Was the German army defeated before 8th August 1918?

[truthergw]

John,

.....................

. Yet Germany still came pretty close to breaking the British army. I am pretty sure if Haig had had his way he would have have withdrawn all the British forces back to the channel ports end March/beginning April 1918 and if that had happened then it was inevitable that they would soon have been withdrawn back to Blighty.

Regards,

Jon

I agree with your remark as to 1918 being full of contradictions. Just when I think I am getting somewhere, it all falls apart.

I am more than a bit surprised that you think Haig wanted to withdraw to the Channel Ports. I have always thought that he proposed Foch as Generalissimo to forestall that eventuallity. He did not wish to see the British Army and the French lose contact.

[paul guthrie]

I agree with Tom, I don't think that happened - withdrawal to channel - since 1914 and that's not exactly what even French proposed but rather 10 days or so out of the line. Petain was prepared to lose contact with British to try to save Paris but Haig was not.

By the way Foch's hreat attack 0f July 18 was mostly French troops but spearheaded by 2 doublesized US divisions and Morrocan Division. US forces performed quite a bit better then than later in the Meuse Argonne.

[truthergw]

By the way Foch's hreat attack 0f July 18 was mostly French troops but spearheaded by 2 doublesized US divisions and Morrocan Division. US forces performed quite a bit better then than later in the Meuse Argonne.

To what do you attribute this Paul?

[paul guthrie]

The short answer is just beforethe September 26 MA offensive the US had reduced the St Mihiel Salient, not a really big fight cause Germans were withdrawing, well the divisions that had gotten experience elsewwhere were used there, September 12 I think. They had to move about 80? miles to MA which had only 3 north to south roads. The divisions used were very green, men who did not know how to use their weapons etc. 79th at Montffaucon, quite an obstacle, had zero experience as did Harry Truman's 35th on western edge. Also in Foch offensive and at Amiens allies fought tired Germans who had left fortified positions , gone on offensive, they, their horses exhausted. The Germans at MA, though 3d, 4th rate troops were still in their 4 year developed fortifications v. men who had learned nothing from the war and attacked head on. Explanation could go on & on but this is basic reason.

Get the Test Of Battle by my late friend Paul Braim, terrific on this battle where US did not perform at all like Pershing thought.

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Jon

Offensives have always been costly, what would be useful is a study of offensive casualties, of all sides, also a look at other wars would be good.

By 18th July the German was nolonger fit to carry on a offensive, but evan a broken Army can put up a fight and defend itself to a point, and as the German Army were pushed ever closer to its homeland, it started to pull itself together again, if the fighting had continued onto German soil, then Allied casualties would have become horrific.

I agree by 8th August

there was more artillery available to the Allies than at anytime previously, the Allies enjoyed air superiority (which normally meant Allied planes bombing and straffing German positions), plus the Allies had available improved and much more reliable heavy and light tanks to negate enemy strongpoints.

thats one of the reseasons the Allies finaly won or at least forced the Germans to ask for an armistice.

Annette

[6th Shropshires]

I am pretty sure if Haig had had his way he would have have withdrawn all the British forces back to the channel ports end March/beginning April 1918

I totaly disagree with this Jon, what makes you think this.

Annette

[truthergw]

Hi Jon

Offensives have always been costly, what would be useful is a study of offensive casualties, of all sides, also a look at other wars would be good.

Annette

I have tried to do this comparative analysis for several actions. Trouble is, there are always as many differences as similarities. The deeper I dig and closer I look, the more the resemblance disappears. It is very difficult to decide which similarities are real and which differences are important. I think what I am saying is every general has to make his own plan and fight his own battle.

[gporta]

In 1918 they were conscripted and drafted overseas aged 18. A significant number of these teenagers remain where they fell or in nearby cemeteries - from this I conclude they were not best prepared.

Joathan,

while I won't say that this could be the case of some youngsters, bibliography on both 1918 and conscription leds me to think that this is a broad generalisation to think that all were raw and ill-prepared... Was a 18-year-old boy joining in August 1914? while surely more enthusiasthic, I believe that the training received by him didn't prepare him to war as well as the Training Reserve and Young soldiers & graduated battalions did to the 1916-18 recruits.

As Charles Messenger (author of "Call to Arms ") and Justin point in their post, young men in 1918 had the benefit of a relatively long and systematic and were trained in the use of weapons and tactics (Lewis gun, Tanks, Mills grenade, latest types of gas warfare, etc...) which were not in existence in 1914...

