BEF 1914: Attrition of Officers' Experience

[Guest]

Martin

I assume thse figures cover 1915-18, rather than just 1915. I wonder whether heavy casualties on Gallipoli skews 52 Div, especially since it would not have suffered the same.level of casualtiews in Paleatine. Its casulaties during thwe last eight months' fightring in France may also have been unusually high.

Charles M

Charles, the figures cover the whole war, however there is a very heavy skew in the casualty data towards the first year. We saw this phenomenon in the 1914 cohorts; typically 75% of the casualties of the 'first encounter' cohorts occurred within the first 12 months, with very little variation. I had expected that by 1915 the New Armies and the TF deploying in 1915 might have learned some lessons from the high attrition of the regular army. We know that the LOOB was introduced for example on the Western Front and an earlier form of the same at Gallipoli in July 1915. Similarly Officers beginning to dress in OR tunics to avoid being conspicuous etc. I would have expected these measures to have had an impact by slightly reducing Officer casualty ratios. The opposite happened.

The battles of Loos and the Gallipoli campaign had a marked impact on the data. Gallipoli is interesting in that there were five TF Divisions which had markedly different experiences. The 42nd (East Lancashire) Div Officer casualties were as bad as anything on the Western Front. At the opposite end of the scale the 53rd (Welsh) Div and 54th (East Anglain) Div casualties were a mere fraction of the East Lancashires'. It appears that the 52nd (Lowland) Div Officer casualties at battalion level exceeded those of most of the BEF battalions in 1914. This surprised me. A lot.

The New Army divisions saw similar asymmetry in Officer casualties in 1915. I have not yet analysed the full data for the other Divisions, however some preliminary analysis indicates that the disparities were very large. The 15th (Scottish) Div data is, again, worse than the 1914 cohorts... Another surprise.

Having already transcribed the 1914 Star rolls I am now very close to being able to analyse the data across single regiments, comparing the experiences of the Regular, TF and New Army battalions within each regiment. It is clear that the first encounter had a huge impact on the data. The experiences of the Scottish TF battalions that served in France and Flanders in late 1914 and early 1915 was markedly different from those battalions serving at Gallipoli.

My sense is that local factors had a massive impact on the data, particularly the deployment in the first 6 - 12 months.

Work in progress. MG

[phil andrade]

Perhaps the very title of the thread explains why the lessons were not learnt.

The experience died with the officers.

One has to ask why the NCOs and other ranks did not advocate a better husbandry....but this might be a function of something systemic in British army culture .

Phil ( PJA )

[seaforth78]

I'm curious Martin and this thought just popped into my head when re-reading this thread and the one back on Le Cateau but would you hazard a guess (and I understand references exist somewhere like Maxse's papers for example) but would you say that the Army as a whole learned a great deal since 1914 due to their experiences and a good deal from the French especially? The latter suffered horrendous losses like the British early in the war which they greatly improved on which the Germans themselves credited them for. Indeed, the late Sir John Baynes Bt. told me a story on how Maxse (he had written a biography on him) that as late as 1916 Maxse was appalled at the still elementary level of the Royal Artillery compared to their French counterparts which led him to devise a clever scheme on how to handle a battery operation by having the French come in and service RA batteries until the latter absorbed the lessons that the French learned the hard way in 1914-15 for the post Somme battles.

Indeed, I have read elsewhere that BO's were frequently sent on to French battle schools where they commented on the much more superior training methods than their own schools. This being from 1915-16 onwards....I get the distinct impression that the French had a lot to teach the British which is apparent in BO's dairies, letters etc of a frequency which the French have not been given the proper credit for.

Have you seen this refrain as well?

[Guest]

I'm curious Martin and this thought just popped into my head when re-reading this thread and the one back on Le Cateau but would you hazard a guess (and I understand references exist somewhere like Maxse's papers for example) but would you say that the Army as a whole learned a great deal since 1914 due to their experiences and a good deal from the French especially? The latter suffered horrendous losses like the British early in the war which they greatly improved on which the Germans themselves credited them for. Indeed, the late Sir John Baynes Bt. told me a story on how Maxse (he had written a biography on him) that as late as 1916 Maxse was appalled at the still elementary level of the Royal Artillery compared to their French counterparts which led him to devise a clever scheme on how to handle a battery operation by having the French come in and service RA batteries until the latter absorbed the lessons that the French learned the hard way in 1914-15 for the post Somme battles.

