Was the German army defeated before 8th August 1918?

[Jonathan Saunders]

I think, to go back to earlier points, that the defeat was not specifically one of the German Army, but one of the German Nation.

Martin - I agree entirely. I am firmly in the camp that believes the war of attrition started with the Royal Navy in 1914. I think the first indication within the German population that they could not win the war was with the September 1916 war bond, which failed miserably as you will know. Interestingly my reading suggests that available munitions (to which you referred) was not greatly impacted prior to around the middle of 1918.

Recently I have to say I have found myself reassessing von Falkenhayn who I believe realised the war could not be won by the end of 1914 and then conducted a campaign to win the negotiated peace. Ludendorf on the other still seems to be fighting for a decisive victory in 1918 and that was never going to happen.

Regards,

Jon

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Jon

Do you include Foch and Petain in your views of French military command

Petain -yes at this point in the war but I was thinking more of Clemenceau & Poincare then the Generals.

Annette

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon

Petain -yes at this point in the war but I was thinking more of Clemenceau & Poincare then the Generals.

Annette

Interesting!! I think British written history has been a bit unkind to Petain. A subject for another day!

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, I agree with your point about Haig being anxious. It was something that happened with the attack on Landrecies in 1914 too. It is not clear to what extent the anxiety affected decision-making.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan, I agree with your point about Haig being anxious. It was something that happened with the attack on Landrecies in 1914 too. It is not clear to what extent the anxiety affected decision-making.

Robert

Robert - I agree with you on Landrecies too. I think one thing that is clear to me from my exchange with Annette is that it is not easy to assess how this impacted Haig's decision making process. But I do think it clear that he momentarily wobbled.

Jon

[stuartd]

Because in 1914 Britain effectively had close to 180,000 first echelon troops, not a lot less than the enemy. The doctrine required them to be used as such. In fact Kitchener siphoned off the "cream" of Britain's available combat troops right at the start, whereas the Germans perhaps cynically had their finest troops evenly spread out throught their large conscript army. So Britain and Germany performed mass slaughter on each other but by mid 1915 the BEF was nearly wiped out by exposure to indiscriminate firepower, whereas Germany's losses were mostly absorbed by its average conscripts - classic conscript warfare doctrine which Saddam Hussein would recognise.

Rod, interesting information but can you just explain to me how Germany only had 180,000 first echelon troops? Obviously its conscript army ran into millions, so I assume you're referring to its professional core?

[6th Shropshires]

Hi all

momentarily wobbled

or just covering all his bases, I think as C. in C., he would have had to looked into "How do I get my Army out if things start going belly up".

Annette

[owilki1984]

Hi Oli,

When responding to your earlier post I made an error with my timetable. I was thinking that the Georgette offensive ended mid-April and the Chemin des Dames offensive commenced at end of April, when in fact Georgette was brought to a halt at end of April and Chemin des Dames did not commence until end of May.

Just reflecting on your comment. I think it right to say that Ludendorf’s aim was to deliver a smashing blow on the British. However I still cant see that he had a clear strategy to achieve this but rather a series of tactical offensives – the hammer blows. I still think Ludendorf lacked a clear strategy from the outset, which he, himself, seemingly admits by the quote I provided earlier.

I think how Ludendorf conducted his offensives – the hammer blows up and down the Line – just caused confusion amongst the Army Group commanders and the senior command at OHL.

My apologies for confusing the dates earlier.

Regards,

Jon S

Hi Jonathan,

I would, perhaps back peddling a little probably agree with your assessment, especially in light of the quote from Ludendorff. Bearing it in mind I would still assert that there was in fact a strategy operating there and it very nearly worked. The way he conducted it however, perhaps not following up as he should have done I would concede seems fickle.

You also mentioned earlier about the later attacks targeting the French rather than the British, but I am not to sure this is altogether true.

Haig delivers his backs to the wall speech in April 1918 – Clearly the British had had a bad time up to then.

Now 27th May the offensive was launched on the Chemin des Dames. My gt grandfather was here and got taken prisoner. Interestingly however many British units e.g. 9th KOYLI, DLI, 7th & 8th Battalion Leicestershires, had previously been sent there, to a French section, to recuperate. The attack comes – But I don’t believe the French were the target.