For an individual example of a young man in 1918 (not , of course to be generalised , in his memoirs "Men of 1918 in 1918", Frederick Hodges wrote how he, keen to serve, enlisted shortly before his 18th birthday in order to do it along with a group of slightly order friends. technically, he would have to be drafted to France in his 19th birthday in July 1918, but was drafted instead in March 1918 due to the emergency situation... This still makes some eight moths of training, to which we should add the weeks in which he was in the army before his 18th birthday. During this time he received basic military training, and then specialized courses afterwards... this is of course the case of him and his friends, but surely this could be also the case of many boys of his age.

So I am of the opinion that the British army the Germans were facing post-Kaiserslacht was by no means a low-quality one... and let's also remember that along with the new arrivals there was a body of experienced veterans with whom they merged.

Gloria

P.S.: Truthergw, further talk and debate on the issue of Conscription is welcome, either on the thread about Ilana Bet-El's book which Martin has linked, or in a new thread. I think it's an interesting subject (and not extensively dealt with).

[truthergw]

Joathan,

while I won't say that this could be the case of some youngsters, bibliography on both 1918 and conscription leds me to think that this is a broad generalisation to think that all were raw and ill-prepared... Was a 18-year-old boy joining in August 1914? while surely more enthusiasthic, I believe that the training received by him didn't prepare him to war as well as the Training Reserve and Young soldiers & graduated battalions did to the 1916-18 recruits.

Gloria

P.S.: Truthergw, further talk and debate on the issue of Conscription is welcome, either on the thread about Ilana Bet-El's book which Martin has linked, or in a new thread. I think it's an interesting subject (and not extensively dealt with).

I will give the subject some thought and launch a new thread.

If I may comment on the other part of your post. The men who answered the call in 1914 were of an average age well in excess of 18. They were not trained but they were much more mature. They were, many of them , men in the prime of life and strength. My grandfather was probably not unusual, a married man in his mid thirties with 3 children. These men went to France in June 1915 having had 10 months training.They first went into action in September at Loos, after some months in the trenches. The lads of 18 were just that with all the advantages and disadvantages of being lads in their late teens. This was balanced to some degree in the overall recruiting pattern by older men in their early to mid forties but these in the main went to the Labour batts. and then Labour Corps e.g. my other Grandfather. Conscripted at the age of 42, the father of 7.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I agree with your remark as to 1918 being full of contradictions. Just when I think I am getting somewhere, it all falls apart.

I am more than a bit surprised that you think Haig wanted to withdraw to the Channel Ports. I have always thought that he proposed Foch as Generalissimo to forestall that eventuallity. He did not wish to see the British Army and the French lose contact.

According to Kitchen it was Clemenceau and not Haig that proposed Foch as supreme commander. I think his reference for this was either Edmonds or WO papers - unfortunately I dont have the book at hand to double check. When considering Haig's "willingness" to serve under Foch then his willingness once Foch was supreme commander ie. Haig did his utmost to oppose, obstruct and generally ignore or refute Foch’s requests for cooperation, then I would concur that at best Haig's endorsement of Foch was a realisation f it wasnt going to be Haig himself then anyone but Petain.

Again using Kitchen - whose book is endorsed by Strachan and Sheffield and was recommended to me by a trusted source - refers to a dangerous gap occurring between the British and French armies because Haig withdrew the main body of his forces to the north-west ie. north of the Somme. Haig's preoccupation with getting the British army back towards the Channel Ports would explain why the Fifth Army was woefully under resourced to resist the opening of the German offensive despite knowledge of the location of the attack through intelligence.

My time is limited this evening but I will try and reply to those various comments madein response to my own comments in due course.

Regards,

Jon S

[owilki1984]

John,

Now this is a most interesting comment. What were Luddendorf's aims? As far as I can see he did not have one clear strategy for the German offensives of 1918. But rather all his aims were localised - keep banging away at different points until you find a weak spot to exploit. What was absent from the German 1918 offensives was a clear cohesive strategy and this was as much a hindrance to the Germany army as the resolute Allied defence. Yet Germany still came pretty close to breaking the British army. I am pretty sure if Haig had had his way he would have have withdrawn all the British forces back to the channel ports end March/beginning April 1918 and if that had happened then it was inevitable that they would soon have been withdrawn back to Blighty.

