Was the German army defeated before 8th August 1918?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Martin Kitchen in his The German Offensives of 1918 makes an interesting point in his chapter on the Battle of Amiens, 8th to 14th August 1918:

“Of 36,500 men lost by [German] 2nd Army an amazing 27,500 were missing, most presumed to have been taken prisoner. In [German] 18th Army, of 11,500 losses 5,500 were listed as missing.”

Does this extremely high level of prisoners suggest that the German army were already defeated before 8th August, if not in terms of military defeat, certainly by lack of morale? And more importantly that a new critique is required on the extent of the tactical achievement for which Haig, particularly, is credited?

Interestingly, combined British and French losses are given as 75,000 (51,000 British, 24,000 French), which offers a counter argument that those Germans that were fighting were fighting damn hard (or were these high losses due to poor battle planning!!?)

Look forward to your views.

Regards,

Jon S

[truthergw]

There is a theory that creaming off the best troops to form storm trooper battalions left a very weakened main body to follow on. The large number of prisoners may be evidence of that. By August, the losses in the assault battalions would have been very heavy.

As to the heavy losses in the Allied armies. In open warfare, the attacking forces were expected to lose more heavily than the defenders until these were pinned and defeated. As long as the defenders could break off and fight another day they could control losses to some extent. Not so the attackers who were perforce thrusting forward and ' taking risks which would have been criminal before'.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Many thanks your reply.

I agree with your assault troops comment. Also we are aware at this stage the German army comprises a large element of, shall we say, under-trained and ill-prepared troops. Yet the figures given as “missing presumed prisoners” remains excessive if considering, say, the fighting performance of the British volunteer armies at Loos and on the Somme. Or the fact that by August 1918 a large part of the British army was made up of teenage conscripts equally ill-prepared.

This last point might be a reason why British losses were so high in this period of fighting and again whilst I would agree that the attacking force should sustain much heavier casualties, if looking at the German offensives earlier in 1918, there was not such a great disparity between their losses and Allied losses.

Regards,

Jon S

[paul guthrie]

I have an article on the WFA site that argues Germany was beaten at least by August 8 and I think earlier when Foch assaulted the Marne Salient July 18 after failure of the last German push. The entire URL is not visible when I go to it so I can't post it but it's under American perspective, did America win the war?

[armourersergeant]

When the German offensives failed in march/april/may 1918 Germany IMO effectively lost the war. The Yanks were on their way, they had failed to break the Allied army and the Naval blockade was doing its job. It was but a matter of time. 8th Aug was the time that I think the High command could no longer deny to themselves the reality of the war.

regards

Arm

[MelPack]

Hello Jonathan

It is a very interesting question that you have posed.

The quote cited from Kitchen appears to be referring to 'lost' ie figures for killed or missing in action rather than the total casualty figure whereas your refernce to Anglo-French 'losses' appears to be the figure for casualties as a whole.

Is this the case?

I would certainly be interested to hear from our colleagues who have access to the original material on the state of theGerman Army from the summer of 1918 onwards.

Regards

Mel

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hello Jonathan

It is a very interesting question that you have posed.

The quote cited from Kitchen appears to be referring to 'lost' ie figures for killed or missing in action rather than the total casualty figure whereas your refernce to Anglo-French 'losses' appears to be the figure for casualties as a whole.

Is this the case?

I would certainly be interested to hear from our colleagues who have access to the original material on the state of theGerman Army from the summer of 1918 onwards.

Regards

Mel

Mel – I wondered exactly the same thing. Kitchen isn’t clear – my hope is that he is consistent in this regard but I just don’t know. Your point is valid.

Regards,

Jon

[Borys]

There is a theory that creaming off the best troops to form storm trooper battalions left a very weakened main body to follow on.

Ahoj!

Creation of "elite" units always results in lower quality "line" units. However, if the "elite" is small, than the "damage" is minal. The bigger the "elite", the worse the "line" becomes.

And this may work on two levels - even if with the same result.

To form the "elite" you either siphon off the best men from existing units, or direct the best quality recruits there, or you do both.

I would say this one of the inviolate rules of war.

Borys

[gporta]

...Or the fact that by August 1918 a large part of the British army was made up of teenage conscripts equally ill-prepared.