Indeed, I have read elsewhere that BO's were frequently sent on to French battle schools where they commented on the much more superior training methods than their own schools. This being from 1915-16 onwards....I get the distinct impression that the French had a lot to teach the British which is apparent in BO's dairies, letters etc of a frequency which the French have not been given the proper credit for.

Have you seen this refrain as well?

It is a complex question and I don't think I am really qualified to make comment as I have not studied 1915 in as much detail as 1914. I am really just scratching the surface. The short answer is that I don't think the British tried to learn from the French experience. If they did, there isn't much evidence in the infantry diaries. The Artillery diaries might reveal more but my sense is that tactical change in the British Army was extremely slow in 1914-15. People better read in tactical doctrine might have a different view. My sense is that there were two much larger and more critical limiting factors facing the British Army in 1915

1. Lack of artillery and artillery ammunition

2. Lack of trained personnel at every level.

The first point is well understood, however the second point is more complex than it appears. Kitchener was forced by circumstances in 1914 to make a calculated gamble that the (largely regular) British Army could hold the line while the New Armies were being trained. It very nearly failed. The Regulars were largely destroyed in 1914 and replaced with Reservists and re-enlisted men. The earliest arrivals of Kitchener men with no prior military experience I can find is in mid Nov 1914, albeit in small numbers. First Ypres left only a fragment of the regular army and itself created a limit to the amount of experience that could be transferred: it is difficult to transfer experience efficiently if 26 of the 27 Officers in the original battalion were battle casualties and 95% of the NCOs are similarly incapacitated. According to the OH 1914 barely one Officer and 30 men of the original battalions were still standing at the end of 1914. What is not widely understood is the very rapid depletion in trained Reserves that replaced them.

Between Aug 1914 and March 1915 the British Army was losing Officers and men far faster than it could replace them. It was inevitable that there would be a crisis of trained manpower at the prevailing casualty rates. Kitchener understood this (I think) and there is hard evidence in the weekly returns that the official calculations for the number of trained reserves were an illusion. Someone - I suspect Kitchener- demanded a more accurate assessment; In the space of a few weeks the number of trained reservists nearly halved at the stroke of a pen; the more accurate categorisation of the men in the reserve battalions exposed the brutal truth that there were significant numbers of unfit, recovering wounded and semi-trained men in the official returns. By mid March some regiments had literally run out of trained reserves. Dozens of regiments had less that the equivalent of one draft left. It is no coincidence that this critical event happened as the first TF formation deployed to France; 46th (North Midland) Div.

The stop gap between Sep 14 and Mar 15 had been under-trained and ill-equipped TF, the Indian Army (IEF-A) and improvised infantrymen in the shape of the Cavalry. The accelerated training of Kitchener men is a certainty but as yet unquantified in any serious research. The New Armies started to arrive in F&F in May 1915. I have analysed K1 in detail and it seems fairly obvious that despite 8-9 months of training, these formations were still poorly trained and tactically naive. These disadvantages were exacerbated by appalling staff work. One only has to look at the shambles between 6th-9th Aug at Gallipoli to see compounding effects of poor training at every level. Attrition within K1 at Gallipoli and F&F was worse than for the BEF of Aug 1914, which might indicate that the British Army was criminally slow to adapt. If the British Army failed to learn from their own experiences of 1914 and early 1915, I can't see how or why they would have even attempted to learn from the French.

In the context of the materiel and ammunition shortages, it makes the decision to start the Dardanelles campaign even more puzzling. Some formations deployed with no artillery and a fraction of the normal scales of support arms. It is little wonder that it was such a catastrophic disaster. The tactical ineptitude exhibited in the Dardanelles might suggest there had been very little transfer of knowledge from the Western Front despite some of the commanders having served in the BEF in 1914. The large scale actions of 6th-21st Aug 1915 at Gallipoli and the actions between 25th-30th Sep at Loos on the Western Front would seem to demonstrate that the New Armies were woefully prepared for their roles. Infantry tactical doctrine does not appear to changed much since Aug -Sep 1914.

I sense that the combined failure of Gallipoli and the stagnation in the aftermath of Loos was a watershed on a number of levels, starting with the dismissal of Sir John French. The changes that cascaded down the command structure probably signalled the beginning of significant change. I am not sure if this answers your question. Personally I see no evidence of learning from the French. Most of the diary entries seem to be focused on tactical criticism of the French, particularly when operating side-by-side. MG

[phil andrade]

Failure to learn from the French : inability to do so...or unwillingness?

