declaring the war had been won and personally moved to the battlefront to be there when the coup-de-grace was delivered.

I think you are right to say Ludendorff continued the Somme offensive too long, but I would go further, and say Ludendorff was wrong to attack in that sector fullstop. I think I am right in saying that this was Wetzell's point of view as well, although he did support the hammer-blow process.

I would be interested in your further views.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Why was Amiens so important?

Robert - have you ever come across anything to suggest Haig strongly considered abandoning Amiens in late March 1918? I had left myself with the interpretation that he had and this was partially the cause for my post 25, which seems to have caused all the furore.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Castelnau and Foch suffered from their long association with Joffre, as well as from their being devout Catholics.

Foch had been somewhat in the wilderness after Joffre. Before the ink had dried on his new job description, Foch was on the road. He went straight to Gough. 'There he asked a number of questions of Gough, reiterating that there must be no more retirement, and that the line must be held at all costs. He offered no advice as to how this had best be done, and did not mention reinforcements.' Gough wrote about the meeting in 'Fifth Army'. He was very scathing! There is no doubt from Gough's account, however, that Foch's visit was announced, albeit at very short notice. GHQ phoned Gough, which means that permission for the meeting must have been given by Haig. Presumably the same was the case for Foch's next meeting. This involved General Barthélemy, who was General Fayolle's Chief of Staff. Then he went to see army commanders in Fayolle's Army Group. A note was sent to Pétain:

"In order to assure the protection of Amiens at any cost, General Fayolle is invited to [my emphasis]:

1. Maintain at all costs the position actually held by the British Fifth Army...

2. Support, and then relieve, the Fifth Army south of the Somme as soon as possible, without in doing so compromising the region south of Roye, and defending the ground foot by foot to ensure this."

Note that the imperative about the area south of Roye, mentioned in point 2, is directly in conflict with the need to protect Amiens 'at any cost' and is consistent with what Pétain was trying to do. The 'invitation' was interpreted, however, to mean Amiens first, then Noyons second. Pétain changed his orders to Fayolle to comply with Foch's missive.

Then the trouble started. '[Next day, Pétain] telephoned Fayolle and told him to give first priority to protecting Noyon, and thus Paris, and second priority to protecting Amiens. As Fayolle noted in his diary, Foch wanted him to give first priority to Amiens and second to Noyon. Elevating Foch to his new position obviously had not ended friction between the two generals. Doughty goes on to catalogue further incidents, as well as frustration experienced by Haig once the Battle of the Lys started. I have to say that Pétain's 'obstinacy' at this point was probably very helpful. Foch increasingly favoured going over to the offensive. Pétain systematically refused to comply until he was good and ready, which was probably very wise. The success of Mangin's counter-attack depended on careful preparations, which were initiated by Pétain not Foch. Prior to this, the French, and British, had been trying to react to each new move of the German High Command. Doing this, and attacking as well, would have seen a recurrence of the losses sustained in some of Foch's early campaigns. The Second Battle of the Marne saw the initiative pass totally from the Germans to the Entente. The time was now right for Foch's demands for offensive action. Doughty notes that Foch's ideas about the offensive began to align with Pétain's - successive limited attacks in different areas, which Foch illustrated 'by punching with his right fist, then his left, and then again with his right and following these blows with a vigorous kick.'

Just one quick example of Foch's influence. It was he who suggested the battered British divisions should recover in the 'quiet' sector of the Chemin des Dames. Pétain was unimpressed. The ongoing problems with Pétain were a factor in Foch receiving the title of 'general-in-chief' of the allied armies in France on April 17. No change though, so on June 26 the War Committee 'compelled Pétain to obey [Foch's] directives'.

Another example is that Foch strictly controlled the release of reserves to Haig in response to the Battle of the Lys.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

have you ever come across anything to suggest Haig strongly considered abandoning Amiens in late March 1918?