Were those young conscripts really so ill-prepared? I think that their training was more organized, and systematic, than the of the one the early Kitchener volunteers had had, the younger ones having a full year of training (as long as they were not hurriedly drafted before the official age of 19). Besides, the former had the advantage of having instructors who had experience of trench war and therefore were trained in up-to-date tactics... And they also were more realistic about what they could expect to find in the battlefield.

Gloria

[Jonathan Saunders]

(as long as they were not hurriedly drafted before the official age of 19)

Gloria,

In 1918 they were conscripted and drafted overseas aged 18. A significant number of these teenagers remain where they fell or in nearby cemeteries - from this I conclude they were not best prepared.

Regards,

Jon

[6th Shropshires]

Simply put, yes, after the failure to break the Allies in March, April and June, then followed by Foch's counter stoke on July 18, I would say they had lost the war by 18th July.

Annette

[truthergw]

Were those young conscripts really so ill-prepared? I think that their training was more organized, and systematic, than the of the one the early Kitchener volunteers had had, the younger ones having a full year of training (as long as they were not hurriedly drafted before the official age of 19). Besides, the former had the advantage of having instructors who had experience of trench war and therefore were trained in up-to-date tactics... And they also were more realistic about what they could expect to find in the battlefield.

Gloria

The role of the conscripts in the last two years of the war and particularly the 100 days, has not had nearly enough study. I can think of only one book devoted to them. I am desperately trying to find it here and can't. Author an Israeli but I can't remember her name. Deserves a thread of its own Gloria. ( broad hint )

The general feeling I get is that they were very keen but desperately lacking in training.

[Justin Moretti]

My understanding is that 2nd Marne was the point at which the Kaiserschlact had ended and the pendulum began to swing the other way, but pendulums do that. Amiens was what demonstrated to the German High Command that their army was no longer a valid bargaining chip. It wasn't so much the German Army's black day as Ludendorff's - the day he realized that he now wielded a broken sword, and not just a blunt one.

The quality of the armies on BOTH sides had deteriorated by this time; the difference was that the BEF (which fought the most important bits of Amiens) had a better system (compared to 1915/16) within which its poorly trained conscripts could operate. The techniques of battle and the material with which to wage it had finally evolved (and come together) to the point where the commanders could actually achieve what they were planning with some hope of consistency and regularity.

[Gibbo]

The book about conscripts is called Conscripts- Lost Legions of the Great War & the author is Ilana R. Bet-El. It aready has a thread, which is linked below:

Conscripts - Lost Legions of the Great war.

[truthergw]

The book about conscripts is called Conscripts- Lost Legions of the Great War & the author is Ilana R. Bet-El. It aready has a thread, which is linked below:

Conscripts - Lost Legions of the Great war.

That's the one. I missed that thread. Thanks very much.

[charlesmessenger]

I feel that it is worth pointing out that the young British soldiers sent out to France from spring 1918 had a official minimum age of 18 years 6 months. Most had been enlisted soon after their 18th birthdays and hence they had much longer training than the standard 14 weeks and were much better trained, as Gloria has pointed out. If this had not been the case it is most doubtful that they would have performed as well as they clearly did during the 100 Days.

As for the question that started this thread, it is an interesting one. I am not going to give a view at this time but will bear it very much in mind as I continue work on my book on 8th August 1918. Suffice to say that my publisher has decided that it should be titled The Day We Won the War!

Charles M

[MelPack]

To return to Jonathan's opening proposition, the following is an extract from the Official History 1918 Vol 3 by Brigadier J E Edmonds:

"The Second Battle of the Marne was over. Between the 15th July and 5th August, the French Armies and the Allied divisions engaged with them had taken prisoner 659 officers and 28,708 other ranks, had captured 793 guns and 3,728 machine guns. The French casualties in the battle had been 2,539 officers and 92,626 other ranks. The enemy losses are not yet known. The Germans attribute their defeat to the surprise by General Mangin's Army on the 18th July, and to the numerical and physical weakness of their infantry. Battalion trench strength (excluding machine gunners) had, it is stated, fallen to 200-240 rifles, with 15-20 light machine guns, with a fatal lack of regimental officers and N.C.O.'s: one regiment, reduced to two battalions, had only four of its companies led by officers and both battalion commanders were second lieutenants. Physical fitness had been reduced by poor rations and influenza.