Regards,

Jon

Hi Jonathan,

No sure about you comment here. Ludendorff did have aims and a clear stratergy. To rain a series of hammer blows on the allies, specifically brake the British Army and thus force the French to conceed. Moreover his initial attempts in March, April and May nearly did. Seems like a good plan to me.

Why it failed I think is really to do with numerous factors such as Ludnedorffs determination in key areas - he might have flitted from one hammer blow to the next for example. Also you have the problem that your thread is all about - the Army.

Churchill (I think) said of the Second World War 'Give us the tools and we will finninish the Job'

The crux for me is did Luddendorff have the tools? I dont think so. The Stormtroopers did the trick (while they were alive, but hugh numbers were killed while on the offensive) but the German army as I noted earlier in the thread, and others have said, was tired out. It simply could not follow up successess.

In my view the strategy was not the problem.

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

So I am of the opinion that the British army the Germans were facing post-Kaiserslacht was by no means a low-quality one... and let's also remember that along with the new arrivals there was a body of experienced veterans with whom they merged.

They may well have been proficient and even enthusiastic in practical training but of course being under fire is a completely different proposition. For many of these adolescents the arrival of their conscription papers probably necessitated the first time they left their locale, possibly even leaving their village for the first time. As a generalisation - there are of course always exceptions - it is my opinion that they were not worldly mature for the rigours that faced them.

The following extract is a typical example of the type of evidence that has formulated my thinking:

Quote:

When we went to France the following June there were several boys of 15 to 17 who went with us but they shouldn't have been allowed to go for it was a man's war and I found a signaler who was with me on a station who was 17 he just folded up when trouble came.

Unquote.

The June referred to was June 1915 and the battalion (6/RWK) had been raised in August 1914 so these "boys" had had the benefit of 8+ months training, albeit at a lower level than those of 1918. But everything is relative and the fact, IMHO, remains, they were essentially boys. A 17 y o does not become a mature adult on his 18th birthday, maturity, as I am sure you will agree, is something that develops over time and experience and I dont think these boys had had that time and experience.

I am afraid we wll have to continue to differ on this issue.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

No sure about you comment here. Ludendorff did have aims and a clear stratergy.

Hi Oli,

This is an interesting quote from Ludendorf when discussing his intention for the 1918 offensive.

"I'm going to punch a hole in the lines and then see what happens?"

The source is a paper by the German historian Holger Herwig - it is online but I am afraid I cant find the link for it.

A quite extraordinary comment for a C-in-C in all but name, to make prior to launching a major offensive. It was tactics before strategy.

I agree with you that Ludendorf didnt have the tools. Also that other circumstances played there role, if you recall my opening comment was about the German army being already defeated by a lack of morale - morale was from the home front, from the performance of their allies, from their personal status ie. lack of food, disease etc, knowledge of failure of the U-boat campaign, the arrival of US troops and so on - so I would disagree that my thread is all about the army, but it is about whether the German army was already defeated prior to a certain point in time after which the Allied armies are lauded for their comprehensive victory. But if the German army was already "defeated" how should this impact our view on the Last Hundred Days?

Back to strategy and just one final point in regard to your comment about Ludendorff's strategy to break the British army, whilst the initial offensive was primarily launched against the British, I think I am right in saying that most of April, May, June, July was spent in battle against the French armies.

Regards,

Jon

[David_Blanchard]

Most of the ground covered in this discussion, is very similar to a debate on this forum a few years back.

Click Here

Regards

David

[Jonathan Saunders]

I totaly disagree with this Jon, what makes you think this.

Annette

It is a combination of Haig refusing to help the French when their position was precarious at various times once Ludendorf had switched the offensives south of the Somme, and Haig's overall reticence to allow his army to leave the close proximity of the Channel ports, together with various meetings held at high levels to discuss the possible evacuation from France of the British army. I think at the end of March there is reason to believe that Haig probably thought the land war was lost in a similar way to the Kaiser thinking it was won.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Most of the ground covered in this discussion, is very similar to a debate on this forum a few years back.

Click Here

Regards

David

David thanks for this and I will certainly read it with interest.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Petain was prepared to lose contact with British to try to save Paris but Haig was not.

Paul - can you expand on this please.

Regards,

Jon

[MartinWills]

I think, to go back to earlier points, that the defeat was not specifically one of the German Army, but one of the German Nation. It was reflected not just in the state of the troops at the front; the differing units; the abstraction of "stormtroopers"; the poor morale. You need to consider the home front, the effect of inflation through the war in Germany; the impact of the blockades; the shortage of key materials the poor home front morale. Couple this with a glance at the German Navy bottled up and fermenting revolution from 1917 onward.