I have an account by a captured Lieutenant who was interrogated on 27th by his German jailers. He says he resisted but that the Germans already knew the information that the various British units had been sent there, for a rest.

I, however, do not pretend to know all the ins and outs of these offensives and am somewhat of an amateur but it does seem to me that the British were being targeted by the Germans. If they could break the British I think they thought France would fold.

Finally I have been reading some information today about a captured man, taken prisoner on the 27th May (It was provided by Susan Tall off the forum and there is some interesting info on the Chemin de Dames thread if anyone wants to look it up). But I provide what I think is an apt quote, that shows the state of Germany and the army in c July 1918

"The German guards seem very dispirited. They do not think they will win, and they also say that the moral of the civil population in Germany is low and that it only wants a spark to set a revolution going. They seem very bitter against America, and realise that she has put a final touch to the war."

Regards

Oli

[RodB]

Rod, interesting information but can you just explain to me how Germany only had 180,000 first echelon troops? Obviously its conscript army ran into millions, so I assume you're referring to its professional core?

It's a guesstimate based on the fraction of the serving (600,000) army that could be classified as up to the standard of modern professional troops. A relatively small core of career NCOs and officers together with the conscripts who discovered they were natural soldiers. As a conscript army it was superb, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many men were killed early on through simple inexperience, making mistakes that professionals wouldn't make. Britain learnt a dreadful lesson in the Boer war and other colonial conflicts that led to a doctrine of battlefield survival both in training and in passed-down mentality. Germany lacked this experience and most men had to learn as they went, if they survived. Hence 3 Brits and 3 Germans killed at 1st Ypres probably meant 3 irreplaceable modern fully professional combat troops but for the Germans probably only 1 - I'm assuming that less than half the average male population has what it takes to be a combat soldier, no matter how brave or determined he is. Hence the volunteer British army had already siphoned off this fraction into its standing army. I have been surprised that writers do not pick up on the fundamental differences between volunteer and conscript military realities.

The German soldiers with combat aptitude who survived would obviously soon become "first echelon", but early on I think the German superiority in artillery firepower covered up initial inexperience in the troops. Mons was British riflemen versus German artillery.

[armourersergeant]

You also mentioned earlier about the later attacks targeting the French rather than the British, but I am not to sure this is altogether true.

Haig delivers his backs to the wall speech in April 1918 – Clearly the British had had a bad time up to then.

Now 27th May the offensive was launched on the Chemin des Dames. My gt grandfather was here and got taken prisoner. Interestingly however many British units e.g. 9th KOYLI, DLI, 7th & 8th Battalion Leicestershires, had previously been sent there, to a French section, to recuperate. The attack comes – But I don’t believe the French were the target.

I have an account by a captured Lieutenant who was interrogated on 27th by his German jailers. He says he resisted but that the Germans already knew the information that the various British units had been sent there, for a rest.

I, however, do not pretend to know all the ins and outs of these offensives and am somewhat of an amateur but it does seem to me that the British were being targeted by the Germans. If they could break the British I think they thought France would fold.

Finally I have been reading some information today about a captured man, taken prisoner on the 27th May (It was provided by Susan Tall off the forum and there is some interesting info on the Chemin de Dames thread if anyone wants to look it up). But I provide what I think is an apt quote, that shows the state of Germany and the army in c July 1918

"The German guards seem very dispirited. They do not think they will win, and they also say that the moral of the civil population in Germany is low and that it only wants a spark to set a revolution going. They seem very bitter against America, and realise that she has put a final touch to the war."

Regards

Oli

Oli,

I would be interested in that source and quote about the British officer who said the Germans were aware of who they were attacking. It is not an idea I have come across before and bear some investigating. All writing I have come across says that they were unlucky to be in the area!

regards

Arm

[owilki1984]

Oli,

I would be interested in that source and quote about the British officer who said the Germans were aware of who they were attacking. It is not an idea I have come across before and bear some investigating. All writing I have come across says that they were unlucky to be in the area!

regards

Arm

Hi Arm,

It certainly is an interesting twist, and I had not come across anything like it. But when I read it certainly could add a new perspective.