The state of the German Second Army at the beginning of August has been revealed, and the others were hardly in better condition: on the 3rd August, of its 13 divisions only 2 were "fully fit for battle"; 5 only fit for position warfare; 3 only fit for defence on a quiet front; and 3 required relief, having a trench strength of about one quarter of their establishments. French and British Intelligence calculations agreed that the Germans had lost almost exactly a million men in battle on the Western Front since the 21st March (450,000 in March and April and 550,000 in their subsequent diversion offensives), plus 350,000 on other fronts; the depots were nearly empty and men with two months' training, drawn in anticipation from the 1920 class, were being sent to the front."

The depiction is very telling. The German Army is clearly not the same entity that launched Operation Michael on 21st March. It had been ravaged by the substantial losses incurred in the Spring Offensive and was now clearly dependent for further replenishment upon ill trained conscripts drawn in anticipation of the class of 1920 .

I would like to invite further clarification on the sate of the German Army before we broaden the discussion to the non military factors hinted at in Jonathan's opening post.

Regards

Mel

[owilki1984]

Hi everyone,

At the risk of taking a controversial stand in this debate I would like to proffer the view that the German Army was ‘broken’ way before August 1918, and in fact when Ludendorff started his ‘hammer blows’ in March he was drawing on a dilapidated army.

Yes I realize that the storm troopers were a elite section. Comprising of the ‘cream’ as someone has already aptly put it. But the storm troopers were not the German Army, only a part of it.

These guys did battle and died in huge numbers, which served to creamed off the cream! If they were the teeth of the German monster what about the tail?

This tail I would say was broken early one – Even in March. The testimonies of the captured British POWs for example reveal how shambolic the German army was. As they were marched into captivity they took heart form the ‘circus’ they saw. The German soldiers are described as tired, dilapidated and fatigued. The consensus from the British witness seems to show that the German Army was fed up!

Moreover, as is commonly known, when the Germans made their advances in the Spring Offensive they began to slow due to the supplies they came across. Yet more evidence that they were run down, tired and low on resources. As soon as they come across anything they stop!!!

Of course I am taking an extreme view, and with the wonderful position of hindsight good evidence can be found. A fence sitting view might be a better one, that allows balance to be made of German successes against British ones and the ratio of losses etc

But never one to get splinters from that fence I would say that although in those Spring offensives the German tooth might have been sharp, the German body and tail was ready for a rest.

Regards

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

All,

Thanks for the various replies so far.

Just on the matter of the 18 y o's and their training - my own consideration is that 5 months home training alone wasnt necessarily sufficient - there had to be a bedding down process once in the war theatre and when considering the overall maturity issue of conscripts aged 18/19, then I think as a whole, it would be extremely difficult to consider them prepared in the time frames given. My view only.

The feedback to date suggests the German army was probably close to collapse before the March offensives, which leads to another couple of questions 1) exactly how poor and where was the weakness in the Allied armies that allowed the various German offensives of 1918 to be so successful on a local scale and 2) if the German army was in such a poor condition why were the Allied army casualties so heavy between 8 August and 11 November. Possibly questions for another thread.

[MartH]

Hello

Perhaps the thread should be titled was Germany defeated before 8th August 1918?

The blockade and the agricultural policy of taking skilled labours off the land, had resulted in s pre war diet high in meat produce becoming more vegetabel based, and very poor vetagbles based, even in 1917 the food situation was dreadful, and harvests where lower compared to pre war.

If the army was not so straved of resourses, due to the situation at home, it might have fared better, where's the knief and where's the back?

They reacted in early 1918 because the high command knew that later in the year the tide would be so much against them. Germany was defeated before August 1918, but they didn't know how totally they had been defeated.