I have real difficulty with the notion of "defeat". The war was lost and the German state in dis-array but I struggle to recognise a "defeat" and it was the lack of "defeat" that provided the climate for the ascendancy towards another war. In all probability the war was lost before the spring offensive, though that last effort could, perhaps, have turned the tide but failed through lack of logistics and support. After the offensive stagnated the war was truly lost (even before the battle of Amiens) but "defeat" is a more difficult term and one which the German establishment worked hard to avoid. They capitulated and sought an armistice on punishing terms and the war was lost but a full defeat is hard to acknowledge and, I suggest did not truly occur.

A controversial approach, I know, but one which I thinks stands closer examination.

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Jon

Going back to your first post

Martin Kitchen in his The German Offensives of 1918 makes an interesting point in his chapter on the Battle of Amiens, 8th to 14th August 1918:

“Of 36,500 men lost by [German] 2nd Army an amazing 27,500 were missing, most presumed to have been taken prisoner. In [German] 18th Army, of 11,500 losses 5,500 were listed as missing.”

Does this extremely high level of prisoners suggest that the German army were already defeated before 8th August, if not in terms of military defeat, certainly by lack of morale? And more importantly that a new critique is required on the extent of the tactical achievement for which Haig, particularly, is credited?

Interestingly, combined British and French losses are given as 75,000 (51,000 British, 24,000 French), which offers a counter argument that those Germans that were fighting were fighting damn hard (or were these high losses due to poor battle planning!!?)

I wonder were Martin Kitchen got his figures from, the British Official History does not match his for the Battle of Amiens. British casualties for the Corps' involved covering the period 7th-15th August (all ranks) is-

Cavalry Corps Total 887

III Corps Total 6,250

Canadian Corps Total 9,074

Austalian Corps Total 5,991

Grand Total for 7th-15th August is 22,202 (in an other volume British casualties for the period 7th -20th Ausust is given as 1,662 officers & 31,720 other ranks for whole of western front), no were near the 51,000 stated by Martin Kitchen.

The official history gives a German total for the Battle of Amiens at about 75,000. It reports that a statement of the commander of the German Second Army (OH quotes Lossberg, p. 354) that his Armies losses for the 8th August alone were roughly 700 officers and 27,000 other ranks. I can not find figures for German missing for the Battle of Amiens itself.

Also the official History records the following "On the face of it, the 8th August hardly seems to have deserved the fatal label of "the black day of the German Army" bestowed on it by General Ludendorff. In the anonymous "Kritik des Weltkrieges" (p.238-9), however, it is explained what the First Quartermaster General had in his mind: after the battle divisional commanders and officers from the front were summoned to O.H.L.: from them he learnt that parties had surrendered to single horsemen and whole detachments to a few ranks: in some units the officers had lost all influence and had fled with their men."

This suggest to me a broken Army, and it was not the relatively small Battle of Amiens that broken them but their losses during March-July without defeating the Allies, followed by General Foch's counter-stroke on the 18th July.

Annette

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Jon

It is a combination of Haig refusing to help the French when their position was precarious at various times once Ludendorf had switched the offensives south of the Somme, and Haig's overall reticence to allow his army to leave the close proximity of the Channel ports, together with various meetings held at high levels to discuss the possible evacuation from France of the British army.

Sorry but I still do not agree. I do not think it was a case of Haig refusing but a case of him having no more reserves. He placed what was left of the 5th Army south of the Somme under the command of the French. He suggested that it might be necessary, he thought, to rectify the line at Arras, but only by withdrawing it from in front of to behind the town. Also General Wilson had ascertained that there was no intention of abandoning Amiens and falling back on the Channel ports. And I can see why Haig did not want to weaken his front up north, the Germans had about 193 divisions on the western front at the time, of these it was known that 69 had been identified as engaged with about 25 in resrve, this left well over a 100 divisions, and a very big threat to the Channel ports. The French were worried that the British would cut and run, but they or their leads at any rate were a bunch of *****, best not say what I think about the French leaders (not their soldiers, who were great).

Annette

[Robert Dunlop]

This is a complex issue. I just want to contribute a couple of quotes at this stage. Before doing this, it is worth noting that many anecdotal accounts fail at this point in the war because the authors were either prisoners or, more usually, wounded. Sulzbach and Bucher offer two examples of the experience of the failure of the Spring offensives:

'15 July [1918] - [During the Battle of Reims] 2/Lt Thuns, commanding No. 3 Battery, has been killed in action with five of his men, and 2/Lt Bone and 2/Lt Huebner of the same battery are also dead - that makes 34 officers lost since the first offensive this year.