“After my capture I was marched to German H.Q. in Fort Brimont about 8km W of Couroy where I was asked the usual questions none of which I answered. I might state here that the German General informed me through the German interpreter that they knew we were 21st Division and that we were a worn out Div after the March 21st Offensive and that we had come from Kemel to the Champagne front for a rest” (Captain F.A. Marsden, 9th KOYLI)

Marsden was an experienced soldier, joined in Sep 1914 as a private and had risen to Captain by 1918. Also won the MM. To be frank he was no ‘duck egg’ so I think his testimony is very credible. Moreover he has no reason to lie in his account. This is to account for himself on the day of capture – this piece of information does nothing to clear or condemn him. It is simply some additional knowledge he picked up and recounts to the authorities.

Sorry but I am a History student so I always try to validate sources.

I think this is credible and as you say could put a new twist of the ‘Blucher’ offensive.

Regards

Oli

[6th Shropshires]

Hi Oli

You are right in thinking the British were the Germans main target for the March and April, I am not to sure about the on the Chemin des Dames, was it bad luck ? It is very possible that the Germans knew, that several weak British Divisions, had been moved to the Chemin des Dames area but I would think the planning for the attack started before the British moved into the area ?

Just thinking about it was it good or bad luck for the Germans, these weak British Divisions put up one hell of a fight, evan thou they were pushed back, they played a big part in stopping any break through on that front.

Annette

[Jonathan Saunders]

Oli - personally I think it was mainly coincidence that there were British battalions on the Chemin des Dames when the Germans launched this part of their offensive but there might be something in what you say.

The original intention in launching this offensive was to encourage a withdrawal of British troops from around Ypres to support the Chemin des Dames sector, whereby the Germans would immediately close down the Chemin des Dames offensive and launch a new offensive towards the weakened Ypres sector.

I think it likely that the Germans had already decided on this course of action but if they were aware the British were already sending tired troops south, it might have encouraged them that attacking in Chemin des Dames was the correct "next step".

Regards,

Jon S

[owilki1984]

Hi, Jon

That is a very interesting comment. Basically you are saying that the Germans had planned and antcipated the move and the British basically fitted into there plans perfectly.

Never thought about that - but if the Brits had not have gone to the sector you think the Germans would have attacked anyway. The British presence was a bonus, that was anticipated by the Germans and in the event it occured as planed (even if the eventual outcome was failiure)

Regards

Oli

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi, Jon

That is a very interesting comment. Basically you are saying that the Germans had planned and antcipated the move and the British basically fitted into there plans perfectly.

Never thought about that - but if the Brits had not have gone to the sector you think the Germans would have attacked anyway. The British presence was a bonus, that was anticipated by the Germans and in the event it occured as planed (even if the eventual outcome was failiure)

Regards

Oli

Well not quite what I am saying!

The Germans were anticipating British units being moved south irrespective of whatever the intelligence was at hand, ie. knowledge of a few tired British Divisions moved to that sector. However this knowledge may have endorsed what they believed would happen - remember Ludendorf had no overall startegy and was making up as he went along ... well not quite ... but knowledge of British units already moved south may have convinced him that the British were not against that course of action.

As it happens, the British did not send large forces south, mainly because Haig refused to weaken the forces protecting Ypres and the Channel ports. So it did not materialise as the Germans had planned.

I hope that is clearer?

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

So I am of the opinion that the British army the Germans were facing post-Kaiserslacht was by no means a low-quality one... and let's also remember that along with the new arrivals there was a body of experienced veterans with whom they merged.

By coincidence I was browsing Prior & Wilson this morning and came across the following comments that appear to support the opposite view of recruits in 1918.

This is in relation to III Corps who were attacking north of the Somme on 8 August 1918:

"Both Divisions (18 and 58) had been rebuilt (cobbled together might be a more accurate description) with the rawest of conscripts brought hastily from Britain in the post-March panic. ... The training of these new arrivals following their descent upon France had at best been sketchy, and such experienced soldiers as they found in their units were still recuperating from the experience of retreat ... In sum, there was good reason to question the readiness of these III Corps divisions for battle in particularly testing circumstances ..."

If the replacements to III Corps were as ill prepared as Prior & Wilson intimate then I am sure other Corps would have faced the same problem with their replacements.