Regards

Mart

[RodB]

I'm wondering whether subsequent obsession with raw number-crunching has obscured the picture of what was actually happening in later battles of WWI ? Round about 1916 it seems that first the Germans and then everybody else discovered modern warfare, where only the first echelon troops and weaponry actual contribute meaningfully to combat and all the rest just support them. And if troops aren't first echelon and aren't actually providing much real support then they are negative assets just chewing up provisions and taxpayers money (the Rumsfeld doctrine). Like myself, of zero military use to anybody - I would have duly enlisted and duly got myself killed and been listed as a statistic but would have contributed precisely zero to the result of WWI. So the question is, how many first-echelon troops on either side were still alive by 8th August to actually influence events ? Reading the history of my grandfather's division's advance in the last 100 days of WWI reads eerily similar to my father's advance in Italy in WWII - there were enough experienced, motivated, trained and correctly led troops on both sides to wage maximum intensity warfare, probably more intense than the futile mass assaults of 1915. It seems to me that, tragically, all the millions who were slaughtered in all the futile frontal assaults up till then had no effect on the war, and neither did all those who surrendered or deserted. To me the war was finally decided by the few surviving combat troops, and one side had more than the other.

Another thought on this - I feel that French understood this concept very well, and his fighting retreat aiming at keeping his army in being followed what we would call modern doctrine. I feel it was Kitchener who sucked Britain into the numbers game, somehow believing that even if he desroyed the BEF he had millions more where they came from. So - would his mass civilian army have been better employed at home making guns, shells, aircraft and whatever else the lads at the front needed, or just providing labour in France? Because in 1914 Britain effectively had close to 180,000 first echelon troops, not a lot less than the enemy. The doctrine required them to be used as such. In fact Kitchener siphoned off the "cream" of Britain's available combat troops right at the start, whereas the Germans perhaps cynically had their finest troops evenly spread out throught their large conscript army. So Britain and Germany performed mass slaughter on each other but by mid 1915 the BEF was nearly wiped out by exposure to indiscriminate firepower, whereas Germany's losses were mostly absorbed by its average conscripts - classic conscript warfare doctrine which Saddam Hussein would recognise. This contradicts the common view that Britain had the right idea with its homogenous fighting units compared to the German mistake of using elite units later on. Britain started with elite units and squandered them, whereas Germany's mass conscript doctrine allowed it reach the end game with more first echelon troops in total, and hence allowing it to "cream them off" for the Kaiserschlacht.

[6th Shropshires]

German army was probably close to collapse before the March offensives

I do not think it was close to collapse before March but agree it was tired and fatigued.

Jonathan I think the British/Allies suffered heavy casualties between 8 August and 11 November because they were on the offencive all that time, and it was very much open warfare again. A trench offers some protection, where as being out in the open offers little. Also, evan thou the main body of the German Army was broken by 18th July there were still parts of it who were on the job, like their artillery and machine gunners.

Annette

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Annette,

Thanks for your reply.

Obviously I understand your point but I dont think it a reasonable explanation (sorry!!) for the following reasons.

In 1918 there was more artillery available to the Allies than at anytime previously, the Allies enjoyed air superiority (which normally meant Allied planes bombing and straffing German positions), plus the Allies had available improved and much more reliable heavy and light tanks to negate enemy strongpoints. These are just three headlines advantages that the Allies enjoyed at this time. Even fully accepting that an attacking force should sustain greater casualties than the defending force, when considering the overwhelming superior odds that the Allies were able to bring to bear, I still dont understand why the Allied losses should be so high.

I find 1918 riddled with contradictions.

Regards,

Jon S

[johnharper]

Just to throw in a couple of observations,

Young British recruits may or may not have been well trained, but they would surely have been trained in trench warfare. From the beginning of the Kaiserschlacht through Amiens and beyond was a totally different kind of fighting. One which the original 1914 army would have understood.

I also think that most offensives that don't achieve their aims doom the attacker in the long run. Think of the German army in front of Moscow in 1941. I suppose it's a case of "Never start something you can't finish".

John

[Jonathan Saunders]

I also think that most offensives that don't achieve their aims doom the attacker in the long run. Think of the German army in front of Moscow in 1941. I suppose it's a case of "Never start something you can't finish".

John,

Now this is a most interesting comment. What were Luddendorf's aims? As far as I can see he did not have one clear strategy for the German offensives of 1918. But rather all his aims were localised - keep banging away at different points until you find a weak spot to exploit. What was absent from the German 1918 offensives was a clear cohesive strategy and this was as much a hindrance to the Germany army as the resolute Allied defence. Yet Germany still came pretty close to breaking the British army. I am pretty sure if Haig had had his way he would have have withdrawn all the British forces back to the channel ports end March/beginning April 1918 and if that had happened then it was inevitable that they would soon have been withdrawn back to Blighty.

Regards,

Jon