A can of worms indeed !

Phil ( PJA)

[Guest]

Failure to learn from the French : inability to do so...or unwillingness?

A can of worms indeed !

Phil ( PJA)

Answer (d.) All of the Above.

[MikeMeech]

Failure to learn from the French : inability to do so...or unwillingness?

A can of worms indeed !

Phil ( PJA)

Hi

The trouble with the above statement is that there are too many examples, both in books and archive sources of it not being the case. From 1914 onwards the BEF was 'learning lessons' from the French as well as there own experiences, this continued beyond the end of 1916. For example Farndale in 'The History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery - Western Front 1914-18' page 69, mentions in October 1914:

"During the month also British and French artillery commanders discussed the best means of supporting the infantry in attack. The British believed in fire and movement, with bursts of fire whenever targets presented themselves. The French practice was to fire a violent "rafale" and then stop as the infantry rose to assault. This frequently failed, as the enemy were left free to man their guns during the assault. It was from these discussions that the idea of a moving barrage of fire was born,.."

Also in October 1914, according to Baker in 'From Biplane to Spitfire' (life of ACM Sir Geoffrey Salmond), page 49:

"In early October, while RFC Headquarters were still at Fere-en-Tardenois, Colonel Sykes sent Geoffrey Salmond to study French methods of aerial photography." and while there he: "...also had time to study their method of control of artillery from the air."

Before the battle of the Somme in 1916 the BEF was incorporating some of the lessons learnt by the French during the Verdun fighting, including the French air/infantry techniques. Although not forgetting the British lessons learnt from their own battles.

At the end of 1916 and early 1917 the BEF sent groups of officers to visit the French to study their experience of the 1916 fighting, as well as individual officers to attending French conferences etc.

So "unwillingness" is unlikely, however, the difficulties of incorporating battle lessons, both French and the BEF's was difficulty due to having to fight and build a 'Mass Army' at the same time. Pre-war the French were not 'demanding' a large British Army to support them, that only became needed by the French after their experiences in 1914. That meant that Britain had to build a large mass army from scratch after losing a lot of experienced officers and troops during 1914. That of course was not only a manpower requirement but also the whole infrastructure for accommodating and also the training facilities to go with it, not to mention the uniform, equipment and weapon requirements that went with a mass army, all which was in short supply in the war's early years. This was going to be a big problem as Britain did not have a big 'war' industry as it never had an army on a 'continental' conscript scale, so that had to be built or converted from 'civil' industry. There was also a lack of Staff Officers and experienced men for training, commanding and controlling a mass army (most of this experienced was gained during 1916).

These problems and their consequences should be realised by us today and should have been realised by Senior French Officers, and I hope they were, at the time as these were problems they, and the Germans, did not really have on such a scale.

As an aside the British Cavalry of 1914 actually had nothing to learn from the French or German Cavalry as they were already more tactically flexible and trained/equipped for fighting dismounted and mounted.

Mike

[Guest]

Hi

The trouble with the above statement is that there are too many examples, both in books and archive sources of it not being the case. From 1914 onwards the BEF was 'learning lessons' from the French as well as there own experiences, this continued beyond the end of 1916.

Mike

Mike - Do you have any examples of changes to British infantry tactical doctrine resulting from French lessons? Particularly in 1914-15. MG

[MikeMeech]

Mike - Do you have any examples of changes to British infantry tactical doctrine resulting from French lessons? Particularly in 1914-15. MG

Hi

What we do know is that many French Tactical Training pamphlets (CDS and SS in British use) were being translated and issued to the BEF (and Home Forces) during 1915. Endnote 21 of Chapter 3 In 'Battle Tactics of the Western Front' by Paddy Griffith gives some examples; 'Object and Conditions of Combined Offensive Action' June 1915, 'Tactical Notes compiled by the General Staff from both British and French Fronts, 1915, 'Impressions and Reflections of a French Company Commander, Regarding the Attack by Captain Laffargue, 25 August 1915' issued by HMSO January 1916, although this was a reprint (of 20,000 copies)of the same content that had previously been issued in December 1915 as CDS 333.