Regards,

Jon S

[stuartd]

I'd like to return to some of the earlier posts on here about the preparation of British troops in the war. I appreciate that it is very hard to generalise, and many examples can always be found to counter the established norms, but just what was the average length of training for a British soldier? How long did one of the 1914/15 volunteers spend training before being sent to the front, and how long was it for the conscripts from 1916? In fact, this is just the beginning of a series of questions that I have on this, but I may save it for a 'Conscription' thread that I, or somebody else, can begin!

[Jonathan Saunders]

In fact, this is just the beginning of a series of questions that I have on this, but I may save it for a 'Conscription' thread that I, or somebody else, can begin!

Stuart - my own findings suggest "training" before entering a war theatre varied greatly. I think a "conscription" thread would be a good idea.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

There has been some discussion in this thread about the German planning for the Spring offensives in 1918. I just want to offer a slightly different perspective at this juncture, taken from Crown Prince Wilhelm's book on his recollections of the war:

'The German plan of campaign, which led to a great battle of March, 1918, came into being but gradually. My Army Group took an active part in the necessary decisions and preparations.

If the war could not be ended otherwise than by a military decision, there was nothing for it but to take the offensive. It was not, of course, to be expected that we could thereby force a peace which meant the dictation of our own terms. But great military victories would justify us in hoping that the peoples of the Quadruple Entente would be anxious to make peace and bring their governments into the path of negotiation. Further, the condition of the troops after more than three years of war imperiously demanded the offensive. We could not impose another year of defensive battles upon them without serious qualms. Release from the leaden pressure of nerve-shattering trench warfare was the ardent desire of the whole army in the West. Our capital - the systematic training for the offensive in peace and our high standard of generalship - which had lain idle for years, could only make its weight felt again if we attacked. In my view those critics misunderstand the psychology of our army who look only at the fact that we had lost the war, and now condemn the decision to take the offensive out of hand, and think we should have confined ourselves to the defensive in the West. The choice of the defensive would have been nothing less than unnatural and certainly disasterous.

Even if we could confidently anticipate a great tactical success, our strategic success remained uncertain. We could only conjecture how far it would be developed into something which would decide the campaign. If the attack did not succeed or came to a standstill, after initial successes, it must be broken off. Otherwise a long-drawn-out battle, which was the same thing as a defensive battle so far as wastage was concerned, would be inevitable. In that case, to avoid losses we should have to contemplate retiring to the line from which we started. But if we made another attack as soon as possible at a different point, we should keep the initiative and stick to the idea of the offensive itself.

Main Headquarters first ordered the preparation of plans for attacks on the whole Western Front. At the first conference with General Ludendorff, in November 1917, my Chief of Staff put forward the view that the first great blow should be against the French.

General Ludendorff, however, favoured an onslaught on the English from the start. At the end of January he decided finally on an attack against them.'

With respect to the attack across the Chemin des Dames, which is frequently referred to in this thread, Wilhelm recorded:

'The first orders from Main Headquarters for the preparations for the attack of the 7th and the right wing of the 1st Army were issued as early as April 17. We set to work without a moment's delay. Fresh Corps Commands were made available, and the assault divisions of both armies were brought up to the back areas for the purpose of recuperation, training and rest.

Unfortunately more than a month had to elapse before we were ready.'

Robert

[Jon Miller]

but it is about whether the German army was already defeated prior to a certain point in time after which the Allied armies are lauded for their comprehensive victory. But if the German army was already "defeated" how should this impact our view on the Last Hundred Days?

I have found that this thread has an underlying tone which is distasteful to me. Something along the lines of 'How many people can I get to agree to the Germans being defeated before 8 Aug, therefore allowing me to disregard any achievement by the British Army in the 100 Days. And most importantly, that would enable Field-Marshall Haig of any credit whatsoever by the end of the war. Because this is an anti-Haig thread, isn't it? Or was the insistance of mentioning Haig's plans to evacuate the continent in the Spring of 1918 just a coincidence? This attempt to ignore the efforts of the BEF in the 100 Days is an insult to all the British soldiers who took part in, and died during this period. These sympathies were also aired in a previous thread where a German Officer maintained that taking the Hindenburg Line was no big deal as it wasn't the defensive obstacle in Sept 1918 as it had been when first built. What was the supposedly only really big event in the last 100 Days? The taking of the Hindenburg Line. Make out that it was no big deal, and bingo! Something else you can avoid giving Haig any credit for.