Jon, I have never seen evidence that the British planned to abandon Amiens. There were contingency plans in case Amiens was captured, which is not the same thing. I don't know the details but given the proximity to the sea, first principles would suggest that a German penetration past Amiens would have lead to the area being withdrawn. Defending a sliver of territory with backs to the sea is not wise. It would have been really tough for the Germans though. The Royal Navy would have come into play with their naval gunfire support. Nasty stuff that helped stop the German advance along the Belgian coast in 1914. After that, the German coastal defences meant attempts by the Navy to bombard the coast did not come to anything. No such defences to stop the Navy off the coast of France.

Fox gives insights into what GHQ was planning. Before Operation Michael, 'in the north our line was dangerously close to the sea. Our most northern port, Dunkirk, was actually under shellfire and in consequence could be very little used. A very small gain of territory by the Germans in the north would have brought Calais and Boulogne under shellfire. Then our existence north of the Somme would have become impossible. We could not have kept an adequate force there in supplies. In the north every yard of territory was of the greatest strategic value. As our line ran south the French coast bulged out. We had more room to manoeuvre there; loss of ground was not so vital. If the Germans had won on the line Ypres-Armentières the same depth of territory as they won on the line Arras-Péronne, we should have had to evacuate all France north of the Somme.

In short we took the biggest risk of loss of ground where the loss was least dangerous to the vital plan of the campaign. In the light of the manpower available it was probably the best course that could be pursued.'

Fox then describes the problems GHQ had in preparing in case of a withdrawal. The French authorities were reluctant to do anything that required civilian evacuation (which the Germans had done for example). He went on to note:

'Still, on the big issues the French were splendid. What, for example, could have been more heroic than the decision they came to a little later [than February 1918]: that, in the case of a German advance continuing, the whole of the Pas de Calais province was to be destroyed, the harbours of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne wrecked, the dykes and locks destroyed so that the country would have been generally inundated?

It was on April 12th, 1918, [well after the March threat to Amiens had passed but when the Battle of the Lys had got underway] that the Allied Commander-in-Chief [Foch] gave orders for defensive inundations to stop the Germans from getting to the Dunkirk-Calais region; and on April 13th the Governor of Dunkirk began to put these into effect.'

I won't go into the myriad of other details that are mentioned with respect to this withdrawal, except to say that they were very detailed and carefully agreed with the French.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

I have never seen evidence that the British planned to abandon Amiens. There were contingency plans in case Amiens was captured, which is not the same thing.

Yes I think I have to accept I got this totally wrong. All part of the learning curve/process

Cheers,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Foch had been somewhat in the wilderness after Joffre. Before the ink had dried on his new job description, Foch was on the road. He went straight to Gough. 'There he asked a number of questions of Gough, reiterating that there must be no more retirement, and that the line must be held at all costs. He offered no advice as to how this had best be done, and did not mention reinforcements.'

I have thought about this. Was it because Foch doubted the ability of Gough and not without good reason? But I also wondered if this had any impact on how Gough deployed his forces - which was pretty appalling IMHO with the main body of men in forward positions at strong points and easily isolated by the German offensive - together with Gough's confusing non-retire order.

Note that the imperative about the area south of Roye, mentioned in point 2, is directly in conflict with the need to protect Amiens 'at any cost' and is consistent with what Pétain was trying to do. The 'invitation' was interpreted, however, to mean Amiens first, then Noyons second. Pétain changed his orders to Fayolle to comply with Foch's missive.

Petain had immediately sent three divisions to support Gough when requested by Haig to do so (at this point it should be remembered that Petain had his own concerns whilst Haig was vehemently refusing to remove troops from the northern sectors). The French divisions were in location within 24 hours I think, which is a bloody fantastic achievement. Yet Haig commented in his diary that Petain was wobbling and refusing to assist!! This cant reflect well on Haig. The Germans then attacked towards Roye and Noyons and Petain had to adjust his priorities with good reason. At this point logical thinking would suggest Haig should have withdrawn units from the north but as far as I am aware he did not. In retrospect Haig may have done the right thing. A few days later the German push against the French stopped at Noyon and Petain once again sent forces north to defend Amiens. Whilst the main thrust of the initial German attack had been against Gough's Fifth Army ie. 8 Divisions, effectively the brunt of the fighting had been by the French.