Alongside this British pre-war tactics were being taught and adapted as well as adapting the tactics with 'new' weapons eg. the 'bomb' (hand grenade) was being increasingly used during 1915. Also alongside this various 'infantry tactics' and training methods were being tried out in 'raiding', although relatively small scale during 1914 and 1915 (see 'Raiding on the Western front' by Anthony Saunders for details). Back to Griffith, on page 53 he mentions that:

"The BEF of 1915 certainly started to make its own serious tactical experiments for the offensive. In the course of the small but fierce battles of Neuvre Chapelle, Festubert, Aubers Ridge and especially Loos there grew up at least a rough outline understanding of what ought to be done."

But bare in mind this is a period of shortages and expansion of the army and the work soldiers had to undertake labouring on trench works. However, the infantry were not used in isolation and they had to work with artillery in any attack, aircraft were also being used with artillery and during these battles of 1915 were undertaking experiments with the infantry. All being based on both French and British experience. Griffith also mentions that during these battles:

"Artillery fireplans rose to major prominence among the infantry's concerns, especially the question of their precise timing and density, for which effective formulae were glimpsed but not yet grasped. The first creeping barrage and the first machine gun barrage were fired. Novelties such as aircraft, gas, smoke, trench mortars, Lewis guns and signals even wireless - began to be absorbed into the general picture, to the extent that it was fair to say that British tactics would continue to be based on the model of Loos until late 1917."

One can imagine the problems of absorbing all these factors and experiences of both the French and British into an expanding inexperienced 'civilian' army with the limited resources, and especially limited numbers of battle experienced officers and NCOs to train them. I think it was 1915 that the 'specialist schools' start operating in France to pass on knowledge and this process continues through out the war and spreads to the Home Base. Again I have to say there appears to be no lack of "willingness" to learn from the French.

Mike

[Guest]

Thanks Mike - it is still unclear to me exactly what British infantry tactics changed as a result of learning from the French.

Printing other Armies' pamphlets and training manuals was done extensively pre-war. The inside covers of most pre-war British Army Training Manuals have long lists of other manuals available, including those of other armies. This does not necessarily mean that British doctrine changed or was adapted simply because they had these manuals in their possession. It simply means that they were aware of other armies' tactics and doctrine. According to some sources German Army doctrine was being translated and distributed as soon as it was off the press pre-war.

Take, for example the method of relieving troops in front line trenches. The 1914-1915 British infantry diaries note the differences in methodology. Having possession of an English translation of French tactical doctrine might simply have been to educate those troops who were operating side by side, or in this instance critical differences in how troops handed over front line responsibilities.

I don't doubt that the British learned something from the French, however I would be interested in identifying exactly what the British infantry learned, and exactly what infantry tactics changed and when. I suspect that a professional British Army was rather reluctant to take lessons from a conscript French Army. Fifteen years after the disaster of the Battle of Colenso the British Army was still debating the tactical deployment of artillery. It took the artillery disaster of Le Cateau to reinforce the lessons of 1899, such was the resistance to change. I have not yet seen any evidence in the 1914 or 1915 British infantry diaries that highlight changes due to French influences. That is not to say it didn't happen, rather I am looking for the hard evidence that the French had better infantry tactics which the British infantry adopted.

If one lined up all the changes in British infantry tactical doctrine between Aug 1914 and Nov 1918, how much could be attributed to the direct influence of French tactical doctrine? The Infantry Training Manuals would be a useful reference point.

Separately, the British had the equivalent of 11 Divisions* at First Ypres in Oct 1914. Handling Armies larger than two Army Corps was nothing new to the Officers who commanded at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers, Festubert and Loos. The latter battle is interesting as it happened over a year after the first British troops were deployed. Despite some marginal territorial gains, the cost in casualties was extremely high and the performance of parts of the New Armies brought into question, suggesting very little had been learned or passed on in the intervening 13 months. the line at Loos subsequently stagnated for 2 years. This of course happened only a month after the other half of K1 was annihilated at Gallipoli in the space of 14 days. The diarists who survived to write about the aftermath of Loos and Suvla didn't seem to think the British Army had learned much. Similarly the correspondence between surviving Officers and the OH historians suggest rather a lot of anger and frustration that they could still be so inept over 12 months into the war.

There seems to be rather a lot of evidence that the dominant factors for British infantry tactical reform were its own disasters and the necessary change of command. MG

* 8 Infantry, 2 Indian Army, the Cavalry and assorted TF battalions.

[phil andrade]

From Martin's post above :

I suspect that a professional British army was rather reluctant to take lessons from a conscript French army.