The attack is coming to a halt outside Prosnes: enemy resistance seems to be insurmountable. How is it going on our right and left flanks? We haven't got the same morale that we had on 21 March or on 27 May. The Kaiser is here, at the command post of a General commanding our Army. 15 July passes without our being moved forward. We are very depressed indeed, because if a giant attack like this does not succeed straight off, it is all over.

16 July

We have got some sleep, and the situation is unchanged.

Our morale is quite terrible, we can't get the faintest glimpse of what is going on, and all we can guess is that this great offensive hasn't come off! We haven't actually had any proper rest since Soissons, because even if it were called a rest period, we started work on the new offensive almost straightaway, work that generally went on late into the night.

We hear that our attack has in fact been repulsed by the French in this sector, with heavy losses. We feel really desperate.

17 July

Orders to withdraw to Bazancourt.

On 18 July, after getting a bit of rest, we received an order which seemed really sinister; I give the full text:

1. Strong enemy attacks in progress in the Bois de Villiers-Cotterets against left flank of 9th Army and right flank of 7th Army...

This order tells us everything, and we are speechless. It looks as though we are being thrown into the largest enemy offensive of all time - and it was supposed to be our offensive! We couldn't have dreamed this would happen - never.'

Sulzbach's quote above appears to be based on a contemporaneous account, which, if correct, adds an additional level of authenticity.

Bucher's account is retrospective. He was involved in the unsuccessful crossing of the Marne river:

'At last we knew what was in store for us: early next morning we were to cross the Marne and seize its southern bank.

"It's nearly four years since we were in this neighbourhood, Toni" I said.

Riedel nodded and gazed at me vacantly. 'Yes, George, nearly four years. Shall we manage it this time?" His voice rang hoarsely. Was Riedel too the prey of anxious thoughts?

Were we to succeed this time? We had no choice but to succeed unless the Marne were to be again as fateful as in 1914. I ground my teeth together, determined that I should exert my remaining strength to the uttermost. We simply had to succeed, for a defeat would exhaust me utterly, would release all the misery which I had striven to keep in subjection, would plunge me into the blackest hopelessness. It dared not be defeat.

In the morning, wild with enthusiasm, we crossed the Marne which flowed with German blood and German corpses. The river ran with blood as the mangled bodies splashed into it; but we crossed it, the young soldiers with tremulous bravery, the old soldiers with tightly shut lips. We who were the hope of a weary, stricken homeland gave all that was in us to give - our strength, our blood, our souls.

If only fresh storm-divisions had been with us during those hours, we should have broken right through, even without artillery support, for the devil was in us.

Evening came, then the morning; evening and morning once more. We lay there, dug-in across that same cornfield, having advanced three miles. Three miles!

We lay there exhausted and dispirited. As the days passed our hopes sank - the hopes of our weary leaders, the hopes of a still wearier homeland. They had asked us for more than we could give - we had given all we could, our strength, our eagerness, our courage. For us the end had come.

It wasn't the intense shellfire that unnerved me and stupefied me, but the helplessness of exhaustion - the consciousness that we could do no more. I almost envied those who had fallen in the advance - they at least had escaped the agony of that trench.'

I have many accounts but these two suffice. They illustrate all too clearly the tremendous psychological impact on the German combatants. The quotes do not illustrate the grinding relentless exposure to the subsequent Entente offensives in the last 100 days. Both record that the problems with German morale arose before 8th August. Lest anyone underestimate the significance of these quotes, it is important to understand that neither man was a quitter. Bucher had previously described his involvement in some of the major battles, such as Verdun. Both went on to fight in as determined fashion as possible. But there is a quantum difference in their accounts post-Kaiserschlacht compared with the heady days when all seemed to go well again.

Robert

[owilki1984]

I think, to go back to earlier points, that the defeat was not specifically one of the German Army, but one of the German Nation. It was reflected not just in the state of the troops at the front; the differing units; the abstraction of "stormtroopers"; the poor morale. You need to consider the home front, the effect of inflation through the war in Germany; the impact of the blockades; the shortage of key materials the poor home front morale. Couple this with a glance at the German Navy bottled up and fermenting revolution from 1917 onward.