Which brings me onto this......'the Allied armies are lauded for their comprehensive victory. But if the German army was already "defeated" how should this impact our view on the Last Hundred Days?' Having now got the sniff of the idea that this is all anti-Haig, this quote seems terribly desperate, as if the world is full of books extolling the achievements of the BEF at the end of the war. In my admittedly limited experience, the truth is precisely the opposite. I thought it was common knowledge that as Lloyd George and Haig were bitterest enemies, LG made sure right back then that Haig would get as little acknowledgement for the BEF's string of victories at the end of the war as was possible. Hence, virtually nothing mentioned about the 100 days in general books about the war. Virtually all the books I have read about 1918 have the same pattern - a vast amount of time spent on the Spring Offensive, and the following attacks, all pushing the Brits back. But by the time the BEF strike back in August, Germany have lost the war due to the Franco-American attacks in July. Better mention 8 Aug, maybe a bit about the Canadians, then hey presto! It's the Armistice. 100 Days passed right over. The situation became so bad, that I started a thread to find out whether there was actually a book that dealt with the 100 Days properly. Apart from some Canadian books, there was only one suggested to me. Just one book to deal with the 100 Days....it hardly smacks of over-production of that side of things.

So was the German Army already defeated by 7 Aug 1918? If you're going to say yes, you might as well use hindsight to its fullest extent and say that as soon as the Schlieffen Plan failed, and the Naval blockade was put into place, Germany had lost. But has no-one heard of the phrase 'they don't know they're beaten'? It doesn't matter a jot whether Germany had lost by Aug or not. They still had thousands of soldiers manning machine-gun posts, ready to take out any Allied attack. The Germans would have been pushed back as they were no longer defending trenches that they'd had a year or so to make into a stronghold. But enough of them were holding out, defending as well as ever, to cause considerable casualties. I don't think there is any cause to look down upon the efforts of the BEF in the 100 Days, with this borne in mind.

Jon.

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

I dont feel the intention is too bash Haig, with this thread, though I know Jon Saunders feeling on Haig, however I have always found him to be objective and analytical about Haig, and I have had a fair few conversations with him about Haig. That said as with all threads involving Haig they do seem to quiet quickly turn into two lines of men in the sand the anti and pro.

I have to say though that I feel the question to be a valid one. For instance if the case was put that the German army was beaten by May 1918 and if this did effect the ability to defend the Allied attacks in the 100 days, then given that Haig's reputation gets much redemption for this time, what does that say about his reputation?

That is not my stance I hasten to add, whilst I sit on the fence in much of Haigs ability, I believe if he accepts criticism for 1916 and 1917 then he surely deserves the credit for 1918. In fact the sacrifice of 1916 and 1917 in many ways lead to and aided the results of 1918. If the German army was defeated by may 1918 then it was as a direct result of the efforts and 'results' achieved by Haig and the army under him.

I believe that the German army was defeated, as in that they were not going to win the war, much as the German army of WW2 was defeated by the time the allies landed in Normandy, IMO. That does not mean that they still had to be cleared from France and Russia and the army defeated and that could not be done in either war by standing still and doing nothing. It had to be done by engaging the enemy in battles that drove him back. Which takes skill, enginuity and the lives of many brave men.

regards

Arm

[owilki1984]

And most importantly, that would enable Field-Marshall Haig of any credit whatsoever by the end of the war. Because this is an anti-Haig thread, isn't it?

Hi,

from a personal point of view as one of the contributors to this thread I certainly have not taken an anti-Haig line. If anything I would lead the other way.

The achivements of the last 100 days were remarkable and unprecedented in British military history. However I do belive that the German Army WAS defeated before Aug 1918.

This I do not believe takes anything away from Haig. As Arm's post says if it was defeated before August 1918 then this earlier sucess must be attributed to Haig, who as the C-in-C takes responsibility for success (and of course failure). The 100days success was part of a broader move that deafeated the Germans.