If I understand Mike correctly, he's saying that there was no lack of willingness to learn ; but that the exigencies of the war made it difficult to turn this willingness to account.

This makes me think of the US experience in the summer and autumn of 1918 : there had been Franco British instruction available to the Doughboys, and they were willing to avail themselves of it....but they still found it difficult to apply the lessons, and paid a commensurate price.

Likewise the British on the Somme in 1916.

The comparison between the British and the French performance in that battle is quite painful when it comes to relative gains and losses.

I wonder how far that syndrome of " Tunnel Vision and Tribalism " played its part in thwarting the best endeavours of the respective armies to pool their experience and learn from each other.

The effects of this syndrome were bound to be amplified in an army which had drawn too heavily on its reserves of professionalism in the first encounters.

Phil ( PJA)

[Guest]

From Martin's post above :

I suspect that a professional British army was rather reluctant to take lessons from a conscript French army.

If I understand Mike correctly, he's saying that there was no lack of willingness to learn ; but that the exigencies of the war made it difficult to turn this willingness to account.

Phil ( PJA)

I would offer an alternative view: The British Army was rather focused on trying to transfer experience. In Nov 1914 seventeen TF battalions were attached to 17 separate Infantry Brigades to do exactly this: learn from experienced soldiers on how to conduct warfare. The same happened throughout 1915 and beyond as raw units were introduced to the front line under the tutelage of more experienced professionals. The exigencies of war did not prevent this, rather they accelerated this. The impact this had is debatable. My point is that while the British were happy (but slow) to learn from their own experiences in 1914 and 1915, I think they might have been more reluctant to learn from the French. I would be happy to be proven wrong. I simply don't see the evidence within the British infantry units, particularly those deploying for the first time in 1915; what tactical changes impacted the infantry battalions of K1 that were different from the tactics of the infantry in the 1st- 8th Divs that can be attributed to the French?

The 46th (North Midland) Div (TF), 47th (London ) Div (TF), K1 and K2 on the Western Front (Loos), and K1, 42nd (East Lancs), 52nd (Lowland), 53rd (Welsh), 54th (East Anglain), RND at Gallipoli are useful reference points. There is plenty of material. MG

[MikeMeech]

Hi

There is always a problem in spreading 'experience' to the 'inexperienced' as it is not a 'reality' until you go into action, you do not know if a 'system' works or how people react until they are in battle. Tactics used depend on the conditions of battle and the Junior officers and NCO's using the correct 'drills' for the situation on the battlefield. Also the infantry can be restricted due to the type of artillery support they have for an attack, the infantry are not working in isolation. GHQ certainly were interested in French experiences (French learning on the job cost them many casualties during 1914) and that continued throughout the war. I am presuming that when it is said that the French achieved 'more' on the Somme it is referring to the First Day rather than the whole battle of the Somme, as the comment then would not apply, although the 'success' of the French on that day tends to be put down to heavier artillery support in their sector by many historians I believe.

It was the whole battle of the Somme that gave the 'new' troops of the BEF, not only infantry but artillery, RFC and other arms their 'experience' and we find tactics and methods changing as the battle went on, with units learning their own lessons and putting them into 'after action reports'. Historians (eg. Peter Simkins and others) have also pointed out even on the first day different 'tactics' and 'methods' were used on different parts of the British front. Learning their own lessons did not mean the British were going to ignore the French lessons during 1916, this is why GHQ sent groups of officers to visit the French at the end of 1916 and beginning of 1917, for example Solly-Flood (Commandant of the Third Army School) went with a group of other British Officers (over 20) to visit the French Army at Chalons in late November. Peter Simkins on page 47 of 'From the Somme to Victory' mentions that they looked at French platoon organisation, which included:

"....specialist bombing and automatic rifle sections and riflemen trained as rifle-grenadiers."

Some of this was already being looked into by the BEF but the French ideas was seen as an 'off-shelf-offering' and could be adopted and adapted and inspired SS143.

Another fact finding mission was made in January 1917 to Verdun, famously Currie attended but so did 20 other officers sent by GHQ including Birch, Uniacke and Major Alan Brooke, although this group appear to have been mainly looking into artillery. The work of Trevor Harvey, mentioned in Simkins page 48, indicates that the subsequent pamphlet 'SS 139/3: Counter Battery Work' may have 'owed' something to this visit. However, the BEF did not just take the French ideas, they adapted them incorporating there own experience and ideas.