It was at this point the Doullens Conference took place and Foch was appointed Supreme Commander.

Robert - does this interpretation generally follow yours?

Doughty notes that Foch's ideas about the offensive began to align with Pétain's - successive limited attacks in different areas, which Foch illustrated 'by punching with his right fist, then his left, and then again with his right and following these blows with a vigorous kick.'

I think Petain is hard done by in English history - I expect partially because of Haig's verdict on Petain. Personally I think Petain knew how to fight the German army and deserves much more credit.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, I would have to go back through my sources again to double-check movements of reserves, etc. I won't have a chance to do that now but I would like to post some more thoughts on the outcomes of the Battle of Amiens tonight. That will be as much as I can do before I head off tomorrow.

As far as Pétain's reputation is concerned, the only things I had ever known about him before my real interest in WW1 started was:

1. He helped save France from Verdun and from the 'mutinies' (I didn't know about Nivelle then). Operation Kaiserschlacht, and all its comings and goings, was not something I knew about.

2. He capitulated to the Germans in WW2 and was the head of the Vichy Government.

Haig knew nothing of the latter and I suspect history will continue to judge Pétain on 2., not 1. Terribly sad IMHO.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

history will continue to judge Pétain on 2., not 1. Terribly sad IMHO.

I agree, and with your sentiments.

Robert - I am very interested in your thoughts on the Battle of Amiens but please dont push yourself on this. We can always catch up another day.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

I meant to add the following anecdote from Lord Moyne. It relates to new recruits. While he was still a Staff Officer with 74th Brigade, 25th Division, the brigade was involved in Operations Michael and Georgette. On 22 to 25 April, they 'received drafts to replace our casualties and got to work on a new line which was to be dug approximately north and south a couple of miles east of Poperinghe.' Then, on the 25th the brigade was involved in launching a counter-attack alongside a French unit. 'The attack went astonishingly well. The 39th French Division on our right never moved; our 7th Brigade, who were attacking on our left having had very heavy officer casualties including all three Battalion Commanders, mistook their direction and lost touch with the 49th Division, who were on our left. The result was that before we got to our final objective and captured many prisoners and guns, we were completely left in the air and had to come back. I don't think any one would have got out of it if it had not been for a thick fog. The operation had, however, cost us many of our best officers owing to the fact that we had been filled up with half-trained recruits who didn't know their job and had to be shown.'

The other significant factor in this story is refered to in the following comment:

'Fortunately we were up against a poor lot of Germans, the prisoners being from the 118th and 186th Regiments of the 56th Division.'

Robert

[Jon Miller]

Because this is an anti-Haig thread, isn't it?

First of all I would like to apologise to the contributors to this thread who felt I was accusing them in being anti-Haig in their replies to the original question. That premise had not occurred to me then, nor does it now.

For the record, my feelings on two of the most important components on this thread are most ably reasoned by Arm in post 71. He explains his own thoughts on Haig's successes/failures, and how potent a threat a 'defeated' army can be when you consider the Germans post D-Day. I couldn't put either case any better.

Jon S, you were right to be affronted by my vitriolic fervour as regards insults to the 100 Days soldiers. I will try and explain where I was coming from in a far more rational way. In the meantime I hope you will accept my apology - I might be misguided in my arguments, but I'm not habitually malicious.

The reason I let the red mist descend was that anything I perceive to lessen the credit I feel due to the BEF in the 100 Days pushes my button. And the original posting exhibited questions that seemed far more likely to do that, than further their reputation.