I have real difficulty with the notion of "defeat". The war was lost and the German state in dis-array but I struggle to recognise a "defeat" and it was the lack of "defeat" that provided the climate for the ascendancy towards another war. In all probability the war was lost before the spring offensive, though that last effort could, perhaps, have turned the tide but failed through lack of logistics and support. After the offensive stagnated the war was truly lost (even before the battle of Amiens) but "defeat" is a more difficult term and one which the German establishment worked hard to avoid. They capitulated and sought an armistice on punishing terms and the war was lost but a full defeat is hard to acknowledge and, I suggest did not truly occur.

A controversial approach, I know, but one which I thinks stands closer examination.

Hi Martin,

I would agree with a lot of what you say here. The home front was definatly an issue for the Germans, after all this was a 'total war'. In any such war the nation, and then the army must have a belief that they can win. I would say that by late 1917 and certainly by 1918 such belief has evaporated both at home and in the army due to the reasons you mention. This starts to bubble over in things like the Naval Mutiny - But this is only the culmination to something that had been happening for quite some time.

Also I think it is a very interesting idea about the 'defeat'. The crux I think is the agreed Armistice over actual German defeat, even though the allies were rolling towards defeating them. It become clear at Versaille for example the difference in perspective about this so called 'defeat'. The Allies seem to think there had been one and that they could basically take the initiative in the talks. The Germans on the other had turned up expecting to be included in the talks, not decreed to. Why? - As you say I dont think they accepted a 'defeat'

Regards

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon

Sorry but I still do not agree. I do not think it was a case of Haig refusing but a case of him having no more reserves. He placed what was left of the 5th Army south of the Somme under the command of the French. He suggested that it might be necessary, he thought, to rectify the line at Arras, but only by withdrawing it from in front of to behind the town. Also General Wilson had ascertained that there was no intention of abandoning Amiens and falling back on the Channel ports. And I can see why Haig did not want to weaken his front up north, the Germans had about 193 divisions on the western front at the time, of these it was known that 69 had been identified as engaged with about 25 in resrve, this left well over a 100 divisions, and a very big threat to the Channel ports. The French were worried that the British would cut and run, but they or their leads at any rate were a bunch of *****, best not say what I think about the French leaders (not their soldiers, who were great).

Annette

Hi Annette,

Thanks for you further comments.

I did re-read my notes on this again late last night and they do not support the view I have formulated or put forward, or rather the memory I had been left.

My thought pattern was concerned with Haig seemingly abandoning the French army (which I believed Haig considered as good as finished) by withdrawing to the north-west and what I deemed to be his pre-occupation to get back to the Channel ports. I coupled this with the due considerations that were given to evacuate the British army from F&F (from memory this was seriously considered at end March, and then again end May and mid-July) and I think in searching for an answer I have wrongly interpreted this as Haig momentarily believing the land war was lost at the end of March 1918 and that the British army should be evacuated.

I apologise – the memory I have been left with I now think was wide of the mark although I do think Haig was in a state of panic in late March of 1918.

Do you include Foch and Petain in your views of French military command?

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Back to strategy and just one final point in regard to your comment about Ludendorff's strategy to break the British army, whilst the initial offensive was primarily launched against the British, I think I am right in saying that most of April, May, June, July was spent in battle against the French armies.

Hi Oli,

When responding to your earlier post I made an error with my timetable. I was thinking that the Georgette offensive ended mid-April and the Chemin des Dames offensive commenced at end of April, when in fact Georgette was brought to a halt at end of April and Chemin des Dames did not commence until end of May.

Just reflecting on your comment. I think it right to say that Ludendorf’s aim was to deliver a smashing blow on the British. However I still cant see that he had a clear strategy to achieve this but rather a series of tactical offensives – the hammer blows. I still think Ludendorf lacked a clear strategy from the outset, which he, himself, seemingly admits by the quote I provided earlier.

I think how Ludendorf conducted his offensives – the hammer blows up and down the Line – just caused confusion amongst the Army Group commanders and the senior command at OHL.

My apologies for confusing the dates earlier.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Going back to your first post

I wonder were Martin Kitchen got his figures from, the British Official History does not match his for the Battle of Amiens. British casualties for the Corps' involved covering the period 7th-15th August (all ranks) is-

Annette,

All throughout the book Kitchen references back to original sources and the bibliography itself is pretty impressive. Yet when it comes to the statistics I quoted Kitchen gives no original source.

Sorry.

Jon