Personally I have done most of my own research on air/ground co-operation and the archives are full of information from correspondence with the French (especially when Battle of Verdun is in its pre-Somme stage) and the adoption and adaption by the British can clearly be seen.

I hope that is of use.

Mike

[phil andrade]

Mike,

The first day of the Somme was all too clearly an example of French tactics being superior to those of the British.

I think that this was not confined to the first day alone.

By the end of the battle, the French had captured more prisoners than the British, while suffering fewer than half as many casualties.

There was still a disparity through 1917, although it was significantly diminished.

I daresay my yardstick is too crude a method, and there are many factors to bear in mind, but it is very apparent that the French achieved a much better exchange rate than the British for the entire period of July 1916 to December 1917.

I suspect that German accounts will bear this out : allusions to French skills and British rigidity. The British were credited with greater doggedness.

As to how far this can be attributed to the destruction of the original British officer cadre in 1914....I would like to test the water with that.

Other nations also suffered catastrophic officer losses in the early battles ; but perhaps the conscript armies were better able to assimilate the damage.

Phil ( PJA)

[Guest]

I am still at a loss to understand which British infantry tactic changed in 1914-15 as a result of learning from the French experience. Any specific examples would be welcome. MG

Edit. I would suggest that the pace of any tactical change during this period was hobbled by the fact that Officer casualty rates were so extraordinarily high (the subject of this thread). Implementing change would be quite challenging when the officer corps turned over two to three times in 1914-15.

[David Filsell]

PJA

All tactics employed by the British on July 1s used on the Somme were far from uniform. Nor did all fail.

[phil andrade]

David,

Point taken.

The sector where the British abutted the French was the scene of conspicuous success for the BEF that day.

Phil (PJA)

[MikeMeech]

Failure to learn from the French : inability to do so...or unwillingness?

A can of worms indeed !

Phil ( PJA)

Hi

So far I have not found in my own research or on this thread any evidence of a BEF "unwillingness" to learn from the French. There is plenty of evidence (and I have put some on the thread) to show that GHQ was receiving and disseminating lessons the French were learning through pamphlets etc.(as well as British lessons learnt and also captured German documents and reports on German methods). They were in correspondence with the French, Liaison officers were with the French and reporting back, their were individual and groups of officers sent to visit the French with the purpose of learning what they were doing. So if anyone has 'evidence' of the BEF not wanting to use a method or tactic JUST because it was 'French' can they please give us that evidence.

I don't think there was an 'inability' to learn from the French, I think there was a 'difficulty' in training a new mass army initially without the resources and infrastructure that was common in the mass conscript armies in Europe (but even they had to 'step up' due to the unexpected losses and changes in the technology etc. of war). The British on expansion had to spread their 'experienced' military personnel very thinly, not only due to the losses in 1914-15 but also due to the fact Britain did not have the reserve of military trained officers, NCOs and men that a conscript army of many years standing had. Developing a training infrastructure manned with instructors who were experienced and 'up to date' with modern warfare techniques took time, with 1916 being the catalyst when many got experience whether infantry, artillery or any other part of the BEF, that's why many younger commanders start replacing older men during later 1916 (the 'young' now had the experience to replace them).

A definition of 'Infantry Tactics' used during 1914-15 would be good as so far it appears fairly narrow. The infantry tactics used may depend on the situation, for example a 'Wave' attack was successful on the first day of the Somme as it was actually following a heavy barrage (in the south of the line with help from French artillery). 'Artillery' tactics cannot be separated from 'Infantry' tactics as the infantry depended on the artillery plan for their 'success' or not. Various artillery methods were being tried out during the 1915 battles eg. Hurricane bombardment at Neuve Chapelle. Sorting out communications with the front line and attempting to avoid 'friendly fire' casualties to the infantry from their own guns were also associated with 'tactics' used. Infantry (and other arms) tactics were in flux throughout 1914-16, hence the great number of documents being produced by all armies during this period and beyond.

As for the poor 'exchange rate' this is a very blunt instrument indeed, the Soviet Army during 1941-45 had a very poor 'exchange rate' with the German Army all the way to Berlin, but they were victorious and the German Army destroyed. The French Army still had problems as well during WW1, despite their 'success' compared with the British during 1915-16, their problems in 1917 appear to indicate that.