The observation of so many Germans giving up on the 8 Aug being taken as a suggestion of the morale of the German Army at that time and onwards, coupled with the hindsight-guided belief that the Germans were already defeated cannot but detract from the achievement of the BEF afterwards. This really bothers me, not so much because of Haig's reputation, but because looking at the war simplistically, we get to chew over defeats and tragedies for four years, but when the BEF are doing things right, they still have to be knocked and discredited. I think the amazing amount of prisoners taken on 8 Aug might well be due to something other than disillusionment. I would have thought the unprecedented amount of tanks to be of importance. I don't have the numbers to hand, but an enormous number of tanks lined up for the Battle of Amiens. Something like 650 rings a bell, but I stand to be corrected. I should have thought it a distinct possibility that this mass of tanks enabled the BEF to press home their attacks and surround Germans ad nauseum before the enemy had time to make a fight of it. This overwhelming opportunity to take prisoners was lost in a matter of days due to the loss of 90% of these tanks before the week was out. With far less tanks, future attacks would continue to be successful, but at greater cost. Looking at 21 March 1918, hoards of the BEF were taken prisoner. Was this due to disillusionment, or because the enemy struck so quickly and strongly that the time to surrender arrived before a proper battle could take place?

Actually, forgetting Haig completely, the posting that I really disagree with is number 23. In this, Jon S totally disagrees with Annette's explaination of excessive casualties which I thought to be perfectly plausible. Jon points out that the combination of dominant artillery, command of the skies and tanks was enough to rule out the possiblity of high casualties. I would side with Annette and use a couple of counter-arguments. Firstly, I admit that before reading this thread and its offshoots, I didn't know how superior the Allied artillery was rated at the end of the war. But even so, with that, and the command of the skies, you are not going to hit every target, by any means. Think of the pre-battle bombardment before the First Somme. Somebody somewhere will survive, and if a MG unit survives, the enemy has the immediate means to cause hundreds, if not a thousand casualties with just one gun. And more than one gun is going to survive. Consider the Worcesters at Pigeon Ravine. Ok, there were utterly sacrificed, but it didn't take many MGs to do the damage. As for tanks, while I think their massive presence on 8 Aug could have been a huge factor, their 90% rate of loss in those few days means that apart from breakdowns, the Germans were not slow in finding ways to liquidate their threat. I remember a Timewatch programme seriously questioning tanks' effectiveness after 8 Aug. My opinion is that although we may now know the Germans were technically defeated by this time, their resistance was of the highest order, and a lot of blood was going to have to be spilt to oust them. And the conscripts did it, and much should be made of it. BTW I would have thought that the huge numbers of teenage soldiers brought into the army via conscription would automatically mean a lot of that age dying, but of course this argument cannot be satisfactorily reasoned without an immense number of relevant figures.

A lot of water has passed under this thread's bridge since my previous post, but as it's taken me some time to get this post together, I felt I would still post it. This thread has been and is incredibly informative, and hopefully one or two new bits and pieces will stick with me. So Jon, it's a good idea to continue posting questions ready for debate like this, look what has been covered - and you won't always get someone charging in like a bull in a china shop.

Jon.

[Jonathan Saunders]

A lot of water has passed under this thread's bridge since my previous post, but as it's taken me some time to get this post together, I felt I would still post it. This thread has been and is incredibly informative, and hopefully one or two new bits and pieces will stick with me. So Jon, it's a good idea to continue posting questions ready for debate like this, look what has been covered - and you won't always get someone charging in like a bull in a china shop.

Hi Jon – many thanks for your further explanation. Regarding "vitriolic fervour" – despite my best efforts I know I have my own shortcomings when using this Forum and I’m not habitually malicious either! I think it is too easy for misunderstandings to occur with language and this method of communication and I often regret the way I have put my point across. Otherwise it can only be a positive that we can still create this passion about our respective point of views.