Wether defeat came in Jan, May or Aug a defeat is a defeat. I lean towars an earlier date of defeat but the credit of such this allied sucess must be given, in no small part, to Haig

Regards

Oli

[6th Shropshires]

Hi

I think this as been a good thread myself. I am pro Haig myself but I do not see that by saying that the Germans were defeated before 8th August would make one anti Haig, after all he was in command from mid 1915, and it was mainly British (I included the Aussies, Newzlanders, and all others who fort under British command) who brought about this defeat. Plus evan thou I think they were defeated before 8th August, I still believe the German Army had sting left in its tail.

Annette

[Jonathan Saunders]

I have found that this thread has an underlying tone which is distasteful to me.

I have just gone through the thread and tried to see your point but I am afraid I am struggling – if my incentive was anti-Haig then I think it very vague.

First of all my motivation for the question came in two parts:

The first is reasonably straight forward - I found the high number of Germans surrendering from 8th Aug onwards without what I assume to be much resistance, of interest.

My second motivation is a bit more long-winded. I am from that part of the Forum that is critical of the non-WW1 content the Forum has attracted recently. I have never been a great initiator of threads but I read something on WW1 every morning on my way to work and I thought a good way to encourage more WW1 related content would be to form a question every morning from whatever it is I have read – basically the getting off my backside and doing something about it approach. Now I have not formed a question or comment everyday, maybe not even every week, but I am sure a quick check will prove I have been more regular as an initiator of threads recently. But possibly you are right, there was a desperation in my question but not for the reasons you have cited.

I would agree with you that you cannot disregard the achievement of the Last 100 Days but I think you can look at it objectively in its context and question previously held beliefs – I wouldn’t regard the pursuit of that task as an insult to anybody’s memory and I refute any suggestion that that was what I intended to do, directly or indirectly and I feel that direct accusation a lot more distasteful than you may have regarded any attempted slight on Haig. On the contrary I would say my original post is promoting consideration of the Last 100 Days, and in view of your point concerning the glossing over of the Last 100 Days in the history books you have read, then surely that can’t be a bad thing – afterall the prevailing answer has been supportive of the Allied achievement.

Concerning any anti-Haig element, I did mention Haig in my opening post – that was my choice as I was framing the question. The next reference to Haig was again by me and in post 25 – in between I had made 5 replies to the thread, none of which mentioned Haig. I have to say I regret what I said about Haig in post 25 and I did acknowledge that I was completely wrong later on in the thread, when having had the benefit of re-reading my notes I said they did not support the view I had put forward. I did apologise but to be honest I think I made a fool of myself by making that comment, I hasten to add not the first and certainly not the last. However back to the subject in hand and I guess I have made about a dozen comments on this thread in total, and have mentioned Haig directly in, say, 3 or 4? I don’t think that smacks of an anti-Haig agenda.

I have never hidden my views on Haig. Everytime he takes a step forward in my estimation something happens by which he takes two backwards. For the record I think he knew how to build an army, supply an army and he knew what it took to win a war. I think he was personally brave – we all know the story of the Menin Road at First Ypres, well all of us apart from Denis Winter. However in regard to strategy and offensives I think Haig’s tenure as Corps Commander, Army Commander and C-in-C was below the required standard – its my opinion, its well known and its nothing I am trying to hide.

There are other reasons why I think you are wrong to say this is an anti-Haig thread. First of all the replies it has attracted and the people who have been willing to enter the debate. I don’t think these are the type of people that would want to put their name to an anti-Haig thread in any shape of form. Another reason is part of the debate developed around Ludendorf and I thought I was more disparaging of him than Haig.

Jon S

[David_Blanchard]

I write in support of Jonathan- well, sort of! You could also see the thread as being disrespectful to the French contribution post 8th August 1918. It wasn't just the British army that lost men defeating the Germans.

(there was a recent thread which pointed out the high casualty rate amongst the French and Belgian troops in this period- but I cannot find the thread in question at present)

William Philpott in his book 'Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front, 1914-1918' strongly argues that the French contribution post August was significant.

I don't think we can be Anglo-centric about the concluding months of the war and credit should also be given to Foch.

David