If anyone wants the 'British' tactics used during 1915 compared with 'French' tactics used then the particular tactics have to be described before compared, but be aware that different tactics were used by different units at different times (as I mentioned much was in flux). It would be an awful lot of work to go into that detail. Always remember that a 'successful' tactic may not be 'successful' in all circumstances. In 1918 we see that 'storm trooper' tactics 'failed' sometimes, they were also left 'hanging on the wire'. Wasn't it Mangin that said: "Whatever we do soldiers die" or something like that?

Mike

[charlesmessenger]

My feeling is that during 1915 the British were more interested in French technology than in tactics. After the opening of the Somme there was more tactical interest. There is a very interesting letter written by Capt Cyril Falls, who was an LO with the French, shortly after 1 July. He laid much stress on the French infantry conducting combined arms (riflemen, bombers, machine gunners, etc) at the very lowest level. This was one of the reasons for the French success on the opening day. It was this concept which was mirrored in the British pamphlet SS143 of early 1917.

It is also worth noting that until the Somme the British had always played a subsidiary role in Allied attacks. The French had built up a greater experience of offensive operations and hence learned more quickly.

Charles M

[phil andrade]

Mike,

The blunt instrument that I use in comparing the exchange rates does make me feel I'm a bit of a one trick pony.

It's very apparent from the posts you make that you have really studied these things ; my reductive technique of comparing the exchange rates makes me feel a bit uncomfortable about my approach .

Yet there is a horrible bottom line here, and I really think that it must be countenanced.

Even in 1917- the nadir of French morale - the casualties inflicted on the Germans were almost exactly evenly divided between the British and the French, this despite the fact that the British paid a price nearly fifty per cent higher than their French allies.

Churchill makes some very pithy comments about this in his assesment in The World Crisis.

Phil ( PJA)

[seaforth78]

My feeling is that during 1915 the British were more interested in French technology than in tactics. After the opening of the Somme there was more tactical interest. There is a very interesting letter written by Capt Cyril Falls, who was an LO with the French, shortly after 1 July. He laid much stress on the French infantry conducting combined arms (riflemen, bombers, machine gunners, etc) at the very lowest level. This was one of the reasons for the French success on the opening day. It was this concept which was mirrored in the British pamphlet SS143 of early 1917.

It is also worth noting that until the Somme the British had always played a subsidiary role in Allied attacks. The French had built up a greater experience of offensive operations and hence learned more quickly.

Charles M

Indeed Charles and with the French leading the way in technological advances with the British taking an interest in these developments wouldn't this inspire tactical changes which I am trying to allude. I think respectively that there were conscientious BO's who like your example and General Maxse who noted these changes and made note of them. I cannot at this time bring up specific officers to show here but we have seen how much professional the British Army had become by 1917 that I think can be safely said that apart from finally from their past mistakes must have surely been influenced by the advent of French small unit tactics. Sorry again for no present references.

[seaforth78]

The Coldstream Guards 1914-18 Vol I page 273: Fourteen of the original 90 officers were still with their battalions on 23rd Nov 1914. An attrition of 84%.

Cross checking this data against the diaries, medal rolls and CWGC data, I have managed to trace 88 Coldstream Guards Officers who disembarked with their battalions in Aug 1914. Of these 74 became battle casualties (84%) and 38 died - a 41% fatality ratio of the original cohorts of the Coldstream Guards' Officers.

Hi Martin,

I may have missed it but could you please (if you had compiled it of course) the chart showing 1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards? I have an interest in a Lieutenant Frederick Pollock who died I believe on the 21st October 1914. I just bought his sword that he fell with that day.

Many thanks!

S78

[Guest]

Hi Martin, I may have missed it but could you please (if you had compiled it of course) the chart showing 1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards? I have an interest in a Lieutenant Frederick Pollock who died I believe on the 24th October 1914. I just bought his sword that he fell with that day. Many thanks! S78

S78 please see attached. 1st Bn Coldstream Guards 1914 Star medal roll with the fate of each. Sorted by disembarkation date and rank.

[seaforth78]

Many thanks for this Martin. It's a remarkable document and confirms how lightly Haig's Corps was engaged the entire time from disembarkation till 6 September when we see the first casualty. Now apart from the probably unfair remark, I couldn't check but was 1st GC in reserve? I don't recall it was but wanted to make sure. It's not until the Aisne that we see the men dropping.

S78

[Guest]

Not in Reserve. CG were part of 1st Guards Bde and 4th Guards Bde in I Corps. Not heavily engaged until the Aisne when compared to II Corps