The points Arm makes in post 71 are fair. Personally I feel that before I subscribe to the “if Haig is criticised for 1916 & 1917 then by default he should be commended for 1918” theory, I need to find the answer to “did the Allies win the land war because of Haig or despite him”. As yet I just don’t know. For example, if the key men in local command areas (ie. a Divisional General right down to a Section-Leader ) were better in 1918 because they had been able to evaluate and learn from the past mistakes they experienced under Haig’s 1916 &/or 1917 strategies, then why should Haig take credit for them making a right out of his wrong? I am not sure I have explained that well but I hope you can follow what I mean. I don’t expect anyone to agree with me … but its one of the reoccurring questions I am trying to answer.

Also whilst Arm makes a perfectly valid point about the German army of 1944 it gives no consideration to the vastly different circumstances with the German army of 1918. For example the Nazi indoctrination process of the youth of Germany from 1933 and actually before. This was not only reflected by those children who by then were adults in the SS or Wehrmacht in France of 1944, but by the Hitler Youth who were rushed to the Front in 1944. This willingness of self sacrifice in the German army of 1944 was not, IMHO, present in the German army of 1918.

Again I think it is a fair comment that you make about the tanks on 8 Aug. I also think an important element was surprise. Ludendorff, and consequently the OHL, just did not expect an Allied offensive at that time. But your point is well made.

In contrast the British troops that surrendered circa 21 March 1918 had very good reason too, IMHO. First of all, due to Gough’s decision to place nearly all his troops in a series of small strong points in the forward zone, the German army were able to very quickly isolate them and cut them off. Just for good measure, Gough had also issued a non-withdrawal order.

Regarding Annette’s post 22 and my reply in post 23. First of all my reply is badly worded. I do agree with Annette up to a point. Neither was my reply meant as a reflection on those officers and men at the cutting edge of the fighting. My badly made point was if the British had all these advantages why were they still suffering such heavy casualties and difficulties in forcing the German army back. Whether it was Rawlinson, Monash, Currie or Haig that was really calling the shots (bad pun) at this time, surely there was some duty of care that was absent, hence the high casualties. There was always going to be the danger of MGs – mobile and difficult to locate and destroy – but the Germans had had more relative success in March 1918 than the British did in August 1918, and the German’s accomplishment was without the far greater force of arms that were available to the British. Possibly in my deliberations I am making the process of understanding more complicated than it should be.

Just regarding the First Somme: I fully understand your point that somebody, somewhere, will survive. It is relevant but I would be cautious to use this alone as a measure for August 1918 because of all the improvements that had taken place with range finding, quality of munitions, quality of guns, creeping barrage etc, not to mention RAF straffing and other associated improvements. Which probably takes me back to that point I was trying to make in post 23.

I don’t for one minute think I am any more right on this than you, but these are the type of … contradictions that I feel I am faced with when considering the still phenomenal achievement of those men who had to actually do the fighting in the last months of the war.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jon Miller]

Hello Jon

You don't make it easy for Haig to gain a bit of credit with you, do you? Now, you'll know this as opposed to me, but wasn't Haig in control of the BEF in the 100 Days in the same way as he was in 1916 and 1917? You make it sound as if suddenly in 1918, lower ranks had more chance of improving their tactics and resulting successes, without having to pass on any credit to Haig, whereas he was definitely in control in the previous two years, and wasn't that awful? Did Haig delegate to a greater degree in the last months of the war? And if he did, and this was successful, shouldn't he be credited for it?

Yes, the BEF did have good reason for surrender on 21 March 1918. That was the point I was trying to make, but possibly not clearly enough. But also with regard to the Germans on 8 Aug, perhaps the surprise element that you mentioned, and the tanks that I mentioned were much more the reason for wholesale surrender than downright disillusionment?

The idea of who had more relative success in 1918 is interesting. Could you please expand on why you think the Germans deserve this accolade? Then I'll try and return a couple of points!!

I think it's going to be near enough impossible to clear up the debate of the possibly excessive casualties.

The only way I feel that you would get enough of an idea of why, is to find out how the casualties were caused, and that would mean reading a huge amount of War Diaries and histories. But it would be absolutely fascinating to find out how the casualties were sustained. Naturally, I would still stick with the idea of MGs doing the damage, until persuaded otherwise.

Jon.